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


NOTES

ON

THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

J. A. STEWART





NOTES

ON THE

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

OF

ARISTOTLE

BY

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BOOK VI.

CHAPTER I.

ABGUNENT.

We have said that we must choose the mean, and that the mean is that who he the reght reason points out. But how is the right reason' determined? It has makes it' the right reason'? What is it that 'the right reason' has in view in having on this point rather than on that as 'the meson'? The mission, for example, in tuniory his instrument, must have some standard of tension before his mind. It is true that instrument, must not be too tight or inclose, but just the regal triphocal Agreem, it is true that the patient wint get just in not a chiffing payer can would previous meether more more less, all this is time, but it is more definite example. So on morally it, time that we must show the mean in the right reason by that not definitely what the right reason by that is toldy, or in relation to what, if it right'

We have a surjected to vertice of the soul or vertice of the mora, however and vertices of the interfect. We have decented the moral vertices, iet as now decent the interfect who has first a few words about the soul generally. We have decented about the soul generally. We have seen that there are two parts of the toul, the part which has reason, and the creational fact. Now let us decide the part which has reason into. I that part to make a very terms and a that by which we foreste consumeral trials for a the object of the water of the water generically destined, there must be governedly destined facilities of the soul naturally coers former facility and copyright. Interfect, the section similarity and have his occurrent facility in the facilities of the section similarity and (2) the Calculative facility, for to delivered and to calculate is the same thing and no one deliberary about necessary trulks. In test that of one had thee facilities will be the "vertice" of each it a how to be cover, then what is the vertue of each, or the state which enables it to parform its proper function.

List b. 10, because reason (as distinguished from feeling) is the faculty which perceives the exact point where, in a given case, the moral mean hes. The moral function of reason cannot, it would appear, be rightly understood apart from the ideal or law which regulates its speculative function. The completion of the doctrive of the moral mean thus seems to be presented by the writer of §§ 1-3 as the just fication of a formal discussion of the aperol of the rational part of the soul, leading up to a definition of the ideal, or law, of the perfect exercise of reason. But mi & 4 the discussion of the intellectual doesn's not introduced as for the sake of the right understanding of the moral aprent, the writer, having finished what he has to say about the moral aperal, simply passes on to the second coordinate part of his treatise the discussion of the intellectual aperai. It is to be noted that the writer of the M. M. does not seem to have had § 4 before him. He follows the writer of §§ 1-3 in introducing the discussion of the intellectual aperal as necessary to complete the doctrine of moral virtue; see M. M. l. 34. 1196 b. 4 daubi d' varp von aperon elogram, and river elois and ex river and need note, and need existing notion, ort εί πραιτοιμέν κατά τον όμθον λόγον το βίλτιστον, τό μεν ούτως είπεψ, τό mara viu apli v hógas uparrece, ouocou iores bourg de el res eina con igreca Δμιστ' Δυ γένοιτο, εί τις τὰ ύγιανα προυφέροιτα. τὰ δή επιούτου ἀσαφίς. DN spel une, ta maia dearrichyrose inter byerena, notice and int too holyon, the eater of his ne was the o option hospes; druggedon home eater points per, en S hayes explored, inip rairou duhiadas. Suplathy mir our inip buxis ώς τυπφ καὶ πρότεμον, ότι το μέν πίτης έστι λέγον έχον, το δὶ Αλογον μοριον της ψυχής έστια δ' είς δύα την διαίρεσαν έχαν το λάγον έχον μαμιον της ψυχής, δεν έστι το μέν βουλευτικου το δε επιστημονικόν κ.π.λ. Further on, (M. M 1. 34. 1197 b. 28-35), we find him stating distirctly that his treatise is been flow, and defending, though not without some confusion of thought, or perhaps of language, the discussion of auchie in such a treat se anophasis d' au ris um bouponasis, did ri ine, idear heyories and noheronies result upurpureum unip comme heyomes, ore true ye uporan pin aid addorpia dofreen du cinai à anifes à buip abrit, elitop early divery, we prepely. It it true early pekantipou and meal τούτων παραπισκοπείν όσα έν τῷ αὐτῷ τυγχανουσιν δίντα. καὶ ἀναγκαίον δέ, έπει περί τών εν ψυχή λέγομεν, περί άπαντων λεγειν. ζοτι δέ και ή συφία έν ψυχή: ώστε ούκ άλλοτρίως ύπέρ . . . ψυχής ποιούμεθα τους λόγους.

It is not a prefitable line of enquiry to ask which 'introduction' is 'Aristotelian,' and which 'Eudemain.' Thus much may be said, however, by way of bring ug out the implication of each - § 4

seems to assume that the Statesman's Manual ought to cover the 1188 b 18 whole ground of Luman nature, the intellectual deerni being as andispensable as the moral operal to the noble life. The unity of the operation the emordator laving been assumed once for all, no explanation is offered of the special connexion of one aperi with another, or of one set of aperal with another set; it is thought to be enough to arrange them according to the popularly received psycholegical divisions, and to describe them in order as they occur on the list : §§ 1-3, on the other hand instead of passing, like § 4 without comment from the description of the moral aprecito that of the note lectual apreni, come forward with a reason why the intellectual aperas should be discussed at all:-they are to be discussed because the Lacussian of them is necessary to complete the ductrine of the moral mean. Whereas & 4 seems to present the moral and intellectual discens as bolding coordinate places in the treat se, §§ 1-3 give us a legical bridge by which we seem to pass from the main subject of the treat so-the mora operal-to a subordinale part the discussion of the intellectual aperais as pended as necessary to the comprehension of the main subject. But if the true position of the writer of \$\frac{1}{2} is to be estimated from E. E. O. 3. (II. 15) 1249 a 21-b. 25 (and it is safe, I think, from the striking a melacity of larguage, to suppose that it is), he misrepresents himself, when he thus apparently from a desire for legical connexion between the parts of his tremine-introduces reason as if it were merely ancidary to moral victor. It cannot be his real intension to put reason on any such footing. The amonde of open of the present passage. If identical with that of E. E. O. 3. (11, 15), will, after all, be the law of the moral mean, only because it is the law or ideal of man's life, not as human and rioral, but as godlike. Reason does nox exist (as becomes afterwards clear) to accommodate itself to the ex gen es of the moral life, and to perform the function of blirdman's leader to passion, rather the moral life is for the sake of the life of divine speculation, as mat er is for the sake of form. Reason must regulate passion, that man's life may become beenoby row elbour -receptive of its true form, capable of the contemplation and service of God. I transcribe the whole passage E, E, O 3, (H, 15) 1249 a 21-b, 25, as being essential to the right understan ling of E N. vi. 1. Ef 1-3-inel & earl ree opos nat ro largo, mois be denchipur πριεκι τό θρετικόν σωματι κολ μή, καὶ προς δε μεχρι ποσού ποιητέσε έκαστου mai ed dyminou, el de l'harrou h nhéou, nixére: oven noi roi ontoudaise nepl

1130 b. 15 vás apafeis nal alpéreis rue dones pée dyadue obe équiverue de del rivé elem Spor and the afewer and the appearant and I well purit (and well) appreadour πλήθους και όλιγότητας και τών εξτυχηματών. έν μεν οδν τοις πρότερον things to be a horse toute of eath banes as at the in tole nest the τροφήν είπειου ώς ή ἰατρική καὶ ό λόγος ταύτης. τοῦτο δ' άληθες μέν, οὐ surpre de. dei di domen mai in roie addoes mode ad donos (in, and whos wife έξιν ευτα την ένέργειαν την του άρχοντος, αίου δούλου πρός δεσπύτου καί бластон приз тір выйстон навідницист йрхір. віней ві най бовритов фисте συνέστηκον έξ δρχοντος καλ άρχομενου, καλ έκαστον διν δευί πρός την έμιστων άρχην ζην (υδτη δε δεττή: άλλως γάρ ή εατρική άρχη και άλλως ή bylses: ταύτης δε ένεκα εκείνη) ούτω δ' έχει κατά τό θεωρητικόν. ού γάρ έπετακтий пруши в выбо, бода об биена ў францана виститем (вітеби до то ой Tream diministrat d'en annois), étal neiros ya orderón deirat. Fris obr αίρεσες καλ ετήσες των φύσει άγοθων ποιήσει μέλεστα τήν του θεού θεωριαν, η σωματος ή χρημάτων ή φίλων ή των άλλων άγοθων, αθτη δριστη, απί αθτος δ όρος καλλεστος. ήτις δ' ή δε ένδειαν ή δε όπερβολης κωλύει τών θεών Orpanever nat Compeir, airy de county. Exer de roire to frage, nat oires της ψυχής όρος άματος, το ήπατα αίσθάνεσθαι του άλόγου μέρους της ψυχής, ή τοιούτον. τές μεν οδν όρος της καλοκάγαθέις, και τές ὁ σκοπός rur dulus ayabur, coru elequiror. . . If I may venture to say so, Zeller hardly does justice to the place of the Sixth Book in the Ethics, from failing to connect the oper or enough of chap, i with that of E. E. O. 3. (H. 15). He regards the Sixth Book as written merely to complete the doctrine of moral virtue by an account of phonon-the other intellectual operat being discussed only with the view of defining more accurately the sphere of phornous. His words are (Ph. der Gr. li 2, + 648 third Ed.) 'Alle ethische Massbestimmung, and mit the alle ethische Tagend, 1st durch die Eassicht bedingt. Auch für das Verstämlinss der eth schen Tugend lasst sich daher die Frage nach dem Wesen der Einsicht nicht umgehen; und so beschäft gt sich denn Aus oleles un sechsien Buch seiner Ethik mit demselben, indem er es durch Vergleichung mit verwandlen I' gerschaften erläutert und die prakt sehe Bedeutung der I' nsient ausemanderscirt."

It is important to remember that hopes is at once the objective order, and the faculty in man which perceives it. When a man's passions are regulated, his nature is a hopes, or organism, of the balance of

which in all its parts he is delicately perceptive by means of his 1138 b 18 \$\lambda\delta\gamma_0\text{s}\$, or reason. Such a man will know at once where the mean point les in a given case, because his 'moral consciousness' his consciousness of the 'right law,' or 'just proportion' of his nature will tell him, as healthy feeling tells a man when he has eaten enough. But what makes the \$\lambda\delta\gamma_0\text{s}\$, or right? It is safe to answer—his end. What then is its end, or, as the writer here expresses t, is anomic or \$\delta\outle{op}\delta\epsilon_2\circ\$. For the sake of what does human nature exist as an organism? Til we know this we carroot attach definite meaning to the plane \$\delta\openanty\delta\epsilon_0\epsilon_2\circ\delta\epsilon_0\epsilon_2\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\epsilon_0\e

con ris ononos | Grant says "Entreiver eat delgour is a melaghor b 22. from tuning the strings of a lyre. Cf. Plato, Lysis, p. 209 B and έτειδίν, δε έγώμαι, την λύμαν λιέξης, οδ διακωλύουσε σε οδά ό πατήρ οδά ή μήτημ έπιτείναι τε και ανείναι ην ών βιόλη τών χυμδών . . . This meta phor is not quite in accordance with the other metaphor of 'look ng to the mark,' but in fact the term onomic seems to have become so regular a formula with Eudemus as to have lost its metaphorical association. By Aristotle, exorus was used as a pure metaphor . . . But in the writing of Endemns a scenis used as a scientific term equivalent to rolus : ef. Eth End. ii. 10. 20 [i.e. ii. 10. 1227 a. 6] êner de Boudeverm del à Boudevaperor évend rerar, ent éart anomáe res des τώ Βελευομένο πρός δυ σκοπεί το συμφερου, περί μέν του τελους oddeis Beckeleras . . . The a milar use of spor by Eudemus is not found in E^{rh} N_{rh} , but appears becrowed from the mode of writing in the Points of Anstolle. Grant's remark that by Aristotle exemple was used as a pure metaphor' is true, I think, only of two passages in the so-called Aristotelan books of he E N-viz. it 6, 14 policy pier to deserveix rou exonoù, ued i 2. 2 nastine, refina, enondr exorres. In the one o her place in which the word occurs in these books—iis 12 9 διά δεί τοῦ αμφρούνε τὰ ἐπιθυμητικόυ αυμφωνείν τῷ λόγο σκοποι γίω δωφούν το καλόν, it seems to be used in much the same way as in E. E. ii. 10. 1227 a. ; quoted by Grant. The same may be said of its use in Rhet i. 6, 1362 a. 17 enel be upone rat re σομβ ελείωτε σκοπός το συμφερου, Βουλείωται δί οδ περί του τίλους άλλά wepi rar more of relog early, and of its use in Pol. A. (H.) 13, 1331 b. 36 care de des carin en ale general to en mane, rotroin d' farin in pen en to tor oxonor nelodal nat to thos two moistour dudies, in de the mais to τέλος Φερούσας πραξεις είφισκεις. Here surely we may borrow Grant's wor is about the Fudemian monds, and say that by Aristotle 'monds is used as a scientific term equivalent to ribor - although, when two

- 1138 b 22 lines be ow he uses it again, he seems to remember to metaphorical character-ivines yap à per ornans isserrat sodies, év de up uparreir tor rogeir adrod dingaprammour. But in E. E. i. 2. 1214 b. 7 is it not also used metaphonically? Smooth the description Gov ant the airco προκίρεσων θεσθαι τενά σκοπόν τοῦ καλῶς ζην, ήτοι τιμήν ή δύξαν ή πλούτον A maideign apog by drofthenwy minimeras minus rds apages. There seems therefore to be nothing in Grant's view that 'By Aristotle occurée was used as a pure metaphor. but in the writing of Fule nus it seems used as a scientific term equivalent to volve.' Both 'Aristotle" and "budemus" use it as a metaphor, and both use it as a sc entific term equivalent to relog. As for the similar use of spor by Eudemus' it is true that it 'is not found in the Eth. Nic.' But Grant numits that it occurs in the Politics. The non-metathorical use of more and one as 's entific terms' in the South Book of he Ethics seems to me to contribute nothing to the solution of the question of authorship.
 - § 2. com be to per einele outer anner anner per, aubie be ander Friesche finds in these words a strong confirmation of his view that Eademus is the author of this Book. He says eadem sunt verba de re eadem Eud p. 1249 b. 6: pusquam in E N est haec formula. An Aristotelem se ipsam tam graviter repreher disse veri simile est? Con ra eum, qui reprehendendi et conformand emendandique locum sabi reper sse videretur, in repetenda hae formula sabi piacuisse et credibile est et similibus recent orum philosophorum, qui, scholae philosophi cera ad fett, quum quaedam principe scholae melus sibi intelligere videnti i, baec ut nauseum paene moveant ident dem repetunt, exemplis possit i lustrari, nisi odiosa sint exempla.' Grant also sees in the words the protest of the disciple against his master. He says - This same expression, with the same illustration of the medical art, is repeated Eth. End. vii., 3, 13 [4. 3 (11. 15), 1249 b. 6] is per rose updreson cherely ro as a hoper. voires d' forte bourg de el ric de rois mepl rie aportire eineise de ji largueig sui à digos raires, roire à adabes pie, oi oudie de . . . In the present place there is an apparent protest against the indefiniteness and relativity of A istelle's moral theory of "the mean" and "the law," Eudemus does not seem (according to the statement here) content to give greater exp ic thess to the idea of the 'law' by the cevelopment of the idea of the wise man who is its impersonation. But he asks (separating oxonds and oper from the hoyes), " What is the

mark to which one possessing the law must look?" "What is the 1138 h 26. start and of the law?" In reality these questions get no answer. They only cloud the subject by introducing a confusion of framulae. But are the words displie per older de ander too strong to be used by a writer speaking of himself? Surely not, if we may judge from An. Post a. 19. 100 a. 14 (quoted by Ramsauer) d di displie from eading or adopted displies of framework or from £. N. 17. 9 dill' lives the pire eldaymouse to dispute displies, or from £. N. 17. 9 dill' lives the pire eldaymouse to displies displies of the displies of the find have and Grant of the find have connecting houses. I'm words i lent cal with those in which fritzsche and Grant here see the protest of the disciple against his master.

Again, is Grant right when he says that the questions of What is the mark to which one possessing the law must look?" "What is the standard of the law?" get no answer? Surely they do at the end of the E. E., where the spot the salozayablas is determined, and in the Lenth Book of the E N where the flow braphrow's is discussed. It is true however that in the Sixth Book itself we get no answer to them. The Sixth Book merely prepares us for the answer by completing the detailed account of the aperal of the onou-balor, When the one-door has been once placed concretely before us in the fulness of his attributes, we shall then be in a position to appreciate the definition of his spee or sweetle of the ideal for with he lives. It may be that in the undisputed Nicomichean But he more value is attached to the living example of the unordator than to a formal defin tion of his oxonor as we have it at the end of the F E. (see note on F N. ii 6, 4g), but so far as a formal account of the ideal is given in the undisjuted Nicomacheau Books, at does not seem to differ from that given at the end of the E. E. In E,N x the ideal is of book endingeral deliverified and moved notion proc th tipe word to apartitive the identity $(E,N,x,\gamma,8)$, and the man who acts up to it is dioquité reason (x, 8, 13); in E. E. O (H.) the ideal is can bean begannenen an bempein. This latter formula is quite 'Aristotelian' in substance and it matters little whether it owes its phraseology to the master himself or to a disciple of the school.

§ 3 8th 8th . . ris 8pos] A moral rule—r g, 'Be moderate in b 3s, your pleasures'—cannot be interpreted aright apart from a correct

⁴ If he wrote E. N vi, as Fritziche and Grant bold.

1138 b. 32. view of the ideal or chief end of life. As interpreted by an Epicurean this rule would mean-'Enjoy yourself as much as you can consistently with your own health and peace of mind.' But this would be excess from the Aristotelian point of view, such enjoyment would hinder to the said to spariator raw in airo. What the writer of E N. vn. 13. 4 says of corregions here virtually sand of personal, viz. wode the adda marker a done either the mean point in every case is fixed, where it is fixed, because the Chief Good is what it is. What ther is it? The answer finally given is. The excrete of the Speculative Reason. But before this answer can be given, the ratio ial part of the soul, as a whole, must be exam ned, and especial y the Practical Reason - poorgag - both because it is that mainfestation of Reason which is propagorapor hair, and because it must have performed its function of rationalising the feelings and desires, before the Speculative Reason can engage, without impediment, in that activity of Bropia which is the highest expression of man's naturet.e. the final cause of his being. We have seen that the object of this speculative activity is 'God,' and that he man who engages in it is thought or one. It may be said then that, in their answer to the quest on review vir opes, the Austotelians maintain that the ultimate moral standard is given by the religious consciousness. The open the perortitue given by optimous, or the Practical Reason (cf. & år å hpobelpor spiveter L. N. it. 6. 15, and êf.s å narå rår apthor dayor, option of a nara riv spanning vi. 13 4) is not the ultimate scandard, because the position of oppingous in the hierarchy of facult is is that described in E. N vi. 13, 8 dhld pape olds require y' inrir à polongue rise rochiat aude rou fledriame popios, wones audi της θρεικός ή Ιωρμαή, ος γαρ χρήται αξεή, άλλ, όρφ θαώς λέρθαι εξεινής obe évena intrintes, all' obe feeing. For oucces non el ore the malitude фасц бруго том веду, бъе епетатте пері панта та ей ту подес: У. К. 8. 1 Secrepces & & nava vipe and aperin e.r.h.

This note may be brought to a close with a reference to a note of Fritzsche on E. E. in 5, 1222 b. 7-8, in which he main aims he view against which I have been arguing that the is he is fusionare of the E. N. was put forward as an ultimate standard by Aristotle, and that it was left to Eulemus to correct Aristotle, by showing that it is not ultimate, but dependent on the oper rise make anywhile my contention being that 'Aristotle' (as we must conclude from the subordinate place which he assigns to the induced depend of word the operation of E. N. x. 8) does not regard the

on a standard which is identical with the 'Fuderman' open eye malordyallac—that, in short, there is no lifference between the positions of 'Ar stotle' and of 'Eudermus' with regard to the termate standard. Fritzsche's note, which thus raises a very important question respecting the difference between 'Aristotle' and 'Eudermus,' will be found on p. 40 of his edition of the E' E'

daysas] Kb r Ald. Bt.

b. 38.

§ 4. spaper] E. E. ii. 1. 1220 a. 5. E. N. i. 13. 19.

1199 a. 1.

5. mpárepor E. E. ii. 4. 1221 b. 27, E. N. i. 13, 9.

a. 8.

choyor] After this word Spengel (Arri, Stud. p. 211) supposes ■ 4. that he dig disputes to alloyer, or words to such effect have fallen out; but the supposition is unnecessary. The order refered superior relates to δυ είναι μερη τής ψυχης, and the writer means that as the ψυχη has two pairs. —τό λόγον έχου κι d τό άλογον, so τό λόγον έχου has also two parts.

and imprecious him the hoper experts. This division is not to be a. o confused with that it dicated in E L. ii. 1. 1219 b. 28 bnowood a 860 μερη ψεχής το λογου μετεχουτα, ού τον αυτόν δε τροπον μετέχειν δμήσο, akka en per em enceurece, en de em necleufu, and daniece nechrecen, und m E. N. i. 13. 19 dirrûr îgral kaî to hûyor êxar, to pêr kupîle kaî êr oiro to 8 homes the north it decorration to In these passages we have really the main division of the week into alloyou and hoper from and only apparently a subdivision of to keyor from. But in the passage before us (vi. 1. 5) the layor exar rep we kan in norm in itself subdavided into the faculty which apprehends things which are necessamly what they are to up indexquera allow exert, and that which apprehends things which are cortingently what they are-re indexeproce. For the distinct on between the up bedrydaine address from (- rd aidin, ra of diviyage dinhas) and rd erdenduern dahar incir (tere = rd or int to roke), see notes on 11 3. §§ 3-5, and i 3 4 This distinction, regarded by Aristotle as in temps, is really in our way of locking at things. There is no contingency in things, but there is often fadire on the part of organic beings to cope with the complexity of the necessary laws which things obey. A 'necessary truth' so called is one of which we become conscious by the way of many on ' Thus, the truth that the three angles of a triangle

² CL Spinois's theory of Scientic intention, Eth. U. 40; Schol. 2.

1130 n. o. are equal to two right angles is apprehended by us as 'necessary' because we see that, in the diagram before us (which represents all that is essential to a triaigle), they are plainly equal to two right angles; we assist at the operation of superposing them upon two adjacent angles, and see that they cover them. Again, the truth that a thing cannot be at once this and not this is at prehended by us as 'necessary' as soon as we look at an object and see plainly that it has a definite attribute -that a rose, e.g. is red, and not also not-red. When, however, we pass from this region of direct intustion to that of forces so complicated in their interaction that t is impossible to calculate more than roughly what events will result, we are in the reg on of the so-called 'contingent.' The events which do result are indeed necessarily what they are-there is no 'contingency' in them, as we should see if we could comprehend all their causes; but this we either cannot do, or cannot want to do. for in most cases we are called upon for present action in relation to these imperfectly understood future events, and are compelled to forecast them as we best can. Our attitude towards them is thus not 'speculative,' but essentially 'practical,' The apprehension of contingent truth 'is, in short, 'correspondence with environment.' In apprehending this kind of truth, we prepare, as we best can, for a future condition of the environment, which must always be more or less difficult to forecast; in apprehending 'necessary truth' we see planny something which is immedia ely present. *Conungent truth' may then be deserbed as that body of beliefs and expectations upon which a being, whose life is a correspondence extending in time " acts on the whole successfully. The Aristotel an God, whose life is a simeless infutive function, perceives all things as 'necessary." In so far as man perceives 'necessary trulh,' he too is a spectator' of the universe, and lives a divine life, but, as concreic human being, he, is no longer a 'speciator,' but an 'ac-or' engaged in a struggle-del you some to (you-and in this struggle his human life is guided by his perception of 'contingent,' or, as it may be called, 'practical' truth.

In the foregoing remarks I have treated to indexture them is as being here equivalent to the int to make. Technically the int of make. Technically the intervalence as well as to be int to make, fall under the head of the description than a farm, but are obvious y not to be thought of here in a passage

Bee Spencer, Psychol., vol. l. p. 330.

which distriguishes faculties of knowledge in relation to objects of 1130 a.c. knowledge. The dre viggs are not objects of knowledge.

. onapper adrois The doctane that to generically a. 8 disabet objects of knowledge must correspond generically distinct faculties is here based by the writer on the hypothesis that knowledge implies a 'similarity,' or 'kinship' between object and faculty. This hypothesis meets us in various forms in the history of Psychology. Sometimes it is the avalogy of the reflection in a morror (perhaps suggested by the fact that we see by images reflected at the eye), which seeds to determine the form which the hypothesis takes. Knowledge in the mind is something in having which the mind becomes like the object which it knows, just as the micror, in reflecting, becomes like the object which it reflects. Under this head may be brought those ancient theories identified with the names of Empelocies, Democritus, and Epicarus, according to which certain sidular, disapparar, proporar, images of themselves are thrown oil by objects, and passing into the soul, become its knowledge of the objec's and also the various modern theories of Rep esental ve Perception, which explain knowledge by means of 'ideas'. To a closely related class belong the theories, bota ancient and modern, of 'unpressions,' 'traces,' and the like, in which the mirror analogy has been replaced by the alfred was and scal ana ogy Sometimes again the Lypothesis ywwariobas ro opoio to opoios appears in a form determined by a desire actually to men's the faculaces of the knowing mind with the objects known. Under this head come these theories which assert that the mail is pail made of the elements (orozona), maierial or forma, which it perceives in objects: see de An. i. 2. 404 b. 10 despotes the fugger was appear, of her telefore thosoferes theres, of de hine ταύτην, ώσπερ Έμπεδικλής μέν ές τών στοιχείων πάντων, είναι δε καὶ έκαστον wught routes, kiyes outer

> γαίη μέν γόρ γοίου όπωπαμεν, ύδατε δ' δδωρ, αλλίρε δ' αίδερα δίαν, άτὰρ πυρλ πύρ όϊδηλου, στοργή δε στοργήτε νείεες δε το κείεις λυγρφ.

τύν μίτον δε τρόπου από ο Πλάτων έν τῷ Τιμμίῳ τῆν ψυχῆν εκ τῶν αποιχείων ποιεί γινωσκεσθαι γὰρ τῷ όμοιῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, τὰ δε πράγματα ἐπ των ἀρχίω είναι. ὁμείως δε και ἐν τοῖε περὶ τριλοσοφίας λεγομένεις διωρέσθη, οὐτο μὲν τὸ ξῷαν ἐξ αὐτῆς εῆς τοῦ ἐνὸς ἰδέας καὶ τοῦ πρώταν μηκους και πλέτους καὶ βαθους, τὸ δ ὅλλο ὁμοιοτρόπως. ἔτι δε καὶ ἄλλως, νοὺν 1139 a. 8. μεν τὰ ἔν, ἐπωτήμην δὲ τὰ δύο μοναχως γαρ ἐψ' ἔν' τὰν ἀν του ἐπιπιδου ἀριθμόν δίξαν, αἰσθησω δὲ τον τοῦ στερεοῦ. All such attempts to explain how mind and external objects can be brought into the con act of knowledge are i.le. The gulf, which they would bridge by 'images' and the like does not exist. Knowing faculty and object known are not two separate entities. Each exists only as the correlate of the other in the organic whole of know edge. We can of go beaind knowledge to find there something γυνουμώντερου by means of which to explain it. What seems to be an explanation is invariably a metapl or, fitted only to conceal from us our true problem—the fait ful description of the organic whole as it is actually given.

The view ead aposityta time and sincistyte if yourse, adopted here without demur, is submitted to engthy or ticism in the Je An., and finally accepted only in a modified form. In de An. i. 5 the point first insisted upon is hat it is not enough to make the 40 x9 contain merely the four material grougelo which it perceives in external objects; it must also, if the view is to be consistently held, con'ain the manifold hoyer, or ourboser, in which these overce a are combined in the objects; and this is regarded as a reductio ad absurdum of the view in the cru le form in which it is here by Empedoces; are de An 1. 6 410 2. 7 ouder nou deputas éverent en atalyera en to frenço. ed my way of godin entaneur way is a substitute. Another day genation to amount to & nation of the distribution and in, if up and take increase toute & ats ddingrow widen del köyete vie yap an anupquesen el fuerren in vij hengi kistos h dechmans; opicios de un ro dyudar cal ro un dyudar sie ubede de recome ral wep, your address. The more refined form of the view, according to which the mind contains not the material, but the formul order grin a c. the categories which it perceives in things, is next examined, and dismissed-for the mind cannot perceive these proxima in things either in virtue of containing that which is common to them all (the categories having nothing in common, being ultimate year); nor yet in virtue of containing old a, wo or, moreov, and the rest, separately, masmuch as it is itself ownia, and our of cannot be built up out of clements which are not substantial, If, e.g. the mind contains some, or is composed of more it must be noone. Again the view is inconsistent with the fundamental truth that 'bke cannot be affected by like ' a truth which is referred to in de An. ii 4. 10 416 a. 29 in connexion with nutrition (the parallel between autrition and knowing is an interesting point in the Aristotenan psychology), and insisted on generally in de Gen. et 1188 a. 8. Corr. 1. 7. 323 h. 29 and exel of the topor nechone nature and notein. add' dou h courses early h evapremous tree, drayen and to monous sal to πασχου τῷ γενει μεν όμοιου είναι καὶ ταύτό. τῷ δ' είδει ἀνόμοιου καὶ εναυτέου. e.r.A. In de An. ii. 3 the view is subjected to a second criticism, through which Aristotle passes to the statement of his own position. If a sense (so olodysmon) is like that which it perceives, why does it not then perceive utill? It does not, which shows that it is a potentiality of perceiving (which only becomes actual under the influence of the stimulus supplied by an external object), not. as the bioton buolog theory makes it, the thing perceived—the actual 'earth,' the actual 'noody.' It may be compared to something combustible which does not actually burn till fire is applied to it. As the conbustible is not fire, but becomes fiery, so the mad, unlike the object which affects or impresses it (for otherwise it could not be affected or impressed), when once affected or impressed, is like it: see de An. ii. 5. 417 8. 17 núrro de nuviges sul κονιται υπο του ποιητικού καὶ ένεργεις δυτος. διο έστε μέν ως ύπο του opolou mangel, fare de de lind ros avopolou, eaflines elimper mangel per γάρ το άνωματον, πεπανθύς δ' δμοιών έστεν . . . 418 3. 4 πάσχει μέν οδυ πόχ Summer So, removeding of equationis and force older series. This then is the modified form in which the famor during hypothesis is accepted in the de An a form in which the influence of metaphor is as plain as in the cruder forms of the hypothesis, upon the criticism of which it is built. The Aristotelian theory of sensation, in fact, starts from the wax and scal metaphor: see de An. ii. 12, 424 a. 18 9 per alathate intl to destrior too alathatur alder for the these oint ο επρός του δακτυλιου άνω τος σιδηρού και του χρυσού δέχεται το σημείου As wax cannot be impressed by a soft substance like itself, but, being impressed by that which is unlike itself, takes on the likeness of that which impresses it, so the mind takes on the likeness of the objects which it knows. Yet the metaphor, assuming, as it does, the separate existence of two entities brought into mechanical relation to each other, does not bind Aristotle's speculation, as similar me aphora seem to have bound the psychologists whom he criticises. The powerful instrument of thought which he wields in has plalese phical language, enables him to pass beyond his metathor. The employment of the distinction between discounts and evipyon enables him to see that, after all, the two entities of the metaphor are really two correlates—an apergu which he formulates

139 a. 8. in de An. ii. 2. 425 l., 26 à bi rot alothres évérgene na vie niorhouse à airq più iers sai pia, rò d' aira oi vairir airnis: a r.h. This is his philosophical position; but on the whole he is satisfied with his metaphor which, it must be advitted, takes account of the disality in knowledge, which some of those who must upon its unity, are inclined to a ake too little of.

Now to return to E. N. vi. 1. g. In what sense is the faculty which apprehends ' Sero which are necessarily what they are ' like these orro, and the faculty which apprehends ' Sore which are contingently what they are 'like these bera? The answer is that, on Aristotelian principles, the faculties in exercise are not merely like, but identical with the of jects as perceived. The sura, their objects, are in both cases relations, i.e. Alba, whose 'entity consists in their intelligibility." That Beaple, or the scientific faculty in exercise, is identical with the designa is a doctrine of the walest reach in the Ansotelian philosould, and is often insisted upon . e.g. de An. in 7. 431 a. 1 to 8' auro coruni nar erupyenar entarque rei aparquare: ef. de An. iii. 4. 430 a. 4, ili, 7, 431 b. 16. But what is thus said of the scientale faculty is true of all faculties. In active exercise they are all identical with their objects for their true objects are edge constructions of their own activity, 'relations which the mind sets up!, whether it be in sensation, in practical deliberation, or in Dempus: see de An. 1... 8. 431 b. 21 if deuxi to iera nos dores miera γάρ ή αξαθητά τὰ δυτα ή υσητα, έστι δ' ή έπωτήμη μέν τὰ έπιστητά πως, ή & uludyous ed modyru' nus de raire, del fyreir, rejeverne alle f encornon ασί ή αίσθησιε είς τὰ σμαγματα, ή μέν δινομες είς δινόμεις, ή δ' εντελεχείς ele ivredezeme ene de purie es alaborenio ent es enceropavento devoluer रबर्गाय रेजर., रचे क्ररेंप्र केंग्राजनमार्थिप रचे देने बांकिकीमार्थण. बोर्म्यपूरत हैं है बांग्ये में पर्व करिय rione. wird man dy od' où yap o hidor en ry thung, which to eider wate h ψυχή ώσπερ ή χείρ έσταν καί γάρ ή χειρ δργανόν έσταν δργάνων, καί ό καθε elder einer eat i alodyour elder alodyran. With the ob yap & didor in of work, alla of elder of this passage may be compared Green's remark (Proleg. pp. 36, 37) that as we pursue the analysis of the operations involved in the simplest perception of fact, we are unable to detect any residuary phenomenon attributing to a fact at all, that can be held to be given independently of a combining and relating activity, which if the antithesis between the work of the mind and the work of things be accepted must be ascribed to the former' Cf. also Green's Works, vol. ii. p. 179, § 18.

¹ Green, Prolegonic, p. 36.

The forecasting or calculating faculty in exercise will then he 1139 a. 8 identical with its object the probability of the occurrence of the event about which the forecast is made. The probability is not a quality belonging to the event, it is a quality a taching to the thought of a mind ready to venture upon a certain line of action! Just as the theorem is what the it inker plantly sees it to be, i chis thought, so the probability of the occurrence of a certain event is the real ness to act in view of it displayed by the man whose interest it is to make as correct a forecast as possible.

We thus have two district faculties of the 'rational part'—that of plainly seeing the truth of the theorems (to if district 3, 2), and that of wisely forecasting future accurrences (to enquisor and indeponents vi. 2, 6), each naturally to ated to its of ject in the way

described.

The writer of the M. M. gives a good commerciary on the distinction between the two rational facts less. It will be observed that he does not trouble homse I with the not applicate & gradie explanation of the distinction- M. M. i 34, 1196 b. 15 form & sie δύα την διείμουν έχεν το λόγον έχων μόριον της ψεχής δια έστι το μέν Βουλευτικου το δε επιστημονικόν. Δτι δε έτερα αλλήλων έστεν, έκ των tunerquirus du γένοιτα τρανεράν, ωσπερ γάρ δή έτερα εστεν άλλήλων rempir te auf rouse and Propos and dough, wondras and the ulabhorse έτεξαι αύτων ή φέσες δπέδωκευ (ψόφον μέν γλρ όκο], χυμόν δε γεύσει γραφίζομεν, χρώμα δε δίγει), δμοίως δί και τάλλα τ'ν αύτον τρόπον δεί Emaloratives. Inel di Erepa ra inoneigena earch, Erepa nat ra rije fluxije eiros pepa als tauta gruposagues. Tespon & istel to vontor mil to alabator ταύτα όδ ψυχή γνωριζομεν' έτεραν δρί διν είη το μάριον το περί το αλαθητό mil tá rogtá tó di Bushtutuir nai apraspetinor nepl tá alodgra nai ér αινήσει και άπλως ώσα έν γενεσει τε και φθορφ έστιν. Βουλευώμεθα γάρ ύπερ τούτων ά είρ' ήμεν έστεν και πράξοι και μη πράξοι προελομένοις, περί δ earen rai Borka nul aponipeaus rod upakat à mà upakat, ruora d'éaren αξαθήτα και έν κινήσει του μεταβυλλειν' ώστε το προαφετικόν μόριαν της ψοχής κατά του λόγου των αλοθητών έστίν.

§ 6. το μεν επιστημονικόν το δε λογιστικόν] the 'scientific' faculty a. 12. and the 'calculative' faculty. I think that Grant is right when he says that the terms επιστημονικόν and λογιστικόν as they occur in de An.

1.1 11 Aristotle s discussing the psychology of animal motion, with

⁵ Cf. Lotze, Lagie, p. 367 (English translation).

perception of a particular fact as falling under the perception of the fixed principle h sobidou indays: the socket), is due to an element in the calculative faculty which he calls to incompanion (434 a. 16).

powers of E. N vi is not a principle of action. ούδεις δέ βουλεύεται περί των μή ένδεχομένων άλ deliberate only where we have to do with things modify by our action. Power of modifying the co by action may indeed be accepted as a definition of Bouleuring Specie. An irrational animal, being with donfor-being dominated by the impulse or fancy of and unable to weigh alternatives before alting, is cause of those mod fications in the course of events v to bring about by what it does. It is merely a link of necessary consequence formed by act, impulse, an of impulse. This is what the writer means by den the lower animais, as he does below in ch. 2, § 2. rational being that can initiale a modification in events. For the irrational animal there exist no em from, in the sense of ed by end ed rold, any more that of ra and ragge: see Phys. 11. 6 107 b. 3 aniven week την τέχην . ώσθ όποσοις μή ενδεχετοι πραξει, οιδέ τ ποιήσεις. παλ διά τούτο μέτα άψειχου ούδαν ούτε θημίου οδ

ous and right, die out the aponipeous old edsergue old observations of the and aponisses, where it is appeared to the conference of dispositive about the limit of the conference of the confere

impelling force thran is not a necessary, because not a natural 1139 a 12 agent1.' It is plain that we have here a perm capalite of growing, in a strable soil, in o the 'Free Will Theory' as we find it in modern philosophy. It may therefore be worth while to call attention to the approach which later Aristotelianism to ale towards such a theory. In his treatise appl pugge B. 159 b. 160 a. we find Alexander Aphrod, denying that done and allowed are a any real series the causes of our aponquous. If they were, our actions would be no essary. Only contingent actions are in our power, and contingent actions imply appainted desiring. His words αία (περι ψυχής Β. p. 160, ed. Ald.) μόνων ψυχήν λογικήν έχει (δ indimenos) und fie Boudevendal er eal fyreie dieurat mege tur monnerue σιτών και οι παραπλήσιον έστι τοις άλλοις ζώνις, δ τώ μή ποινωνέν της τοιδισδε δυναμιώς έλογα καλούμεν, τούς προσποπούσεις φαντισίαις έπόμενο το καί συγκατατιθέρετο, και άνεξετόστως διασταν, ών πραττα, ποιούντα, - ο γάρ άνδημοπος μουον των άλλων ζώων μετα τήν προσπεσούσαν αύτώ φαντασίαν popi rivos de mpuntiou, obse re foreir mipli abrod nat Boudebourdus, este дай осухотоговоовая то фанкть, ейте кай рий. Вонденовиреное де кая прінае, обтые одий кай ета то притего в до праттего опотеров най derfreien aposeption in the Boudhe, Appeter, did touto kal paires tan fame δτωτων όφ' σύτῷ το πραττι ν ίχις, ότι κοί του μή προττικν το ούτο τουτο rije ihmaine izet d obe dentrius and mi apobrapzoume nivias nome policielle, reced dore to devoluence ich figur die nel to determine έστι διυπτά δια το τήν αίτων μή προσυταθεθλησθαι" ήτις προυπυρχανσα, Επιτως δυ τοί γενίσθαι τούτα τήν άναγκην παρείχε - διά ταύτα πολλάκες τινές και πεφυκάτες όμοιως και έν τοις αύτοις έθεσεν ήγμένος, διοφέροντες addition riveres maps the eventions appeared to

In this theory of προσίριστε άναίτος we have perhaps the neutrost approach in ancient philosophy to the modern doctrine of 'Free Will'. I will only aid here that the germ of the opposite theory of 'Necessitarianism' is also contained in the Aristotelian view. The Aristotelian view, as presented in the Ethici, however, seems to combine the truth of the 'Free Will Theory,' with that of 'Necessitarianism,' will out abstract up or exaggerating either. Man is 'a creature, yet a cause.' "Ανθρωπος αρχή πρώξεων, and ἄνθρωπος δρύβρωτος γουρ ποι βλίος are both true."

§ 7.] Cf E. N. ii. 6 3 \$ rob dropwnou operh iby av \$ ien do' hr a. 15.

² See Green's Proleg. 330 112, 113.

I have transposed these two passages to bring out the argument more clearly.

CHAPTER II.

ARGUMENT.

There are three from tyles in the soul which go to determine owned action and from because, recome, appealed.

Now zense as such, cannot originate moral action; that the brutes are in-

capable of moral action.

As for reason or westerstanding, and appetite it is to be noted that present and available in the space of appetite answer to affirmation and negation in the sphere of the understanding. Accordingly, since moral virtue as a habit which avoided choice, and since choice is deliberate appetite, the process of deliberat on ownt he time, and the appetite must be viral, if the choice is to be good, is a real understanding and practical truth. The things, there we have the practical understanding and practical truth. The function if the understanding and practical truth. The function of the understanding is to be found to the function of the continued builty performed a few falsely country. To attain truth is embed the function of the understanding generally but the special function of the understanding contains to the fractical understanding, is to attain truth which is an hierarny with appetite rightly directed.

Chand is the efficient, but not the penal same, of moral action? while the efficient inner of now exterify a objective and training secretation a extern end, the hose environmentarities, and a definite condition of the master has a training by tirelf supplies no matrix; it is easy when made training has a practical end before it that it moves to alter the end of the most resource a a engine of a not being in and under the first the end for the most reproduce or make, anything, would be, not for the more sake of making tweetors had a virtual approach of the end of the sake of making the event had a virtual end in these that is the penal in the end of the end of the sake of making the event had a practical end in these things and and anything are sake of making the event had a principle in each

the fast to mat an abject of basic; no man 'chooses' to have a best freely for no man deliberates about the fast, but only about the future and contingent.

a rush them is the object of both the interloction parts. That condition ochied mates each best ance to attain brack pass we the vertice, or excellence of each

• 17 § 1 rola δή forus. δρεξικ] These wor is it trochice a surgularly confused passage, in which the Aristotel an electrice of an male motion, as we find it in de An in chapters 9, 10, 11, and de Alita Anim, is applied to the explanation of πρίξει in paraeular. It will be well then to begin with a sketch of that docume.

The question asked in de An. iii, 9, 432 b, 13 is-What makes 1100 a. 17. an animal move its limbs?-re to awour to conv the said tomor simple; 'H eard vinor simples is a ways accompanied by the idea of an object (poweroin), or by an appetite (opegie) urging the animal to sick or shun an object. Hence if Openius dornous cannot be the cause of this suggest, for plants have i speer. due, but not doursele or specie. Nor can to aiodyresov be the cause of it; for many sentient an mals do not move sara rómos. As for sois being the cause of it the designment rule cannot be the cause of it, for this does not contemplate 'conduct' it has notling to say about things that are sought or things that are shunned—the objects which he man who moves sord rosov has before his mind: while the other kind of sole, which does contemplate 'combut,' and spaces commands about shunning this or accking that the apparends your cannot some suppose in accordance with its commands; indusia steps in, as in the case of the departs, and produces a cirpos contrary to that comman led by rois. And yet, on the other hard, we cannot say that species or indepin is the sole determining cause (equal) of h each conor elequie, for the syspectic, al hough his to fee is strong, follows the dictates of his rois. Thus it would appear that both your (including parrania) and Spefer are causes of i ento rémor sergete. But as some, in this connexion, is à érecá revoc Loyal more and & a mericos, and as the doyf of the apparents more, i.e. that which starts its del beration, is to operfor, we get ultimately one Cause of \$ anta tomor evigors, 33% to operate which is the emove updities. and uses sois (i.e. spoupers, or Bounevered Spiger) and Spige (i.e. endupen to used by airshouse or parragia) as the instruments. That to decree is the prime movent is seen from the fact that edgess (the mere contemplation of truth) without bushe does not produce servis, whereas species (appetite) often produces suggest in spite of λογεσμό.. The δρεστόν, as prime movent of ή αυτά τόπ. air. is the good '-caher that which is really good, or that which a man il inka good-the good, however, in the sphere of conduct (ed wparede iyofa), not the good in the sphere of speculation -the good which is realised in the contingent sphere, not that which is realised in the necessary sphere: see de An in. 10, 433 2, 27 del nivel pie vo άρεστέν, άλλα τοῦτ' ἐστὰν ή τὸ ἀγαθὸν ή τὸ τραινόμενον ἀγαθόν οὐ πὰν δέ,

It must not be forgotten, however, that it is an inserver that God, the object of man's speculative faculty, moves the universe, and with it man's speculative faculty); see Mer. A. 7.

1139 c. 17, αλλά το προκτόν όγοθου, προκτόν δ' έστι το ένδεχόμενον και όλλως έχειν: and de Matu Anim. 6, 700 b. 15 návra rà (pa nal nivi nai niversa ima rwas, ware raid torio autois naone the minasus nipus, tà où inka. δρώμεν δε τά κινούντα το ζφον διάνοιαν και φαντιατίαν και προαίρεσαν και Boudgour and institution, rates of mirro designers els voir aut opefer. unt γάρ ή φαιντισία και ή αίσθησες την αύτην το νος χωραν έχουσεν' πριτικά γάρ miera . . . Pochques de sal boude sai enthopla miera opefee, à de monipeuse compr gravefer was obiferes, gave wire; whosen ag chemien any ag gravedage, ού που δέ το διανοητών, άλλα το των προστών τέλος . . . το μέν ούν πρώτον ий киробильов воль, и в бразав кай то братилов киробрачов всель. The δρεκτόν, as εινούν πρωτων moves, but is not moved (κινιά οδ εινούμενου) the doceroos, or appetitive faculty is moved, and makes (missioner ewil): the animal is moved (species): or to put it otherwise, the an mal is moved by a movent which his two parts or elements -an unmirved part (delegror de An in. 10, 433 b. 15) riz. rò neacros dynbly, and a pirt which is moved, and moves (to enois sai evoiperon), 202, to operation of at petitive faculty. Thus he comment he entered romov depends on a mechanism which may be compared to a ball and socket joint de An m. 10 433 b. 21, of de Meta Anon. 1. 698 a. 14). Take the ball, opege moves in the fixed socket of rd appearan dyadou, as sobe (which is always optios, see de Am. t.i. 10. 433 n. 26) presents the dyadde truly, or as paernous (which is and dody and our open, see de An. [c.) presents it truly or falsely. Or, we may compare the Fractical Syllogism (see now on vi. 3. 9 a. a8) to the ball and socket joint; if andohov indapper sol hoper is a fixed centre of control determining the sweep of the paper 888a; the paper loga is the efficient, but not the final, cause of the apien-the occasion, but not the principle, of the act: non awre were in dola, oly i not how, & αμφω, άλλ' ή μεν ήρεμούσα μάλλον, ή δ' οδ de An id. 11 434 a. 19. There can be no surquis without a fixed point of apput spos to apennir bei anepeidendat to nirov (de Motu Anim 8. 702 a. 26); no spates (if yhp spates alogose) without a fixed principle of conduct-6 καθώλου δόξα ή ήμερούσα. In other words, animal motion (including moral action) implies a definitely constituted organism, or character) and a stimulus received by that organism (or character) from its environment.

To return now to E. N. vi. 2. 1. The difficulty is in rpio. In the de An. and de Molu Anim. va sivolvia are two-wide or dissola (including alabhasis and fournation) and species. But even these two are sevented only in the sense of being instruments of motion. The

the trate cause—en eigene—is ed apreede, il e ed aparede ayable, 1139 a. 17. According to the ductrine of de An. iii. 9, alodovie, sove and spifer are certainly not to be described as kupia vis card rows merjornsunder which, of course, apagie is included, if you apagie simples (E E in 6 1222 b 29). But ones the addition and daybeing in L. N. vs. 2 1 make any defference? It is distances that the apoless which we have here to do with is right that role, which is war option (de Am il 10, 433 a. 26) is operative, and has prevented to du him a quelin. Instead of so filly yes (see de An. i i. 10, 433 b. 7), to the agent as his end; and that the appet tive part of his nature has accepted this roprov as opening faither that delivour, the discursive faculty (see Bomtz, Met. p. 214), which attains differe in joining and separating thoughts as the corresponding things are actually joined and separated (see Met. O. 10, 1051 h. 3 adoption per 6 vd digaquiror alburros dispigathus an ed avyreturer avyreialas. Theratas di d empries in out the appropriate Afet. E 4. 1007 b. 20 to piv yop adales the ευτώβουτε επί τῷ συγετιμένο έχτι, τήν δ' ὑπόψουτε έπὶ τῷ διηρημένο, τὸ δέ ψεύδος τούτου τεύ μεριαμού την άντιφασιν . . . οί γαρ έστε τα ψεύδος ακί το άληθες έν τους πραγμασίν . . . αλλ' έν βιανοίο . . . ή συμπλοκή έστε sal & Successe de Suesto, alla oue de role apaymane), and in selecting the suitable means to an end, has performed its work well -t.c. alaphae, in exact correspondence with the conditions of the virtuous life, and that to dynamion has consented to adopt the means suggested. Thus i es & you annote iner mi i hpefer opth (§ 2), and the result of this harmonicus co-operation of reason and appetite is montruely A fore- night action. The addit on sal daydelas then indicates that we are concerned here with the harmonious action of role or dissoin (including alothous) and Spifes. Although each separately may be described as auroir (just as engine-diver and steam may both be said to 'set the train in motion'), neither can be described as aupior, for more needs on fie, and often thwarts it, and both are themselves moved by rd direction. But acting harmoniously together, they constitute a single cause of mpater not adopted (= mpacron) adopted & 2), or right action; and may well be described as kipia, being enextens we with the whole nature of the agent (sai à moisin apph and pomos \$ 5). In their harmonious action, manifesting itself in apostprose (leftred in § 5 as vois operands or opice disconnece), they are a single canceple of motion, like the ball and the socket in the organic urnly of the joint

But still the difficulty remains that a coor linate place is assigned

1180 s. 17 to alabora, as one of three elements jointly some aprifered and adaption. The posit on here assigned to alongous is certainly not that assigned to it in the de An. and de Mot An., where only two mrooves are recognised-roos and specie-woodyou being included in roos; but it is not necessarily inconsistent with the doctrine of these treatises. It ought, I think, to be explained in connexion with the theory of the Practical Syllogism, the minor premiss of which is described in E N. vn. 3 as doga madgenu, and as aindaruch imarijus. A right action is the conclusion of a syllogism in which the nitior premissa stimulus of sense is followed by that action which the moral rule, defined by the major premiss, requires in the circumstances. Indeed all mpâfis, wrong as well as right, involves such a syllugism' with major and minor premisses. Aiabyan or aiabyran parrania (for the latter ace de An. iti. 11. 434 2. 5) alone, as the lower animals have it, cannot initiate wooks, right or wrong .- E N. v., 2, 2 rourse d' à madause angemus apth ubuleme, gippen ge est en gabie maguair pir iger, spafeme de un norwovers. E. N vil. 3 11 và Ongia où acpari, ότι ούε έχει επθάλου ύποληψιν άλλά των καθ έκαστα φαντανίαν καλ μυήμην: cf. M. M i. 11, 1187 b. 7, and E. E. n. 6 1222 b 15. The lower animals, in Aristotle's view, act on no definite plan, of which they are themselves conscious, but as aladnow aladnown parrovio, and Sorfie momentarily determine; whereas man s olodogour, with the imbinio attending it (see de An ii 2 413 h, 23 onov pre αίνθησις, και λύπη τε αυί ήδυνή, όπου δέ ταυτα, εξ άνάγεης και έπεθεριία), moves, or ought to move, in a definite manner within the 'fixed socket' of rational principle.

I would therefore explain the words apifew sol diaglois, of theorems with the present passage as the formula of the Practical Syclogism read upwards thus—nounce (conclusion), dogs aladyrou (minor premiss), inodyphis rou reagred dressed three (major premiss). Jointly the premisses determine the conclusion. The minor alone could not determine to for the namor alone would have no point dappul, nor could the major alone, house yap.

a. 21. § 2. Fore 8' δνερ . . . φυγή] τό δυ τό διε όληθε (and it is with dλήθεια the έργων θιανοίας that we are here concerned), i.e. is = is frue' (for the various senses of τό δυ, see δίει. Δ. 7, and Θ. 10) consists in affirmation (ανταβασιε) and negation (αντάφασιε) in correspondence with fact. — δίει. Δ. 1017 ä. 31 δτε τό τίναι σημαίνει καὶ τό δυνών δτε όληθες, τό δε μή τίναι ότι οὐε όληθες άλλά ψεύδος, όμοιως έπί

απτοφάσεων και άποφωσεων, υξον ότι έστι Σωκρανης μουσικός, ότι άληθις 1139 a. 31 rairo, à ore fore Zumparne où deunde, des adaptes: et d'ain fores à bimperpos σύμμετρος, δει ψεύδος: Θ. το. 1051 b. t incl . . . τό αυριώτατα δυ άληθες 🕯 ψεύδος, τούτο δ' έπὶ τῶν πραγματών έστὶ τῷ συγκέισθαι ή διηρήσθαι, ὧστ' αληθεύει μέν ό το διηρημένον οξύμενος διρρήσθει κεί το συγκείμενον συγκείσθου, Theoretae de b évartime Lour à tà noughand, not corte à obnitate to adaptée degreewood hyrodos; source zijo acentear ti degaper. of zilo did to ijpac οίναθαι αληθώς σε λενεύν είναι εί σύ λευεύς, άλλά διά το σέ είναι λευεύν ήμείς of purses rouro adaptrooper: De Interp. 1. 16 a. 12 mepl you wirdever nal diaiperer iore ed produt er mi ed anglet : Alel. P. 7. 1012 2. 2 mar ed διανητών και νυητάν ή διανοια ή καταφησικ ή άποφησιν τούτο δ' έξ όρισμού Salve bear adalling of herderen. bear pir will overly dies of anotheren. aligheim, Grav de deli, proderas: De An. al. 0. 430 \$, 26 & pie ole rar admenieum rogaes en roirous uepi à obe fore to breidos, en me qui pe nai 19 hengos nai 70 adarbis, oviobraie ree ofthe comparior donne by throw to a united not as the successive ideas in a revene, but because certain attributes really belong to certain things. Now, the faculty which thinks together those things which exist or occur together in the external world, and thinks apart those things which exist or occur apartwhich, in other words affirms and denies in accordance with objective conditions, and realises truth where it is possible to fail in o fairty (re 'trith' as that is given in proportions) is buivain ' see Mer E. 4 2027 b. 23 où yap eare ed beidor aut ed adyder en rois nyuyuaver, οίτο το μέν άγαθον άληθες, το δε κακόν ειθυς ψευδος, άλλ' δε διανοίς' περι δε to daka en to ti intervald is ti durnio. Amous is the Understanding. or discussive intellect, as distinguished from soon. Reason, or the intuitive into lect. The latter is concerned with ally or netions per se, which are indivisible in the unity of their ovom - rept de rû anda noi sà si dance oud de si diavola se, dard sò adques mai sà peubos (see Alex. quoted at end of this note; their aligher consists simply in their telem intel gibl ty' (ed do dandie ed voels nord Met O. 10 1052 2. 1), and has no veodus opposed to it . see Mel. 0. 10 1051 b. 24 το μεν θεγείν και φώναι αληθεκ (ου γάρ ταυτό καταφασιε και φασιε), τό δ΄ άγροτίν μή θεγγάνειν επαταθήναι γάρ περί το τί έστιν ούκ έστι . . τό δε ψεύδος οὐε έστα, οἰδ' ἀπατη, ἀλλ' ἄγνοια (on which see Alexander, p. 571, ed Bonitz-ine per our that Andrew & Copyand & rose abten one απθάτερ είσλο δοτετοι της φύσεων αύτων και άπλη έπεμολή ώστερ καλ ή δίψας rise youristor . . . A où dipposen oid clor opp mira ; of a. so Themistate. repl worms A. fol. 71 b to rocky her from tous anhous shous naradap Horn. rà diaroxiodat de en rif ourriderat rouroux nat diampile . . . ro prodon de rif

1149 a. 21. συντιθέναι τούτους καὶ διαιρεία καὶ τὸ άληθές" καὶ νοείν μέν ούχ σίάν το ψευδώς, dimensiriba di olov re: see also Alex, on Mel V. 7, 1012 a. 1 (Alex. ed. Boni z. p. 289, line 15). This is undoubtedly the distinction (recognised by Schwegler, Met. vol. iii p. 183 Tren lelenburg, de An p. 272, Boots, Met. p. 214, Watz, Organon, vol. i. p. 298), which the Aristotchans make between roos and bidrow, when they do make any distinction; but they often use the terms interchangeably. Thus in the chapter before us (E. N. vi. 2), delone in § 2 is obviously equivalent to role in § t; and in § 5 apoulpeau is define I as & operates vois & opefic Sinvonting Agun in de An in 4 429 a. 23, we find role given as the faculty of Samulada, and in An. Post, ii. 19, 100 b. g downo given as the genus under which mor falls as a species. Again, in de An u. 2 413 b. 12, the parts of the word are distinguished as openrade, alcograde and biaconrecte; in the 4. 429 a. 30 as vontanov, alodyrenov and sperrinov: in de An. in. 10. 433 a. 9 we read dialerta de ye dio raira sumiera à Spefie à sore, and 2 few lines below 433 8, 17 dos raira palveras ra convera spiese ral Buivous neutrinia. Lustly, Alexander in his commentary on Met. E 4, where the technical meaning of diamon as discurres seems clear, writes as if intellect in the general sense were intended (A exed. Hon tz. p. 424. 4) - où minor d' in rois mpaymiour où cors ro adiffes eni to trudoe and out de tale dehoie toie de to biarala.

For they hand diwere as clonents of f sarà ronar simars f rur (com, see de An. 111 9 432 b. 28 f 8i ningare f priyunte re f dimentor ri cor.

- a. 22. Tie mponiperica E. E. ii. 10. 1227 h. 8, E. N. il. 6. 15.
- a. 23. opefes Bouheuruch] E. E. il. 10. 1226 h. 17. E. N. iii. 3. 19.
- 8. 24. τόν το λόγον άληθή είναι καὶ τὴν ὅρεξιν ὁρθήν] ὅρεξιν 18 ὁμθή when it seeks (ὁιωξα) what λόγος οτ διίνουν αθίτης (κυνφυσιε) to be good, and shans (φυγη) what it denies (απο μασιε) to be good: when, to use the εκμισερίση of Ε. Ν. 1. 13, 17, it διαφωρεί τῷ λόγος : of Ε. Ν. 1. 13, 13 το δ' ἐπιθυμητικών και ύλως ἀρεκτικών μετέχει πως [λάγου] ἤ κατή-

^{*} Cook Wilson (Trons. Oxf. Philol. Sec. 1387-88, p. 6) remarks that "the doctrine that a right or simple notions are neither true nor false is clearly stated in treatises whose generations is doubted, viz. Le lot c. 1, Cat 4 and Met L. 1007 b. 18. I understand Cat. 4. 3 a. 8 to state that vid nord independent expendance happened are "neither true nor false" in the same in which "true" and "talse" are applied to freferedient. In I no not think that this statement is inconsistent with the doctrine that there is an dayses — vd rock.

sone cover abred ent mechanisted. The monve power in man, to durer 1139 a 24. тоже, left to itself, simply seeks present pleasure, and shuns present pan: but this is morning. The motive power is used righto, only when it is used to further that welfare of the who e life which reason comprehends: see de An in 10 433 b. 5 inc. d' doi feis vivorrai rearries additioner, roises de grafficers brow & dilyon and & incluy a évarriar δοι, γενεται δ' έν τεῖς χρόνου αἰνθησιν ἔγουσιν (ὁ μέν γαρ νους δια τὸ undan deffineren nederen f & imidenia bid es fon, hainerat bob be dan ηδο και άπλως ήδυ καὶ αγαθαν απλώς, δαὶ τὸ μή δράν τὸ μέλλου), «Ότε μέν in the sig of supply of inequate, if describe, updates de martin to describe (τούτο γαρ κων, ού κυσώμευου τῷ υσηθηνοι ή φαυτασθήνοι) τίμιθμῷ & πλείω τα εινούντα. By λόγος in Ε. N. vi. 2 2 we are to understand the συλλογισμός or chain of deliberative reasoning leading up to the act of appropriate. This advoc is dangles when the thoughts of which it consists are connected as facts require when the means which will actually ensure the end are duly thought of in the proper order.

§ 3. δεωρητικής . . πρακτικής . . . ποιητικής] See Met. E. 1. 1025 b. 6, 27 25 πώσα διένοια ή πρακτική ή ποιητική ή θεωρητική.

Action in the technical serse—the understanding, or faculty by which the steps to an end are reviewed in their true order, i.e. in correspondence with the actual conditions of the problem, operates in three field, according as the end is the solution of a scientific problem, the attainment of a practical good, or the construction of a work of art. Take the last -the field of regun. The architect apprentials by wir the plan of his temple an indivinble form (oding ever, inlowe). This plan is with him in all the steps of his work. It is a fixed pinciple (dangers) from which his bideous may be said to deduce hose steps. The plan being assumed to be a resholds ere, husaia courried or the facility of thinking of the means by with a rang may be made, performs its function well when it desires a method of fineang and employing materials which is true-i e one in which the steps really suitable are duly thought of. In Geometry again the thicker souts with a definite problem to be solved, and his diaman beappring reviews the steps which lead to a solution in the order determined by the convitions of the problem. see & N. L. 3. 11 & Jup Boulesuperus taine (grew eat ara-Aver too elimperous spectrus water distyrappe. But in the field of spafes we canned, as in the fields of regun and beaugitech emorrhun, start with

- 1139 a. 27 a Jefirite plan or problem. We have no clear-out maken of Life (rò eð (he) before we begin to deal dianoctically with the emerger cres of life. It is only after we have spent much time in dealing with them, that we see rò eð (he as mortos and sakós. We do not know what the problem of Life is till we have in part solved it. This is perhaps a reason for not insisting much on the technical distinction between mor and distinction in this field.
 - 29. τούτο γάρ έστι παυτός διανοητικού έργον] See passages quoted above in note on δυτι δ' όπερ κ.τ.λ., § 2, 2. 21.

τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ καὶ διανοητικοῦ | == τῆς δὲ πρακτικῆς διανοίας. Its function is the attainment of ἀλήθεια ὁμολόγως ἔχουσα τῆ ὀμέξει τῆ ὁμόη. That ἄρεξις is ὁμῆη which obeys the dictates of the mouring διάνοιε and the dictates of the πρακτική διανοία are such as δρεξις can obey—i.e. they are concerning τὸ φεινετόν καὶ διακτόν.

a. 31. § 6. This section, § 5, and § 6 down to πεπραγρέτο Ramsauer marks as probably alreade his translate. At any rate, whether a digression due to the writer himself, or an interpolated fragment, the passage seems to him to be out of place here. I cannot share this view. The passage, a ilminating as it does in διδ β δρεκτικός πολέ ή προαρεστε β δρεξες διακοστεκή (§ 5) seems to me to be fully justified by the contribution which it makes to the writers object the explanation of διακομία πρακτική as κυρία πραξεων καὶ άληθειαι. Much less can I follow Susembli who brackets § 4, § 5 from δια, and § 6 down to πεπραγραφί, and thus brings διακομία δ' αὐτή αὐθεν κινεί at the beginning of § 5 in 0 immeriate connex on with the end of § 3. It seems to me that § 4, dealing as it does with πρακτική διάκομα as a source of κάκησες, is naturally followed by διανομία δ' αὐτή οἰθεν πολέ.

πράξεως μὰν οὖν . . . ἔνεκά τινος] προαίρεσες is the efficient cause (αρχη δίθεν ἡ κωησιε), but not the final cause (ἀλλ' σιχ οὐ ἐνεω) οἱ πράξες: εf. de An. ii 10. 433 2. 13 ἄμφω ἄρα ταὐτα κωητικά κατὰ τοπον, νοις καὶ ἄρεξε, νοὶς δὰ ὁ ἔνεκά νου λαγιζ'μενος καὶ ὁ προκτικό: διαφορει δὰ τοὶ ἐνωρητικού τῷ τελει. καὶ ἢ ὅρεξες κῶν κου πάσα' οὐ γὰρ ἡ ὅρεξες, αὖτη ἀρχη τοὺ πρακτικοί νοὺ τὰ δ' ἔσχατον ἀρχη τὴς πραξεως. ῶστε εὐλόγως ταίτα δύο φαίτεται τὰ κενοῦντα, ὅρεξες καὶ διάνοια πρακτική το ὁρεκτὸν γαρ ν ω, καὶ δια κουτα ἡ διακοια κινοὶ, ὅτι αρχή αὐτης ἐστὶ τὰ ὁρεκτὸν γαρ ν ω, καὶ δια κουτα ἡ διακοια κινοὶ, ὅτι αρχή αὐτης ἐστὶ τὰ ὁρεκτὸν γαρ κιν, καὶ δια κουτα ἡ διακοια κινοὶ, ὅτι αρχή αὐτης ἐστὶ τὰ ὁρεκτὸν ψικ ἡ 18 τὰ προκτον ἀγοθεν (de An. m. το. 433 n. 29) οτ εὐπροξει (ἐ. Ν νὶ, 2, 5). Lis efficient cause is the 'last appente' in the deliberation started ty the final cause—ε ε its chierent cause is the ὅρεξει which translates

into act the idea of something now to be done to which Sulkivore 1130 a. 31 has concucted the agent: see de An iii. to 4332. th to d'écrator don't rose podéens, and E. N. ii. 3. 12 and to donator de the rodéens. and E. N. ii. 3. 12 and to donator de the ris the efficient cause of the del betate direct the sale of which the act is performed appointment directly, the good moves the direct directly, and the limits directly, the good moves the directly directly, and the limits directly, the good moves the directly directly, and the limits directly robe directly ro

The contest conveyed by the works odd of a of form is not to be overlacked. Aposipious is only the instrument, not the easien delee of sasks. An act is good, not because it gives a certain faculty assumed to be "authorianve," or a certain motive classed as "lagh," an opportunity of manifesting itself, but because it centribates to the realisation of an objective good. Right and wrong do not depend on an 'arbitrary make of ficulties,' but are quantes 'in things.' Hyoriganes is distinguished from the indepen which is contrary to it, not by its 'good intentions' or any of its such sall retive quality, but by its ranorality; and its rationality means its correspon lines with objective law. But the acts of the departs (who is μα προσφείρετου Ε. N. vii. 4. 4) are produced by an dρχή-the embount of the momen, - which is at once their efficient and their final cause. They are done not for the sake of objective good, but for the sake of the granhea ion of the subjective feeling which immediately excites them. It is only in man, however, that such a violation of nature is possible. In the irrational animals (which are mean this of department N. vi. 3 11) Species adways primarly for the sake of objects and only incidertally for the sake of its own gratification. When the arrational an male seem to lohow present pleasure they are really striving after to del Ros to Accor. Thus repositions of butter discounted only conforms to the law of all healthy specie in producing acts which look beyond the grat heation of subjective fee ag to correspondence with environment, buder's comenno i aga net Hoolies-t iat, as food, not self (i.e. pleasure), is the of jett of the appetite of hunger, so our neighbour, not self, is the of ject of berevolence, is based on the recognition of this law

1190 a. 31. of the often strangely ignored by moralists antihelemistic as well as he-donistic, perhaps more often and more thoroughly by the former than by the latter.

In his note on apositive of dispeter and hoper of treat rever. Eustratius is puzzled by Aristo le's inconsistency in first making diefer the views of apositives, defined as Soukerred (differentia) diefer (genus)—i.e. its material cause, and then here its efficient cause.

a. 33 διό οῦτ ὅνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας οῦτ ὅνευ ἡθικῆς ἐστὶν ἔξεως ἡ προκερεσις] Ηστε νοὶ εἰι ὑπναισε take up λόγοι in the immediately preceding clause, and ἡθικῆς ἔξεων takes up ὑμεξες. Της διαξιε τηνο νεά τη προκερεσις, as distinguished from that involved in there ἐκιθυμία, is a seasily operating appetite, proceed ug from and declaring the ἡθικὴ ἔξει οτ ἡθοι οἱ its subject— see Ε. Ν. iii. 2. 1 οἰκειδιαστον γὰρ είναι δοιεῖ ἡ προκέρεσιε τὴ ἀρετη και μαλλον τὸ ἡθι κρίνειν τῶν προξεων. Αccording as the ἡθικὴ ἔξει οτ ἡθοι is good or ba i, so is the end οἱ ἡ ὁρεξει Ε. Ν. iii. 5, 20 τῷ ποιοί τωτε είναι το τέλος τοιδιάς τωθιμεθοι: νι. 12 ἡ μέν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν ακοπὰν ποιεῖ ἀρθύν: ν∫. νὶ. 12. 10, νὶ. 13. 7.

It may be asked whether soes and diamee are distinguished it E. N. vi. 2. 4. It is certainly plain that e sewhere in this chapter they are not distinguished but here we are tempted to think that the two names would not have been brought so close together in less the writer had wished to distinguish two faculties. In de Au to. 9 433 a. t. which resembles the present passage in orniging the two terms closely toge her, a distinction seems to be intended for an emiratroprof rob pod has degologic the diagonal progress re h disserv of mirror, adde and the industry aparter, alor o departs. In de An. iii. 9 Aristo le seems to dis inguish voes as authoritative principle or down (immorrance) from diamona as mere y indicating (Acyologic) what particular things are to be sought or shu med. If we are to distinguish between vois and didoor in E. N. vi a. 4, we may say that roce grasps the end immediately, and burrow reviews the means how opera gives the moral interest in the end declared by wir, and appolprous is the rational choice of the means discovered by diarona. It may be mentioned that Eustratius, in his note here, treats pode and baron as distinct. He says a rupiwe pode andale έπιβολι εξε γινωσκειν πέψυκε, τυυτφι μέσφι χρωμενη ή διάνοια οίκτιφι τού πράγμοτος δυειλεγμένως ασταλαμβανει.

 34 εὐπραξία γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἐναντίον ἐν πράξει δυτυ διανοίας καὶ ήθους οὐκ ἔστιν ἐ.ε. τὰ θηρια πράξεων οὐ εσινωνί—τὰ θηρία οἰκ ἀκρατή. \$ 5. δεάνοια δ' αὐτὰ οὐθὰν κενεῖ μότο, hy πεν Κ. without όμεξε τοῦ 1139 a 36 πρωστου αγαθοί ε ε. διανοια δεωρητική. Επεττάτατε λεν- ή διανοια διανοια διανοια διανοια τόλος αὐτὰ καθ αὐτὰν οὐκ ἔχες τι τέλος τῆς αληθείας σκοπιμωτερου ἴνα τε πρὸς ἐκείνο κενῆ . . . ἡ μὲν επιστημονικὰ διανοια τέλος ἔχει τὸ εὐρεῖν τὴν αληθείων, καὶ περαιτερω οἰδεν προστ δησιν, ἡ δι πρωτική εὐρίσκοτοι μεν καὶ αὐτὰ ταληθείς, οἱ μεχρι δε τουτου ἴστατα, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ αὐτὰ εοὶ πράξειας ἐν' ἐψέκηται τοὺ ὑρειτοῦ περὶ οδ καὶ συνελαγίσατο: ε΄ς. δε Μεθε Απείπ 6. 700 h. 24 οὐ παν δὲ τὰ διανογείν προσιριτόν, ἀλλα τὰ των προστων τέλος. δια τὸ ποιούτόν δυτε τῶν ἐγαθόν τὰ κινοῦν ἀλλ' οὐ πῶν τὰ καλὸν κ.τ.λ.— οα whi h Mich. Eph, (δε Μοθε Απ, fcl 152) has τὰ γὰρ μαθήματα διανομεί μεν, οὐ προσιριτὰ δε . . . ἀλλ' ου πων το πολόν ἡ γαρ γνωσιε των ὅντων ἡ δυτα κιλον οὐσα ἡρεμίας μιλλον πλλ' οὐ κινήσεως ἐστω αἰτία.

Although it is convenient to distinguish during with from h per conference (e.e. operation constraints), it must be remembered that all during is per operation. Pure speculation is sustained by the ardour of a mind striving to make itself more and more perfect a truth re ognised by Plato when I e makes open the impulse to distort, and by Sphaoda when he identifies intellectus as discontant, and by Aristotle himself in the opening words of the Metaphysics was represented in displacement will albert a proper to displacement will albert a proper property.

aden you not ris vointenis appers] I.e. we have not theo diamoetic b 1 option surpress, 2.2. aparticly and augment diamon, for aparticly diamona in the doct of notification. A life of notification (compation) is the end for the sake of which all nonpeal, from the collider to Plinas, work

καὶ οὐ τέλος ἀπλῶς (ἀλλά πρός τι καὶ τινός) το ποιητόν] Cf. E. N. b. 2 11. 3. 4 της μιν γαρ ποιησεως έτεραν τὰ τέλος, της δε πραξεων κῶκ ἀν εἰη: ἐστι γάρ αὐτή ἡ εὐπραξία τέλας.

aλλά το πρακτόν | εε. τέλος ἀπλώς. The teading ἀλλ' οὐ το προκτόν, ο 3 given by A d. Firste, το Κ', το CCC, NC, Cambr., requires us to understand πρός τε αολ τινός.

ή δ΄ δρεξες τούτου. δεό κ.τ.λ.) τό πρακτίν άγαθός, the object of δείνοια δ 4 πρακτική (κα) τι'εντ πεολγ ο βαυνια ποιητική), is όμεταν · therefore του , από δρεξες διανοητική.

§ 6.) This section down to nemprysies, might have been dispensed 5 5 with: but this is no reason for bracketing it.

οδδί γάρ βουλεύεται περί του γεγονότος άλλα περί του δσομένου παί το τ ένεχομένου] See the remarkable passage, de Interp. 9. 18 a. 28 1139 b. 7. επί μεν οδυ τών δυτων και γενομενών άναγκη τήν κατάφασεν ή την αποφασιν eilysig & pereg einer . . . I. 33 en de ron und examen und pellideron oby όμοίως εί γάρ κάνα κατάφασις ή δεύφοσα άληθής ή ψευδής, καί δεαν άνάγεις ύπαρχειν ή μή ύπάρχειν, ώστε εί ά μέν ψήσει έστσθοί τι ό έλ μή φήσει το αύτο τούτο. δήλαν ατι ανάγκη αληθεύειν τον έτερον αύτών, εξ πάσα naradames adolis i vendis . . . b. 5 odder and obre force obre querus abre από τίχης οθθ' σπότερ' δευχεν, οίδε έτται ή ούς Ισται, άλλ' έξ αναγκης anarra eal vòx anorep' freixer. A yap à das annover à à anoques . . . el Core heunde vor, adaglie for einele mourepor ore form heunde, wore det adaglie ην αίπειν ότιουν των γενομένων ότι έσται et de not αληθοι ην οίπειν ότι foren h fores, oix olun re rouro più civas vidi più forendas à de più vidin re på preiodat, idirarov på periodat i di idirarov på periodat, irana yeneadar Smoora por sa écopiera avayentor yeneadar alder lipa halmep ένυχες οιδε όπο τύχης έσται εί γάρ άπο τύχης, ούα έξ άνάγκης αλλά μήν oid de oiderende ye adques evdeneras deyes, olar bie obre erras abre ala form . . . b. 23 of be pipe even pipe pij form abplor, oùe du ein rô όπότες, δτυχεν, αίου ναυμαχία: δέοι γύρ δικ μήτε γενέσθαι υπυμαχίαν μήτε μή yentobar . . . b. 31 bore oure Borkebeabar dies les obre apaymareienbar. ώς έλν μεν τοδί κοιήσωμεν έσται τοδί, είν δε μή τοδί, ούκ έσται τοδί. ούδιν γαρ κωλύε, και εξε μυριαστού έτος του μέν φώναι τούτο έσεσθαι του δε μή paval, wore of anisons forodal increpants attan adopte he einer thre 19 2. I wore et du duarre poors avens eigen wore ed frepor adobeleviba, dvayraine he rains geniadus, sat exarrae rue yenqueene del citus siger Gare if draying periodos. & re yop adaptive eine res, des intas, oix करिंग पर १में प्रवर्शनियां साथ परे प्रथमितराज्य सेरेन्टिस्ट मेंग श्रोतराम संस्थे केंद्र हैताराम. सं केंद्रे ταίτα άδινατα-δρώμεν γαρ ότι έστιν δρχή των έσομένων καλ δπό του βουλεύτσθα, και από του πραξαι τι, και ότι όλως έστιν έν τοις μή άτι έντργούσι ed havorin einer eat jui aparate en als aufua esdenerar, unt en einer ent ro juit elvas, Gare nai ri yeriadas nai ed un yeriadas, s.e. futuro even s are not selded referehand. They have yet to be produced by overe or by human agency. If we maintain therefore that of two contradictory propositions about a future event, the one must be tiue, and the other false, in the sense that the one is acrealy true, and the other attently false, we make the occurrence of the contingent' necessary: we banish the 'contingent' from the world, and leave no place for de iberation. It is of course, logically necessary that a battle should entier lake place to-mortow in a certain spot, or not take place: but if it takes place, it does not take place 'necessarily,' and if it does not take pace, it does not not-take place 'necessarily.' -de Int. 9. 19 2. 28 cina μεν ή μ) cina ásar άνάγκη, καὶ έντυθεί γι ή μή. οὐ μεντοι

διελόντα γε είτειν θύτερευ αναγκύου. λέγω δε είσε άνάγεη μέν Ισεαθα 1130 b 7 να μαχαιν υξωον ή μη Ισεαθαι, οδ μέντοι Ισεαθαί γε αδρίαν ναυμαχαιν άναγεαθαν οδδέ μη γενίσθας γενίσθαι μέντοι ή μη γενέσθαι άναγκαθον.

δμφοτέρων δή των νοητικών μορίων]. Τhe έπιστημοκεόν μέρος and the h. 12 λυγεστικόν μέρος of chap. τ. § 6.

CHAPTER III.

ARGUNIAT

The modes in which the wall reaches truth in affirmation or negation are few-art, whence produces, wisdom, reason.

The object of a sense step by so called a new exact truth or that which a cannot be otherwise and a cheerfore elemently bruz; for things that are necessary in the stract sense are all element, and things what are element one without generalization and consistent. Moreover science can always be trught, and on object learns. Now, at tracking starts from previous himpledge as we say in logue, and proceeds consistent by implications, consistent by splingsim. Industrian is the new of the amount of liquity remarks and their from inscience of the similar of denon tracting starts from inscience of the similar of denon tracting over obtained. The similar half accordingly is the family of denon tracting constants for periodiles which are better known than the constants, already from them. So much for minute.

§ 1. apfanesar our avuder meal autur nahre kayuner | This chap- b 14 ter, Grant sixs, 'proposes to consider the two parts of the reason (scient tie and calculative) from a fresh point of view," In chap, t § 5 Reason was divided into two parts because its objects are if two kirds, here it is the consideration of buison, the faculty of affirming and denying truy, which suggests a list of five rational states. Frem do ale akobesier of which the naradavan of anodavan newto the appliance. In his list rigen answers to diciron nongresh, incorrigin to diamora bempyring, and discovered to diamora aparture white vois suffices rigin, interium, and opported to their respective doyal (see chap. 6), and empio is the presention of both mor and diamon-especially Graphed dimen (see chap. 7 § 3). If this is planty the rationale of the present ast, it is even more plainly that of the list in Anal Post, i 31, 89 0, 7, by which Grant thinks it highly probable that the present list was suggested. In An. Post 1, 33 we have the rational sames given in the following order -diduous voice descriping, rigin, promote, ordin e.e. first, the main division of the rational part into the discursive reason (havour) and the reason which grasps principles immediately (wit), then, the three kinds of discussive

1130 b. 14. reason and lastly, the possession of discursive ability together with the power of grasping principles. The list as we find it in E. N. vi 3. 1 bears as rationale less clearly on its face. Accord is not mentioned, although we must assume from δίε όληθεύει ή ψυχη το correption h deodorou that the writer has it in his mine, and the logical order is reversed when andia is placed before rade, although it is to be noted that in the subsequent discussion of these two stales outra is taken last. Grant thinks that 'Fademus' does not distinguish diama from sors here. It is certainly in favour of this sie a that more appears in a list of odologic of hour to narapavac f anoodrai, for, as we have seen in Mrt. O. 10, 1051 b. 24, quited in note on vi. 2. 2 a. 21, the abiform which is perceived by root, as intintive reason, is that of the Beyram s, or of paster, not that of enturinge ? enopson which is the Toyor Sausoise. On the other hand the identiheation of voir in the present list with diavoid is inconsistent with the special function assigned to mor as distinguished from imorning in chip. 6. The statement with which chap. 6 ends-Assarran soils eiror raw apyar makes it, I think, impossible to regard the root of the I st as any bing but the intuitive reason. The words of adolls in the naraddras & droddras must dierefore be taken to apply directly to rigen emergen and polenous, and to be loosely extended to sois on account of its position as expand one impressione (chap 7 & 3)

> Prantl, in his work tiber die domoetra hen Tugenden in der Nuomachischen Ethik des Artstoleles 1852, maintains the thesis that to regard this as a list of five intellectual aperal is to involve oneself in a confusion of Logic and Ethics. There are only two intellectual lorrai -some and primare. Lod a is the ipera of the Abyor ever pepoe, and concerned with ve un endryimen allow eyers, and opingous (including ei Bookia, giveras, young and Benvirys) the open of the hoper exar niput. and concerned with the indexourse address from. Nove is not an aperi, but des l'imestellare, s e, the mond i self. 'Emorchen is not an aperh, for there is an aperh imoripate, vez ouches. Tenon is not an aperh, for there is an open regime, which in its highest form is also called σοφά:--see j. to of Prantl's work for a summary statement of these results. On p. 14, be calls atten ion to E N. v., 11, 7, 1143 b. 15, as strongly supporting his view that codice and doinger are the only intellectual aperal-ri pie our forte à oppospire ant à coopie aut nept τίνα έωτέρη τυγχώνει ούσα, καλ ότι άλλου της ψυχής μοριου άρετή έκοτέρα eippear Zeller examines Prant's view in his Phil. d Gr 11. 2, p. 649 note 2, and rejects it on two grounds + (1) because the subject

of Book vi, as stated in ch. 1. § 4, is the diagogram's operal, and no 1139 b 14 hint is thrown out that these are not the five states enumerated in ch. 3 § 1: (2) because the Aristotelian conception of aperi as enwerg ifa (E. N. 1. 13. 19) applies to all five. Enwign and regen are certainly insured ifice (interiput is adduced as an example of a life in Cal. 8, 8 a. 29, 11 a. 24); and we'r (not as part of the soul, but as riate of the soul) is expressly described as a ifer in E N. vi et. 2. If it is a ifee, it is an incovery ifere.e an dorri. I think that Zelier's general position is unassailable. Lappe ward the Her could undoubtedly be said of the imeripant, and also of the regettye, without violence to Aristotelian usage. But it must at the same time be conceded to Pran I that a certain d th ulty is felt by the writer of the Sixth Book about the place of energy and regree see vi. 5. 7 alla pipe rigree pipe forth opera, φρονήσους δ' αύκ δυτιν . . . δήλαν ώτι άρντή τις δυτίν [ή φράνησια] καὶ αὐ that is perhaps why rigon is omitted from the list given in ch. 6 \$ 2): see also M. M. i. 34. 1197 2. 10 form & i pompor aperi, ès defear to, obe interfug (interfug seems to do duty for beth interfug and regry here, as in the list \$196 b. 36), drawered yap slow of power mar, à d'émaines aparties des d'émicrospique per micros apart écres, apparaisses de dorri obn forter, daa' de foiner, abre te dorie aperij. I ought to add that Rassew (Forsch. p. 124 note) gives his opinion very strongly in favour of Pranti's view that oodia and opomous are the only intellectual dperui, properly so called, recognised in the Srich Book.

implied is expressed fully in ch. 6. § 2—il di ols diaglobajas nat publicares diagnostiques and publicares diagnostiques and indexidues and indexidues and indexidues and pobliques days and angle and indexidues and angle and indexidues. Note is infallible as the immediate perception of idinipera or india; son Mel. 6. to, 10, 10, 10, 24, and other passages quoted infante on vi 2. 2, 2. 21 Entermands is infallible massived as the muths which it apprehension, are such as, if seen at all, are clearly seen for what they are, and leave no room for the supposition that they make be seen otherwise—see § 2 below, narray yap inchapturagues, because it is post and invertiging (ch. 7. § 3). But in what sense can the ifees which have to do with vi didaydeera allow tyres be said to be infallible? We are saved the trouble of trying to answer

1130 b 17. this question as regards vixen, for vixen does not appear in the corrected list of infallible igns given in ch. 6. § 2, and it is stated in ch 5. § 7 that there are degrees of excellence in it-right his form deerly, and implied that involuntary, as well as voluntary duaprie is possible in it is his rixun o ends duaprison eigenversor (se rod decourage duapramerroe). We have therefore only to explain how opingon, concerned as it is with the indexiguent ashor freez, is infallible. The explanation seems to be that polygon is corn lived with the perfect organisation of the whole moral nature - E. N. vi. 12. 10 άδωστον φρύνιμον είναι μή δετα άγαθόν. Φρονησες is the con sciousness of what goodness requires for its preservation. This consciousness is always present with the good man, and as horitative in 1 im. An artist may forget his art, because it is only a part of himself lake a limb which may be cut off, caving the hody alive, but opdonous s the good man himself-a second nature. which, laving once put on, he cannot put off-E. N. v. 5. 8 άλλα μήν ούδ έξες μετά λόγου μόνον σημείον δ' ότι ληθη της τοιαίτης These forn, pooriname & our force. It directs him unertingly in the interest of the reble life, as instruct directs an annual in the interest of the physical life. There is indeed nothing exceptional in the infallistry of the good man' (see F. N II 4 4, 5 -6 omordains yap facera apera belor, aut ir facorous rubydes airo haireras . . . Gomes raver and perpose nires as); every organism knows infalls y how to be itself.

Oπολήψει] iπόληψε is a * rew or assumption whell et true or false; see Bonitz. Met. p 41— Significa, ûnoλαμείωνων sumere et scatuere aliqued pro vero, use dlud est scrum use secus. It is sometimes teached mediately as the conclusion of a sy logism— δταν δώ συλλογωμού λάβη την ὑποληψω, sometimes is taken us namediately— ὖναν δπλώς υπολαβη ὑπορχεω ή μη ὑπορχεω (see An. Post 1. 16 79 b. 27). In the atter case it may amount either to ἀπονημη ἀμανοδεικτος— defined in An. Post i. 31. 88 b. 7 as ὑποληψεν τῆς ἀμάσου προσάσεων sc. καὶ ἀναγκαιας), or to δοξα αν defined in the same passage (89 a. 2-4)—λείπεται δάξαν είναι περί τὸ άληθες μέν ἡ ψειδος, ενδεχομενου δο καὶ ἄλλως ἔχεων τοῦτο δ' ἐυτὶν ὑπόληψω τῆς ἀμάσου προσάσεως και, μὴ ἀναγκαίας. It would thus appear that ἐποληψες τα α αστη οι very wide application. Με Αυ. τι. 3 427 b. 24 εἰνδ δί καὶ αἰτῆς τῆς ὑπολήψεως δαφοραί, ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα καὶ φρώνησες καὶ τὰνωντία τοῦτων , and Ε. Ν. 1. 9 7 ἡ εἰβοικία εῖη ἀν ἀρθοσης ἡ κατα τὰ συμφερον πρῶς το τελος, οἱ ἡ

φροιηστι εληθής υποληψε έστιν. In the section before us (vi. 3. 1) 1130 b 17 lanceset εποληψες is evidently used in a specific sense as equivalent to δίξω, the standing opposite of έπωτήμα, see An Post, 1. 33, 89 2. Το φτο γραφορό δεί τοίτοις κόδια εξέται δοξαζείν όταν οίηται άδύνατον άλλως έχειν, άλλ ἐπάσταυθας άλλ εταν εξωί μεν οίτως, ου μήν άλλα καὶ άλλως οίδιν καιλύτιν, τότε δοξαζείν, ώς τού μεν τοιουτού δύξαν οδοταν, τοῦ δ΄ ώναγκαίου έπιστήμην.

§ 2 ἐπιστήμη μὰν οῦν κ τλ] See An. Post 1. 2 τε 1. 9 ἐπ στοσθοι b 18 ἐὐ οἰὰμεθ ἐκιστομ ἀπλώς, ἀλλὰ μὴ τον σικριστικόν τρόπον τόν επτά συμβενοκού ἐταν την τ' σίτιαν οἶωμεθιε γινωσεειν δι' ἡν τὰ πράγμά ἐστος δει επεινου οἰνια ἐστί, καὶ μὴ ἐνλεχεσθαι τοῦτ' ἄλλως ἔχειν. Δήλως τοιοπον ὅτι κοιοπόν τι τὰ ἐπίστιαθεί ἐστις κοὶ γιρ οἱ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι καὶ οἱ επιστέμενοι τι μεν οῦνται αἰστι οῦτως ἔχειν, οἱ δ΄ επιστάμενοι καὶ ἔχουσιν, ώστι οἱ απλῶς ἐστιν ἐπιστημη, τοὺτ' ἀδύνατον ἄλλως ἔχειν. Κὶ μεν οῦν καὶ ἔτερός επτι τοῦ ἐπίστιαθαι τρόποις, ῶπτεριν ἐριμέν ἀς καὶ ἐι ὑποδειξεως εκλεναι. ᾿Αποδιεξεν ἐα λεγω σελλογισμον επιστημονικών. Επιστημονικών ἐτ λέγω κοθ ὑν τῷ ἔχειν αὐτὸν ἐπιστάμεθα. Εὶ τοινον ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιστασθοι εἶον ἔθερεν, ἀναγκη καὶ τὴν ἀποδειετικήν ἐπιστέρον καὶ αιτικόν του στιμπεμάσματων και ἀμεσων καὶ ἀμεσων καὶ ἀμεσων του στιμπεμάσματων καὶ ἀμεσων καὶ ἀμεσων του στιμπεμάσματων καὶ ἀμεσων καὶ ἀποσειεία, τοὺ διεκνομένου, Συλλογισμος μετο κότω γορ ἔντοι κοὶ ἔνευ ταῦτων, ἀπόδειξες δ΄ οὐκ ἔντοι' οὸ γὰρ ποιὰσει επιστημην.

rais opacomon! "the sarious analogical and inactural elises of 6 to the word "knowledge" (Grant). In the strict sense discribin is excellent of as described in An. Post, 1 2 quoted in less note: but first, and many other apayermum dealing with the endexposes of the described where there can be no disobletic—see E. A. vi 5.3), are called enorther in a loose sense. They are "branches of knowledge."

Star the ros beaper ylental fle means that a concrete thing is b. 21. I can be certain to exist, or be of a certain and exity when it is a tankly present to our observation; whereas a necessary truly expended as being always what it is new approximated to be. If f. v. 3. 131 h. 21 drov yap to old their less proqueror the old there was present advants you form el ere unapper, ded to the property of old the property of old the certain advants of old the certain of the property of the certain of the

if årdyngs] In Met Δ. 5 vò if dirbyngs an (1) μη δυδοχόμενου άλλως b 22. izer in histographed from (2) vò firet οδ οδα ένδέχεται, (3) το βιστον, and (4) ή ἀπόδιεξες, οτ sylogistic consequentia · ef Alet Δ. 7. 1072 b

- 1130 b 32 12 (where no. 4 is omitted) το γορ άναγεείου... το μεν βία ότε παρά τήν όρμην, το δέ οδ οδα άνευ το εδ, το δε μή ένδεχόμενου Πλλως άλλ' άπλως έ ε το μή ένδεχόμενου δλλως έχειν (ε.g. a muthematical truth) is άναγκείου έν elself: the other kinds disanguished are άναγκεία έξ έποδεσεως—see Phys. ii. 9, 199 b. 34.
 - b 23. diblor dpa] Il if diriyens in the sense of μή ενδεχόμενου διλως έχειν, then deit see Phys. ti. 5. 196 b. 10 επειδη όρώμεν το μεν dei ώσούτως γισόμενα το δε ώε επὶ πολύ, φανερου ότε οίδετερου τούτων αἰτία ή τύχη λέγεται οὐδε τὸ dmò τύχης, ούτε τοὶ εξ εἰνόγεης πολ del ούτε τοὺ οἰς ἐπὶ πολύ: cf. Alct. E. 2. to26 b. 27 ἐπεὶ οὐν έστὶν εὐν τοῦς οὐσε τὰ μέν ἀς. ὑστιὐτως έχοντα καὶ ἐξ ἀναγητε, οὐ τὴς ποτὰ τὸ βίωων λεγωμενης, ολλ' ἡν λεγωμεν τῷ μἡ ἐνδεχεσθαι ἄλλως, κ.τ.λ. The Divine Power which moves the πρώτος οὐρανός, and with it all things, is οὐσία ἀιδιος ἀιωντος—νεε Mcl. Λ 6 1071 b. g. 2nd 7. 1072 2. 23. So aἰκο pute ἀντης, as it is studied in the mathematical sciences, is ἀιδιον, α ee E. N. ni. 3. 3 περὶ δὴ τῶν ἀιδίως, οἰδεία βουλεύεται, οὖνε περὶ τοῦ αδσμου ἡ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρός, ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι. Phys. iv. 12 222 2. 6 τὰ ἀσύμμετρου εἰναι τὴν διάμετρου ἀιί δοτω.

τά γάρ εξ άναγκης διτα άπλως] as distinguished from rd οναγκοιο τά εξ ύποθεσεως: see Phys. ii. 9 199 h. 34 τὰ δ΄ εξ ἀνάγεης πότε,κον εξ υποθεσεως ὑπάρχει η και ἀπλώς ετλ. If a saw is to cut, 'it is necessary that' it should be made of iron (Phys ii. 9, 200 a. 12)— εξ ὑποθέσεως δη τὰ ἀναγκοίου. Here the 'necessary' is extrinsit — if we are to have cutting, it is necessary to have iron. But the truths of mathematics are ἀναγκοιο ἀπλον—necessary without qualification, in themselves, i.e. their necessity is intrinsic; see Mel. Δ. 5, to 15 h. 9 τῶν μὲν δη ἐνερον αίτιον τοῦ ἀναγκοῖα είναι, τῶν δι οὐδέν, ἀλλά διὰ ταῦτη ἐνερα ἐστιν εξ ἄναγκης. ὡστε τὰ προσον κοὶ ευρώς ἀναγκοιον τὸ ἀπλοῦν ἐστιν.

b 24 τά δ΄ άιδια άγένητα καὶ άφθαρτα) Sec Med. N. 3. 1091 a. 12 άτοπον δε και γάνεσεν ποιειν άιδιων δυτων: Z 8. 1033 b. 17 το μεν οὖν είδος ή σύσιλε λεγόμενος οὐ γίγνεται: Z. 10. 1035 π. 27 όσα δὲ μ) συνείλησται τῆ ὅλη αλλ' ἄνεν ῦλης, ὡν οἱ λόγοι τοἱ είδους μόνου, ταῦτα δ΄ οὐ φθείμεται, ἤ ὅλαις ἢ αίστι αῖτια γε' Z. 15 1030 b. 20 ἀπεὶ δ΄ ἡ αὐπὶα ἀτερα το τα αὐναλαν καὶ ὁ λόγος 'λέγω δ΄ ὅτε μέν οὖτως ἐστὶν οὐσία σὐν τῆ ῦλη συνείλημμενος ὁ λόγος, ἢ δε ὰ λόγος δλως. ὅσαι μέν αὖν οὖτα λεγουται, τοὐτων μέν ἀστι φθορα' και γόρ γένεσες τοῦ δε λόγου κῶι ἰστιν οὖτως ὡστα φθειμετθαι' οιδὰ γὰρ γένεσες (κὸ γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ οἰκις εἶναι ἀλλὰ τὰ τηδε τὴ οἰκίς).

1.15-

§ 3. en bibanti . . . oulloyiono Sec An. Post. i. t. 71 a. t Haga 1190 b 25 διδοσεαλία καλ πάσα μάθησις διανοητική όκ προύπηρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως Φανερών δε τούτο θεωμεύσεν επί πασών αι το γώρ μαθηματικαί τών επιστημών διά τούτου του τρόπου παραγώσεται καλ τών άλλων εκάστη τεχνών. Όμοίως δε καί περ. τούε λύγους οί το διά συλλογισμών και οί δι έπαγωγής αμφότεροι γέρ διά προγινωσκομένων ποιοίνται την διδασκαλέιν, οί μεν doublinemers de mand furieran, of di decenures ed unbadou dia roc dydan είναι το καθ έκαστον. 'Ωσπύτως καὶ οἱ βητορικοὶ συμπειθουσιν' ή γόμ διά παραδιεγμάτων, δ έστιν έπαγωγή ή δέ ένθομημάτων, όπερ έστε συλλογισμές. Grant, after quoting the above passage, says-'what Aristotle had said of dialectical arguments (rois hóyous) Eudemus applies to science, which he accordingly asserts to be sometimes inductive. His further assertion that the principles of deductive science are obtained by induction is inconsistent with the conclusion of chapter vi (e.e. heneral root show root appear), though it agrees with Arist. An. Past if 19 [100 b. 12 vove by elq vov apxwo]. Whether the two statements ή έπαγωγή ἀρχή έστι και τοῦ καθολου and νοῦν είναι τών degine are really "micor sister t" will be examined under chap. 6 & 2

de rois dealurancie histories? This is a general mode of ex b 27 pression, not a particular reference (Grant). For the 'Analytics' of Eudemus see Fritzsche, E h. End. Prolegom, p. xvi, and Grant's Ethics, vol. i. Essay i. p. 32 (4th edition).

bi inapositis! Anstotle's treatment of inapositis may be brought under three distinct heads — (1) In An. Port. ii. 19 he treats it psychologically, giving a sketch of the process by which general notions are gradually formed in the mind out of the data of sense. (2) in An. Prior. ii. 23 he treats it formally, supplying a salogistic formula for the inductive process, to correspond with that already found for the deductive process: and (3) in Top. 1. 12, 13, ii. 10, 11 certain beyond hi he elimptorouse subdompion, and certain room, are explained which remind us of the Inductive Methods of Modern Logic. It is in these chapters of the Topics (in which the word inaposity seldom occurs), and in the chapter on napobosyna, An. Prior. ii. 24, rather than in An. Prior. ii. 23 (on the inductive syllog sm) that we must look for Anstotle's real contribution' to the Logic of Induction'. The so-called in licetive syllogism of An. Prior. ii. 23, being if disderse, misrepresents a process which results.

I lincon seems to take no account of this contribution.

- 1130 to 27 rot in demonstrated truth, as the deductive syllogism does, but in moral, or practical certainty.
 - b 28. συλλογισμῷ defined An. Prior. i. 1. 24 b. 18 as λόγος ἐν ῷ τεθέντων τινών ἔτερών τι τών περινών ἐξ ἀνάγεης αταβλάνει τῷ ταῦτα είναι.
 - ή μεν δή έπαγωγή έρχή έστι και τοῦ καθόλου] L.b and Ald. read áρχης, and Γ seems to omit και Ka. may have been introduced, to make the clause coherent, by a sembe who read άρχης. If the gentive του καθόλου depends on άρχη, it is difficult to explain και if και be retained, it seems necessary to render—'Induction is the beginning, and is concerned with the universal'—not a very satisfactory rendering. I think.
 - 6. 20 elole don donni el ur . . . Emaywell don | See An. Post. i 3. 72 b. 18 Πμείς δι φαμεν οδτε πάσαν επιστίμην αποδεικτικήν είναι άλλά την τών фистор финованетор. Вый тоей без февренции, фореров в упр фицем рав eniorandae rà mpirepa sul ef du fi anoderfes, lorarae de noce rà apena. ταϊτ΄ όναπόδεικτα άνάγκη είναι. Ταϊτά τ' ούν φίτω λίγομεν, καὶ ού μόνον επιστημην άλλα επί άρχην έπιστημης είναι τινα φαμεν, ή τούς όρους γνωρι-Course. The words snaywyh apa are regarded by Trendelenburg (Histor, Beite, sur Phd vol. ii. 367) as a gloss. In the parallel passage M. M. i. 34 1197 a 21 imywyń is not mentione! - i pas yap emorgan ras per anadeless breas earls, at & doyal avanddescrot: nor in the passage just quoted from An. Post. 1, 3, 72 b, 18. But surely we must retain imayory) apa, unless we are prepared to reject ή μεν δή έπογωγή άρχή έστε καί τε εαθώλου. It seems to be impossible to distinguish between 'Eudemus' and 'Aristotle' here. Both ascribe the principles of syllogism, sometimes to drayoyi, sometimes to role. Anstolle, at any rate, saw so little inconsistency in this, that he even gives us the two explanations within the limits of the same immediate context-An Post is 19, 100 le 3 Salvor de ore quie τά κρώτε έκαγωγή γεωριζεω άναγκαίου καί γαρ κοί αιτθήσες αίτω τὸ καθυλου έμπουες. Επεί δε των περί την διανοιαν έξεων, αις άληθεύομεν, αί μον απί αληθείς είσαν, αι δε επιδέχηνται το ψεύδου, αίων δώξα και λογισμός, αληθή δ' ακλ επιστήμη και κούς, απλ ανδεν έπιστήμης δεμεβεστερών άλλο γένας ή νούς, αὶ δ' άρχεὶ τών ἀποδε ξεων γνωριμώτερας, έπιστηρη δ' άπασα μετά λόγου έστι, τών άρχων επιστήμη μέν ούκ αν είη, έπελ δ' ούδεν άληθέστερου ενδιχεται είναι έπατήμης ή ναύν, νούν αν είη τών άρχων, έκ το τούτων σεοποιοτε και ότι αποδειξεως αρχή είνε αποδειξες, διστ' είδ' έπιστήμης επεστήμη, εί αθε μηδίν άλλα παμ' έπεστήμην γένος έχημεν άληθες, νους δυ in interfuge duty. No explanation of soils de sig the applier can be

τις t τ τ ich fails to take account of a passage like the following— 1139 b 29

An. Fort, i 18, 81 a. 38 φαιερον δε και δτι, εί τις αισθησιε εκλέλοισεν,
απιγκη και επιστήμην τινα εκλελοιπέναι, ήν αδύνατον λαβείν, είπερ μανθανομεν
ή επογωγή ή άποδείξει ευτε δ ή μεν ἀπόδειξει ἐκ τῶν καθύλου, ή δ' ἐπαγωγης,
ετει και τὰ εξ άψαιρεσεως λεγόμανα ἔσται δι' ἐπογωγής γνωριμα ποιείν, ὅτι
ἐπάρχει ἐκαυνω γενει ἔναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ χωριστά ἐστιν, ἤ τοιανδὶ ἔκαιστον,
επαγθησια δὶ μη ἔχονται αισθησιω ἀδύνατον, τῶν γὰρ από' ἔκαιστον ἡ
αιλ. Θυσιι' ωὶ γὰρ ἀνδεχεται λαβείν αὐτῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην' αὐτι γὰρ, ἐκ τῶν
καθολου ἀνει επαγωγής, οὐτι δι' ἐπαγωγής ὅνευ τῆς αἰσθήσεως. See below,
ποιε οπ ch. 6. § 2, a. 7.

§ 4. Τζις αποδεικτική, καὶ όσα άλλα προσδιοριζόμεθα ἐν τοῖς ἀνα- b. 31 λοτικοῖς] See An. Post. i. 2 γε b 9—2 passage quoted above, § 2 note ἀνιστήμη, b. 28.

Brav yop. Her rive morning | Scient fic knowledge is real sing b 39. a trial, as the necessary consequence of premisses which are clearly known, i.e. more clearly known than the conclusion established by means of them; for if they were not more clearly known, how could the conclusion be established by means of them? It would ! be it dependent of them. It would be knowledge without proof 'acc debtal knowledge.' The language here resembles closely that of An. Post. L. 2. 72 8. 25 inel de del neuredeur re nal eldinas ro πράγμα το τοιούτον έχειν συλλογισμού δυ παλούμεν αποδείξιν, έστι δ' ούτος τφ τοδ΄ είναι έξ ων ό συλλογιαμώς, άνογκη μή μάνον προγινώσευν to separa, i seuto o ina. dada sai paddor del yap di o brappes έκαστον, έκτινο μόλλον έπαρχει, οίον δί δ φιλούμεν, έκτινο φίλον μόλλον. bor' elsep loner but the tours and more conser, and the lapter to and πιστεύομεν μάλλου, ότι δι' δεείνα και τὰ δυτερον, ολχ οδίν το δε morroem pakkon hu oiken, à ph roppoints pare tibile pipe fickron διακειμένος ή εί ετίγγανου είδως - συμβησεται δε τοιτο, εί μή τις προγνωσετοι των δι' ἀπάδειξεν πιστευύντων μάλλον γάμ ἀνάγκη πιστεύειν τειές άρχαιε ή πασαιε ή τισί του συμπεράσματος. του δέ μελλουτο έξειν τήν inarriago rio di anadelfene al pavao dei nas apple pakkao groupifero mi μαλλον αύταις πιστεύειν ή τῷ δεικνυμένο, άλλα μηδ' άλλο αύτῷ πιστάτερον είναι μηθό γρωριμωτέρον τών άντικειμένων τοίς άρχαίς, έξ δυ έσται συλλογωρός ό της έναντίας απάτης, είπερ δεί τος έπιστομενον άπλως αμετάπειστον FINDS.

CHAPTER IV.

ARGUMENT.

In the ophers of the contingent, or that which can be otherwise, making and doing are to be distinguished. The nabit of reasoning truly, where the making of something is concerned, is Art. The artist sees have something, which may or may not be, shall be produced, the principle resuling in himself, the maker, and not in the thing that is being made; for art is not concerned with things teat exist or come sate existence of mecessity; more to to concerned with the products of nature, for they have their franciple on themselves. There is a sense we which hame and art are concerned with the same things. Art loves chairs and chance now, art. Art, then, is a hinter of reasoning truly where something is being made while the man who is without art reasons fastely, and operate in the ophers of the contengent

- 1140 a. S. § 2. ἐτερον] ποίησει is an ἐνέργεια ἀτελής— it hus an ἔργον παρ' αὐτήν:
 πραξες in an ἐνέργεια πλίελι is its Own τέλος: see notes on i. t. 1, 2 ·

 εξ. Μ. Μ. 1. 34. 1197 a. 3 οὐ ταὐτὰ το ποιητικόν καὶ πρακτικόν. τῶν μιν
 γαρ ποιητικών ἐστὶ τι παρα τὴν ποίησιν ἄλλο τέλος, οἰον παρὰ τὴν οἰκοδομικήν ἐπειδή ἐστιν ποιητική οἰείας, οἰεία αὐτῆς τὸ τέλος παρὰ τὴν ποιητικών
 δικόιως ἐπὸ τεκτονικής καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τών ποιητικών ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πρεκτικών
 ουκ ἔστιν ἄλλο οὐθεν τέλος παρ' αἰτήν την πρῶξεν, οἰον παρα τὰ ειθαριξειν
 οἰκ ἔστιν ἄλλο τέλος αὐθέν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τουτο τέλος, ἡ ἐνεργεια και ἡ πραξες
 - n. I. Eustral. han-éforepinois d'évoques de le les ris doynées notes en ris doynées de les ris doynées nouve ne ris naight dans.
 - ή μετά λόγου έξις] μετά λόγου is apposed to άλογοι in Met. Θ. 2 1046 b. 2, and is really = λογωόι, as that adjective is used by the later Aristotelians in the tense of "rational,"
 - a. 8 διὸ οδδὶ περιέχεται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων] Ramsatter remarks that this is inconsistent with vi. 2. 5 σύτη (ἡ πρακτική) γὰρ καὶ τῆι πουγτικῆς ἄρχιι. and thinks that the writer of the present chapter cannot have had ch. 2. § 5 before him.
 - n. 7. § 3. δπερ] 'A logical formula implying identity or convertibility of terms' (Grant). Eustrat. ad loc. has -εδ δί δπερ δηλούν κείτοι το υδαιωδώς κατηγορείσθαι τῆς οἰκοδομικῆς τῆν τέχεην, καὶ τὸν δρωμών αὐτῆς' ὡς εἰ τις λεγει τον δυθρωπόν το ζώρο εἶνω, καὶ δπερ οὐσία τες ἔμψαχος

αίσθητικη. διά τό και μέρος είναι του ζώου του διθρωπον ώς είδος είς γενος 1160 a. 7
τό ζώου άναφερόμενον δεαστου γίας των είδων όπερ τί όπτι το γένας αυτών
του ώπερ δηλούστος την ουσώδη αυτηγορίων του γένους κατά του είδανς και
δε ταιτών έστιν είπειν όπερ τι ζώον είναι τον διθρωπων, και όπερ τινά ούσιαν
δεθγείς αυτών είπειν όπερ τι ζώον είναι τον διθρωπων, και όπερ τινά ούσιαν
τεκά, και όπερ έξεν τινά μετά λόγου ποιητικήν, ώς του όρου τούτου εξεσύζοντος
προς τήν τεχνην από διτιστριφούσιος. See tiole on vi. 23. I όπερ, b. 6.

perd λόγου ἀληθοῦς] Where we have τέχνη, as discirguished from a 10. ἀτεχνῶι (see below, § 6), the calculation, or λόγος, which διένοω τουτεία goes through, consists of ideas following one another in the true order—τ z in the order of the steps which actually constitute "the making" of the thing.

§ 4. περί γένεσιν] See An. Post in 19. 100 a. 3 (το ποβόλου) τεχνης a. 11. άρχη και επιστήμης, έων μέν περί γενεσιν τεγνης, έων δι περι το δν. έπιστήσηπε Βιτ φόσις το αίνα περί γένεσιν: accordingly, to define the province of τεχνη, it is necessary to add as the writer does here δυ ή άρχη έν τῷ ποιούντι ἀλλά μή έν τῷ ποιούμεν: ef thet. A. 3. 1070 2. 7 ἡ μέν οδν τέχνη άρχη δι άλλφ, ή δε φύσιε ἀρχη δν αύτῷ: Phys. ti. 8. 199 b. 28 εὶ ἀνῆν ἐν τῷ ξύλφ ἡ καναγγική, ὁμοίως ἐν φύσιε ἐποιει. Επιταί με has the following note here—Jore γαρ ἰδείν καὶ τὴν φύσιν περί γενεσιν ἀναγνόταν, iλλ' ἡ μέν φύσιε ἐντὸν αθνα καὶ διά τῶν σωμάτων χωρούσα ούτως ἐν σύτοἰς ἐνεργεί, ἡ δὶ τέχνη ούκ ἀντὸς ούσα άλλ' ἐκτὸς τῶν σωμάτων περί ὰ αιταγινέται, ούτως δι αὐτοῖς ἐνεργεί, καὶ ούτως αὐτοῖς τὰ τεχνητά εἰδη ἐντίδητων' ἐκτὸς γαρ ἡ ἀνδριαντοποιητική τοῦ χαλκοῦ, καὶ ἡ τεκτοπεκη τοῦ ξυλον' ἀν τοις τεχειτοις δ' ούσαι καὶ ἄμφω, ούτω κινουσε τα ὑποιεμενω, διὰ και ἐκτὸς οὐτῶν κατά τὴν ἐπιφάνειων τὰ εἰδη περιτιθίασεν.

sal rd regretter and tropeir J. Lek.", Fritzsche, Rams., and Susem., following Muretus, bracket the second ani. Muretus says: "delegated und enant docuit quid sit régret, seating addit quid sit regreter."

§ 5. Incl 8d nologis . . . wolfews elvai] Rassow (Forsch. p. 43) a. 10. brackets this sentence as an interpolation.

nai trouver that replied adre torne is tour and is there] view and a 17 spaces (nainers or view being included under spaces, see E.N. vi. 2. 6) Operate in the same sphere, viz. in that of rd same specificant vignificant force Phys. if 6, 196 b. 18) Where a man uses his intelligence to do or make something, he generally succeeds—is the result which follows is caused by him. But sometimes a result (good or bad) which he did not contemplate makes its appearance.

- 1140 s 17. Of his Chance is the cause. He ploughs in order to raise a crop, and he turns up a treasure "by chance": see Phys. a. 5, 197 a. 5 δηλον δρα ότι ή τίχη αίτιο κατά συμβεβηκύς έν τοις κατα προαίρεσιν των ένεκά του. διό περί τό αύτο δαίνοια και τύχη, ή γορ προσέρεστε ούκ άνευ Binvoias; 11. 6. 197 b. 1 if wer gap rough and rid and ridge force bour and rid ειτιχήσοι δυ θπαρξειου καὶ όλων πράξις. διό καὶ άναγεη περί τά πρακτά είναι την τίχην' σημείον δ' ότι δοκεί ήτοι ταθτύν είναι τη εύδαιμονία ή εύτυχία ή έγγύς. ή δ' εὐδαιμονία πραξιε τιν' εὐπραξία γάρ. ώσθ' οπόσοιε μή ἐνδέχεται πράξαι, ουδέ το οπό τίχης τι ποιησαι, καὶ δού τουτο ούτε δήτυχου ούδευ ούτε θηρίου αθτε παιδίου οδθέν ποιεί από τύχης, ότι αδα έχει πρυαίρεσεν' οδθ' εθτυχία αδδ' druges images raisons, of ph and oposityes. Tigh and spages (the latter including manage) are thus med rd abro, rough operating irregularly to produce or frustrate results which apiles produces regularly. There is a special sense, however, in which rixy and rixin (rixin being distinguished from moutes) may be said to be most re nord Tigg scems to cooperate with and favour (foreper) rixen, as it does not favour months. This is because months is a more perfect expression of reason or the organising principle, than regen. House is the realisation of the rational personality itself. But vegen realises its good in an external loyor, and the cibes which it imposes on As is only a surface form-very different from the forms, penetrating to the very heart of the Ma, which plans and apari produce (cf E. N v. b. 9 & 8 apert manne regene dupiterripa not deserve durin Gomes sail & proces. Met. A. 3 1070 n. 7 \$ who over their άρχη & άλλφ, η δε φύσιε άρχη & αύτφ). Τεχνη is a weak principie which cannot succeed unless the underlying the element of irrationally and accident - be favourable. Thus its greatest triumphs are often unexpected. The ex gency of a thyme suggests a beautiful turn of thought; 'a mere accident' gives the world a great mechanical invention. But though, for this reason, right owes more to right tran apage does, we must not forget that the highest months evolutioner, needs circyia, and that the fundamental moifis-the physical life of plant and anunal-is often most vigorous when some 'accidental' variation has given a new direction to inherited tendency.
 - a. 31. § 8 h & arexula reduction part hopes belong weighted like) When the unskilled man tries to make something he realises the steps of the operation 'falsely.' He goes to work 'in the wrong way.'

CHAPTER V.

ARGUMENT.

Frudence comes west: in order to understand what it is, let us book at ene characteristics of the people who are weened printent. It would appear to ve tura term in of the gradent man to be able to deliberate well about the things that are good and expectent for him elf, not on the narrow were of good for har'th or strength, but in the general cense of good for the life of the noble ests one. New no man deliverates about though which are necessarily what they ere, now about things a but it is not in his own power to de. growers . List and he waster or art and wanter, because its object—that with the recent is consequent, and not because making and doing are generally are el remains, then, that prudence is the faculty of reasoning truly where worthing is being John its others being that of man's good and cast. The end of dian's or not some king different from the doing, it is well-doing, whereas the end of waters is something different from the process of making. Fermies may be touch as an example of the prodent man, he popularly understood-the men who has the faculty of exercy what is good for himself and for others in the Siste and the farmer. Here too omforevery gets its name had not appear the opened a terrare at preserves a man's conception of what is good a one-ftion ce fermite, which differe from a cerentific conception, or principle, in he my decorren and exercised by pleasure and form for an conduct the and armed at is the francistic, and the man tune has been vittated by pleasure or form we, because so vitadias, bland to the good end. Prudence, then, is a rational tout, and he fores, time semioptions about what is good for man, and is nes in nome, action to recover an execution e, not an art; for my speak of excelcome a art, but not of excellence on presence; and in art voluntary error is better than emmants y, whereat in the sphere of fruitme and of the moral entered wountary teror is worse. It is the excelence of that decision of the outered fact of the wal, which forms opinions, we deals with provide ities. but it is not merry a emporal habit for a mere y rational habit may be fort; out produce is never lock.

§ 1.] From bence onwards the Sixth Book may be thought to 1140 a 21 just by Letter in place in an Filheal Treatise. It will now be concerned mainly with Reason as 'the Moral Faculty', but see note on ch. 1. §§ 2-4-

nepi be possive of the doctrine of possive down to the form which it takes in this Book.—'Plato (Phaedo 79 D) identified the

1140 a 24. moral consciousness with philosophy - 1. e. he made promote identical with coopia- With Aristotle openion was gradually coming to assume its distinctive meaning, as practical wisdom,' being described in the Politics P. 2, 1277 b. 25 as 'the only virtie properly belonging to a ruler -i.e as 'practical wisdom, but in a broad general sense with reference to state affairs rather than to individual life ' while 'in the present Book we have the Fu limian exposition and development of Artstotle's theory, which en irely contrasts poorgres with copia, and limits the former to the regulation of individual life" See also Grant's Ethics, Essay in vol 1 p. 194 I cannot agree with Grant that in this Book opingum is limited to the regulation of individual life; nor do I think that in the Politics it is denied to the individual as managing for himself his own private affairs-(I this is the import of Grant's remark, quoted above, on its place in the Politics), but only to the individual, qui άρχόμους. We shall have or portunities, however, of returning to these points in subsequent notes.

θεωρήσαντος τίνας λέγομεν τους φρονίμους] For this method of enquiry Fritzsche compares Ε. Ν. iv. 3, 2 διαφέρει δ' ούδεν τ'ν έξεν ή του κατά την έξεν σκιπείν.

- a 28. πρὸς τὸ αθ ξήν δλως] (f E N. vi. 9. 7 πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀπλῶς. Bekker omits ὅλως with K³. All other MSS, read it (οτ ὅλων). As I have had occasion to remark before, the omissions of K³ count for little; and Rassow (Forsch. p. 62) is undertheedly right when he says 'ὅλων, das kaum entbehrlich ist, hātte Bekker memer Ans cht nach aufnehmen so len. Vgl. p. 1141 2. 12 ἐνωι δέ τωνι σοφωίε οἰόμαθα δλως, οὰ απὰ μέρος, οἰδ' άλλο τι σοφούε."
- π. 20. § 2. ων μή dστι τέχνη], because τέχνη is concerned with ποιησιε. not with πρωβίε.
- a. 21. § 3. βουλεύεναι δ' ούθελς κ.τ.λ.] See E. N. ili, 3.
- a. 89. per dnobelfeus] See note on ch. 3. § 2 imorfun, b. 18.

ών 8' al doxal ένδέχονται άλλως έχειν, τούτων μή έστιν απόδειξιε] See An. Post. 1. 4. 73 u. 21 έπει δ' άδουστον άλλως έχειν οὐ έστιν έπεστημη άπλώς, άνωγεαιον δν είη τὸ έπεστητον τὸ εατά τὴν ἀποδειστισην έπεστήμην. ἀποδειστική δ' έστιν ήν έχομεν τῷ έχειν ἀπόδειξεν εξ ἀναγκαίων άρα συλλογισμός έστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξες.

warra γάρ ἀνδέχεται καὶ ελλως ἔχειν] τ. ε. κ.ὶ conclusions from con- 1140 κ 55 tingent from the contingent see Eustral.—παντα νὰ ἐξ Ισδεχομενων άς χων συναγομενα συμπνράμανα ἐνδεχεται και δλλως ἔχειν τοῦτο δ΄ οὐα ἀντιν ἀνοδεξες τὰ γὰμ ἀποδεικτικῶν συμπνροινόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐα ἀνδεχεται. The paten besis beginning with κάντα, which Fritzsche, Niichelet. Susemibl, and Bywater close with έχειν, ought, as in Bekker's text, to include καὶ οὐα ἔστο βουλεύσασθαι κερὶ τῶν ἐξ ανάγειο ὅντων, for, as Rimsauer points out, if these words belonged to the protasis, we should have μή, not οὐ.

66 4-8] In these 66 the order is very confused. The following b ◆ rearrangement is offered, not as a reconstruction of the text as it may have originally stood, but as an attempt to make the meaning of the passage, as we now have it, clearer. It will be seen that I am included to Rassow (see Forsch, pp. 43-45, and 30-31), and to Sa- mil 1 (app. crit. ad loc.), although I have ventured to take a Ine of my own:- 1140 b. 3 . Gr. Add to your muifeme and motherms. रमेर प्रथम प्रवेश समार्थनाच्या रेंडरमाम रचे प्रशेषक प्रमेष है सामार्थनाच्या गरेर विमार्थन रेंक्टर प्रवेश σύτη ή εξπραξία τέλος. άλλα μην τέχνης μέν έστιν άμετη, φρονήσεως δ' αία έστιν, παι εκ πεκ εξέλυ ο εκών οπαλιακών αιδεικεύουδ μεύς με φυρικώσες heren. Comes and nest rds operus, biston our ore during rie fort and ob τίχνη, δυούν δ΄ δυτοιν μερούν της ψυχής τών λογον έχωντων, θατέρου διν είη aperty, raw diafeogramsout of respite diafeo mean to indeposition address syam and if φρενησιε. ωστ' ανάγκη την φρώνησιν έξιν οίναι μετά λόγου άληθη , άληθούς?) περι τὰ ἀνθρωπικά άγοθὰ πρακτικήν. διὰ τοῦτο Περικλέα καὶ τοῦς τοιουτους Φρονίμους οιόμεθα είναι, ότι τὰ αύτοίς όγωθα και τὰ τοίς ἀνθρωποις δύνηντας θεωρείο είναι δε τοινιστούς ήγουμεθα τους πέκονομικούς και τους πολιτικούς. άλλα μήν κάδ έξις μετά λόγου μόνου σημείου δ΄ ότε λήθη της μέν τοιαύτης έξεως έστε, φρανησεως δ' ούε έστες, ένθεν καὶ την σωφροσύνην τούτη προσαγορετώρεν τῷ ἀνόματι, ὡς σφίροσων τὰν φρύνησεν σφίζει δὲ τῆν τοιαυτην υπόληψικ, ού γάρ άπασον ίποληψιν διαφθειρει ουδε διαστρέφει to give mal dunggou, now but to epigonou bis dodus tyes have tree, adde τας περί το προκτον. οι μεν γόρ άρχαι των πρακτών το ού ένεκα τα πρακτά. To de durchtapping be glange & denne eithe at palveres dern, will beir raveou evenes wied dech rold alpeladus núrra nat nocirces fore gup à conta pdapraci appir. The points in the foregoing rearrangement which I would call attention to are—(1) one of the two clauses in which poingour is define I is omitted-v a that in § 4, which differs from that in § 6 in adding out case, and in having in apposition in which it would be difficult to read adyllour: (2) why and prompte

- 1140 b. 4. are contrasted in a continuous passage; and (3) the statement daka upp old the perhaps upon, with the square for high passage which explains the function of the moral this, supposition, in 'preserving' the shall be widness of the intuited upper of disposition and your This reassagement professes merely to make §§ 4-8 real more evenly. About the causes of their present unevenness commissions interpolations, transpositions, or double versions—I forbear to speculate.
 - b 5. § 4. the dayon Rassow (Forsch pp. 44, 45) calls attention to this strange conjunction. The definition of rexing at the end of the 4 is the rice part harm dayon dayon's nountary to be we ought to have here the part harm dayon dayon's nountary. In § 6, however, dayona is supported by good authority (1) and ought, I believe, to be read. The definition given here in § 4, with its ral rand (at addition supported neither by § 1, nor by § 51), and its dayon placed where adyone would be unnatural, seems to be a late interpolation due to some one who thought proper to show that opposite is a the part dayon by oir tors and an a the dayon by oir tors and and a the dayon.
 - b 6 Trepor to telos] See M.M i 34 1197 a. 4, quoted above in note on vi. 4. 2. 1140 8. 2.
 - b. 7. Our fir eig The corruption our dei is given by Mb and accepted by Fustratus and Michelet, who explain that there are some nonless of nonreced rigns with ends which, though not logic the ends of the nonreced rigns, are sail subservient to higher ends as, e.g. the immediate end of riding is subordinate to victory.
 - b 8. § 5. Bepeake. Surely this is against Grant's view (note on view, a quoted above ad loc.) that the developed theory of the Sixth Book 'I mits φροιφοιε to the regal, took of individual life'. Indeed, in his note on the present §. Grant refers us to his note on this 8. § 1, which treats of 'the connection established by Fulleman between thought (i.e. φρόιφσιε) for the individual, for the family, and for the state.'
 - ь. 10. oiкогорыкобе] ССС has the strange blunder olecoperacie.
 - In Next, e. 9 3366 to 20 however we have approprie & lovin aperal diamoias, not he of pour corres becarres replayabler and nander rise experience en elitarportar.

την σωφροσύτην... ως σώξουσαν την φρόνησιν) The editors quote 1140 b t2. Pinto, ("raty.as 411 Ε σωφροσύνη δέ σωτηρια αὐ νύν δή έσκιμμεδα, φρονήσουσ.

§ 6. την τοιαύτην υπύληψιν] την περί τα άνθρώνω άγαθά καταγινών b. 12. party of ea come (Fistrat us). Pleasure and pain are the inflaences which interfere with the maintenance of that moral balance of which pointer is the conscious ess. Zupponion then, being the municipance of the Lastice, gud en langered by the most pressing pleasures and pains will 'preserve' dyoogene in a special manner. The wide Patonic conception of authorizing however, as the oposion of all the parts of the soul, seems also to be present to the we ter's n and bete as well as the narrower Aristotelium correction of it as persons neph respective indones and denue. If, with the doctrine of this passinge that of E N. ; 3-that the man whose noon are not under moral control does not 'know' what is right and what is wrong, and that therefore (wave naon didagradus kal naga padagus diameter of approximate yourse yoursely we trust not begin to tran him by the way of the intellert - the makerings one force disclos impourns it reast direspos you took noted took floor apolition . . . Ets be tois παθεσιν απολουθητικός διν ματοίως άσούσσται από άνωφελώς τοίς roloirous (s.e. tois eará mados (wow) dedentes à présais plretai, codanes τοιε ακρατίσων τοίε δε κατά λύγαν τας δρέξεις ποιουμένοις και πρώττουσε modumpedes hu sin ad mean rainmu endium-F N. i. 3 §§ 5-7. It is only the 'good man' who is poorgon, because the 'knowledge' in virtue of which a mar is called province is knowledge a meticive to nilt a tien-knowledge upen tehuh a man is prepared to act. The 'knowledge' with which the dispurier is credited is cely formally 'knowledge': of the eldism power polymon alla uni the partiane of & deputie of spaceticie (F N vl. 10, 2). Bit knowleader which does not call for action-wise one of spigorous existing accessible to good and bad men indifferently. In short, knowledge of an environment we ascribe only to the being which corresponds with that environment :-- & annudator feature upless dollar, not in imiorais radifice airi paiveras (E. N. 1:1, 4. 4).

δύο δρθάς] sc. ywwine.

b 15.

αί μεν γάρ άρχαί κ τ λ] cf E.N. vi. 12. 10 ol γάρ συλλογισμοι του b 10 πραετών άρχην έχνιτες είσιν. (πειδή τοιωθε τό τέλος και τό άριστον, σειδηποτε ών (εστω γάρ λόγου χώριν τό τυχον) τοῦτο δ' εί μή τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐ

- 1140 b. 16. φαινιται διοστροφοι γάρ ή μοχθηρία και διαψεύδεσθαι και ί περί τός κρακτικός δρχώς. Δστε φανερών δει δάθνατον φρόνιμον είναι μή δυτα δγαθύν,
 - b. 22. § 7. τέχνηε μέν ἔστιν ἀρετή, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν] The Paraph Heliodorus has—τῆς μέν τέχνης ἔντε καὶ κακία καὶ ἀρετή καὶ γὰρ δυνατον καὶ ἀγαθον εἶναι τεχνιτην καὶ ποπρόν φρονήσεως δὲ οδτε καεία ἔστιν (ἀδύνατον γὰρ φρονιμόν τενα ψαϊλον εἶναι) οδτε ἀρετή. αἰτή γαρ ἐστιν ἀρετή ὑρετή δὲ ἀρετής οὐκ ἔντιν, οὐ γὰρ μεσότης μεσότητος. εf. M. 1. 34. 1197 2. 16 ἔστιν δ' ἡ φρονησες ἀρετή, ὡς δόξεων ὧν, οἰκ ἐπιστημη (= τέχνη hete). ἐπαινετοὶ γαρ εἰσιν οἱ φρόνιμος, δ δ' ἔπαινος ἀρετής. ἔτι δ' ἔπαιτήμης μεν πασης ἀρετη ἔστιν, φρονήσεως δὲ ἀρετη οἰκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔσιως», αὐτό τὶ ἐστιν ὁρετή.

to Met a. 29. 1023 a. 6, where the paradox our inders paradox Boltrius, maintained in Hopp Mon. 373 C. is crinicised. The Aristotelians seem to miss Plato's point when he says that it is better to do injustice voluntarily than to do it involuntarily. They tell han 'that the analogy of the arts does not apply to the virtues, The man who voluntarily speals incorrectly is indeed a better speller than the man who involuntarily spells incorrectly (see Xen. Mem. iv. 2. 20 norspor de praphaticorepor aplices de de écue pi delbuc ypichy sal deagegeworn, h be axwe; be de desir); but voluntarily to keep back money one owes is worse than to do so unwitingly." Surely Plato did not wish to dispute this truth. Voluntarily to keep back money, he would say, is worse, because it indicates 'ignorance in the soul' (Rep. 382 B) in the sense of a had character, just as involuntarily to spell incorrectly is worse, because it indicates 'ignorance in the soul' in the sense of defective education or simpidity. But Plato rut this paradoxically; Le said that to do wrong voluntarily is better than to do so involuntarily. The Aristotelians, it would appear, either could not, or would not see that by 'involuntarily' he meant, not 'in consequence of an accidental oversight,' but 'in consequence of moral blandness, or ignorance in the soul. His larguage is of course rather mislead ing; but he could not have really misled Aristotle Aristotle must have seen that Plato was only making the distinction marked by the ayrora i and record and the ayrora i audohou of E. N. 10. 1. 15.

b. 20 § 8. δοξαστικοῦ] = λογιστικοῦ of L' N. vi. 1. 6. Rassow (Firsch. pp. 43, 44) finds the employment of δοξαστικόν for λογιστικον .ncon-

Sisters with the manner in which diffe is conceived, not only in 1140 5 26. other parts of the E. N. Lut in this Book. In this Book it is Booker and not deficient which a characteristic of the applying and the wife difference between diffa and Build is seen in the chapter on eistochia (41, 9), where - \$142 b. 13 \$3 18 82 d and you ή δαξα οι ζήτησια άλλα φασια τις ήδη ό δε βουλιυσμένος, είν τε εδ έάν το καί names Burkeigras, force in ca. doylferus. Purther, to prove that dodonous is the darri of the enformaly piper, the writer of vi. 5. 8 adds of re yap take repl en iedegoperor aldar igere eat & spotenore; but this is inconsistent (Rassow tanks) with E. N. n. 2, 10, 1111 b. 31 h pir yaş dağa dasın nepi nasını elim, eai addis heros nept vü áldın san vä üdusura of the op hair. The erm deferreds for heyereads occurs again in this Book 1144 b. 14 vi. 13, 2, in a context, however, which Rassow suspects to be of later origin. I cannot attach much weight to Rasson's differthes. It is true that the Index Arist, given the term & foremor = hoyormak as occurring only in these two places in the Aus otelian Corpus; but it must be remembered that in 16. 10 3 we find advisors defined as consisting in the xphother the boky en to aparen nept robius nept do à docupair cores, and that to document - the probable '- is the regular Ansiotel an opposite of ris imargrant; nor intest we forget that the premisses of the Practical Syllogism are generally described as dofar (e.g. vn. 3 9). All this makes me think that Kassow goes too far when he accepts the occurrence of Eccurrence - Anytortude here and in vi. 13. 2 as evidence for the interpolation of the respective contexts. It seems to me quite natural that the wriet of vi 1. 6 should happen to substitue document here and in v., 13. 2 for hoyumois. With regard to Rassow's difficulty about the consistency of deformation $= \lambda ayearming$ with E, N. in 2 to surely that passage does not mean that ed doforcon as such is ever to addor: it surely means only that, although probable matter' is the proper object of biga as dis inguished from imorium, yet people are ready enough to trespass into the reg on of thecessary trut a' with their 'unacientific opinions'-to offer 'op mons' about what ought rot to be matter of opinion at all, but of 'scientific knowledge.' Lastly, as regards Rassow's difficulty in connexion with E. N. vi. o. 3. 1142 b 13-it is true that difa (r. e. an opinion) is forme ric, and produced is forgote; but this does not imply that to defeartier pipes gud youperer rais defeus is not a faculty of theyars.

σημείος 8' ότι λήθη α τλ | See note on vi. 3 1. 1139 b. 17. YOU. IL

b. 23

CHAPTER VI.

ARGUMENT.

Since recently boundedge is knowledge derived by a discurring process from necessary principles, the derivation of these principles themselves cannot be descurring they cannot be descurring they cannot be descurred in the mind by the operation of the making faculty, nor yet by that of the faculty of principles—for they are necessary principles, and art and principles have to do not consumercies; nor again can we say that Wissom or Predictoply gives us the principles of demonstrated or resemble harveledge, the could be too general a statement, for the philosopher does not merely apprehend principles dut draws consistent from principles. Accordingly, in one list of the faculties by which, or may sim which, restain truck is always attained—before, Principles, Wissom, and Reason—Reason only remains as the faculty by which we obtain first principles.

The argument of this chapter, as the editors no e, is borrowed from An. Pest ii. 19, 100 b. 5, quoted in note on vi. 3, 3 b. 29

- 1140 b. 31. § 1. περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν ὑπόληψιε] ἀποδεικτική ἐπιστήμη, with which, as distinguished from rois, the present argument has to do, is ὑπόληψιε περι των ἐκ τῶν καθόλου—see F N. vi 3 3 ἀ ἀν στλλογισμου ἐκ τῶν καθόλου. These demonstrated truths are of course themselves καθόλου κοὶ ἀναγκῶν, but it is awkward to begin a chapter, intended to present the distinction between ἐπιστήμη and νοὺε, with words ascribing to the former a characteristic (τὰ περὶ τῶν καθόλου ὑπόληψιε εἶνοι) which it shares with the latter. The ὑπόληψιε of the present passage is ἡ ἀιὰ συλλογισμοῦ of An. Past. i. 16, 79 b. 29: see note on vi. 3, 2, 2139 b. 27 ὑπολήψες.
 - b. 83. μετά λόγου] Cf. An. Post. 1.. 19. 100 a. 10 επιστήμη δ' δπασα μετά λόγου έστι. Λόγοι is here = συλληγισμος, an again in E.V. v. 8 9 ό μεν γλρ νούς των δρων, ων ούκ έστι λόγος, and vi. 11. 4 των έσχατων κούς έστι καὶ οὸ λόγος.

τής άρχής τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ οὖτ ἐν ἐπιστήμη εἶη] ε ε ἀποδεικτική ἐπιστήμη (with which alone the present argument is concerned—τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν ἀποδεικτόν), (or there is an ἀναπόδειατος ἐπιστήμη which gives ἀρχαί: see Απ. Γ'ast 1, 3, 72 b. 18 ἡμειε δέ φομεν οὖτ πῶσαν ἐπιστήμην ἀποδειατοι, ἀλλὰ την τῶν ἀμέσων ἀνιπαδέιατοι.

τοῦ γὰρ σοφοῦ περὶ ἀνίων ἔχειν ἀπόδειξίν ἀστιν] εί.c. the συφόι is the 1141 a. 2. comprehensive genius who grasps scientific principles, an I reasons from them, as explained in chapter 7. § 3. Σοφία is not exclusively νῶν ἀρχῶν. We have to find the faculty which has to do with them exclusively.

§ 2.] Why is recomposited from this list, after having been a. 3. included in that given in chapter 3. § 1? Is it because rizen has been shown in chapter 3 to be a life he late λήθη? Or does duscrium here include rizen? Or have we the lists of two different writers?

Accreton root elvan the doxine Grant says- In following im- a.7. plicitly the passage above ested (An. Pest. il. 19, 100 b. 5-15, which is to the effect that root ar ray far dayar), Endemus has ignored for the sime the earlier part of the same chapter, in which Arester e attributes the origin of universals rather to induction (Post. An. n. 19, 100 b. 3). Also he is at variance with his own statement above ch 3. § 3. I have pointed out in my note on ch. 3- § 3 1139 b. 29 that έπαγωγή ἀρχή έστι καὶ τοῦ καθόλου and Assertat soir risat ris appir can scarcely be inconsistent statements in the South Book of the Ethics, when Aristotle himse f in the An. Post, makes hem both in the same context (An. Post, it. 19 from 100 b, 3 to end of the chapter). There is no inconsistency in maying at once that mile given oppol, and that imayoring given depail, because voir, as distinguished from aladyous, is the faculty which man, as rational being, possesses of taking notice of that which is common a a number of particulars presented; and in aywyi is the process in which the particulars are presented.

CHAPTER VII.

ARGUMENT.

Window we speak of the Wislom (copin) of a great artist like Phillips, we main by 'Window' nothing but excellence in the particular art. • • • Window' is, in the most perfect of the intences or arts accordingly if a man at 'wine' is a known' perfectly,' he will know not only seven-spic results but principles: 'Window' is therefore Science crowned, as at were, with Resonmendownedge of results, and group of principles, in the highest sphere.

It remaid be absurd to make practical knowledge higher than ejecutorie knowledge, unless Man owere the highest object of knowledge in the universe

The elects of practical knowledge or Printence, I he she continent of beath. 2010) but the abrilate truth, which Wird m' or phinosophy oppositions, may he compare to 'White' or 'Straight' which is always the same Therearens many different kinds of Printense, as there are, asses of men perby see sught to say of anima, a apable of seeing to these overs a florent extensive. It so flack, then, that we cannot ident fy Prosecus and Wisdom without failing into the con traduction of 'many kinds of it istom-many kinds of Absolute Truth' Int fer haps it may be arrived -Man is to far exalted above other creatures, teat use may regard his peculiar human good as a thing was generic and confene- as the best thing in the summerse, an absolute to be apprehended by the highest faculty, the faculty of "Wisdom," To this it must be replied, that man is not highest in the universe. the mature of the Heavenly spheres is more I wine than human nature. If the knowledge of man's pend or human good be . It is done, there was I be "another bind of Wasdam" concrened with the good sokuch is more divine than man's but 'another hind of it culom-another hind of Absolute I ruth as a contraduction on terms. There is only one ' it erdine' the exercise of the understanding and the reason in relation to the informate Indeed, popular openson recognises clearly enough the discontion Truch. between the spheres of Wildom' and 'I'ndence' Anavagoras and I ha'es are held to be ' wase men' - phalosophers' with the knowledge of the my high and wenderful but synorant of the weful touthe of dany iste when I'mlence percepes.

France, is conserved with man's pending human good in is far as that good an be made object of del berasion. Indicas, distincting well is the distinguishing fine from of the printent name. No man deliberates about hings which are necessarily what they are, and cannot be changed, or about things which have no reference to a practical end. The man who 'del berases well in the street sense of the extressions, is he whose calculations emakes him to het the highest and bast mark which man can ask at—to realize as perjectly as may be the ideal of the site of noole oction. Into Fradenic has to do not record week the ideal or inspectable, but also with fasticities. It ultime is a hold which results in action, and action is conserved with fasticities there to be doned these fasticular things to be done, therefore the printent man must know as well as the ideal. The analogy of an art site that of the physician shows we have full that more theory without experience, it is refer to brow that 'can kin's flesh is discretible,' than to know generally that 'all right flesh is discretible,' and nothing more.

Since I realise them, is not mere theoretical knowledge, but knowledge for the take of moral dition, and since moral action sanature are end or sava, for the take of which forthwhat things are done, to be fruident a roan must know both the manifestal and the farticulars at any rate the particulars. But a know we say "at any rate the particulars," let us remember that even in which common to be knowledge of more particulars there must alway, be present some consciousness of the "plan" which the particulars subserve,

With 1 5 of this chapter of. Mel. A. 2. 982 n. 4 and de ταίτην την έπιστήμην ζητούμες, ταίτ' όν εξη σεςατέον, ή περί ποίας airias από περί ποιας άρχας έπιστήρη συφία έστέν. εί δή λάβος τος τας ύπολήψεις de έχομεν πορά του σοφού, τοχ de la τούτου φαντρον γίνοιτο μάλλον. υπολαμβανομέν δή πρώτον μέν δείστασδοι πάντα τον σοφον ώς δυδέχεται, μή and encured expert encoughy action ofthe the the galend grande duringeror ет рід задля подрыну угунывання, койток вофок (од удр ківваневда πάστων κικου, διά βάδιου και ούδευ σοφόν). Έτι του δκριβέστυρου και του dedinant epine por lange minimal and mebar beby again que medifula. mi two encorrance de the equity evenes had too eddents yapen alpethe oderse μάλλον είναι συβίαν ή την των δποβαινόντων ένεκεν, και την αμχιοωτιραν the imprevious michae cleas suplies at you bein involves the the author αιλ' επιτυττείν, και ού τοιτον έτερη πειθεσθαι, άλλά τούτο τών ήττον σοφόν, τάς μεν οθε θποληψείς τομότας και τοσούτας έχομεν περί τής σοφιάς και τών σοφών τούτων δὲ τὸ μέν παυτα ἐπίστασθαι τῷ μαλιστ' έχτονε την απθυλού επιστήμην αναγανίου ξαιάρχουν οδτος γιλρ οίδε πιας πάννα τά δποστιμονα. - αχεδόν δε καλ χαλοπώτατα ταύτα γνωρίζου τοῦς ανθρώπαις, rá padsara undudou noppuraru záp rův učabíjasův čariu, depisiovental de rese enterques ai paliara rese upentes eiats ai yap if ilarrisees άτριβιστέρου τών ζε προσθέσεως λαμβανομίνων, οδον άριθμητική γεωμιτρίας. άλλα μεν και διδασκαλική γ' ή νών πίτιων θεωρητική μαλλον ούνοι γάρ differentiation of the airies desputes well exacted to d'eidens cal to iniarands, acries issue edding bud, bet 19 rat paktur intarprot intarhun. ό γαρ επιστασθαι δι' έσυτό σημερινός τήν μάλιστα έπιστήμην μολιστα αίρησεται, τοιαύτη δ΄ έσελε ή του μάλιστ' έπιστητού μάλιστα δ' έπιστητά na semana sai rá airea. Sea dade tantas sai en tantam tanda desaniferas, and ού ταυτα διά των θεοκειμενών, άρχικωτάτη δι των έπιστημών, καί μαλλον αιχώη τής ύπημετούσης, η γνωμέζουσα τίνος ένεκιν έστι προκτέυν έκαστον rours & earl royalin er exactors, thus de th Spictor is the diver navy, र्ट् वेसवान्याम वर्षेण रखेन बोर्ग्यार्थभाम बंतरे रहेन वर्णरहेम बेसवर्ग्यम् सासराह रहे (हर्ण्यार्थभाम ένομα δεί γαρ επίτην τών πρώτων όμχων και αίτιων είναι θεωρητικήν και yap rayabir sal ed of ereas ir the airiar istir. According to this account copio is the scence of first causes. This is not inconsistent with the view of the writer of E. N. vi-bii apu ror cooper μό μόνου το λε των άρχων είδιναι, άλλα καί νερί τας άρχας άληθεύευν (91 7.3.

§ 1. & ec | Lh Mb have & ye, and Cambr. and Ald. have ev 1141 a. 9. alone. Runsaver, reads g re, and fading to find any conjunction answering to it (even be rear to § 2, 1, 12 he regards as answering

1141 a. 0. to loroide ply in § 1, l. 11), conjectures that the quotation from the Margites was followed by a clause containing illustrations of the ascription of suchia to of depisierers rite enteripas, as distinguished from of dams, rae regime. As the text now stands, the argument conducting to fore dishor l. 16 is, he thinks, defective. It is possible that something has fallen out before bore bylow, but the anacouthia noted by Ramsauer need not be regarded as pointing to such a supposition: & often answers to re in Aristotle and the best writers (see Eucken de Ariel, dicende ranone; pars prima, de particularum usu pp. 16, 17, and Pritzsche on E. N. viii. 14. 1 and ix. 11. 1), and clear de rues, though answering, so far as regular form is concerned, to the nearer branda par, may well answer also, per anacoluthiam, to ev te rois régreur rois assuficatorois ras rignes (to which indeed irraida pir relates). The two factsthat would is ascribed both (**) to those who are perfect in some art, and (8t) to those who are capable in the general sense (800s), seem to me to be sufficient to warrant the conclusion fore difficient ότι ακριβιστότη δυ τών έπιστημών είη ή σοφία.

An examination of the articles coopie and coopes in Liddell and Scott shows (1) that any one who excelled his fellows as a carpenter charioteer, \$100, soothsayer, soulptor, and especially as a poet or muscian, was called coopes: (2) that a man with natural abilities was distinguished as coopes from a public who owes alto teaching: (3) that coopes was applied the operation to the man who was wise in matters of common life—e.g. the seven sajes were called coopes; and (4) that the application of the term was restricted by the philosophers to those who were skilled in the sciences, learned, profound, wise.

dapsβεστάτοις] On dapsβεω, see note on i. γ. 18; also Grant's note on that §.

- 6.10. olor beiblar] 'se hipores: quod e verbo droditoper eller potest.'
- 4. 13 § 2. σοφούς οίδμεθα όλως οὐ κατὰ μέρος] Of course, if these are (as is generally assumed) σοφοί pur excellence—pulose places like Thales and Anaxagoras, and not merely men of brill ant general ability and culture, the conclusion ώστο δήλου απλ. follows easily enough.
- a. 14. Some Oungo's onow The quotation merely gives illustrations

til ή κατά μέρου σοφία, and throws no light on the conception of the 1141 a. 14. σοφές όλως.

de to Mapping In Poet. 4. 1448 b. 30 and 38 Aristotle ascribes the Margaier to Homer, and says that it bears the same relation to comedy that the Iliad and Odyssey do to tragedy.

οδι' άλλως τι σοφόν] The editors reles to Clem. Alex. Strom. i. a. 16. 281 (221), who completes the line with πάσης δ' ήμαρτανε τίχνης.

Gore δήλου ε τλ.] The argument is (t) that, because voque is ascended rois displacations, it is itself displacation, and (z) that it is expisionary now interpolar—because, as displacation, concerned, not only with the extins displace, but with displace, and, in its highest form, with the ultimate displace of all imperium, with the remiserant th displace is see An Post t 27, 87 a 31, where a science which has in itself both the distribution that displace is said to be displaced than one which has to borrow its distribution.

§ 3.] Cf M. M. 1. 34. 2197 2. 20 ό δε νοίε έσει περί τόε άρχάε τῶν 2. 17.
ποητών και τῶν δυτών ἡ μεν γόρ ἐπιστήμη τῶν μετ ἀποδείξεως ἄντων ἐστικ, πὲ
δ ἀρχαι ἀναπόδειπτοι, ῶσε οὐκ ἀν εῖη περί τὰς ἀμχὰς ἡ ἐπιστημη, ἀλλ' ὁ ναῦς.
ἡ ἐν στήμα εστίν ἐξ επιστήμης και νοῦ συγκεεμέση. ἔστιν γάρ ἡ σοφία καὶ
περί τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰ ἐν τῶν ἀρχῶν ἤδη δειενύμεσα, περί ἀ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἡ μὲν
οὖν κεμί τως ἀρχως, τοῦ νεὶ αἰτη μετέχει, ἥ δὲ περί τὰ μετὰ τὰς ὑρχάς μετ'
ἀπολείξεως ὁντα, της ἐπιστήμης μετέχει ὥστε δηλον ὅτι ἡ σοφια ἐστικ ἔκ
νε κεί καὶ ἀπιπτήμης συγκε μένη, ῶστ' εῖη ἀν περί ταἰτά, περί ἀ καὶ ὁ κοῦς
καὶ ἢ ἐπεστήμη.

συπερ αεφαλήν έχουσα επιστήμη των τιμιωτάτων] The σοφία, α. 10. so called of a creative artist like Ph.d as is Ganep πεφαλήν Ιχουσα έπιστήμη—technical sk.ll guiced by art stic ideals which the artist's own gen as supplies—σύν ας μέν πανάριστος δε αύτδς κάττα ναήση: the σοφία of the metaph. καται —and t.i.s is the σοφία strictly so called—is διπερ πεφαλήν έχουσα έπιστήμη των τιμιωτάτων, τ.ε των χωριστών εαλ απείτων, the explanation of the universe by reference to its ultimate prin ple, God, νό πρώτον πίνουν , hence distinguished from μαθηματική and φυσική, the other θεωρητικα, έπιστήμα, as διολογική: 202 Μ.λ. Κ. 7, 1064 a. 28 έπελ δ΄ έστι τις έπιστήμη τοῦ δίντας ή δε καὶ χωριστών, σκιπτών πότερών ποτε τή φυσική τὴν αύτην θετών ταύτην είναι ή μάλλον έτέραν, ή μέν αὐν φυσική περί τὰ αινήσεως έχουτ' άρχην έν αὐτοῖς εὐτὸς, ή δε μιθημοτική θεωρητική μέν καὶ περί μένσετά τις αῦτη, ἀλλ' οῦ χωριστά. περί τὸ χωριστόν άρα δν καὶ τὸ άκινητον έτέρα τούτων άμφο—

- 1141 κ. 19. τερων των δειστημών έστι τις, είπερ υπάρχει τις ούσία τοιπύτη, λέγω δέ хиристі кай йейптов, батр петраобиява декнойчась кай вітер боте тев rolliery divois is rule overse, ivraid de ely new sol to below, sai airy de ely πρωτη καλ ευριωτώτη άρχη. δήλου τούνων ότι τρία γένη των θεωμητικών incorpair earl, quarti, pulnyarmi, leukaymi, Bedriorer pir our to των θεωρητικών έπιστημών γένος, τούτων δ' αύτων ή τελευταία λεχιθείσα. περί το τεμιωτατου χώρ έστι των διτων, βελτίων δε κοί χειρων δεάστη Nigeriu nard vo oliecou emigrifiche. Gnopficeit & ib vie novepôr mure vije του δυτος ή δε έπευτημην επεθίλου δεί θείναι ή οδ. των μέν γάρ μαθηματικών έκυστη περί ζε τι γένας άφωρισμένου έστέν, ή δε κυθύλου κοινή περί mirror. el per obe al ground abola sparac rue deras eici, ear f hoaren abmed ame guraaubme ein, er g, gaare gaba donte ver verafe χωριστή και δείνητας, έτέραν δυάγκη και την έπιστήμην σίτης είναι και sportpor the quarties sai solution to spartpar. For the technical meaning of ripus see notes on E. N. L 12.
 - άτοπον γάρ] Ramsauer and Susernal suspect a lacting between ripiordray and dronov on insufficent grounds, I shirk: see their notes ad loc. The connexion seems to me very plain in the text as we have it - Lodia is aspidearous two interspain, i.e. anordinarass, because concerned with to remove (cf. Met. K. 7 quoted above); for (Mb has de) it would be absurd to say that privious is anordanrang, inaumuch as its object is xingov-cf. M. M. 1. 34. 1197 b. 6 Form of xeipon & spongare the coplas (nepl xeipo yap iotin if her yap socia sept ed videos sui ed beior, à di provinces nept ed arapheros άνθρωπφ.

Lb, Ob, Bt, Bt, Bt, NC, CCC, r, and Ald, read viv énuripage πολιτική», introducing confusion into the passage by making imornium the subject of a passage which is concerned with coopia. Coracs, reading imminute, proposes to meet the difficulty by inserting the before moderation, while Cambr. does so by reading the

водитисть висоториям.

el μη το άριστον κ τ λ.] Cf. below § 4. 1141 2. 34 και γήρ ανθρώπου άλλα πολύ δεωτερα την φύσεν, κ.τ.λ. Cf. an interesting passage in Grant's Ether, Essay v. vol. i. pp. 286, 287, in which Aristotle's tidea of the slightness of man and of his actions in comparison with nature, and what he would call the "diviner parts" of the universe,' is dwelt on: 'Aristotle might, in leed, seem to coincide with the utterance of the Psalmist, " What is man in comparison with the Heavens?" But with Lim the heavens were not a more physical creation; rather the e erral sphere of Reason, the abode of 1141 a 21 pure Intell gences, the source of all emanations of Reason and Intelligence throughout the world. Compared with this higher sphere individual man, with his practical and moral life, appeared insign ficant.' On the spicros objects and other operation, see note on ni. 3. 3.

\$ 4. el Sh systerdy u.v h.] I prefer d' (Mh) to Sh bere : another a 22 reason is being given for not identifying opporture with cookin. The argument of the § is-As 'heal by' or 'good' has a different meaning, according as it is applied to the condition of men, or of fishes, while 'white' or 'sitaight' has the same meaning in all connexions, so 'wise' has always the same meaning, whereus 'prudent' has not: 'prudence' in one case is not necessarily 'pradence' in arother, any more than what is a 'heathy' condition in one case is necessarily a "healthy" con lition in another case unlates, the objects of Prudence or Statesmanship, vary, and there are consequently many kinds of Prudence or Statesmanship; but policeplan truth, the object of Wisdom, is one, and there is on rone kind of Wisdom: accordingly, if we identify Pradence or Statesmansh p with W soem, by making Wisdom the knowledge of gardes, we shall land ourselves in the contradiction of "many kara's of W.s.l.m '- many kinds of philosoplac truth,' But it may be asked-Is not man so nighly exalted above the other attemas, that we truy place his u thry in a calegory by i self, as the thin) for executive one in contracistinction to the many varying at they of he other an male? If so, may we not then all nuly States, anship, the science of man's unity, with Wasdern, without thus making 'many Wisdoms'? No, because there are existences Figler tran man. With these Wis lom most cercern riself; and if it concerns itself also with man's utility, we shall still have many Wiedems' I follow Michelet in making the apodosis begin at and to order l. 24. Zell would make it begin at parepor de enf 1. 28.

"Ynserie and dyador are the objects of province, in the wide sense of the term in which it netwices the 'ntelligence' of the lower animals; but observed and elds are not the objects of auria; they more y resemble its objects in being aways the same. So the Patagh of other maps after foreign and of other was a wird near the result of the

- 1141 a 22 observed, takes το σοφόν as the object of σοφίο. It is better to take it as the subject of σοφίο—the wise being or faculty. He or it is of only one type: whereas το φρώνιμον, the prudent being or faculty, is of many types.
 - 25. τὰ γὰρ περὶ αὐτὸ ἄκαστα τὸ εὐ θεωροῦν ψησίν εἶναι ψρόνιμον καὶ τούτω ἐπιτρίψει αὐτὰ] This is Bywater's reading for Brker's τὸ γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ ἐκαστα εἰ θεωροῦν ψαῖεν ἄν εἰναι ψρόνιμον, καὶ τούτω ἐπιτρίψειαν αὐτὰ. For τὰ all MSS, read τὰ: τὰ before εἰ is omitted by r and Mh: φησίν is given by Kh alone, and ἐπιτρεψω by Kh alone. Susemilal, otherwise following Braker, reads ανεούς for αντα, after Mh. Rassow advocates αἰτσύς Foruch, p. 6; If Kh is right with ψησίν and ἐπιτρέψω, the change to the singular number, after the emplaire πάντες ἐν εἴπουν, is so awkward, that one is lempted to suspect that something has die pped out; but wee Byw. Contrib. p 50. Αὐτά are the ἐκαστα, its own peculiar ἀφίλιμα. We trust a being which is φρόνιμον to see to its own interests.
 - 27. τῶν θηρίων ἔνια φρόνιμα) του Μεί. Α. 1. 980 b. 22 φρόνιμα...
 οἶον μέλετα καὶ εἶ τι τοιεύτον ἄλλο γένος ζφων ἐστίκ.
 - existences as such. Hence the editors have suspected the ger uneness of the words. Perhaps they have a usen out of a ditograph of nurser: but G. E. E. 1217 2. 26 quoted by Byw. Cont. 52.
 - a. 34. οὐδὰν διαφέρει] 'that makes no difference'—st ll there will be 'many wis lome.' Easte, has—οὐθεν διαφέρει τοιτο' τουτέσταν οὐκ οἶκείον ἐστιν πρὸν το δείξαι μή ἐτέ σε οἶσος πρὸν ἄλλήλας σαφίαν κοὶ Φρόνηνω.
 - b. 1. σου φανερώτατα γε εξ ων ο κόσμος συνίστηκεν] ' Λω— to take the mest obvicus instance the heavenly bodies' (l'eters). So the Schol. Paris quoied by Zell—τὰ σίρανια σωματο, ὑια μὰ λεγωμεν ῆρωσε καὶ δαίμονος. Cf. Met. Λ. 8. 1074 a. 30, quoted ly the editors, τέλας δαται πάσης φορμες τών φερομενών τι θείων σωμάτων κατά τών σ'ρασόν. Phys. B. 4 196 a. 33 του δ' οἰρανών και τα θεωτατα των φανερών: cf. Met. Ε. 1. 1026 a. 18 τοὺς φανερώς τῶν θείων. These platates—τα θεώτατα τῶν φανερων τε φανερά των θείων—show that ' to take the trost olivious instance' does not fully render the force of σίον φανερώτατα γε. For some account of τα εξ ῶν συνίστηκεν ὁ εσυμος see passages quoted in note on it. 3. 3.

§ 5 in by ... vy photos Ramsauer and Susemall bracket these 1141 b 2. marks. They are unnecessary, and interrupt the obviously close committion between the classing hars of § 4 and 8.8 Anafaryipan nal thanks and room renotions coupons are phononum of an pages close. Ramsauer also notes the unusual nature of the construction pois ran transvision.

Βιό κ.τ λ.] Grant quotes Plato Theore 174 Δ ώσπερ καὶ Θαλής ο 3. δστρονομουντα, ὁ Θεσδωρε, εσὶ ἄνω βλέποντα, πεσόντα ε'ε φρέπρ, Θρήττα τικ έμμελής καὶ χορίεσσα θεραποιν ε ἀποσεωγίαι λεγεται, ώς τὰ μέν ἐν σύρμεψ προθυμοίτο ειδίναι, τὰ δ' ἔμπροσθεν σύτοῦ καὶ παμα πόδας λαυθαικα αύτων. Τπύτων δε ἀρειὰ σκωμρα επὶ πωντος Κσωι εν φιλοσοφές διάγουστο.

§ 6. η δε φρότησες... b. 12 πρακτόν άγαθόν] Razeow (Forsch. b. 8. p. 20) prints this sentence and the beginning of chapter g as displicate prisages. Grant notes that the remark βουλεύσται δ΄ οίδει απ.λ. is here repeated for the third time. A. ch. r. § 6, at d ch. g. § 3.

eid down up that is tore, and rours upantor dyador.] No man b. 11. deliberates about what is invariable, nor, in the region of the variable, about things which have no practical bearing upon life—
1. c. about things "which involve no end realizable in action." As Kamsweet terrains old down limits the sphere of proposite to a certain class of indeplaces, whereas in ch. t. §§ 5, 6 it is simply said that to dopper of a concerned with the indeplaces.

δ δ ἀπλῶς «ῦβουλος] ε. ε. «Εβουλος το the strict sense of the word: b 12
 f ch g § † ἐστε καὶ ἀπλως «ἔ βιβουλεύσθαι καὶ πρώς τι τέλος: εf. ch.
 § 5.

τοῦ αρίστου] τοῦ τὸ (ῆν First. has the following note here: b.18.
δριστου δὶ ὁιθρωπος ἄστιρ διαφυρά πειρενου ἐν τῷ δρισμος ἀπό τῶν πατὰ
τέχνην ἀποτελουμενων διάττησε τὸν φράκμον καὶ τὴν φιαννιστιν ἀγαθὰ
γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τεχνῶν ὑπάρχει ἀποτελέσματα, ἀλλὶ σὐδὶν ἐξ ἐκείνων
ὑπαρχει ἀνθρωπος τὸ ἄριστον, οἰκεία γὰρ καὶ θρουσε κοὶ τροπεξα, και ἰματιον
καὶ τὰ τοιαιτα ἀγαθα μεν ἀνθρωπος, ὡς χρήσεμα καὶ ὑφελιμα, οὐδιν δἰ
αὐτῶν ἀπθρωπος τὰ ἄριστον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτά ἐντι τα ὑποθεσθαι τῷ λογισμῷ τὰ
καθη, καὶ κίριον κύτὰν καὶ δεσπάτην τῆς ἀλόγου ποιήσασθαι. προκτὰ δὲ
λεγωται ἀγαθα τὰ διὰ πράξεων κατορθούμενα, οἰου τὸ ἐν πολέμφ ἀνθρέο
σποθαι, τὸ ἰπὸ ἐπιθυμίας πολεμούμενον ἐγκρατεύνασθαι καὶ ὑσα τοκαύτα.

- 1141 b. 13. δυ πάντων δριστόν τε καὶ εξαχώτατον ή όπαθεια, καὶ τὸ εξω γενέσθαι τῆς σαρεύε. κ.τ.λ.
 - b. 14. § 7 out dark h primare the eachou power? This remark seems to suggest use f here as a qual feation of what has just been said. The general conception of the depotor declarate is also necessary.
 - b. 16. πρακτική γάμ] It is of the essence of the 'knowledge,' which the φρουμμα as such possesses, to issue in action. In the sphere of conduct, 'knowledge' without works is dead.
 - b. 17. odie elboren] ec. ra undohou, Bustr.
 - wal & role dahous in other matters as well as in those with which φρώνησικ is concerned; e.g. in matters with which larger (el γάρ ending on the enden a,t. A) is concerned; so Eustrat. Zeil and other editors quote here Mel. A. t. 98t a. 12 mpès più odu và mpirretu έμποιρία τέχνης ούδεν δυκεί διαφορείν, άλλά και μάλλον έπετυχώνοντας όρωμεν τους εμπειρούς των άνευ της έρπειρίας λόγον έχοντων, αίτων δ΄ έτε ή μεν έμπτιρια τών καθ' έκαστών έστε γνώσες, ή δε τέχνη τών καθιλού, αξ δε mpafeie nat ut yevegete naam nept to nad enaardu etatu. ob gap audomnae bytalet & tarpetime, while ohl' & sort outsteptiese, ohld killing & Suspiry η των άλλων τινά των ούτω λεγομίνων, ώ συμβεβητεν άνθρωπφ είνα.. έάν our drev rise impreplies into rea row histor, and the mis malifabou groupille, to & in routh nat inacron ayour, northanic diapapripartui the lepantius' lepaneurou yan to nad ecaston, that spot to y' elderes nat to ensure the regen the immercial inapper violeda pakkor, and authorizant tous required των εμπείρων δπολαμβανομεν, ώς κατά το είδινοι μαλλον άκολουθιοσταν τήν onchiar naow. routo di, ote ol nir the airlar louaur, o. d' au, al ner ydp Emperpor to ore new idage, debre d'able courses al de en dute mit tips airlins young work, did not the apperentance sept interes represent an publico ribergt populoper ton resputences and notheriging, but has although nonpérme tomes. The writer of E. N. vi. 7. 7 may have had this passage in his mind. His introduction of the term appreciation of the term thay have been suggested by did sal sole doxiriarores a.v.h.
 - b. 18. to notife concurre apie and bytered] souper is opposed to remotive Bapes de Part. Anim. 1. 11. 673 b. 7 quoted by Ramsauer. The argument is All light flesh is wholesome, the flesh of fowls is light: therefore it is wholesome. The man who knows the conclusion, 'the flesh of fowls is wholesome,' is more likely to presente successfully than the man who knows the major 'all light flesh is wholesome,' without knowing the minor, 'the flesh of fowls is

light.' Hence Trendelenburg (Histor, B. trace ver Ph. vol. ii. 1141 b 16 p. 371) would seem to be right in bracketing soops soi h. 20. Wretter Rassow is right (Forsch pp. 96, 97) in substituting spin sai for the rejected words is more coubiful. But spin sai may have come in here (h. 20) as a distograph of spin sai in the line above (19).

φ δέ φράτησε προκτική) Rassow (Form h p. 45) regar is the whole b. 21 passage beginning with these words and ending with σκεπτών ca. 8, § 4. 1142 π. 11 as an interpolation. The σημείον in ch. 8, § 5 can be properly understood, he thinks only in close connexion with the ternarks in ch. 7 § 7 ending with ποίρσει μάλλον 1141 b. 21. I shall try to show that the σημείον follows naturally what has been said in the immediately preceding section—vi. 8, 4

ταθτην μάλλον | την καθ ξιαστο φρίνησιν.

b. 92

ein 5' ar ris noi deraids dexirencement | But even to the most i stimate knowledge of và sell issures the direction of a master faculty is necessary. The man who knows details cannot deal with them without a plan of life. This plan he finds, for the most part, embodied in the institutions which have grown up under the rousdona of 1's State. The master pradence apy recrouse pranque, under which his prudence of de ail works as a geiperigree, is the direction afforded by making qual complering referred to a few lines below in ch 8 § 2. It is only as conforming to general rules Liid down for the common good that the individual finds his own private good. For appreciational physical sec. M. M. 134, 1198 a. 32 nérepor à dorir à épologous apartich à ob, loc du res évicides, és, esc έπιστήμας επιβλέψας, οίου έπι την οίκοδομικήν. έστιν γάρ, ώς φαμέν, έν oleodomen a les girkeremen ere enguinemes que entablement que que entre oleogomes. obroe d' enrie municide alette. Luite di eat à deperferue, andà obros limites oleian, mangrade oleian. Spolun di dui run abbun run nongrador ixes, in ale δοτιο άρχετάκτων καὶ όπηρέτης τούτου. πουγτικός άρα τινός καὶ ά άρχετεκτων έσναι, και του αυτού τούτου (οδ) ποιητικός καλ δ υπηρετικός. ελ τοίνου έμουσε και επί των άμετων έχει, όπερ είκθε και εθλογον, και ή φρόνησες άν नीत कारवाराम्में, वो पूर्वत वेत्ररावी क्रवेतवा कारवारामवी श्रोताम, में देवे पीर्वामनाह विकास apperierou res abiou forer bour pap abro aportifice, airos al aperal eal al ear' abrae upierovers. east obs at operat upartical, and if important apaerus) do sin. In this passage we transf understand that it is

1141 b. 22. as realising ή καθ' έναστα φρονησιε, or empirical knowledge of eight and wrong, that al aperal are contrasted with ή φράνησιε ή αρχιτεκτουκή.

CHAPTER VIII.

ARGUMENT.

Statesmanship and Prudence are the same faculty regarded from different

pornets of wiew.

Ender States manchip, or Prudence as conversed with the welfare of the State, are included - 1 the faculty of less latens in accordance with a comprehensive plan of social life. (3 the faculty of dealing with the details of social life this latter operes within has taken to steelf the general term, state manchips is (a) desiberative and be judicial; and dealing as it does in the assembly and love courts, with farteenlar cases assuing in particular decrees and verdicts, is thought by many to bothe only form of statesmanship, for it is that in the practice of which alone people are seen to be "doing comething," like workmen.

Semilarly, many think that Prudence as concerned with one's own private offairs is Prudence for excellence. It has, indeed, the generic mane, Frudence; but knowing the good of others in the jame's and in the 'state creatily Prusence. Knowing what is good for onest f is only one species of knowing what is good for man, but it is a specie, distinguished from the other species—knowing what is good for other people—by a large differentia; it therefore cerns to many to be soll general. The man who can see well to be convened to them, but to be prudent, and those who devote themsees to the inverses of others are consistent that and structure from the interest of other people. A man cannot be prudent in the count interest without considering the interest, of other people in the family and the State.

If 'one's own' interest could be abstracted from the savad terme, and made the objet by start of 'Prudence,' then boys would be 'prudent' they was increasing with with the abstraction, of mathematics; suby not, then, at a with the abstraction of 'their own' interests? But they are no more 'prusent' in 'their own' interest than they are well versed in philosophy and the natural venera. This may be taken as a sign that 'one's own' interest comes abstracted, that Prudence, like professions in the concrete viences, requires long and wide experience for its auquirement—experience of 'whe's own' interest as

that inheres in the classes of the interests of the community.

Pendence, then, being the commediate knowledge of garticulars, or set accounted knowledge, for recentric knowledge or med ate, or proved, knowledge, at is therefore the anothers of Reason, for Reason apprehends universals immediately. Its furtherstars, then, being apprehendes, not mailine'y as combinesses


are apprehended by science, but immediately. Prulence will be a port of tensemet indeed like light, which perceives olowe immediately as its operal object or kearing which fereines would but rather like the sense by which we perceive a geometrical figure a transfe or a circle-immediately for what it is.

§ 1. η πολιτική] Grant has an important remark here—that, 1141 b.23. according to Aristo le, 'φρώνηστε was a psychological term expressing a faculty of the mind, but πολιτική was merely one of the divisions of the sciences. In order to make them commensurate, Findenties alters the sign fication of πολιτική. He treats it as a state of the mind (έξικ), as a mode of φρώνηστ, dealing with the State either un versally or in details. From the same later point of view he adds also οἰεονομική."

ή αύτή μέν έξες, το μέντοι είναι ου ταυτόν αυταίς Sec note on v t 20. Holosof the processe of the citizen, and opposition, the pro lence of the man, are the same liabit viewed from different points, as the citizen and the man are the same person viewed from different points. Take the case of one who 'gets on well in the world.' He may be locked at either as a man who conducts his own affairs prudent y, or as a citizen who contributes by his position and influence to the welfare of the State of which he is the product. His career is a line in which the private can only logically be distinguished from the public side. Except as conforming to the conditions of the community to which he be ongs, and as promoting its good no man can be said to mirrage his own affire prad at y non fare ed abrod ed abro obnomina odd ares nodireins § 5. From the narrowest φρώνησιε πομ αὐτών is πολιτική—al.hough the latter name is technically given only to the faculty of the · public man' the legislator, ecclesiast, dienst, or executive officer. We may say then that the ific monogram uspi ed mount ayathi is Sphenou and nepi ubrue, and nohman quel nept ereport. These are two aspects legically distinguishable: but there is no such thing as curing only for eneself, or caring only for others.

Fritzelie and Grant make much of this & and the three following §§ as fulfilling a promise 'made before in the E. E.' v.z. i. 8. 1218 b. 9 vo d' où évera me réloc éphorou sal airms tou úp airò and spursus narras. Some roit de els auto ed depudes to rilos eme delpusque upustus, roito d' iord to ind the applas naoue, ant d' iord noltres and oissenauted and opposement. Superpousa yép avras al éfece upos tès dillos to roisser elsas upos d' all'has el ti diapépousas, vorspos lestées.

1141 b 84. § 2] The d visions made in this § and in § 3 may be tabulated thus:—



Here $\phi_{phinprie}$ is used in a generic sense (A), and a specific sense (a)—boxe, de sui $\phi_{phinprie}$ μ_{dhinr} when ϕ_{phin} above sai for sail δ_{R} is also used in a generic (A), and a specific (a) sense.

b. 26. νομοθετική) The architectoric relation of κομοθετική to ή πολιτική ή περί τὰ καθ εκαστα, απ wed as to ολουνομική and ή περί σύτθυ φρόνηστε, is not exhibited to the eye in the above table, in which νομοθετική appears an coordinate with πολιτική (a), and as having no bearing at all upon ολουνομική οτ φρόνηστε (a). In the well ordered State, however, it donai rates all three —φρώνηστε (a), ολουνομική, απ Ι πολιτική (a)—δ γάρ κόμου δγορεύει περί άπάστων. Its architectoric relation, to πολιτική (b) at least, is better brought out in Pol. Δ. 11 1297 b. 37, where three μόρια τόν πολιτικόν πασών are distit turshed.

1) of Buolevolueron repl run nowume the del betative holy: (2) of repl ris applied the executive: and (3) to design—the judicial body; and supplered is said to be concerned theoretically, i.e. are intectanically, with all three: fore dy this polyce the nonlinear marks are deliberated and are not designed.

† δί ως το καθ έκαστα] The Vet. tr. has—have autem ut care singular a commune habet nomen politica as if he read † δί ως εκρίτα καθ έκαστα. Rumsauer cut jectures † δί ως χειροτεχική (οτ ως πραττουσα) περί τὰ καθ έκαστα. Would it not be simpler to read † δί ως καθ έκαστα! Cf. hl. 1, 15 † δίνοις . . . † καθ έκαστα.

πρακτική και βουλευτική] This is not the formal division of \$141 b 27 πλιτικέ (a). That is given in the next section as βουλευτική at d διαστική. Here the writer wishes mercy to characterise πολιτική (a) λε προκτική ε as concerned with τὰ αυθ ἐκωστικ in contradistinction to κομιώττική which insolves ή τῶν καθάλου θεωρία. He adds και βουλευτική το στό το explain πρικτική τὸ γῶρ ψήφισμα προκτόν ὧε τὸ ἐσχατον. He might have written—σῦτη δὲ προκτική, ήτοι βιουλευτική καὶ δικιστική: το γαρ ψήφισμα προκτόν ὧε τὸ ἔσχατον (s. . ἐν τή βουλεύσει), καὶ ὁ πρόσει.

64 to donator Fustr. has -to popularia dorte & redeviation of apieus 5. 28 of Bandonstone irrefiguate to dec presentes ent to apareflere (gripare, oix is eastilou quanturen all is to yator on eastenanter to yap easiline of asafes investment. A hippropa is the first step in the execution of a policy. It carries with it consequences which result in the realisation of a certain +Aus. Dellheration, starting from the conception of this rador, reviews the steps by which it may be realised till at last the first step actually to be taken is reached in thought This is he poplious, whi h is thus to logarov; of E. N. ill 3, 11, 12 6 yap Bookevoueros cours Cyrein nat duahorar . . . ώσπερ δωγραμμα . . . και το έσχετον έν τη αναλύσει πρωτον είναι έν τη yerian. The term layerer often stands simply for the 'particular' as such-eg E. N. vi. 11, 3 for. 38 row and finite sal row logaries άπαντα τά πρακτα: Μεί. Κ. 1. 1059 b. 26 πασα έπιστημη τών καθολου cal of the drydrer: of. E.N. vi. 3 23 foxorer book. Furticulars as such are called fuzuro, doubless because they are individuals, or ultimate units found by breaking up genus and species.

διο πολιτεύεσθαι κ.τ.λ., πολιτική (a)—ή χειροτεχνική, has appropriated to recil the generic name which it ought to share with ή άρχιτεκτονική. Only "party men," active politicians —those who have a hand in carrying on the current business of the State," are popularly regarded as "our statesmen." Postical thinkers are not regarded as "statesmen."

§ 3, δοκεί δε και φρότησες κ.π.λ.] Similarly, φρότησει (a) has ap-b. 20. propriated to twilf the generic name which it ought to share with οἰκονομικό and πολιτική. Το be able to manage 'one's own' affairs well is Produce and the only real Produce, it is thought (δοκεί); for to attend as a 'politician' to other people's affairs is the mark, not of a product man, but of a busybody. The truth, however, νου, π.

- 1141 b. 29 is that, as the State which is ruled by hypórman a strat of rópos sinks into the social chaos of h loxdry dynospania (Pol. E. 8. 1312 b. 36), so the man who tries to manage his own adairs, without regard for the common good, courts his own rule. One's own good' cannot be abstracted from the common good, and treated as a thing by itself.
 - § 4. elbog . . . nohunpdypoves] 'Knowing one's own good (pointure b. 33 i) and knowing what is good for other people (molinish) are the two species silly of knowing what is good (applement A). Hit these two species are distinguished from each offer by such a large 'affirence' (diapopi), that they often do not seem to be coordinate species at all under the same genus. 'My owr good' is such a very different thing to me from 'my neighbour's good, and seems so superior, that the tendency is to make the knowledge of the former coextensive with Prudence, and to cast the knowledge of the latter out of the genus altogether as molumnaypouries. This interpretation assumes that diodopa is here used in its logical sense as diapopa elboracie or differentia specifica and is suppressed by the freegoing elder = species, see (e.g.) Met. 1. 7. 1057 b. 7 in pup rov yevere nal raw diadopar ra cidy. It is the interpretation του καθ έσυτον φρονίμου πρώς ολκονομικών και πολιτικών και φησίν ώτο έκαστφ μεν τούτων καί γνώσες έστε και φράνησες πλήν έχουσε διαφορώς πρός άλλήλους, τφ γίνει μίν ίσως διτας τούς αίταις (τούτας Funts.) διαφιροσσία di nodi roctor mois tà domi, sui romairer dote sal doccie tar c'èma τά περί αυτου, απο περι αὐτά διατριβοντα, φρόνεμον είναι, τον δε πολιτικών οὐ ψρώτρου άλλα πολυπραγμούς ώς το έξω έσυτου ζητούντα, και έξυταζουτα

It is difficult to suppose that in a context in which the species of a genus are distinguished, διοφορά can be used in any but in this, its logical, sense. Ze I, Cornes, Grant, and Ramsatter, however, follow Lambinus in understanding δλλ ζει διαφοράν πολλην to in can—

verum de hoc ipso magna est controversia.

n. 34. yracewe] Lustr. had a r. L. diponiareor before him.

το αυτώ είδεναι] Eustr. says that the phrase is elaptical, and that we must inderstand δερέλιμον, συμφέρον, οι δριστον. Αύτοί the

¹ Outproperty is not mentioned, perhaps because, as kusts, anys, 4 paperturous of the transfer of property of the period of the

reading of Mb, is tempting, but is probably only one of the con- 1141 6 34 jectures of which Mb is full.

ual bossi u.v h | Tustr. brings out correctly the force of these 1149 a t words - διαφέροντας (ε c. του καθ' έπιστου φρόνιμου καί του πολιτικου) τοσούτον ώστε και δοκείν τον είδοτα τά περί αύτον φρόνεμον είναι, τόν he makerinin of policy on alka making proposes. So much is made of the spec he difference between difference well abrox and notional, that the latter is east out of the genus which the former is allowed to enampel se.1 But the truth is, as the writer is about to show, that the mipl minim and molerary are closely connected. A man cannot secure 'h a own' interests fiver vinoroping old firer noderems § 4). If § 5) one's own in crests could be abstracted from the exercte tissue of social well-being, and treated simply by themselves, boys, who can deal with simple abstractions, might be expected to be discount. As a matter of fact hey are not opposition, because the 'good' with which even the most self-regarding φμώνησιε is conerned, is concretely imprivated with the 'common good,' which unly a man of ripe experience can estimate.

οί δε πολιτικοί πολυπράγμονες Zell and Grant quote Plato 8. 2. R p. 413 A το τά αύτου πραττειν και μη πολυπραγμουείν, and Gorg. 520 C φιλιασκρού τα αυτού πραξαντός και ού παλυπρογμοσύνην έμπειρούν Τους. περί άταβόντως 319 τους μέν διά πολυπραγμοσύνην έμπειρούν πόν όγωνου γεγενημένους.

Espenions] From the Philocutes of Europides; see Dindorf, Port Seen. p. 352. The third late of the present quotation seems to have been in full—

ions μετασχείε τη σοφωτότη τίχης;
After this line there seems to have followed a passage (para-

After this line there seems to have followed a passage (paraphrased by Dio Clir. Or. 59, p. 575) which ended with the lines.—

> ούδω γάρ αύτω γαύρον ε δα άνλη έφυ: τους γάρ περισσούς καί τι προσσοστας πλίου

After which in our text 1142 a. 6 the l'araph. Heliodorus seems to have read 2000 pure, and CCC adds our fiere provinces.

Egradar) 1. . Il ose ole duni o nepi abror elbar nai diarp Bar pporque elvat. a. 7.

1 For examples of the general tendency illustrated by the extrusion of notions from its genus, see Mal's Logic iv. 3, especially \$ 4.

* γαύροι - αυθάδης, σεμούς, μεγαλακρικής ή μετίωρος-llerych.

- Rairot lows our fort to autou en' aven cinoropias oud aven modiffices 1142 A. O It is impossible to secure one's own good, without taking account of the good of the house sold and even of the State. The Paraph has a good no e here in which he shows how the next sentence in di and, and the openior & 5 are connected with this remark unitoe ad devardy lowe the houses eines lives the also somethings, aide the nikonqueno don the maketiene of yill dounted ed en endus to mis éautor τινα διαθείναι, της ολείας αυτφ. ή της πύλεως ου καλώς έχουσης. χυλεπόν yap un diadelopinin eing hern boyyan danyan giaebigones, et ge beeg μηθενός διατρίβει, άλλά βίαν έχει μανατην, πώς είσεται το έαυτή άγαθον; deglor yap, and goein didagradian apply about and anifemy. adivaror unes inacibiat deriagon, à qu'elbia emb en comme ja unem corri και οίκιας και πόλεως, και άρευ τοιστιρ ούε όμι έμπειρου σύδε Φρουκμου είναι Similarly Eustrain, who formally distinguishes two reasons why olk fire is avrov ed hery olkoropian old hery moderaine (t) Man is a social being. Family and public life is part of the concrete life of the individual: (2) the deliberation necessary to accure 16 abrox eyable cannot be carned on without coreered. This is how he explains 1142 a. 10 fer de ed airoù min dei dinesiv, Adghor ene okenveur, He says - The de oreiver del converse, à de convenie à cicaropien à materier. This interpretation of overrior 1142 a, 10, by which it is made to refer to the sweete of the opinion, is, I datesay, possible; but it would be more in accordance with Aristotchan usage to make it refer to the oxides of the writer and his ready. The sentence in \$2 . . . occuriou a one which it is in lead difficult to explain satisfactorily in its context. At any rate, however, we may suppose that the our adolor of \$ 6, 1142 a. 20 is intended to contrast with the above of § 4, 1142 a. 10.
 - a. 11. § 5. σημείου κ. τ.λ.] Rassow (Forsch. p. 45), as was pointed out in note on ch. 7. § 7. b. 21, regards the passage leginning ch. 7. § 7. t. 141 b. 21 ή δι φρύνησαν πρακτική, and ending here 1.142 a. 11 with σκοπτιση, an an interpolation and takes the σημείου closely with the remarks in ch. 7. § 7 which end with ποιήσαι μάλλου 1.141 b. 21. It is true that the σημείου would follow these remarks very appositely. But close it not follow unless sim fars το σίτου εδ δινευ οἰκουομίας αιδό δινευ πολιτείων αρμοκίτεly enough? Τὸ εξηημένου is οἰκ fars τὸ σύτοῦ εδ δινευ οἰκουομίας οἰδ δινευ πολιτείων φρουητες περί αὐτὰν καὶ ἐνα

³ Cambr. seems to be the only MS which agrees with K⁵ in reading ed ³ Moral science endocived as the science of the individual's good.

requires that wide expenence which can be obtained only in Rot- 1149 a 11. rossa. The fact that hays are not opphrant, although publiparoson, peints to the truth of this statement; for if we enquire why they as- not position, we find that it is because prosper needs long expensive of life are, if we enquire why they are padaparated, we fird that it is because the abstract tru ha of mathematics do not need 'long experience of life' for their apprehension, but are plain at first sight. If to abrob dyador were something which could suband by use fin abstraction from ro source ayadée (as the dife stated and examined in § 4 would have us believe), boys in ght be equal to us comprehersion, as they are equal to the comprehersion of tip abstract truths of mathematics; but they are not equa, to the comprehension of 78 abree dyadies so it would seem to follow that this dyndor does not subsist by itself in abstraction from 10 nondo ayathe, but that to comprehens it one must be able (which boys are not) to take account of the good of the household and of the State.

Score | - in: see Index Arise. s. v dides; but perhaps we ought a 12 to read in here treating bi- as a distograph of the preceding oc: see Index Arise. - interior dicras do now. dides inde viden ortas case, quod praceedit vocabulum terminans in oc, praecipue roc, Valuen monet Rive. p. 58 - then follow several references to places where dides—fre is preceded by roc.

it έμπειρίας] See Me. A. 1 981 a. 15 ή μεν έμπειρια των καθ' » 18. εκαινών έστι γεώσει: An. Post, ii 19. 100 a. 3 έκ μεν οθε αδοθέσεως γίνοται μεήμη ωστερ λέγομων, έκ δε μεήμης πολλακιε τοι αθτου γενομώσει έμπειρία αλ γάρ πολλαλ μεήμαι τῷ δριθμῷ έμπειρία μια έστιν.

but not oportion?' and the answer was—' because opportunit needs experience, as a he has no experience.' Section 6 proceeds—' and this is the true answer, because (inv.) it assigns his lack of opportunit to a cause which accounts also for his not having a grasp of the rance has of philosophy or of natural science.' Render—' For if we go on to ask why a boy may be a mathematician, but cannot understand philosophy or natural science, we find that it is because the truths of mathematics are abstract, whereas the principles of philosophy and natural science are reached through long experience. A boy does not realise the meaning of the principles of

- 1142 a. 10. philosophy and natural science, but mercy repeats by rote the formulae used to express them; the truths of mattematics, on the other hard, he comprehends fully, for they are plain at first sight."
 - robos i.e outos datos as distinguished from robol en rounira above, line a. 13
 - & despéreus và de or et adminérant, results or products of abstraction,' are regularly used as - 'the truths of mathematics' see notes on 1. 3. 1 and i. 3. 5: cf. Trendelenburg's note on de An. v. 4. 8 (cf. also h s Flem Log. 5 36, note), where it is pointed out that the first meaning of apaleure is material-e.g. it is the process of classing away the block of stone tal the perfect form of the statue is reached in Phys i 7, 190 b 7 to d'apapeau olor is rot lidou o Epuips. It is then applied to the process of reaching offer or concepts by leaving out of account the particularities of inda luals, and fixing attention upon essential characterist cs; and especially to the process of reaching those oldy with which mathematical science (see An. Post 1, 13, 79 a, 7) is concerned Eustratius has the following note on to & apa pircue here χωρίε των δασκειμένων κατ' ένέργειαν διφιστασθαι μη δυνώμετα, άφαιρωδνrat de nor encount in ran bronquirus in ois the rejuve, and by en dan

τασια δφιστηκότα περί της διανοίας την εξέτασω δέχανται περί των έποprivate aireis.

Of posed to if aparprocus 'abstract' is in apportunes 'concrete'; see Md. A. 2. 982 2. 27 and An. Post. I. 27, 87 a. 31, where geometry is said to be 'more concrete' than arithmetic, and therefore less exact—eal of sharroum depitiearopa ris de apondureme vior γεωμετριας άριθμητική λίγω δε έκ προσθέσεως, οίον μονάν οδοία άθντος prepuis de ovoia berbe ravens ex apostéveus. Geometry in ée apoubecause as compared with arithmesic, because it adds positive : it adds also the three dimensions as generated by the motion of the point, and, and plane respectively: see Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre, pp. 83, 84

It is not to be unlestood from the words to per di apartire forw, ries & al appeal of emergias that adaptors and imperior are mutually exclusive. The oppoint natural science are de opaquette, mass uch as they are general points of view, not par scalar observations; see An. Pest ii, 19, 100 a. 6 de 8' contemas & de nurrie ήρεμήσσετος του σοθύλου έν τη ψυχή του ένδε παρά το πολλα δ έν όποσεν is defi derison to alto textus doug our instrument; and it is by in fact on that even en ex diproposeus par excellen e—the truths of mathematics, 1142 a. 1m. are said to become known in An. Post i. 18, 81 b. 2 advaror di en anchar despiror proposeus des imagazios, incl. and en ex diproposeus desopreus terras de inagazios proposeus accommendation on which see Waitz's note.

zal τὰ μ/r] The apyai of philosophy or natural science, των δί a. 19. being τὰ δι ἀφαιρίσων.

ob moredously 'do not real se', see Index Arist—'πωνεύων omn no hemitatem persuasionis significat, sive ea doffy sive èmoré μρε ν επ se naturam habet sive ad cognitionem principlorum perturet' -see de An. ili 3, 428 b. 4, 428 a. 21. Ε.Ν. νιί. 3, 4. An. Pri.e. 2. 23, 68 b. 13 διαινέα πιστευρών ή διά συλλογισμού ή έξεταγωγής.

400 h h dyourse) Grant compares E. N. vii. 3 8 of aparon madares a 20 surfavor min rade horses, brave & obnu.

των δε το τί εστιν ούκ αδηλον] i.e. the definitions, όρισμοί (θέσεις Ot λόγοι του τί έστιν Απ Post. 11. 10. 94 1. 10), from which the that exists are point and easily understood a, first sight: as kustratius says — εστι σειγμή, τί έστι γραμμή, τί έστιν έπεφαντα, τι σωμα, τι κίνλος, τί τρίγωνου, και των σχηματών έκαστον, καὶ όσα έτερα θυστικώς λαμβώνει ο γραμώτρης . . . οίδασι διὰ τὸ μὴ πολλοῦ δείσθαι κούνοι πρόκ τὸ καὶ τοὺν όρισμο αὐτῶν ἐπίστασθαι. On όρισμοί and their tell tou to ἀναδιέξες κων ε χ. Απ. Post. 11. 3. 90 h. 30 όρισμός μων γάρ τοῦ τί εστι και αὐσιας αἰ δ΄ ἀποδιέξεις φαίνονται πασαι ὑποτιθεμεναι καὶ λαμβώνεισαι το τί έσταν οἰνν οἱ μαθηματικαὶ τί μονές καὶ τί τὸ περιττάν, τοῦ οἱ δλλαι όμοίως.

\$7. Ιτι κ.τ.λ.) This seems to be another argument (after the algreener in §§ 3.6) to prove that old fore to altoo et alve observant of a surround and algreeness of Early. τουτο προς το άνωτερω συτίν ατι δεί τη εδήσει του οίκειου άγωθου της του κοινού άγωθου γνωτεως. . . δ γώρ Βειλευμαμενου ή ήμαρτε . . . ή ήνωτύχησε εν τε τψ αωθόλου και το καθεκαστα, σοτε δμέρω δει τόν φρότιμον έχειν . . . καθολου δε άγωθου λέγει και καθεκαστον, το κοινόν και το Ιδικόν Τοτι δι το μίν ίδικον τοῦ ίδιως φρώτιμου, το δι κοινον τοῦ οίκονομικοῦ, ῶστε δεί τῷ ίδιως φρώτιμο τοῦ κακουρικού και παλατικού. (β. thu l'ataph. - "Κτι, έπεὶ ή όμαρτία ή περι τος πρώξεις ἀπό άγνοίνε αυμφερίνεις ή τῆς καθολου, ή τῆς μερικής (κα, γομ ο άγνούν καθόλου, ότι τὰ βορύστοθμα ῦδοτο φαιλα, καὶ ὁ τοῦτο μεν είδια, όγνοων δι μερικος, ότε τὰ βορύστοθμα ῦδοτο φαιλα, καὶ ὁ τοῦτο μεν είδια, όγνοων δι μερικος, ότε τὰ βορύστοθμα ῦδοτο φαιλα, καὶ ὁ τοῦτο μεν είδια, όγνοων δι

1142 a 30 yap indrepos role packor idam), pavepor des upos rolpi de partes, despendent al partes, de role rollina partes, de partes de partes de partes de partes de partes de partes relativas, est de partes de partes de partes relativas, est de partes relativas de partes de partes de partes de partes. It would be a pear that in the present que have a partel addited from medical science to illustrate the interliperante est a knowledge of what is good for others and a knowledge of what is good for others and a knowledge of what is partelled to the knowledge of the social poul; the particular, rolliperant partes, to the knowledge of one sown good. As the conclusions of largues demand in the knowledge of both a major and a minor, so do those of popular even when it seems to be concurred than with one's own good.

Zell refers to Probl. 933 b. 23, where it is stated that to me adjusted happy to di your missor. The adjective Appropriation of pears to occur only here in the Aris otelian Corpus. Secondal limites this §.

- a 23 § 8. δτιδή φρόνησες οὐκ ἐπιστήμη, φανερόν τοῦ γάρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν, ἄσπερ εἴρηται] (f. Mel. K. 1. 1056 b. 26 πάσα ἐπιστήμη τών καθείνα καὶ οἱ τῶν ἐσχατων. 1 or the senge of ἔσχατον (= ult mate melte dua.) του above, note on vi. 8. 2 b. 28. The expression τοῦ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν ἡ ἡρωνησιε has not actually occurred before, hut, as Kamsauer notes, the equiva ence of το καθ ἔεπστον and το ἔσχατον is assumed.
- i. 25. § 9. νψ² s.c. τψ θεωρητικώ νω as distrigated below it 11. 11. 4
 from the πρακτικός νους, which is τοῦ «σχατου καὶ ἐνδιχομενου και τες
 έτέρας πρατάσεως.
- λόγος] = σελλογισμός.
- α 27 (moriga) ι ε, me hate, deductively derived knowledge.

ούχ ή τών ίδιων, άλλ' σία αἰσθανόμεθα ότι τό [δν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς] έσχατον τρίγωνον] We have here the Aristocchan det netion between the iδια αἰσθητά (propria considera) of the Schoother) and the mose αἰσθητά (communia semidilia), as explained in de An 11. 6. 418 a. 7 λικτικού δι από ἐκαστην αἰσθητών περί τῶν αισθητών πρώτον, λεγεται δι τὸ αἰσθητών τριχως, διν δύο μεν καθ' αἰνα ψαμιν αἰσθανισθος, τὸ δί ἐν κατα στιμβεβηκες τῶν δὶ διο τὸ μεν ίδιων ἐστιν ἐκάστης αἰσθήσεως, τὸ δὶ κοινών πασών. λεγω δ' ἰδιον μεν διμό ἐνδεχεται ἐνερα αἰσθήσει αἰσθανισθος, καὶ περί διμή ἐνδεχεται

απατεξόρου, αίου δήτε χρώματος και ακοή ψόκρου και γευσιε χεμεί. ή δ' αφή 1142 a 27 Phelove per Type diagraphic all' design ye aplace nept roomer, eat our απατάται ώτι χρώμα αὐδ' ότι ψύφος, ελλώ τε το κεχρωσμένον ή που, ή τε το property in the same of the second section in the second in second ήρεωία, δράφως, σχέρω, μέγεθος τὰ γάρ τοιαύτα οδδεριάς έπτιν ίδια, άλλά roused militair" and you didly relegate the farm all byth mil byth, mit at until Brene de Legeral authyrus, aine ei en Leuron ein Aupone vine' unen ungledynou γιρ τούτου αιστίανεται, ότι τῷ λευκῷ συμβέβηκε τούτο οδ αίσθανεται. διδ בשל שנילבי משמקינ או דיוווינישי ביו ביו מושלקדום. דביי לל מחם שניים מושלקדום का तीक बाक्राकर रेक्सर कोक्टीपुरात, को सक्कर में में कोकात मार्क्सवरण रेस्वक्सपुर बोमिन्नियान, (). nept trunview 1, 458 b. 4 must & fart row ainthorns olas arthua nu peretor and aimous and edition of combra, idea & olow xpapa hoches gence. We must note the admission, made at the end of the pussege quoted from de An ii. 6 that the acrea olodyra are after all not aloby to in the strict sense (repres). In de An. m. r. 425 b 5 they are called the common concumitants (th ambandoners are noise) of the Die elebyri, and must be regarded as really intelligibility familiar present in the propria sensiblia. As such, they differ from the suna coursesques aladyra of de An. 11, 6, 418 2, 20, which are there y emprically inferred proper sensibles; any when one inters the bitterness of the yellow but which one sees, the bitterness tt eard συμβιβηκου αισθητών (ch. An 11, 1, 425 b. t). The eye, as such, is not affected by it. The nowa alcohold are described by Ham Lon (Red, p 830) as 'concorn tant cognitions to which the or pression on the organ of the proper sensible only affords the occasion', and G ant says 'We acc in the appreciousion of number, figure, and the ike, not an operation of sense, but the mind pairing is own forms and categories, i.e. itself, on the external object.' In de An. iii. 1. 425 a. 13 the five common sens bles enumerated in de An ii. 6 are reduced to the awnors: alka who αίδε τών ποινών οίσε τ' είναι αισθητήριών τι ίδρον, δεν εκάττη αίσθησει αισθωτέροθο (οί) κατά συμβε Ιηκός 1, οίον κινήσεως, στοσεώς, σχήματος, μεγεδους, άριθμου ενίε. 1 τουτα γύρ πυντα πινησει αίσθονόμεθα, οίον μέγεθος εικήσει ώστε εκί σχήμα μίγεθος γυρ τι το σχήμα το δ' ήρεμούν τώ μή κι-

to The ob la Tornirik's emjecture. The mond alothy the are not to be confounded with an anal supplefly and modyra of the An. 1. 6. 418 a. 16. The mond wedgen are not emperically inferred from the line alothy to, but are formally resent to them: see do An. iii. 1. 424 a. 27 the bl monday for lyoper alothy in every of earth and anybeily mor.

We have not real y a sixth common sensible added here to the five given in it. 6, for is included in apicules.

1142 c. 27. ρείσθαι à δ' άριθμές τη άποφάσει του συνεχούς και τοις ίδιοις εκάστη γαρ le alactareras alachares. Gave δηλαν ότι άδύναταν ότουσην ίδων αίντησαν είναι τυύτων, οων κινόσεως ούτω γάρ έσται ώσπερ νύν τη δίμες τό γλυκο οίσθανομεθα, τυντο δ΄ ότε άμφοιν ίχοντες τυγχαισμέν αίσθησικ, ή καὶ ύταν συμnearest the grapheness. On this reflection of the most abound to singers Hamilton (Read, p. 829 note ") has the following remarks 'Many modern phi osophers when they attempted to explain the origin of our notion of extension from metion, and, in particular, the mot on of the hand, were not aware that they had the Stagane at their head. It is to be remembered however, that Asistoile does not attempt, like them, to explain by motion our necessary concept." of space, but merely our contingent perception of the telative extension of this or that particular object. This, however, takes it for granted, that by motion (kingon) Aristotle inter ds local melion. But motion is with him a generic term, composing uncer it lour, or six, spe es; and in point of fact, by motion Aristotle may here (de An. i.i. 1), as in many, if not most, other places of his psychological writings, mean a subjective mutation (alkoword) or modelication of the percipient. This too is the interpretation given to the passage by the great majority, if not the whole, of the ancient expositors It is therefore remarkable that Dr. Trendelenburg. in his late valuable edition of the De Anima, should have appatently contemplated the interpretation by local motion, as the only one proposed, or possible. See also Trendelenturg's Logische Untersuchungen, vol. i. chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8, in which the intuition of motion is described as fundamental in sensation and thought-'Ine Bowegung ist die erste Thätigkeit des Denkens und des Seins. der Raum st. las aussere Frzeugn ss der Bewegung : die Zeit ist die Vorstellung des innern Masses der Dewegung 1 (p. 168).

The nowd alotheri, as distinguished from the idea alothera, are to be assigned directly to the so-called nonder or niquos alothery or nown alothers as faculty: (see de Mem. 1. 450 s. 4). But ultimately it e loss alotheri also are to be referred to it. 'Common sense-nound alotheri also are to be referred to it. 'Common sense-nound alotheri, says Hamil on (Reid, p. 756), 'was employed by Aristict e to denote the faculty in which the various reports of it exercal senses are reduced to the unity of a common appearantiem': see mapl through all dyphydopaws 2. 455 a 12 and b' images and informed alothering alothering to discuss the sense of the several bases are reduced to the unity of a 22 and b' images and informed alothering to discuss the sense of the

¹ Kant would my-intuition, not concept.

κοική δίναμε εκολουθούσα πάσαι, ή και ότε όρφ και άσούε και αισθυστει» 1163 a. 37.

αὶ γερ δή τή γε διψει όρφ δτε δρφ. και κρίνει δή και δύναται κρίνειν ότι

δτερα τὰ γλυκία τῶν λεικων, αίτε γεύτει οῦτε διψει οῦτ ἐμφοῦν ελλά τινι

κοική μομίφ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἀπάστων, δοτε μεν γὰρ μία αἶτθητει, καὶ

το κυμών αισθητηρίου ἐυ' τὰ δ' εἶνοι αἰσθήται τοῦ γίνουν ἐκοατου ὅτεραν,

αῶν ψυζιου καὶ χρώματας, τοῦτο δ' διμα τῷ ἐπτιοῷ μάλισθ ὑτιμχει'

τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ χωρίζεται τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητηρίων, τὰ δ' δλλα τούτου

άχωριστο.

horn aladnor is thus the 'consciousness' of sensations—the reference of them to a self-conscious subject, this subject being enhodied in a tactually sensitive organism governed in the case of rà lempa, by a lie ut - de Samuo, Ch. 3, 456 a 4 márra sa lemma ao, liar They aid if hogy ris empress aid ris anotheress ris upplas inreview form. koon workyour is the ultimate 'faculty' of all sensation—if e ed sound aireford nonmate, figure &c) are indeed to be referred to it, but so are ultimately the this aladyra also. It is the living being, one and in livisible, conscious of the various it in materia in the forms of categories of peyelos, unina, ordina, doublin, conors. But the living being in court tray dyan nivigaeus nu aladyaeus de Sanna 4, 450 a. 5). and the categories in which it is conscious of alabard may be relaced to one viz. almois. Su ce, however, if roi alabyrai impyria no vie olodijorus j alvi iore nal ula (de Au ... 2 425 b. 25) since in actual experience subject and object are one, this informate category of the mind is also ultimate in things: "die bewegung set die erste Thängkeit des Denkens und des Seins."

On the general subject of the ibia and some aladyris, see Hann ton's Read, note D on Primary and Secondary Qualities of Body, especially pp. 828-830 (Hamilton regards the Anstotehan distinction as analogous to that between Primary and Secondary Qualities): see also Trendelcaburg, de Anima, notes on passages quoted above, and I don't Walance, Psychology of Aristotle, Introduction § 18, and notes on passages quoted above see also Grant's useful note ad loc.

ola] 'like that by which we perceive.' The nature of the per-a 53 cept on involved in options is northy illustrated by means of the mathematician's perception of the common sensible exqua. The logarithm, or particular, which he mathematician, as such, perceives is the fartheniar shape (triangular, quadrilateral, circular) of the fairle before him; and shape is not the datum of a single sense

1149 a. 28. as colour e. g. is but is given in the perceptions of in we than one sense. I thus take reference to be merely an example of the common sensel le example (réalor would have done equally well) and dismiss as untenable the view of Michelet and other common ators, that what the mathematician is here said to perceive is that 'what is ultimate or simplest in geometry is the triangle' in e. hat all figures may be broken up into triangles. But surely, if the writer had been thinking of 'that which is ultimate in geometry, he would not have mentioned a figure at all, but errors

Opdonous then is concerned with loxon-particulars, which it perceives, as olabora perceives its layora, immediates; but the Toxara of powners are not like the idea aladara perceived by the special senses, "this is red, this is sweet,"-but rather, they are The the perceptions of the geometer "this shape before me is tranginar, or circular. As a coloured object seen, or a resisting object touched, is the eleasion for the geometer of the perception οί σχήμα by his καινόν αἰσθητηριον, 80 m the φρόνιμος the various feelings and circumstances which make up ed to rate apageon are responded to by an activity of the moral reason which imposes on the the presented to it its own form of Ducy. As the geometer solves his problem by perceiving shapes in the data of eye (or touch), and recognising this construction, or manipulation of shapes, as better fitted for the solution of a given problem than that other construction, so the phompor solves the problem of ro ed for by apprehending rd in rais upderes, not as things pleasant or painful to sense here and new, but as things which are good or bad-i.e. fixed, or not fixted, to have a permanent place in the general plan of life: ayabot yop i atobasis. I atobasis, irribandinatas ούχ οία το ούδε τακου, άλλα μόνον του τέρποντος ή άνωντος, το δε αγαθον and to encou tou say possess cours: Themistins, vol. ii p. 2.1 cd.

Although I believe that the first meaning of ro [ir ros pullparanis] to your in the writer's mind was the geome et's particular—
this farticular ship, i.e. thangle, he could not fall to be conscious
of the other meaning of to your, as the last step in Corpose: see E. N.

I be row and bracketed by Dywater. The words may very well have been meeter, by a scrate in the interest of the interpretation adopted by M cheix referred to above, in his Contributions (p. 41), however, liveater remarks that it a quite possesse that be row and quarteries is only out of place, and that it came in originally after also before pully partitions is only out of place, and that it came in originally after also before pully.

11i. 3. 11, 12 6 yap Borderouerer foice Cyreir and direction . . . Comep 1142 a. 28. dingongon . . . voi ed logator is to modifice epistar clear is to preserve. Indeed the words with which vi. o begins to Inveis de e.r.A. (I see to teason for assuming with Rassow, Forsch, p. 46, and Swemshl, that there is a lacuna between ch. 8 and ch. 9) make it pretty certa 6 to a, as a matter of fact, the term Toyaror hel suggest Cornors to his mind. We may then follow up this suggestion, and say that the prosper, I ke the yourseppe, (gree-fe hows out a train of thought (posrana dogworus in his case, thur, airdning in the case of the yeapting: see Teen klenburg, Historische Beiträge our Phil, vol. ii. pp. 381, 382, de An 11 10, 433 b, 20) til he reaches an layarav iv vý ávakiam seeme hing which he finds will seeve his purpose, and beyond which be closes not case to go "This layuror is a particular reached at last, and recognised as a means now to be taken for the attainment of the end in view. Thus the propring reaches a point at which the further designers of his diayouque (see Mel. 8 9, 1051 a. 21, sqq and note on F N is 3, 11 b 25 deadless . . Budypapper for the interprete letween and business; may cease, when, as in East. El. i. 47, he has got certain spiyone, by means of which he can show that the square described upon the side authenting the right angle is equal to the squares described upon the sides which contain the nght angle. The possessor likewise reaches a point at which he must say-' flore at last I must stop thinking, and begin to act, This is the right thing to do. it is unifeasant, perhaps; but it is right. I must do ft.

we cannot go. We cannot go beyond the appear apo on the one side, or the mo amova or some on the other side.

that this latter sense (i.e. the saw) sindy on operative in mathematic.) is sense rather than prudence, though specifically different from the other sense (i.e. ή των δίων)': so (oras. —αὐτη μέν ἡ ἀντιληψεί τῶν μερικῶν, οδων είρικε συμβαίνειν ἐν τοἰς μαθηματικοῖς, αἴσθησιν ἐν μάλλον λέγοινο ἡ φρώνησικ. In other words, the sense operative in mathematical (ἡτησικ, though specifically distinct from the special senses, is not to be identified with prudence or the deliberating fieulty. It is only analogous to prudence. For ἡ some MSS, and editers read ἡ—in which case the distinction is between ἡ φρώνησιν ἡ κωθ ἐνωνο (which is then said to resemble the mathematician's

1142 a. 20 αΐσθησει) and ή άρχετεκτονική φρύνησεις (which cannot be classed as a kind of aladques). I prefer the & reading; but anyhow the clause is awkward and unnecessary.

CHAPTER IX.

ARGUMENT.

Deliberating, or taking counsel, is a species of suching.

What is good counted? Is it resentific knowledge, or opinion, or happy guerangya

It cannot be exertify knowledge for he gode uneven does not week, and taking good connect, or deliberating well, is a form of deliberation, i. e. of secting.

It covered be happy yours as, for one makes a happy guess all all once textrest 13 maing, undersay del perasson takes time. Nor as it so, a sty, who at a kind of happy guerning.

Arum, il cannot be opinion of any kind.

Since deliberating well is deliberating correctly, it well be correctness of some kind not corrective a of a cent he knowledge, hatveter, for "correct" is mad only where 'incorrect' is possible, and wantshe knowledge is mover '.m.orrect', nor of opinion, for correctness of opinion is truly something definite and letted findered an openion as out h, with their tene or fully, a always committing of the te and satisfied, whereas the man who deliberates (whether correctly or its correct y) has not yet resched anything de prote and settled out is still section and the neing. It remains, then, that deliberating well is a correct process of thinking concerbed as the I count on, not a correct result of thinking con count a . a hand by affroned.

Put when we speak of in threation as " over the as much be us and to note that it to not enough that it should be correct as regards any son to one of the three elements and means and length of time token which are de tengue hed in desberation: at must be 'correct' as regards all three, e.g. he does not deliberate teell, or correctly, who attain to a good end by bad mene , or beds even atterns to a good end by good means, but takes an annual's long time in his of direction.

and so runs the ruk of mining the opportunity of action.

There are of course many ends on relation to which we key of a name, " he desperates to el, specifying in each each the end; but when a man to investe, but or correspy in relation to the end par excellence—the chief and at man we say without any quantitation, 'he deliberates well so correctly,' 'he is a man of good counsel.' Good counsel then, in the street sense, will be sho characteristic quality of the prudent man - the man ruho has a true consection of the chief end and employs the means which subscripe it.

This chapter, as Grant explains, commences the examination of a set of faculties (echankia, everoxia, expiroia, evereus, and group) cognate to possyone, or forming part of it.

I dwe this tendering of theroxia to Peters.

§ 1. περί εδβουλίας.] It is an abrupt, awkward commencement 1148 a 82 of the charter to say, tenguing and deliberating are different, for del beradog is a species of empiring." But what is menut at parer ilv is, to bring "good counsel" under the Lead of enquiring, which separates it at once from both science and opin on.'-Grant. This seems to use to be the correct view of the place of the clause. and I cannot agree with Adosow (Forsch. 7. 46), who says-'das Capitel das über die ekstouka handelt, beginnt mit er um Satz der ville g zusamment angles dastelit, id frees de sal id Bookesington disperse of the Southeleaden forein relieve. The Paraphrest brings out the connex on, recognised by Grant, as follows-sai mourou mept eliborhius viceius pilp less pultitata vi pipopiaes, fis von dayon aprilus dryddalaper bare tor nepl eithodics dayor to nepl tis operiusus συνωστιού, πρωτον μέν ούν ούκ έστε ζήτητιε έπλ πλέου γαρ έστευ ή ζήτησις της εύθουλίας οὐ μόνον χάρι ὁ εὐ βουλενόμενος άλλά καὶ ὁ κοκώς βουλουύμενος (πεί, κοί ού μύνον το ένδεχύμενο, άλλά και τά άναγκαίε (groustan' mepe à durer à emetraphe, clor, el tò tregonou exte den épilie, Corriera uple the incompans, and of h wedgen openposelife fore did roiro ή είβωλια οδε έσταν ταύτον τη ζητήσει. έτι δέ, οδδέ έπιστήμη έστιν ή entential à pur pap emergipar où spres nept le lecerem, à de elibertue (ητεί ή γαρ εξθουλία βουλή τιν έστεν ή δέ βουλή ζήτησιε εστιν τού τέ δεξ sparren sal i Bochenopenas sarvi nal haziseras nepe tun neissen unus οδ καὶ καλως γευωνταν ώστο ή μεν οδ Βουλία ζητησις, ή δε επιστήμη αδ Twarry i el Broken don obe force incorning. The writer of the M. M. than describes the relation of risonain to applement ii. 3. 1199 a. 4 ή δέ γε ευβουλία εστί μεν περί ταυτα τη φιρονήσει (περι γάρ τα πρακτά έστε τά περί αξικουν καί φιγήν όντα), έστιν δέ οδα άνει φρονήσεως. Α μεν γάρ distance appeared rateon early of de entlocken efter of diadence of an anciena 🛊 duserrunt sur és sois uparrois fichtiones eat auphopusésur,

- § 2 are to yap hoyou] does not involve a process of reasoning. b. 2.
- § 8. ayxirota The editors refer to An Post. i. 34. 89 b. 10 for b s the definition of dyxirota as education in it diskining xoling red pidou It is the faculty of guessing at once the 'middle term' or cause, which explains a phenomenon; and thus answers to Locke's expactly (First, iv. 2. 3. 4 quickness of the mind to find out these intermediate ideas that shall discover the agreement or disagreement of any other, and to apply them right'), or to what is now called the 'Scientific Imagination.'

- 1.42 b € oubl bh bota & eupoudia oubenia After this assertion we expect a clause giving the reason for it, but instead we have a clause which goes off with all. It is not till we come to the words 1142 h 13 mi yap 6 doğu. Anyiferm that we get the reason for the assertion odde di dofa . . . oddenia. The run of the passage would be great y improved if we could adopt Zwinger's rearrangement (for which see Zell's note and Sosem Lis Affair Crit, ad low) so far as to insert 1242 b. 13 mil yap & doga . . . doyiferm after obdepia 1142 b. 7. The sentence 1142 b. 7 all inci 6 per marie b. 12 πâs số δοξα έστον would then come in without awkwardness As for the words \$142 b, 12 dhaa uho . . . ooms done, they are rejected by several critics. Their inconsistency with 1242 b. 16 that opporter the error of eliforation Boulde is invested on by Rasse w (Forsch. p. 46) - Achtere Erklärer, we Giphanius und Zwinger, nel men Angross an den von mir eingeklammerten Worten (; e 1142 b. το daad μόν . . . οθπω φάσις), die neueren haken es für hinecal and 24 daysias apa heizeras die Weste ophirma adray eleas 24 erginzen. Allerdings handelt es sich um die Frage, eine opdorge i eiffordia; aber wenn ar f ellese bereits mit hemera erid die letzte Antwort gegeben wird, wie passen dann die Worte all Opforge vie forw h si Booksa Bookie, in denen doch ersteht ch erst das En tresultat der Untersuchung angegeben werden soll? Durch Umstellung ist, wie ich glaube, hier nicht zu helfen."
 - δ δ δ' εὐ δρθώς βουλεύεται] το εὐ πόρθως, threefare ευθουλια is δρθότης τις.
 - b 10 ἐπιστήμης μὲν ydp οὐκ ἔστεν ὁρθοτης (οὐδε ydp ἀμαρνία)] as Eustrat, explains—πιστήμη is itself ὁρθότης, and there is no ὁρθοτης ὁρθοτητος. The infall that of ἐπιστήμη, as such, has already been asserted in ch. 3. § x and ch. 6. § s.
 - 5 11 δόξης δ' όρθότης αληθεία] Of course δπιστήμη, al hough it has properly no δρόσης, has its αλήθεια. It is one of the ficulties of αληθεύομεν και μηδεποτε διοψευδόμεθο, ch. 6, § 2.
 - όμα δὲ καὶ άρισται ήδη κάν οὐ δόξα toriv] 'the object of opinion is, as such, always something definite': δόξα has already adopted a definite view: βουλή is a process which has not yet led to the adopt on of anything definite. As the Paraph puts it—ή μεν εἰρουλία (ητεῖκ δοτίκ, ή δὲ δάξα εὐρησίναι.
 - ο 12. Δλλά μην οὐδ' . . . ούνω φάσις] If this sentence be retained (and

I think that Rasson and Susembl go too far when they tracket it, 1148 b 12 after G plan us), we ought to take the first clause very closely with white immediately precedes. The object of 86fa is always a before result a teady reached; but a soulid souly a process (Augus) which has not yet reached a result. Then follow the words baroint son Annerus, to which we must supply apolityre advise since the elisable cannot be the softeness of our existential cannot be the softeness of our existential or dofa, for the teasons given, it remains that it is the softeness of the discursive accusive the faculty which carries on the process of reviewing the steps with head to results, but is not itself the institute of these results—aim you (see deliver) of no phints.

§ 6. δλλ δρθότης τίς δοτιν ή εδβουλία βουλής Rassow (Forsch, b 16 p 46, as we have seen, regards these words as inconsistent with barrier δρα λείτετοι. I think that something might be said for bracketing them, and retaining the sentence άλλά μήν οίδ ἄνεν λόγου ό ε.δευλία. διαν ίας δρα λείτετοι αίτη γίη οδικο βάσει, bracketed by Rassow. As for the words 1142 b. 16 δ.δ ή βουλή ζητητέα πρώτον τί του περι τί they are bracketed by Rassow, because (Forsch p. 40) that Wesen der βουλή εξ καλου τικές Male crimtert und im l'o genden ist cavon nicht die Rede, vellmehe wird der Begriff der åschore, auf den es hier ganz allein ankommt, näher besummt.

exit & h dodoing nhaveaugh, before on od nava] dodoin definitioned to be an expression which lends uself to several insecurate senses. It is maccurate to describe (1) the man who has taken the right evenus to the attainment of a bad end as dodoing fight hereway of (2) the man who has reached a good end by improper means; or (3) the man who has reached a good end by right means but only after spending an unreasemable tong time in deliberation. Thus who must be taken distributively: "when we say dodoing definition must be taken distributively: "when we say dodoing definition of its various serves, but only in the one strict sense in which it is applied to the man who reaches a good end, by right means discovered within a reasonable time."

δ γάρ δερατής απλ] The description of the disputify here, as b 18 cmploying λογισμός for the atlantment of a ball end, is not consistent with the account of him given in F N vii, and answers rather to the διολοσγος. See Grant ad loc.

& montheres ideas] this is the reading of Kb, L1, Mb, Ob CCC vol. it.

- 1142 b 18. Cambr., B². Instead of low NC and Par. 1853 have an σείψωσθαι δείν—σκέψωσθαι be tig probably a glass on lbiv: ε/. Fustrat b γυρ δ άκρατης καὶ δείνως δ φανλος προτίθεται ώς τέλος ίδειν ήτου σκέψωσθαι όπως είνοῦ ἐποτύξεται, απθό άκρατης καὶ φανλος οἰκ δοται ἀφιλιμος. Machig (Adv. Cril. 462) suggests δείν (so Γ), which is adopted by Grant (3rd ed.) and Jackson, who compare Plato, Soph. 231 A δπερ δρεί προύθεμεθα δείν εξευρέν. Rassow (Forsch. p. 97) suggests οἱ προτίθεται τυχείν, which is adopted by Bek.², Suscititl, and Grant in his last edition. I would suggest λυβείν: ε/, the following εἰληφώς.
 - δοκεί κ.τ.λ.] Fritzsche quotes, among other aptorisms, Soph. Anhg. 1050 spárosrov στηματών εὐβουλία.
 - b 24 § 5. άλλ' έστι καὶ κ τλ] Εικται has ών γυρ ον τῷ συλλογισμῷ ἐνδεγεται ἄληθες εἶναι συμπέμοσμα, τοῦ μέσου λαμβανομένου ψευδοῦς...., οῦτως ἐνδεχεται καὶ δια φαύλου τρόπου τέλος ἀποβήναι χρηστου, οἱον εῖ τις πένης μαιχείπος ἐν τοίταυ ηἰπορηκεν. It is inaccurate as Grant notes, to speak of 'a false midule term' (ψευδή τὸν μέσον ὅρων εἶναι), false hood or truth belonging to propositions, not to terms. What i is writer means is that either or both of the premisses containing the middle term may be false, and yet the conclus on be true: we sto. Pries. In 2. 53 b. 4 ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὖτος ἔχειν, ὅστ' ἀληθεις εἰναι τὰς προτασεις, δι ڏω ὁ αιλλογισμος ἔστι ὁ ὥστε ψευδοῦς ἔστι ὁ ὥστε τὰν μεν ἀληθίη, τὰν δὶ ψευδὸ τὰ ἀνάγκης. εξ ἀληθών μὲν οὖν οῦν ἔστι ψευδος συλλογίσασθαι, εκ ψευδῶν δ' ἔστιν ἀληθίς, πλῆν οῦν διῶτι, ἀλλ' ὅτι' τοῦ γῶρ διότι οὺν ἔστιν ἐκ ψευδῶν συλλογισμός
 - b. 27. § 6. trein] i.e. the Books which, having a good end and employing good means, yet takes too long time. The man who comes to a 'right' decision only when the time for action is pass, cannot be called officehor.
 - dal' δρθότης ή κατά το δφέλιμον, καὶ οῦ δεῖ καὶ δς καὶ δτα] but rightness where the advantageous is concerned—end, means and length of time, being all what they ought to be. I scattely think that East. is right in making and οῦ δεῖ ερεκεgential of τὸ διφέλιμον. Ην 50/2—iseing ἢ ὁρθότης τῆς εἰβουλίας ἐστίν εὐβουλία, ἡ καὶ τοῦ τρόκου τὸ ἐπαινετόν, ὁ δηλοῖ τὸ ῶν, καὶ τοῦ χράκου τὸ ἀρκοῦν, ὅπερ δηλοῖ τὸ ῶντ, τὸ δὶ ἐφέλιμον καὶ οῦ δεῖ να καραλλήλου ἀστὶ τὸ αὐτό.
 - 5 28 § 7.] The Paraph. Heliodorus has the following note: "Επτὶ δὲ τὰ τὰ τέλος ἢ κοθωλου ἐστὰ καὶ ἔσχατον, ἢ μερικόν, ἔσχατον μέν, πρὸς ὁ πῶσα πρῶ-

ξει ανθρωπίνη ψή, νται, μερικόν δέ, πρός δ τινες πράξεις φέρουστε, άκαλούθως 1142 h 28 καὶ ψ εἰθειλία ἔχει ἡ μέν γύρ καθάλου έστέν, ήτις ἀρθή καὶ ἀγαθή βουλή έστε τερ των φεροντων εἰς τὸ ἄσχατον τέλος, την κατ' ἀρετήν ζωήν ἡ δε μερική, ήτις εἰς μερικόν τι τέλος ψέρει, ὁ σὰκ ἔστε μέν τὸ ἔσχατον, ψέρει δὲ εἰς τὸ ἔσχατον τέλος. Τίπια τὸ τέλος τὸ ὁπλῶς 15 the τέλος τελειον—εὐδαιμονία; τ Ε΄ Ν νι 5 τ δακεί δή φροκίμου εἰναι τὸ δυνασθαι καλως βουλεύσασθαι τομί τὰ αὐτφ ἀγαθά καὶ συμφέροντα, οἱ κιτά μέρος, οἱν καὶα πρὸς ὑγιειον. σρὸς ἐσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εδ ζην δλως.

rie 86] so Sus, and Byw after Kb Mb, r. Bekker's \$ 86 rec is \$.30 given by Lb, NC, Ob, B. 4.3; \$ ste 86 by Cambr.

ή εατά το συμφέρον πρός το τέλος, οὐ ή φρόνησες άληθής ὑπόληψές b. 82 tornel Bywater has restored of before seles from Kb and P, instead of re read by Bekker. It has been suggested that to couplipor, not redor, is the antecedent to which of relates on the ground that φροσησιε is concerned with means to the end given by ήθική δροτή (see L.N. vi. ch. 12. § 8-ch. 13 § 2). But then, we should have had spie to reduce to dadie, not apos to ridor or apos to redor. The clause beginning of is necessary to define the reference of vo (or vi) rikor. Nor is there any difficulty in making photogras the inologies rod redeur pourate in appereurouse, 29 well as nepl ed und exaces (see E. N. v. 7. 7). We may say that possess indeed apprehends the end, but could not do so in the way required by morality-i.e. with a 'single eye,' unless ishing iping invested that end with a moral interest. The Paraph, is quite distinct in referring of to ribor. He says that the words nows to reduce of h powgous adolhs boudage is fore are put des την πονηράν βουλήν, ήτιε τὰ μέν τελεε προσήκοντα και ακύλουθα ζητεί, πρός τέλος δε φερεται πουορόν ού ούκ έστιν ή φρόνησες άληθής ύπό-Apper.

CHAPTER X.

ARGUMENT.

Intelligence is not the same as knowledge generally, or opinion (then all men would be 'intelligent'), nor is it a spatial branch of knowledge, like medical trained or geometry, for it is not concerned with the 'eternal and immutable' and among things 'that come into being' only with those which, being difficult to understand are subjects of decideration. Its field therefore is the same as that of Prudence; but it is not Prudence; for Frudence issues commands or recommensations, whereas Intelligence merely sits, as it were, and judges. The

intelligent man, wing his experience, comes to a right decision about reather within the province of Produce hid before him by another in a speech as he testene he does not add to his experience, but makes most kee experience, put as a man who knows (creek does not learn Greek, when he testen 'a onether speech ag Greek, but uses the Greek which he has, on order to understand what is tail. The intelligent man is he will understand, or appreciates correctly, the value of recommendations made to him within the province of Produces.

11426, 84. § 1. σύνεσις) intelligence, is another element in φρόνησιε, or a state cognate to it. It is the faculty of understanding and appreciating good advice laid before one by another person. The awards, qual reverse does not initiate policies, or schemes of conduct, but has the intelligence to recognise good ones when they are presented to him. Σύνεσε is thus the excellence of the spirit who listens to a spee h (δλλαι λέγρησιος § 3), and judges rightly as to the merits of the plan of action which it recommends (διατατείε § 2). Σύνεσε may be regarded as a stage in the development of φρόνησιο A man must have listened intelligently to what its ellers advise on practical matters, before he can take rank limited as an authorizative adviser. Of course the majority of men—so far as large political questions are concerned—never become φρόνησιο and δπεσακτικοί, but are, at best only intelligent followers or critis—συνετοί.

cloureria] All MSS, seem to give dourrois, and, in the next Inc. doubless. Viousala and clourers is the certain emendation of II. Stephanus—made, independently it would appear, by Spengel also (see Arist, Studies & p. 212).

- 214% n. 2. warres yap de hour συνετοί] He scems to mean that all men would then be 'intelligent,' for a l men have either επιστήμη or διξα: Let the Paraph, understands the words rather different y: he says—ή yap de narres of επιστήμονες h of διξάξοντες συνετοί ήσαν, dad' ole elose.

 1. ε. either all επιστήμονες or all δοξάζοντες would be συνετοί.
 - a. 8. § 2. ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτική ἐστιν . . . ἡ δὲ σύνεσις κριτική μόνον] Grant points out that 'the opposition of these terms is taken from Plato, Point, us 259 E-260 C,' where it is said that 'all science may be divided under the two heads of critical and man latory' dμ' οὖν συμπάσης τῆς γνωστικῆς εἶ τὸ μὲν ἐπιτικτικὸν μέρος, τὸ δί τρατικτο διαιροῦμενοι προσειποιμεν, ἐμμελως ἀν φαιμεν διηροσεία;
 - a. 10 radto yap ourcois nal edoureoia nal oureral nal edoureral added to

meet the possible objection that, although obvious is spirited police 1143 a to

§ 3. δλλ' ώσπερ το μανθάνεω κ.τ.λ. Grant quotes Soph. El. iv. 1. 2 a. 22. or e. Ty. ix. 3. to 5 b. 32) for the double meaning of μανθάνων=(1) to leaf., (2) to understand—το γαρ μανθάνων όμωνομων, το τε ξυνωνα χρώμωνων τῷ ἀνωτήμη καὶ τὸ λαμβάνων ἀπωτήμη».

Lesson is not the possession of acquisition of provious—the power of giving good a line—but the employment of one's intelligence in currently advice given. Louism is thus like parking, where parking means, not 'learning something new,' but 'understanding at at is said to one in conversation, by means of knowledge (e.g. knowledge (f the language in which the conversation is carried on) which one already possesses.

what a.t.A. As, in conversation, one 'understands' (undblow) a 19, what is said in a language, and on a subject, with which one is already farthar, so, in the éconologic, the oranitry crizen employs his general experience and intelligence (lafu-of to dofarmine to however A. N. vi. 5, 8, vi. 13, 2) in apprehending (runium) the advice given in a statesman's speech.

δλλου λέγοντος] For σύνεσα, regarded specially as the excellence a. 13. of the extense in the assembly or court, of Hulemon (Meineke, Fragm. Comic. vol. iv. 46)—

χαλοπόν γ' ακροστής ἀσύνετας παθήμενας, Ιπό γόρ ἀναίας σύχ ἐαντὰν μέμφεται.

καὶ πρίνειν καλώς] τε, έστω ή συνεσιε, καὶ ή εὐσυνεσία: then follows τὸ μόρ εὖ τῷ καλῶς τὸ αὐτό.

§ 4. in the its to μανθάνεισ] from the intelligence shown in a, 17 understanding for se, the meaning of a person with whom one is talking. Cornes has the following note here— χρωμάθα πολλακε τῷ μανθάνεισ ἐπὶ τοῦ συντένοι εἶον, ἡνίκα ὁ μὴ συντέιε τὰ λεγόμενα ψησὰ πρός τὸν λέγοντα (Αριστοφ. Βάτρ. 1444)

... πώς : οὐ μανθάνω: ὑμαθέστερου πως εἰπὸ καὶ σαφέστερου.

insp de Piddos delp ipoperause ouros, comment? je ne te comptends point; parle-mos un peu moins savamment et plus intell giblement.

CHAPTER XI.

ARGUMENT.

Judgment is the faculty of deciding correctly what is equitable * this definition of an accordance with the view conviously heid about the equitable oran—that his chief characteristic is to be ready to pass forwarded fulfiment.

The faculties mentioned - judgment, intelligence, printence, and resistent have all, it is easy to see, the same reference, and may be ascribed to the same have seer they all have to do with mitimate particulars, antologence and judgment burns faculties which come to eight decisions at regards matters within the province of printenes, i. o. or regards things which men do, which are always whemate particulars, mover universals. Peacon, indeed, is concerned with antimates aboth ends of the series, it is both deginning and end—a, specialistic, it is concerned with the allowed by pilogente reasoning, but are the immutable first principles of research by epilogente reasoning, but are the immutable first principles of research are continuent, and find their place in the minor primes of the practical efficient in the minor primes of the practical epilogenm. These factionalists the practical reason, as regulating consists, must precise immutations, for it is from often perceiving them thus that a man acquires the universal principle of consinct—the prevailing best of character

Since resson, and the cognate faculties, intelligence and judgment, are concerned with particulars, they will require time and experience for their development, and in a matter of fact, we see there faculties (as writingwished from the speculative faculty) growing naturally up in men, as they become older to much so that we feel that undemonstrated assertions and opinions, coming from money years and experience, have all the weight of demonstrations. Such mon have the eye of experience and operacity.

So much for Printence and Windom. Each has its own mature, and its own sphere, and is the excellence of his own separate part of the toul.

1145 a.10. § 1. γνώμη | rendered by Grant 'considerateness.' It is perhaps impossible to bring out in any single English word the whose meaning of this term. It may be sufficient to think of δ γνωμην έχων as 'the man of good sense and good feeling' especially in to far as he exhibits these qualities in his judicial decisions (ή του έπιστασις dor't aphric δρθή). The deasts swore γνωμη τῆ dρίστη (οι διαιοσατη) κρίνων 'to decide according to the best of their judgment' «/.

Pol ni. 16, 1287 a. 25 ἀλλ' δπίσηδει ναιδειστάς ὁ νυμοτ έφιστησε τὰ λοινά τῆ διαιοσάτη γνώμη πρίνων καὶ διοικών τοὺς δρχαντας . Rad. i. 15, 1375 a.

27 φανερόν γορ ότι, ἐὰν μὲν ἐναντιος ἢ ὁ γνηρομμανοι τῷ πράγματα, τῷ καινή νόμη χρηστέον καὶ τοὺς ἐνωτιος ἢ ὁ γνηρομμανοι τὰ πράγματα, τῷ καινή νόμη χρηστέον καὶ τοὺς ἐνωτιος ἢ ὁ γνηρομμανοι τὰ πράγματα, τῷ

έρίστη τουν έσεί, το μή παντελώε χρήσθας τοίε γεγραμμίνοις. The 1148 c. 10. ong had meaning of young is 'knowledge' or 'understanding.' Thus in Democritus, quoted by Sextus Emplricus Adv. Math vii. 138, ne have younge di bou civir idea, à nir yonain, à de onvery- genuine knowledge" and "dark knowledge"; and in Herodotus ili, 4, γνώμην to stand for 'a thought' -e-pecially for 'a thought' or 'opinion' relating to the consuct of life. And this is the sense in which we find yeary technically used by Austotle in the Rheleric; see Rhit. 11. 21. 1394 p. 22 for d' à prope anispevoir, où perroi obre nepì rem ent έταστον, οίον ποίδε τις 'Ιφικράτης, άλλα καθόλου' καλ ού περί πάντων, οίον ότι το είξε τώ αυμπολώ έναντευν, ελλά περί δύων αξ πραξεις είσι, καὶ αιρετά ή фенета агті прос то проттин. А уныці із thus a generalisation relating to the conduct of life, and Aristnt e takes special pains to make it less that it is a general sation which has merely an empirical base- 1 / has not been verified by syllogistic derivation from ligher principles, for he goes on to say 1394 a 26 dur' incl ra εεθιμηματά δ περί τοιουτών σελλογισμός εστικ, σχέδον τα σεμπεράσματα των ενθυμηματών και εί άρχαι άφωρεθιντος του συλλογισμού γνωμαί είσιν, Dice

χρή δ' οδ ποθ' δε τις άρτιφρων πίφυς ώνης, παιδαε περισσειε δεδιδάσσεισθαι σοφούς.

earm no aum von. aboaregewale ge the curies see toe gra et engenne

χωρίε γαρ δλλης ξε έχουσαν άργίας, φάσου παρ' άστων άλφωσουτ δυσμενή.

eni rà

कोट रिकाम के पाद सर्वार केन्द्र रहेरेकामकारो

eni ri

ούς δυτω δυδμών δε τις δοτ' ελείθεμου γούμη, πρός δό τφ έχομέν**φ** ένθύμημα,

\$ χρημάτων γάρ δαύλός έσταν ή πύχης.

A mox m which may be used, by way of aquains or chos, as the presence of an independent statement syllogism' (see Rhet. i. 2), or may us con less in of an independent be deduced from suitable premains is, if taken by itself impossible to ordhogopui), a group. A young, then, is a moral max m, a piece of provertical wisdom (cf the expression nonreal groupout), advanced and accepted without

1143 a 19. proof, but recommending itself by its obvious agreement with the sentiments and feelings of the society in which it appears

Here, in the Ethics, the meaning of yrbin seems to waver between the act of deciding sensibly and kindly, and the disposition which results in sensible and kind decisions."

ouyyroporas! This is the reading of Kb and Mb rest in 1 by Bywater, instead of Bekker's reysuposor the reacing of L. T. Cambr., NC, B4 & O, CCC, Eustr., Heliod. The Index Aret. does not give abyronous except in this chapter, and in M. M. i. a. where στηγνώμων does not occur, and εύγνωμοσονη is used instead of yeaging. It is not unlikely therefore that chypaging got into the text of the Ethics at a date subsequent to the compilation of the M. M. Apart, however, from this suspector, there is nothing against the word in the context here. Indeed it may be shought that he words at 21 organian be van yap erreiki padrova chapen elear συγγεωμονικόν follow εξγεώμενας more naturally than συγγεωμονος: that the emmexion between inviteur and puryyoung a semmed to be better known than that between implicate and young, and he corpormores not their domer you pro, and is therefore adduced as a enqueior: ef. Rhet. i. 13. 1374 h. 4 do vie yap del συγγνώμην έχειν τοίτα επιτική, and b. 10 το τοιε ανθρωπίνοιε συγγινώσεου έπιτικίς.

Evyyraph means properly 'thinking and feeling with others,' and answers to the trainer communis of the Roman writers:

of. Quartif. Inst. i. 2—Sensem ipsum, qui communis deitur, who discet, cum se a congressu, qui non hominibus solum, sed multis quoque at small his naturalis rat, segregit. t?—Hor. Sat. 1-3-66 Sampheior quis et est . . . ut force legentem Aut tacitum impeliat quovis sermone molestus, Communi sensu plane caret, uquinums:—on which Orelli quotes Seneca, de Benefic. 1. 12 Sit in beneficia sensus communis, tempus locum personas el servet, quia traine disquaedam grata et ingrata sunt. The συγγρομών is the man of social sympathy, who enters into the thoughts and fee aims of others, and especially is ready to make allewance for their hill culties in his formal or informal verdets—who, in short, gives judgment (γρωμη) in their favour (σω) when a rigid interpretation of the law would warrant an unfavourable judgment.

π 23 ή δέ συγγνώμη γνώμη έστὶ πριτική τοῦ ἐπιεικούς ὁρθή ὁρθή δ' ή

[§] I find, time writing the above, that this is Hywater's opinious; see Contributions, p. 55.

roû dlafoûs] Tren klenburg trackets συγγνώμη: the sentence is 1143 a. 23 then a mere repetition of what has just been said three lines alone—ή γνωμη... ή σοῦ ἐπισιοῦς ἐστὶ ερίσιε ὁρθή του the other hand, with συγγνωμη retained, the definition of συγγνωμη is in the same terms as that of γνωμη. I think that the words ή δε συγγνώμη γνωμα σατι ερίσια τοῦ ἐπισιοῦς δρθη ought to be bracketed. The clause ἐρθή δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς follows the ὀρθή of line 20 very naturally, σημοίον δε . . . συγγνώμην being parenthetical. I agree with Rains, that τοῦ ἐπισιοῦς in line 20, as in line 23, is neither—the gendere of the object. Grant makes it mase, in both places.

ορθή δ' ή τοῦ ἀληθοῦς) se πριτική, if line 23 be teta ted. if not, \$ 24 spires - that is a right decision which gives a true vertice,

The whole & may be parapirased thus—What is called 'good sense'—the quality of people whom we describe as 'fait and sense de,' and as 'taking a sense le and proper view,' may be defined as 'the halit of coming to right decisions in matters of equity'. That has is a context define on of 'good sense' is seen, if we re or to the usage of the term common sense' as equivalent to 'fellow being' or tendency to give favourable judgment.' It is generally admitted that 'the equilable man is distinguished for his 'common sense,' or 'fellow feeding, and that to give effect to this sense or feeding in certain cases is 'equitable'. 'Common sense' is, a fact, 'good sense,' which enables a man to come to a right decision in a matter of equity: a 'right' decision being one which gives a true verdict.

Instead of yours, the writer of M. M. uses elysuposion, as we have seen in 2.19% b. 34 à de elysuposion sal à elysuposion, as we have seen in 2.19% b. 34 à de elysuposion sal à elysuposion istà rail mile application mepi va dessa [en] en élhedespesse intè rail missères de rôis élhedespesse intà rail missères de rôis élhedespesse intà posta direct de vouvras especial de la missère posta direct de vouvras especial de la moltre [en] entre appose voi insereson. It ought to be remembered that the rates of the M. M. il senses intrincts in a context parallel, not to E. N. v. 10, but to E. N. vi. 11.

I said that observe may be regarded as a stage in the development of the power of intelligently following a speech, and estimating its recommendations at what they are worth, presupposes something more than mere intellectual sharpness and numbeross.

1145 a. 24. The successful cratic of a policy must be in sympathy with the traditional thought and feeling of the community for which the policy is recommended. Γνώμη, or community sensus, underless νόνεστε. And, as there are many who are συνετοί but never (at least in great matters) become φρόνιμω, so there are many who have γνώμη and στογρώμη without rising to the clear intellectual consciousness of reasons possessed by the πυνετοί. The συνετοί alpreciate the force of the ἐνθυμήμανα (μητορικοί συλλογισμού) with the speaker employs but γνώμοι are points of view which recommend themselves without syllogistic proof (ἀφαιρεθένται τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ)—are felt to be true by ὁ γνώμου έχων.

In the fergoing remarks I have purpose y allowed the A istaletian associations connected (a) with the term yroun, as (1) metal max m. (2) judge's decision. (3) disposition which results in yround (1) or (2), and (6) with the term organization, as communis sensition and especially the manifestation of communis sensition in equitable judgments, to have free play, and influence one another. I believe that the writer of this § could not use the term yroung without being affected by these various associations. At the same time, it is proper to say, in conclusion, that I think that the sense of ground as judge's decision is most prominent in his mand. If absents is especially the space in the landgrain group is especially that in the

δικαστήριον.

a. 27. § 3. yrdupy ixer! This infinitive is grammatically the object of impropers, and we should have expected the article before it: but the water cours the article, because he seld has higher in the mind. That he has higher in his mind is shown clearly by the following accusatives and impropers an overrow. Michelet makes it construction—yroupy you and obvious and impropers and voir in the article airms insupposes, herouse and improve and overrows and interest yroung itself and obvious that, if this is the construction, why have we not the article before improvement overrows?

νοῦν ἡδη] I think that Grant's suggestion is right—that this expression refers 'to what is said in § 6 ἡδε ἡ ἡλιείο κων ἔχει' and is 'nearly equivalent to our saying of a person that he had "at aimed to years of discretion."

σὰ γὰρ ἐπισικῆ κοινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἄλλον]
 for équity enters into all good relations between man and man* -

i.e. equity is coextensive with justice. This is given as a reason 1143 • 31 for the statement or rφ αριτικός είναι πορί δυ ό φρουμος, συστός αυλ εύγνώμων ή συγγνώμων.—the φρόυμος has to do with 'all good relations between man and man'; and the συγγνώμων is αριτικός του έπιστικος, which is coextensive with these 'good relations.

- § 3.] Having proved at the end of § 2 that σύνσοις and γνώμη a. 33. have the same sphere as φρωησιε or mas, because τὸ έπωμη are received size with τὰ dyaθὰ τὰ ἐν τῷ πρὰς πλλος, the writer now proves the same point again, by reference to the fact that τὰ πρακτά (which are λοχονα) are the objects of σύνεσες and γνώμη, as well as of φρωησιε or νολε. Remander brackets τὰ πρακτά in line 33, and Kb Mb P. Cambe, pro and NC read ἀπάντων for δπακτά.
- § 4. Ral à vois tur languaur en dupôtepa] young, aireane, pponnaie a 35 and nois have been eak luted as naous ele taito terrovan, because all concerned with moral langua (insus), ayuda, npasta). The writer now goes on to say that voie is concerned, not only with moral languar. The particulars of action—but, in science as distinguished from con luct, with another kind of languar. In the particular so that, if we use rose in its generic sense, we can say that it is concerned with 'ultimates at both ends of the sense' (Grant) i.e. with universals at the top, and particulars at the bottom.

vous dord not ob horos] The highest un'versals and the unimate b. 1. particulars are apprehended intuitively, not reached by discursive reasoning.

and duev and the drobeless of the construction is described the action of the sole frequencies, as distinguished from the sole squares of it rule spaceage (see distinguished from the sole squares of it rule spaceage (see distinguished from the sole squares of it rule spaceage (see distinguished from the sole squares, or perhaps drobeless understood in a loose sense).

τον danifter δραν και πρώτων] sc. iστί. 'is concerned with.' These b 2 are the First Principles of διαλογική and μοθημονική.

troexoptrou] The full expression requires the addition of sal b. 3.

* Edyrápar o fort. recludendum Hyw. 1 see above § 1, note on ovyyráparar 1143 a. 19.

1143 b. 3. When Their, which Rassow (Forsch. p. 77) accords gly proposes to

rys érépas aporadres] the minor pretions, colled in E.N. vii 3 is redevira approache. The phrase iripa approach loss not appear from the Index Arish to occur except here.

- b. 4. ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οῦ ἐνεκα αὖται] αὖται (a trac ed to the gender of ἀρχαι) are the particulars (ἔσχατα) which constitute the 'minor premiss' apprehended by νουν προστικός. These particulars are said to be the ἀρχαὶ τοῦ οῦ ἔνεκα—to sur μly the materials out of which the moral end, or the character, is built up by ἐἐνσμός, as by a sort of induction—de τῶν mỡ ἔκιστα γὰρ τὰ καθιλου¹. For a similar use of ἀρχη (as the insternal source) Grant compares Ε. Ν. νῖ, 3, 3 κασγωγὸ ἀρχή ἀστι κοὶ τοῦ καθυλου.
- § 5. routur our exer bei alodyour, aury 5' tori vous} The appearable soon is here represented as a remibility to certain purneular impressions. The cumulative effect of such particular impressions is a certain bent of character, or settled way of looking at, and feeling with regard to the objects from which the unpressions are received. But when soir sparries is thus described as a sens.buty to certain particular impressions, it is evident that, from the very first, it must find, in the things which impress it, the con men attribute to which the character eventually formed is the adaptation. Nois spouracie is indeed the sensibility to certain particular impressions, in so far as it is on the occasion of the presence of particular alabará (jósa sai kompá) that it receives its impressions; but these aidbyrd impress it from the first in a moral may. It is therefore not merely passive in relation to them; it perceives this among them to be good, and that bird, are spectively of the present pleasure or pain which attends either; a c. it entices 9 them in view of the requirements of its own permanent nature It is as true, in short, of the aladyare with which the sois monerous is here identified, as of the diothers of the bod y senses, that it involves a perception of the auditor; see An Post it 19 100 a 16 καλ γάρ αλοθανεται μέν τό καθ' έκσστον, ή δ' αλοθησις του καθάλου

^{&#}x27;If re and have (10 Mt liventer) is right as against backer's re-analyses. Treadelenburg's, I think, mistaken view (Hist Bette it. 324 that rehot is to be supplied after another is finally disposed of.

The sharp contrast drawn between the role Beapprison and the 1149 b. 8 poir manaracis in E.N. vi 11 \$\$ 4. 5 is indeed very misleading. A such low is at fire cimly seen by each in the material setting of the and decore belonging to its sphere; and each, using its own pocular me had-rows decomprises using emayory, and rows aparticle, ethopes comes to apprehend its subolor more clearly. The only ground (spart, of course, from the difference of spheres, or objectmater) for an trusting the vois beapprinte and the vove apparents in that of the cearness with which each ul imagly apprehends its median. The generalisations of the some floor prime, clear-cut forms embodied in opiopou, seem, at last, to stand out independent of the particulars; whereas the generalisations of the vois mountains are never clear-cut, but always inhere in particulars. They are the ways in which Kalhas, and people who have received the same danug as Kalas, generally act, in certain (approximately desembed) circums ances, when they act in the manner generally assumed to be right. But the generalisations of the rois diaparents are abstract formulae which distinguish themselves by their necessity from the particulars (as such, contargent) falling under To arrive at such formulae being the goal of the mir despresses, that faculty is represented as being 'concern-1 with' them; whereas the rove sparrieds is said to be 'concerned with pu ticulats,' because it rever can, with any appearance of perfection, detach its generalisations from them.

διό καὶ φοσικά δοκεί είναι ταύτα] ταύτα ατο ναϋς, φρονησις, σύνναις, η θ. 201 γονρη, as Lustratus notes. These habits are all concerned will τό εαθ έκαιτα and therefore (διό) require time and experience for their formation. They grow up in us naturally φοσικά δυκεί είναι, as we gain experience of hie. But we do not naturally grow up to be i historial experience of hie. But we do not naturally grow up to be i historial experience of hie. But we do not naturally grow up to be i historial experience (φυσια σοφία μίν οίδείε) philosophy requires special teaching: see Fustrat ad loc. διστε φησίν έκ τών καθ έκαστα ά προπτικός και ή φρονησιε ήμιν παρογίνεται και ή συννοιε και ή γνωρη, διά τούτο και φυσικά δοκεί είναι ταυτα. ή μεν γάρ σοφία τών καθόλου, διά τούτο και οί φύσει ήμιν προσεστιν άλλ' δε μαθησεως περιγίνεται, ώς είναι καὶ ποολοβων δ φιλόυσφας εύρηκεν, αί δι είρημένας έξεις, έπει από πολοπειρίος συναγονται τών καθέταστα χρύνου δεί είτσίς μακρού, καί ηλικίας και δι μακρύς τῆς ζωής χρύνου δεί δισον ή κτήσες τών έξειων φύσεως ή ήλικία, και διμακρύς τῆς ζωής χρύνου δεί δισον ή κτήσες τών έξειων

1143 b.C. τούτων ποριζεται, διά τοίτο καὶ φυσικά δοκούσι καὶ ἐκ φυσεωτ ἔρχεσθοκ Cf. Ph.lemon (Meineke, Fragm. Comic. vol. iv. p. 34)—

> βιουσα τοίταν αὐτός, οὐδό φύεται αὐτόματον ἀνθρώπνιστη, ὁ βιλτιστη ναθε άστερ ἐν ἀγρφ θύμος ἐκ δὲ ταῦ λέγειν τε και ἐτύρων ἀκαθου καὶ θεωρῆσαι κατὰ μικρόν ἀεῖ, φισεί, φύονται φρένες.

b.c. § 6. 8.8 καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος νοῦς ἀκ τούτων γὰρ αἰ ἀποδείξεις καὶ περὶ τούτων] Rassow (Forsch p. 31) places these words after αἶνη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς § 5, 1143 b. 5. A ser be, he sugges s, trai sposed the two sentences both beginning with διά. This is very likely. Moreover, it is only after τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεὶ αἴαθησεν, αἴνη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς that the grammatical reference of the words ἐκ τουτων γὰρ οἱ ἀποδείξεις καὶ περὶ τούτων is intelligible.

As for the mean of the statement door and ridor wove—it is doubtless given correctly by the Paraph.—upoh min, and door ridor apparant door door for an apparant door of the early of the form of the early of the ear

- b. 14. δρώσεν δρθώς] This is the reading of L^b (and apparently U^b) only: dogác or rác dogác is given instead of δρθώ by K^b, M^b, r, CCC, NC, Cambr., and B^b ^b, Ald., Hel., Eastr.
- b. 18. § 7. αλλου τῆς ψυχῆς μορίου] ε. ε. συφία is the highest excellence of the interpression μέρος, and φρόνησει of the λογιστικόν; see note on ch. 3. § 1. 1139 b. 14, for Pranti's view of the διανογιακά άριταί.

CHAPTER XII.

ARGUMENT

Let us new decours the question- What is the practical use of Wisdom and Prudeous?

It is down at may be neged as useless, it is concerned with that which eternally to, not us A that which comes to pass or is produced, and consequently does not regard his manus which produce Human Happeness.

Prindence undeed regards these means; but must un have Prudence in order to seeme then gradually ! The good man in value of his good has its employs the s scener, i.e. perferrer good acts. Surely knowing that these acts are good does not be p to make how perform them, any more than knowing that a regular furse is a healthy symblem as distinguished from knowing the proper treatment of an errequiar pure makes a man's pulsa regular. And if it be said that we sense have freed me, not mutered to tell us that such and such acts are good, but to test ut how to secure their performance what it may still be asked, is the god a at use of fruitmed. It is inserfluous in the case of those who are already good and perform the a to in question from liabit, and why should those who are not arready good but wish to become good trouble themselves to have Prademe of their som? Why should they not consult a professional expert on Produce, or we do a dector in the matter of health? Lastly, there is the and word foint - If Primerie is practically useful, if it really are something especially comathene is great as the production of Human Happeness at will take the lead over 11 ridom, for the practical faculty which was, materials always arrests as a me tress the aventafic or artistic faculty which supplies the materials. But how can Windom be thus qualitary to Frudence? Prudence is morely in-

So would for the statement of the difficulties, now let us attempt to answer them

fersor to Wardom.

Let us begin by saying that Wisdom and Printence, even if they result in making 'practical,' must be choice-worshy in themselves, inaimach as each of them is the excellence of its own part of the soul.

Sevently, they do produce results. Wisdom produces Happiness, not undeed as efficient cause of v. but as formal cause: it is one of the formal elements in that totality of the virtuous character, which reactes itself in the function called Happiness. The other formal elements are produce and bloral Virtue, Virtue making the end aimed at good, and Fraderic the means. Wisdom is the excellence of the aimstyle fact, Prudence of the deliberative, Moral Virtue of the appetitive the excellence of the fourth part of the worl, the nutritive, is not one of the formal elements in the totality of the virtuous character. for it does not rest with it to do, or not to do.

As regards the abjection that Frudence does not help us to perform good acts, let us weet it by analysing 'a good act' a little deeper. What looks like 'a

good oct may be performed under external pressure or from ignorance, or fee some and which has nothing to do with goodness, by a man who is not good. but an act is really "good" only when it is done by a good man been, de berates chosen by him because at it a good art-i. a contributes to the chief end. Thu easef end for the sake of which acce are deliberately thosen as mouns, it let up by Virtue-Le. it is the same thing to tay ' This man is vertuous or good' and " his end is good "-but the steps which must be taken in order to remise this end are discovered, not by virtue but by another faculty. Let us stop to excluen this point Creverness is the power of hitting upon the means committee to a given end If, then, the end be good, we praise the faces to which discovers the means and call it Prudence - but we call it Kogurry if the end be soit. Covernous or the potentiality of Prudence as it is of togetry, but Prudence as conserved basit does not superview a thout Virtue for, without Virtue spling a main which Printence reasons would have no major premiss. It is easy the good man who sees the good end which constitutes the major presses. I se discorts and families a man's view of the prescriptes of conduct. It is plann, team, that a man cannot be Prudent without being good.

- 1148 b. 10 § 1 Campioul Byw. after Ko Mb, Cambr. All other MSS, apparently, give Geopei, which I prefer.
 - υ. 20. οδδεμιάς γάρ ἐστι γενέστως] on the contrary, it is the con emplation of δενεχ (τὸ δν. 23 distinguished from τὸ γεγνόμενω).
 - b, 33. ἡ περὶ τὰ δίκαια] L^b seems to be right in omitting ή, see Rassow (Forsch p. 63).
 - b. 35 δσπερ οὐδὶ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ οὐδὶ τὰ εὐεκτικά Ramsauer suggests the insertion of τρί Ινίοτε το ὑγιεινὰ. The construction is—ὁσπερ εὐδι τῷ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ καὶ εὐεκτικὰ εἰδέναι πρακτικωτεροί ἐσμεν τῶν υγιεινῶν καὶ εὐεκτικῶν. This usage of πρακτικωτεροί is well illustrated by Rassow (Forsch p. 124) from E. N. v. z. 4 οἰσε ἀπὰ τῆς ὑγιείας οἱ πράττετοι τὰ ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ μόνην λέγομεν γὰρ υγιεινῶς βαδέξειν, ὅτων βαδέξη ὡν ἐν ὁ ὑγιείνων.
 - 5 30 δσα μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξεως εἶται λέγεται] 'I mean úγιανα an l εἰεκτικα in the sense, not of the element causes, but of the than hestations of νγιαια and εἰεξία.' [f]. Med Γ. 2. 1003 à. 34 τὸ ὑγιαινίν ἀπαν πρὸς ὑγίαιν, το μεν τῷ ψιλάττειν, τὸ δι τῷ ποιείν, τὸ δὲ τῷ πημεῖον εἶναι τῆς υγιαια, το δε ότι δεστικών αἰτης: [f]. Τορ. h. 2. 110 a. 10, Med. Κ. 3. 1061 a. 6 He means that the n ere knowledge of 'what concerns health' does not make a man peck τια healthy functions. 'Healthy functions' (τὰ ὑγιαινί τοι τῷ απο τῷς ἔξεως εἶναι λεγομένα) are not hich the means to health' (τὰ ὑνιαικό τὰ τῷ ποιών την εἶξεν λεγόμενα) which are suggested by medical know-

ledge. Medical knowledge knowledge of the means to heath — 1143 b. 98.

thakes a man indeed sparricoreput the Symbol row of south the Symbol Symbol thakes a maintenance of the south sparricores. But not know to bymole despythe or the Symbol that of the Symbol S

oddiv yap upuntumitepou u. t. h.] Af er upuntumitepou we may up lete b. 27. stand, then, and to dynamic and oderstands distributed, or so me auch words. Knowledge of the means to health or good training, as they are so, forth in the sciences of larging and yupunoving, will not make a man who has not the dies of dynam or edefin, a healthly man or a powerful athrete. The Paraphrast Heliodorus has the following comment here—added palahan and void distributed and odernad, died to distribute the following comment here—added palahan and too edd bysecol h ederstand yudunda and too adds iddina to lysesod and edermad, died to distribute to lysesod and edermad, died to distribute to lysesod and edermad, died to distribute to dots to so and edefine of yap of materials to distribute the distributed died and another and distributed died and another and distribute the effect and yupunda died to public died to and another and died to distribute the electric and yupunda died to died to died to distribute the electric and yupunda died to d

§ 2. Toútus gápis] tol salta elbésa gápis.

ъ, 28,

τοῦ γίνωσθαι] εε, σπουδαίους.

D. 20

τοῖε μὴ ἔχουσιν) εε, ἀρετήν: ε ε, 'those who have not the εξίε ο 80 (of ἀρετή ': οδοίν has been unnecessarily suggested for ἔχουσιν.

abrods excert se, the phonon: the writing is very careless.

\$ 3 ποιούσα] when here in the sense of χρωμώη (see E N. i. b. 30. z. 7): hence not to be compared with η πούρσουσα, but with η χρησομώνη of Rep. box D. The Paraphrast seems to suggest the line of thought which led the writer to describe φρόνησιε από η ποιούσα: he says—δοκά δέ ή φρόνησιε βιλείων τῆς σοφίας, απόσου ἀρχή ἐστε πρόξεως, από διά τούτο πυριωτέρα τῆς σοφίας, ητις μόνον θεωρητική ἐστιν ή γὰρ πρακτική εξει ἄρχαι καὶ διατάτετει περὶ διασταν—i.e. φρόνησις, απι πρακτική οτ ἀρχή πράξεως, is the efficient cause το ποιητικόν αίτιον (see de Gen. et Corrup. i. 7. 324 b. 13 fore δε το παιητικού εξει άθεν ή ἀρχή τῆς κινήσεως) of εξιαιμούμη, and (it may be maintained) uses materials supplied by σοφία, which it therefore directs, as the weaver directs the tailor.

repl by rootes deardor our may gap hadontal medi autur motor]

- 1143 b. 35. Zell compares Pol. 9. 6. 1340 b. 20 ποτερου δέ δεί μανθάνειν σύτους βδοντας το καὶ χειρουργούντας ή μή, παθάπερ ἡπομήθη πρώτερου, νύν λεκτύου,
 - 1144 a. 1. § 4.] Human nature, 23 a nystem of iderni, is an end in itself: see Alet. A. 2. 982 b. 24 δήλον οδυ ών δι' ουδεμίου αύτην (ε. σοφίω) ζητούμεν χρείου έτέρον άλλ' ώστερ δυθμωπός φαμεν έλευθερος ό έπιτοῦ ένεκα καὶ μή δλλου ών, ούτω καὶ αύτη, μόνη όλουθέρα ούσα τῶν ἐπιστημών μόνη γόρ αὐτή ἐαυτής ένεκαν έστιν.
 - a. 3. F . After all' de f dyfeig understand od bymirer. Lapin proes' ridamoria- not, however, as the doctor (efficient cause), but s the principle of health (formal cause), produces a healthy state. Eustratius reads và ricerum after byina, but explains the sentence as if he read cidouanum: nopia and primmis, he explains produce ebdomovio, not as merely external causes, like larping when it produces health; but as constituent parts (uspy) of eidaumous, like byicia, which is also a consument part of eddamona. 'H but aperi (the character of which codamovia is the function) is made up of the aperal of the mind and of the body, aided by external means, such as wealth. Zopla s the lightest during of the mental, as bying is of the boddy part. Εθδικμονία is a όλον constituted by the union of these two μόρια. Σοφία accordingly produces εθδικμονία, μικί ακ bylna also produces it, in the sense of being one of the factors which constitute it. 'Larpuch is not one of the factors or constituent elements of that which it 'produces', but is external to the product. Such is the explanation offered by Eastratus. It is not acomsistent with the view of eidogenia presented in Rhet. i. 5. 1360 b. 18 ei by έστιν ή εύδαιμονία τοιουτον, άναγκη αίτης είναι μερη εύγανιαν πολυφιλιαν, χρηστοφιλίαν, πλούτον, εύτεκυίαν, πολυτεκνίαν, εύγηρίαν, έτι του τοῦ σώματος άρετας οίος ύγειας κάλλος ίσχύς μέγεθος δύναμις άγωνιστικές, δοξου, τιμήν, εὐτυχίου, άρετήν. But surely it is inconsistent with the words which follow in § 6, 1144 a. 9 rod de verderou anome rie ψυχής ούε έσταν άρετή τοιούτη, του θρεπτικού. These works make it impossible to regard bythis, the excellence of the Operation, as a pipos the odne apeths: see also E. E. ii. 1. 1219 b. 20 ded sal dado et τι μοριόν έστι της ψυχής, οίον το θρεπτικόν, ή τούτου άρετη ούε έστι μόρων της όλης άμετης, ώσπερ ούδ ή του σωματος. We must therefore understand ro vytabete, not evoluporlar, after vyfria 1144 z. 4, and explain espia (he has dropped pringue for the moment) produces' obdomovio, as formal, not as efficient cause -i.e it is a

pripos, or formal element, in the δλον, or ellos, of the virtuous 1144 a. 3. character whose function is ellaupovia. For the technical use of μερη, as the notae notionis, see Bonitz on Med. Δ. 25, 1023 b. 19 five cis à deaptiral re ή if he σύγκειται το δλον, ή το ellos, ή το έχον το ellos. The phrase δλη άρετή cloes not occur in the 'Nicomachean' Blocks of the E. N., but is well known to Euclemas. Grant tetharks that Euclemus came to elemify ή δλη άρετή with nalosayabla—for which see E. E. H. 15, 1248 b. 8 sqq. The Paraphrast explains the present § correctly—'Energy και χρήσιμοί είναι πρός τήν εὐδαιμονίας, ούχ δισκερ ἱστρική πρός ἐγίνιση άλλ' δισκερ ἡ ὑγίνια πρός ὑγινιαν ἔχει, εὖτω σοφια καὶ φρώνησιε προς εὐδαιμονίαν χρήσιμοί εἰνιν' ἡ μέν γιιρ παθόλου εὐδαιμονία ή παντελής έσταν άρετή, σοφία δι καὶ φρώνησιε μέρος εἰσὶ τῆς δλης ἐφετής' δισκε μέρος εἰσὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης εὐδαιμονίας σοφία και φρώνησιε, καὶ τὰ ταύτας δχειν μετὰ τῶν άλλων άρετῶν εὐδαιμονίαν έστὶ της δλην εὐδαιμονίαν.

§ 6. Fre to Epyon amoreheiras u.t h.] 'Further, the function of the a. o. ridalpar (và l'oyor takes up iropyris (?) immediately preceding) requires for its complete fulfilment Prudence and Moral Virtue-Virtue making the end armed at (ir. in the sphere of conduct) right, and Prudence making the means right." Man's is a oirferes dious. H The april includes, as its pipe, the issued, as well as the dimensions aperal. The deθρώπονον άγυθών, or man's function, as man, is an impyria yeggs, which involves not only Geopla, but apafer. For the doctrine of this passage of. E. E. ii. 11. 1227 b. 19 fort you riv mir groups dulier elem, in de roir upde ron grounds diapapráneur fort de του μαν ακοκον ήμηρεηπθοι, τά δέ κρος έκεινον κεραίνοντα όρθως έχειν, καί μηθέτεμου, πάτερου δ' ή άμοτή ποιεί του ιποπόν ή το πρός του πκοπόν; τιθέμεθα δή ότι τον σκοπόν, διότι τούτου ούκ έστι συλλογισμός ούδε λόγου. αλλά δή ώστερ άρχη τούτο bποκείσθω, ούτε γαρ larpos σκοπεί el δεί ύγιούνου ή μή, άλλ' οί περοπατείν ή μή, οθτε ό γυμναστικός εί δεί εδ έχειν ή μή, άλλ' εί πολώνται ή μή, όμωίως δ' ούδ' άλλη υνδεμία περί του τέλους. Louis yap rais dempyritais at wrodeness appal, ourse and rais valgemais to ridos anth sai indesore. Incede del rode bytamers, avayen roll buapeas. τί έσται έκώνα, ώσπερ έκει, εί έστι το τρίγωνου δύο όρθαι, άνάγκη τοδί είναι, τής μό ούν νηθακος άρχη το τέλος, της δε προξέως ή της νυήσεως τελευτή, εί οδε πωσην δρθύτητου ή ό λύγου ή ή άρετη σίτία, εί μη δ λόγος. End ripe aperie du appear ein re renne, and ou ra mode ed renos. . . . rd uir ούν τυγχώνων τούτων έλλης δυνώμεως, όσω ένεκα τού τελους δεί πραττειν. 'Aperi is the moral structure or organisation, which, like all living

1144 a. 6. structures, strives to maintain the ft in 840 esse perseverare conatur (Spinoza Eth. ii. 6). Asked to define the 'rightness' of the virtuous end, we can only answer—that it is being the end which human nature, as a well-known type is seen to propose to itself. It is the life which this particular organism, as a matter of fact, strives to lead. Our answer is thus given in the same way as it would have to be given, if the question were—How do you define the 'rightness' of (say) a sparrow's grounde?

Φρύνησιε ή καθ ϊκοστα, as here desembed in relation to ήθως dperé, is the consciousness of the moral structure or organisation, in so far as this consciousness in anifests useff in the delicate perception of the particular things which are advantageous or hurtful to the

structure.

- 9 τετάρτου] The four parts are (1) το επιστημονικόν, with its άρετη σοφω, (2) το λογιστικου, with its άρετη—φράνησιε (3) το δρεκτικου, with its άρετη -ήθική άρετη, and (4) το δρεκτικου, with its υρετή -όγδια.
- 10 dperή τοιαύτη] is dperή which can be regarded as a μέρου of ή ωλη dpirή (see note on § 5 above), and more especially (as is shown by the explanatory clause οδότο γόρ όπ' σύση πράττειν ή μή προτευι») ήθως δρετή.
- 2 13 § 7 ανωθεν] Ramsauer compares E N. viii. 1. 6 και περί αὐτών τούτων ἀνώτερον ἐπεξητούσεν καὶ φυσικώτερον—where see note.
- a. 10. η δι' ἔτερόν τι καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτά] ἡ δι' ὅλλο τι ἡ χρήματα ἡ ἡδονήν, τὸ δικαιον ποιούντες, καὶ μὴ δι' ἐσυτό (Paraph.).
- a 10 ofor] here = 'i.e' -see Wai.z. Organos vol. 1. p. 280- Aristoteles saepe voce vior ita untur, ut explicet (seiteet, nempe), non ut exempla afferat.'

For the doctrine of this 5, see E. N. ii. 4.

a. 20. § 8. την μέν οῦν προαίρεστιν δρθήν ποιεῖ ή ἀρετή, τὸ δ' όσα ἀκείνης ἀναια πόφιακ πράττισθαι οὐκ ἔστι τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ἐτέρας δυνάμεως] Grant says—' There is some confusion here in speaking of the means to a purpose, προαίρεστα itself being in the Aristotellan psychology a faculty of means, but cf Fth End il. 11 g-6 [1227] b. 36], where προαίρεστα is said to imply both end and means, and whence the present passage is repeated almost techniem, ἔντι γὰρ πάσα προαίρεστα τίνας καὶ ἔνεκα τινίς οῦ μεν οὖν ἔνεκα τὰ μέσον ἐντίω, εὐ εὐτία ἡ ἀρετή τῷ προαιρείσθαι οὖ ἔνεκα. ἔστι μέντοι ἡ προαίρεστα οὐ τοἶεσν,

άλλά τών τούτου έντας. το μέν οδυ τυγχάντιν τούτων άλλης δυνάμεως, όσα 1146 a. 20. ένους του τελους δεί πραττειν' του δέ το τέλος ύρθον είναι τής προπερέσεως of o form airia. I thank that Grant is mistaken in sar possing (as he seems to do) that there is any deviation marked here from Aristotle's doctrine of appainers as 'faculty of means'. The writer says distinctly fore perror & speciplate of rairor (i.e. of the end), obla row routov has (the means); and if he gives us to understand that spoopear 'm plies both end and means,' he only expresses what is involved in Aristotle's and his own view of mountain as faculty of means-ic. of means to a certain end. There is no more awkward less, I think, in saying vie pair of a appalpeous dothe now! h άρτιή, τό δ΄ όσα έκευης (τε. της προαιρέστως) ένται πέψοκε πρώττεσθας ούς for the dierne, than in raying, as both Aristotle (E. N. til 2. 1) and Fudentis (E. F. t., 11, 1228 a. 2) say, thus we judge of a man's character (i.e. his end) from his aponipeois- i.e. we think less of what his acts are in themselves, than of the end for which he chooses them as means. It mus, be remembered also that the popular meaning of membering to which 'Eudemus' may be allowed to revert here, without being thought guilty of much 'confusion') is that of 'general policy'—as in Demostl., 257. 7 à specupeaux à inh noi à nodireia. By bripos durapeus we are to under stand oppositione. It points out to the man whose interest is in the good end, the dangs naturally fitted to serve as means to this end. These things he accordingly chooses and does,

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s. 22

\$ 9. τον θποτεθέντα σκοπόν] 'à given end'—τ.ε. δεινότης, et a. 24 'clevernesa,' is the power of discovering and employing the means which lead to any end which happens to be in view—no account being taker, so far as the nation of δεισσης is converned, of the more there of the end. Δεισσης, of course, operates largely in non-moral fields, where it undergoes no transformation: but in the metal field, when it is leady unly enlisted in the cause of a good end, it becomes the έξω of φρωσούν, when habitually enlisted in the cause of a tad end, the έξω of πασουργία. In Ε. Ε. n. 3, 1221 a. 12 (in the επογραφή of doubtful authenticity), φρώσου is given as the μασότης between πασουργία and σύηθεια.

the notion of the MSS. I think that E. E. in 11, 1227 b. 40 is

- 2144 a. 25, against Bywater's reading -- το μέν οδυ τυγχάνειν τούτων έλλης δυνάμεως δοα ένακα του τέλους δεί πράττειν.
 - Sid nal rous operimous beiveds nal naroupyous danier eleat These words are to be construed (as by Eustr. and the Paraph.) in the olynous way-rove oportuous being the subject, and branis and nuroipyour the predicate. It is adduced as a proof of the close connexion which the writer wishes to establish between denoting and navoupyin on the one hand, and devotes and optimore on the other, that 'even the polynom are often popularly described as drawn and navorpyor -t. e. that the terms opposition, denote and navorpyoe are used (inaccurately, of course, but still used) interchangeally Michelet construct—did not deper root prompous not morotpyous com downer, but does not satisfactorily explain the omission of the article before waroupyous in the existing text. Ramsauer (followed by Susemill) inserts the article before **avoúpyove. It may perhaps he thought that ou which CCC reads before earnipyone, is a fragment of an original robs. Fritzsche quotes Plato, Thract, 177 A devoi sai navoupyon and Demosth. Olynth. 1. p. 9 navoupyos der and Bearis διθρωπος πράγμασε χρήσασθας.
 - a. 28 § 10. ολχ ή δόναμις] Bekker's οίχ ή δουότης is the reading of Mb alone. Not only do the great MSS.—Kh and Lh. read δόναμες, but the inferior ones—Cambr., CCC, NC, B', B', and B'—also. Accordingly Sissemill and Bywaier revert to δόναμε. I agree with Ramsauer (against Rassow, Forsch p 63) when he says—*οίχ η δόναμε nullo modo feeri potest, hist addition (ή δόναμε) αδνη. Optime, ut sexcenties, Bekkerus de Nie. meruit corrigens δουότης. It is to be noted that the Paraph Helodorus has—δονι δέ ή φρόνησε οίχ αδνη ή δόναμε, ή δουότης, άλλ' επ.λ.
 - * 89 ἡ δ' εξιε τῷ ὅμματι τούτφ μ.τ.λ.] Eustratus (followed by Zell, Pri.zsche, and Grant) is plainly wrong in regarding the ὅμμα here as κοῦτ πρακτικός. The passages quoted by these editors (κ.χ. Ε. Λ. νί 11. ὁ διὰ γόρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐε τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὅμμα ὁρῶσιν ὅρθως, ἱ. ὁ 12 ὡς γὰμ ἐν σώματι ὅψις, ἐν ψυχῆ νοῦς) certainly show that κοῦι is described as ὅμμα οτ ὅψις: but the question here is—What does τῷ ὅμματι τούτφ mean? and it surely can only mean the δύναμε οf δεινοτης, which becomes the ἔξιε οf ψράτηστι (οτ κοῦι πρακτικός), when ἀρετή has taken it into its service. Grant compares Plato, Κερ 518 It will be seen that the δύναμε οτ ὅμμα οf Plato πρένετε to the δεικότφε σε

man'e capacity of E. A. vi. 12 10, not to pologous-518 B &c di 1144 6. 29. είπων, ήμως τυκόνδο νομένται περά αύτων, εί ταξτ' άληθη, την πακδείαν, ούχ our revis eanyyeddoureni dinare eiene, romirne kal eiene, chart di nou oix έντάσης εν τη ψυχή επιστημης σφεις έντιθεναι, οίον τυφλοις δφθαλμοις δψιν irridires. Carl yap our fifm. 'O di ye rur hayas, fr d' dyw, organires raires the fooderar factorou diseases in the physical to departs, & autoμανθανοι έκπανος, εξου εξ διμια μή δινανου ήν άλλως ή ξυυ όλφ τώ σώμανι στροφείν πρώς το φάνον έκ του σκοτώδους, ούτω ξύν όλη τη ψεχή έκ του γεγεσμένου περιακτίον είναι, έως δυ είς το δυ και του έντος το φανότατου demary general denorgialas dempeny rosan d'eleal chaper rayadon. I gap; Να. Τουτου τοινου, ήν δ' έγώ, αύτου τέχνη δν είη, τής περιαγωγής, τίνα τροπον ώς βροτεί το και άνυσιμωτατα μεταστραφήσεται, ού του έμποιήσαι airoj ro onav, aha is export per airo, oin dillor de responsivo pide filemort οι τίλες τυντο διαμηγανήσησθαι. "Εσισε γύρ, έφη. ΑΙ μέν τοίνυν Πλλαι αρεταί ανλοί μεναι ψυχής κινόυμο οροσικ έγγες τε είναι των τού σωματος τώ dert gap aile evoural aparepou barepou ejanutelabat Theat re ent aregaerate. ή δε του φρονήσαι παντύς μάλλον θειστέρου τινύς τυγχάνει, ών ξυικτή, οδισα, δ τήν μεν δύνομεν οιδίποτε απόλλυσεν, ύπο δί της περιαγωγής χρησιμού καλ ώψυλημον και έχηματών αδ και βλαβερόν γίγνεται, ή οθπω έννενδηκας, τών λεγομένων ποιημών μέν, σοφών δέ, ώς δριμο μέν βλέπει τό ψυχόριον καλ ofens diago rown, of a responsible of that the Type Type of the, ranis & ήναγκασμένου διαφρετείν, διατε διαφ άν δξύτερου βλίας, τυσούτω πλείω κακά έργαζδμένου:

is stopped.] Ramsauer makes a difficulty alout the statement tims a so referred to, and comes to the conclusion that it is not to be found, and must have occurred in a lost passage most likely in the present book. But what is the statement? Virtually, that åperh makes the sources of the sum of the statement? Virtually, that åperh makes the source of the sum an immersh sign. This has been said several times in §§ 6-9. I cannot understand why Ramsauer declines to recognise the remarks in these §§ as referred to by in suppress.

oi γάρ συλλογισμοί τῶν πρακτῶν άρχην ἔχοντές εἰσιν, ἐπειδή κ.τ.λ.] a. 31. ἔχοντες εἰσιν (f the reading is sound) must be taken as equivalent to ἔχοντες εἰσιν (f the reading is sound) must be taken as equivalent to ἔχοντες εἰσιν ερακτῶν, εὐε δηλονότι συλλογιέμενοι πρώτομεν, ἀρχὰς ἔχοντες τὰ τίλη τῶν προξεών. For the Practical Syllogism, see notes on vu. 3. 9. Ramsauer suspects τὸ τυχάν, which he regards as mappropriate where τὰ ἀμπτον is concerned. This objection seems a little hypercritical.

1144 a. 36. ἀδύνατον φρόνιμον είναι μὴ ὅντα ἀγαθόν] φρόνησει is the consciousness of what is required, in all circumstances, for the maintenance of the moral character. Similarly, every living creature is aware, in all that it does, of the requirements of its particular type.

CHAPTER XIII.

Λεουπεκτ.

As Fradence is related to Cleverness, so is Visitue struct's so a link related to natural vertue. That there is such a thing as natural virtue is place people are born with tendence to acquire that or that virtuous disposition temperance, er courage or justice such tendencies are constitutional er natural. Enlers directed by reason they are obviously harmful; but under tee derection of Keason, s.e. of Frudence they settle down into habits and become vertues strictly Thus, as we find Cleverness and Pendence under the owning part of the soul, so me find matural vertee and vertue streetly ro earlest aware the moral part : and virtue strictly so called does not come into existence weekent Printence, Heart Sociates held that the virtues are so many forms of Printence. He was wrong in imply identifying the virtues with Privaries, eight in to far as he recognised that Produce is no essary to them. And this is weat all now recognise in their depuision of I wine at a habit in relation to cerain seports -determents, they odd, as the eight ratio requirer, meaning by 'right' that descripted by Printenes. A slight alteration, honoroer, is necessary in tow departien. Firthe is not only a habit descripted as the right rates requires, for thus the right rules might be it late external to the "vertucus dispusitionvather, Varine is 'a habit which has the right rand in itself!

It is plann then from what has over said that a man cannot be good in the tirult sense without Frudence, or princent without moral virtue, and it is by means of the is tenation who a we have diam between Vertue straily so called and natural virtue that we meet the indicational argument which true is shown that the writes may exist reposalely in a man—that he may have this vertue, aminot yet have acquired that The 'writes' which this argument manifulate are only the natural virtue,' which indeed may exist reposality, but as for the virtues which operately. If a man have I villence, he will at the same time have all the virtues apparately. If a man have I villence, he will at the same time have all the virtues. Even if Frudence did not help could be sure about need at a villence of a part of the toul; at it, however, it see he pearwall, without it and I virtue, however, it see he pearwall, without it and I virtue, however would not be right, for I virtue gives the good and makes it alterative, I building discovers means, such as virtue was choust and and makes it alterative, I building discovers means, such as virtue was constant and and and another it alterative.

As for the difficulty about Princence being microses of Baston It is no

more so than medical science is accepted of health. Fradence does not use Window as a meant, but proceedes that Wesdom shall abound. It is less not to Window that Fradence is user community. Fradence classes to Window as the State stands to the gods whose worship is regulates.

§ 1. not γdp... πρός την κυρίαν] The reading of Lb, Ob, NC s t144 b 1. tempting παραπλησίως γλρ έχει ώς α.τ λ. for the και γλρ ή άρετή παροπλησίως έχει ώς α.τ λ. for the και γλρ ή άρετή παροπλησίως έχει ώς α.τ λ. of the other MSS.: in any case, however, the δεαλεγία is given incorrectly: it ought to be—ώς ή φροιηπίε πρός την δεινότητα, ούτω επί ή κυρία άμετη πρός τὴν φυσικήν. Othe is also tempted to think that νὸ τοίτο μεν, διαπον δί is an interpolation. If we retain it, we must understand ή δεινότης τῆ φροιήσει: and might then be ready to agree with Russow (Forsell, p. 126) that the terms of the other rat o are given in the correct or fer—ούτω ή φυσική άρετη πρός τῆν πυρικό.

made yap bouck u + h.] The Joetta e of dword dorry, or a constitu- b. 1. tional tendency to goodness, which lends it e f kindly to moral training, is, Fritzsche (F. F., note here pp. 146-7, and note on F. E. n . 7. 1233 b. 16) takes pains to show, a Eudemian development of hants supplied by Aristotle e.g. in E. N. i., 1. 3, ii. 5. 5, x. 8, 2 x 9. 8. It is true that the doctrine of pooned apera is very definitely presented in the E. E., as will be seen from the passage quoted below; but I think that justice is searcely done to Aristotle's statements on the subject, when they are summarily described as 'hants.'- Confidentius ut de rebus exploraris logartur Eudemus quam facit Antioteles, ex cojus quasi adambrationibus...l aec doctrina petita est' (Frinsche ad E E 1233 b. 16) The statement of Ar stotle (referred to by Fr tzsche) in E. N. in. 1 3 obr' δρα φυσει είνε παρα φυσιν έγχίνονται οἱ άρεται, άλλά πεφυκόσι μέν ήμιν Bétardas auras rehemperme de dia rou édoue, seems to go far beyond a hint. Nor must we forget, in estimating Aristotle's position in relation to this doctrine, to take into account the prominence which he gives to objective defined as down vivour; see note on i. 8 16 corrected 1099 b. 3), and to national character (see Pol. 11. 6, 1327 b. 18 sqq), and to the continuity of mental, as well as of corporea, forms, in the ascending scale of organic life generally: see Hint. Anim. O. 1. 588 a. 16 Τά μέν οδν περί την άλλην φύσεν των ζώων καί την γενεσεν router the the rollion at de spifers and at Sion ward on Abn and the τροφας διοτρέρουσαν. Ενιστι γορ δυ τοις πλειστοις και τών άλλων ζώων Τχνη τών αυρί την ψυχήν ερόπων, δαιρ έπι των άνθρώσων έχει φανερωτεριις τών διοφοράν και γορ ήμερότης και άγριότης, και πραότης και χαλεπότης, καί

1144 b 4. ἀνδρια εαὶ δειλία, καὶ φάθαι και θαρρη, και θυμοὶ καὶ κανουργίαι καὶ τῆς τερὶ τῆν διάνοιαν συνέυεως ἄνεισεν ἐν πολλο΄ς αὐτῶν ὁμαιὐτητες, καθαπερ ἀπὶ τῶν μεμῶν ἐλέγομεν. Τὰ μὲν γόρ τῷ μαλλιον καὶ ῆτον διαφερες πρὸς τὰν ἀνθριοπαν, καὶ ὁ ἄνθριοπαν, ποὶ ὁ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλος (φιος μάλλιον), τὰ δὲ τῷ ἀνάλογον διαφέρει. ὡς γὰρ ἐν ἀνθριωπφ τέχνη καὶ σοφία και σύντος, οῦνως ἀνίοις των (ψων ἐπτί τις ἐτερα τοιαίτη φυσική δυναμε. Φανερωτιστον δ΄ ἀστι τὰ τοιαύτον ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν παίδων ἡλικίαν βλέψασιν. ἐν τοίτοιε γὰρ τῶν μὲν ύστερων ἐξεων ἐσομένων ἔστιν ἱδειν οἰον ἔχνη καὶ απερματα, διαφερει δ΄ απίθεν ὡς εἰπείν ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς τῶν θηρίων ψυχῆς κατὰ τον χράνον τοῦταν, ὡστ' οὐδιν ἄλυγον εἰ τὰ μὲν τπύτὰ τὰ δὲ παραπλησια τὰ δὶ ἀνάλογων ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἄλλοις (ψοις. Οῦνω δὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀψυχων εὶ τὰ (ψα μεταβαινει κατα μεκρον ἡ φύσις, ὥστε τὴ συνεχεία λανθάνειν τὸ μεθοριον οἰτων καὶ το μέταν πατέρων ἐστίν.

The most definite statement of the doctrire of overed every in the E. E is that in ul. 7 1234 at 24 sqq. The writer is speaking of the nodyrekai pevientes (aidus, vipeate, padia, aeprotys, edeponedia) and that respective extremes, and he says-nagar & abrar at programmer immerrar piv, où elot d'aperat, eld al evavent maxim aven aprospiores yap, raira di mint cativ en tale ton madquaren dealbeacam, evacuon dub apron magat re dorle. Bud de rà promà elem ele rue poorine orappublirus openis. doce γαρ, ώσπερ λεχθήσετοι όν τοίς ύστεραν, έκιστη πως άρετή κοί φίσει ral έλλως μετα φρονήσεως. ό μέν υθν φθύνος είς άδικίων συμβιλλετοι (προς γαρ άλλον οι πραξειε οι οπ' ούπου) και ή νέμευτε είε δικοιοσύνην, ή ο δως είς σωφροσύνην, διό και όριζονται έν τῷ γένει τοίτφ την σωφροσύνην. Here an attempt is made to distinguish separate natural or constitutional bases in the mody, not only for separate virtues, but for separate vices; and it may be at once admitted that Aristotle supplies only hints for such detail, as when he says of the courage dia ros bopos F N. iii. 8. 12-posterrity d' loices & bid var begår siras, nas seposta-Bodon aponipense and to of even despela elent, and when he recognises the value of alder as a quality in the young, E. N. iv. 9. 3. The passage in the M. M., parallel to E. N. vi. 13 §§ 1-5 is as follows -i. 34 1197 h. 36 warep & exect deworns upde program, const defense de exem ent rue aperus anorus. Legu de olor elvis aperal sai diore in επιστοιε έγγινέμενοι οίου όρμαι τινες έν έπιστφ άνευ λόγου προς τα ανδρεια ent ru diema aut auf benurge made ru rouebra' eine de dy ani thie eni spoaspiore. al di di però dispor oboas redius aperal cion inquerni επιγανόμεναι. Εστιν ούν ή φυσική άρετή σύτη ή άνευ λόγου χωριζομενο μεν τοι λύγου μικρά και απολεικομένη του εποινείσθαι, πρός δε τύν λόγου και τήν προκέρεσαν πρωτευθεμένη τελείων ποιεί τήν όρετήν. διά αιὰ συνεργεί τῷ λόγος λλ44 b.4. καὶ οὐε ἔστιν ἄνευ τοῦ λογου ἡ ψυσική όρμη προς άρετήν οὐδ αδ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ προκέρεσες οἱ πανυ τελειούται τῷ εἶναι ἀρετή ἄνευ τὰς ψυσικής ὁρμῆς διὸ υἰκ ἀρδίως Σωπράτης ἔλεγεν, ψασκων εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν λόγον ανδεν γιρ ἄφελαι εἶναι πρωτευν τὰ ανδριία καὶ τὰ δίετια, μη εἶδατα και πρωτρουμενον τῷ λόγος. διὰ τὴν ἀρετήν ἔψη λόγον εἶναι, υὐε ἀρδώς, ἀλλ' αἰ νῦν βέλτιαν τὸ γαρ κατὰ τὰν ἀρδία λόγον πρωτευν τὰ κιλά, τοὐτο φυσιν εἶναι ἀρετήν ἀρθως μεν οἰδ΄ οἶνοι. πρωξειι μέν γαρ ἄν τις τὰ διαια προαιρέσει μέν σείδιμῶς, υὐδὶ γνώυτι τὰν καλῶν, ἀλλ' όμμῆ τενὶ ἀλόγος ὁρθῶς δὰ τπῦτα καὶ κατὰ τον ὁρθὸν λογου (λέγοι δέ, ῶς ὧν ὁ λόγος ὁ ὁρθὸς κελεύσειεν, οὖτως ἔπρωξεν): ἀλλ' ἄμως η τοιαίτη πρῶςις οἰκ ἔχει το ἐκαινετάν. ἀλλο βέλτιον, ὡς ἡμεῖς ἀψορίζομεν, τὸ μετὰ λογου εἶναι τὴν ὁρμὴν πρὸς τὸ κιλόν τὰ γὰρ τουντον και ἀμετή καὶ ἐπαινετών. Ειπιτείτια describes ψυτική ἀρετή αδ εἰψοια τις κρός ὁποδοχὴν τῆς κυρίως ἀρετής, μτιὰ ψρόνησιε ακ εἰδοποιησίε τω κοὶ κῶρφωσιε τῆς δεινότητος.

συφρονικοί] capable of becoming συφρούε.

b. 8.

nal τάλλα ἔχομεν] s.e. are capable of acquiring the other εξειε, b. 6. or have the other εξειε potentially.

§ 2. dar δε λάβη νούν, έν τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει] The highes, b. 12. moral life consists in the greatest possible obsigues of the inner, or rational, as distinguished from the outer, or sensitive, man. But reason and sense are not to be regarded as two entities having no part in each o ker, the one being the principle of morality, and the other of immerably. If this were the distinction, it would be difficult to understand Anstorle's view of a voluntary act, as one . n. 1 ging from any doxy within the man, whether it be instrain, Popule, or adyor (L. N. 11. 1. 20), and his definition of apoclipease as Buildenies aprice (E. N. th 3 19). The moral reason is no mere abstraction out of contact with the passions, but it is the Form ("Das) and they are the Matter (vd Secretor) not antagonistic, but really complementary forces which morality seeks to harmonise Choice, or aponiperar, wherein man appears so clearly as an doxinwithout which there would be no such thing as morality, belongs as much to the sensitive and emodonal, as to the rational side of human nature, and presupposes the power of performing voluntary (motiona) acts, which treational beings have no less than man. As the objects of the scientific roor are always presented in a particular Day, so the oppose hoyor, or moral organism, of which rove

1144 b. 12, more rade is the consciousness, is an Impos hayor, an equilibrium of real pass ons. The inner, or rational, is the Form of the outer, or sensitive man. The moral reason is the eldomorphic and prophomic two madquarer. Aristotle thus avoids the extreme Socratic position that virtue is knowledge, and vice consequently involuntary, we hout surrendering the truth that reason is easer hal to meralay, Morality is the perfection of the form of a given matter. In plants, their manner of growth-re opensus -is the form. Asimals are constitute of their organisms in the schemata of pleasure and pain ; and mere dorfie is the exponent of their form, so that what ever thwarts mere δρέξω is not themselves. Acts done from more Speker by man are his own acts, and volumary, because in him the sensil le nature is il e material vehicle of the rational moral nature. and if he is to have credit for achieving the perfect form, he must be responsible for acts which hinder its reception—d virtue is at his power, vice must also be in his power. This is the practical consideration which makes Aristotle, in treating of m emission, represent man as coextensive with his dullery of all kinds. There is therefore no contribution between the statements that Reason is the Man (e.g. E. N ix 8. 6), and that acts done from inchina and flouris, as well as those done from hoyor, are voluntary, e.c. the man's own acts (L. N. id. 1. 21). Reason is the Form taken by the whole sensitive nature. The more clearly a man sees that Reason is himself, the more readily will be hold himself responsible for all acts of the sensibility which stand in the way of the final victory of Reason. A central government becomes stret g and succeeds in crushing lawlessness in the provinces, only by holding itself its men weakness responsible for the lawlessness.

The education of the young citizen under values consists in the process of centralising the digit of his nature. At first he acts and hoper in accordance with an external standard, supplied by the value of the her could not see unless it were pointed out to him and would not conform to unless he were constrained. As time goes on, he begins to see for himself what is right, and to desire, independently of external constraint, to do it, till at last he and part hoper in accordance with a standard which he has now appropriated to himself and assimilated: see E.N. vi. 13 5 form you or patron the rath the habituation the natural tendencies to proper conduct (al furnissi diperat become fixed in relation to one another, and as

they become fixed, the consciousness of their relation to one 1144 b. 12. another becomes clearer, and more capable of serving as a principle of guidance, when circumstances arise in which the due relation is I kely to be disturbed. Oversy apery becomes espin dury, by hal mation, under the eye of pointous, which itself becomes charer as the passions are reduced to order (E. N. v., 13. 6). Allow for example, is the natural basis of modpooring (E. E. III. 7. 1234 a. 32). This natural tendency to refram from acts of intemperance is strengthened by education that begins to attract its possessor's attention, and he makes 'intemperance' and 'temperance' objects of moral reflection in relation to other objects of moral experience. This is the beginning of poongote, which reacts upon the incipient habit of temperance-ensures its fixture by keeping it sieadly in consciousness, and determines its place in relation to other habits similarly made objects of reflection: of. Souftest ary's reflected sense, by the operation of which a creatite rises from 'mere goodness' to 'virtue'."

number dpars. It is not till a man becomes fully conscious for h. 14. homse I of the order of his moral nature, and descately sensitive to all that makes for or against it—that he is virtuous in the strict sense of the term—t. e. virtuous in his own right, and a law to himself.

Sofarmaco] See note on vi. 5. 8.

† κυρία οδ γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως) He has told us in ch. 12. 5. 16. † 10 that άδυνατον φράνιμον είναι μὴ δετα άγαθόν. Trendelenburg Mist. Leavings sur Philos. ii 385-6) discusses this apparent circle, remarking that 'Dialectic can easily exhibit a relation of mutual ty

I handredury's Impulsy concerning Varies, Rook i. Pt. 2. 4 2— When in general, all the Affections or Passions are sorted to the publick good, or good of the species... then is the wateral temper conrely good... § 3 But to process from what is esteemed mere Goodness, and lies within the reach and capacity of all semistic evacures, to that which is called Vistus or Meral, and is allowed to man only—In a creature capable of forming general notions of things, not only the outward beings which offer themselves to the original collects of the affection, but the very actions themselves, and the affections are objects of the affection, but the very actions themselves, and the affection, become objects; so that, by means of this reflected sense, there areas another kind of affection towards these very affections themselves, which have been already felt, and are now become the subject of a new liking or tistike."

- 1144 b.10. as a vicious circle.' We must look out of the dialectical circle, as it were, beyond the relata themselves, and enquire after the cause which has brought them into this relation of mutuality. We shall then see that aperi and promote grow up legether in the cuizen, because the sois, or promote approximate of the sometry, which produces both, cannot, as a matter of fact, produce the one without producing the other. The fully formed if of explaining opera is the assured order of the passions; and the order is not assured till the subject is clearly conscious for himself of its essential lines. This clear consciousness of the moral order is the fully formed if of primare of, also Zeller's Ph. der Generhen, if a (Aristoteles) p. 658 (and ed.), p. 508 (and ed.).
 - b. 17. § 3. διόπερ] The connexion here is well brought out by the writer of the M. M. in the passage i. 34. 1197 b. 36-1198 a. 21 quoted above in note on vi. 13. 1.
 - b. 18. Φρονήσεις (f. E. 1. 5 1216 h. 2 Σωκράτης μέν οδν 6 πρεσμύνης φτι' είναι τέλος τὰ γινώσειν τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ ἐπεξητει τὶ ἐστιν ἡ ἐκεαισσύνη καὶ τὶ ἡ ἀνδρείω καὶ ἐκαστου τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς. ἐποίες γὰρ ταὐτ' εὐλογων. ἐπιστήμος γὰρ ಫ̃ετ' εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετας, ὥοθ' ἄμα συμβαίνειν εἰδεναι τε τὴν ὁκαιοσύνην καὶ εἶνια δίεαιου.

Impérys] See Grant's note ad loc, in which it is concluded from the absence of the article that 'the actual and historical Sociales is designated' here. It is scarcely necessary to say that the hald electrine—πάσαι τὰν ἀρενὰν ἀποτήμον κῶναι attributed by Fudemus in g. 1216 b. 2 sqq. to Σωκράτης ὁ προσβύτης, and by the writer of the M. M. in i. 1. 1181 a. 16 to Σωκράτης, and in 1183 b. 8 sq. to ὁ Σωκράτης in not the doctrine either of the historical or of the Platonic Sociates. Συμβαίων οὖν αὐτῷ (κι. Σωκράτη) ἐπωτήμας ποιούτι τὰν ἀρενὰν ἀναιρείν τὸ άλογον μερον τῆν ψυχῆς, τοὺτο δὲ παιῶν ἀναιρεί καὶ πάθος καὶ ἡθος (Μ. Μ. Ι. 1. 1182 a. 20) is a captious inference from isolated statements of Sociates or Plato, not a fair account of the theory of either, which did not differ essentially from that of the Aristorelian school.

- 6 (friest) Easte, connects δζήτω with the circumstance that Socrates
 philosophised δωλογικώς καὶ ξητητικώς,
- b.21. § 4. καὶ γὰρ τῶν πάντες] Fritzsche has an important note here (E. E. p. 147) — Ego interpretor nunc, quum valual do trina Pers-

poletica, relicia jam Academia, et comparo M. M i. 35. 1198 h. 13 1164 b. 21. δω την άρετην έφη (Socrates) λογον είναι, ούν δρθώς, άλλ' οἱ νῶν βίλτων: stque exist mo ita scribere potnisse Aristotelis aemulum Fudemum, non potnisse ita sur bere Aristotelem. Cf. etiam míra v. 30 ήμας.'

δναν δρίζωνται τήν κατά τὰν δρθάν λόγον] What of νῶν πεία is a 22 cara τὸν όρθον λόγον. Τ καν define άρετή as 'a εξιε concerned with certain objects,' and add 'an accordance with the όρθος λόγος.' Easte, expla us that πρός δ πρός πραξειε και νόθη, and that the 25 ων which is added is κατά τὰν όρθον λόγον. So the Paraphrast όταν δρίζωνται τὴν κρατήν, είνοντας αίκην και κερί τίνα καναγίνεται, προστάθους αιλ κατά τὸν δρθον λόγον.

§ 5. μικρον μεταβήναι] μικρόν παραλλάξοι τον λίξον (Dustr.),

b. 26.

πατά τον δρθόν λόγον μετά τοῦ δρθοῦ λόγου] Socrates made the dorrai hayon, the writer says they are not hayon, but ifore, nept night mi spokers, and hoyou-or rather, perd hoyou, for the hoyos which the ruby of the myseer dyaffer obey is not an external one,—not that of has which a man conforms to, but of principle which he reveres, The aspine dyados performs his virtuous acts proprio mote, according to a standard which he has assimilated -with which be identifies himself : see Fustratius-où yap minne des pérpor del rafai sine diffine dispar ton nur' doer for evoppeine fineireme, w' ein nura ru rofe aperife nur' ubrie. ed γαρ μέτρον ενδεχεταί ποτε τού μετρουμένου χωρεζεσθαι' ούε δει δέ ποτε πράττου ή πόσχειν κατ' άρετήν, χωριζομινής φρανήσεως, άλλα δεί παρείναι καί tor opbbe hogor det, au per abrod rue noufers givenba auf rue nelvers fra our aperne yearers, and if perid row option loyou if is aperil date. (180 the Paraphrant, who has τό γορ κατό λόγου διαφή ει τοῦ μετά λόγου κατά λόγου γω τις ποιεί τι, καὶ έτερου κενούντος, καὶ τὸ τελος στοπούντος, ώσπερ ή φύσες αυτα λωγον ποιες' μετα λόγου δέ, όταν αύτδο είδως πράττη, καὶ τό τελος σκοπων and hopen roug. The introduction of consciousness (from abrile elder mairry) by the Paraphrest as discriminating to perd hoper from to aurà hôyes, is unfortunate. It is true that in man the rule of an internal principle is the rule of consciousness, or conscience; but surely plant life, from which consciousness is absent, is also ruled by an internal principle (4 ydp diour apx) is alrag), and if the term Acros is used to express the law of that Life, it ought to be used in the formula perd hoyov, not, as by the Paraphrast, in the formula word loyor We shall avoid confusion if we take arra hoyou to mark an inward principle (whether its inwardness appear as self-con-

- 1144 b.20 sc ousness, or merely as the organic unity of the physical inch. lual), and surà λόγον an extern il rule. Thus, a temple is built surà λόγον:

 a tree grows μετά λόγου.
 - b. 39. § 8. alla and a loyos magai brapfough The writer of the M M helps us to understand the real nature and of jec. of the dialectical argument (& hoyor . . . of dialegthin res de) referred to lese. which tries to prove that the iperal are independent of one another. Is real object is to make a cash st cal interpretation of duty possible, by showing that there may be 'a conflict of duties' in any given case—that man is nothing but a bundle of separate vir cous tendeucies, any one of which may be indulged at the expense of the others. His words are-M. M. ii. 3. 1199 b. 36 eges & and rd τοιουτον όπορίων, οδον έπτιδον μή ή όμα προξαι τώνδρεια καὶ τὰ δικοια, κύτερ αν τις πραξεινν, εν μέν δη ταις φυσικαίς άριταις έφαμεν την δρμήν μόνου [dein] the aple the makin bail year aren hayor of d'eatin appeare, in to λόγφ καὶ τω λογον έχοντι έστιν. ώστε άμα το έλέσθαι [και] παρέσται καὶ ή redela apera imapfer, he schaper perà chonenous eina, aix arer di sus φυσικής δρμής της επέ το καλόν. αδδ' έναντιώσεται άριτή άριτη. πέφυκεν yap unerser em hoyo, [4] his obtas apagrarres, har' eft b ar obtas and. έπι τούτο επικλίνει, το γαρ βίλτιον υθτός έστιν ο αξρυύμενος, οθτε γάρ wer the promotes at and a special pleasure, old of promote telesa dues Tou and uperar, and overprouse mus per addition enactioned es Φρανήσει.
- 1148 a. 1. δμα γάρ τη φρονήσει μιά ύπαρχούση πασαι ϋπάρξουσω] ύπαρχοι ση (Byw.) is the reading of Kb, Mb, Carrles, · ούση s the reading of Lb, and other authorises, accepted by Bekker and Susem.bl. I think that ύπαρχούση is better than ούση, if we read the future ἐπάρξουσω— ' if φρόνησει is present, all the virtues will be present': but Lb, which reads ούση, reads ὑπάρχουσω. As for μφ it accords with ούση, but scarcely with ἐπαρχούση. We seem to req tire—dia γάρ τή φρονήσει, μιὰ οἰνη, ὑπαρχούση πάσαι ὑπάρξουσω. As regards the doctrine of the sentence— όλη άρετή, of which φρονήσει is the con-

scousness, is the resultant of all the special aperal furth, just as 1148 a 1. siefes is of the normal counts on cf all the boddy organs—see E. E. 11. 1. 1220 a. 2 dursy firstessing differences which said physical aperal firstess. Were it not for the resultant, the special difference would be aperal only in an equivocal sense. If we can be sure that a man has really one virtue—e, g. suppositing we may be sure that he has all the other virtues which make up the organism of first differences. Grant remarks that the theory of this first natural constitution. Grant remarks that the theory of this first approaches nearly to the Steneal mea of the wise man: of. Diog. Lacet vi. § 125 (quoted by Michelet) rie di diperie differences (or in Zemani) dimandantic dddifficial, and for plan figures to diperie domain. On the general subject of the relation of prompers to diperi see note on u 6. 15.

- § 7) This § recapitulates what has been said in ch. 12 § 4 and a. 2 § 7, 8.
- § 8. Cf. M. M. .. 34 1198 b. 9 norepus di avry navros dipper rise n. es έν τη ψυχή, διαπερ δοκεί και διτορείται; ή ους των γώρ βελτιανών φίκ άν d freen, alon ege cochias aun d iget. abba, charin, aurg émiliebetent minemin, rai ropis ivri apourarrossa. add lows free Conep de ciriq é éauxpanes. ούτος γώρ παιτων κέριος και παιτα διοικιέ άλλ' οθεω ούτος δρχει παιτων, adda napoweetales op deventy vyndyr, bowe du desiros jih ewdropseros bou τών είναγεσίων εκελειηται του τών καλών τε καί πρασηκοντών πραγτείν, ούνω και όμοιως νούνω ή Φρονησιε ώσπερ έπιτροπύς νές εσνε της συφιας, καί σορασκεταζει ταίση σχολήν καλ το ποιείν το αίνης έργου, κατέχουσα το παθη καλ τοι το σωφρονίζουσο. Cf. Mel. A. 2. 982 h. 14 καλ τών επιστημών δε την ειανής ένεκεν ποί τοῦ είδενοι χαριν οίμετην ούσαν μαλλον είναι συφίων 🤚 την των δικοβαινώντων δυσευν, απλ την άρχικωτέραν της ύπηρετούσης μπλλου cival troupier of gap dely intrarrector ton compantial intrarrect, and of received ireque nechealar, adda route tou from outsin. As was post ted out in note on vi 1, 1-4 1138 2 18, promote does not apprehend the all week standard. That is given by outle. The motal life is what it is in order to subserve the idea, of the speculative reason.

BOOK VII.

Introductory Note .- These chapters [vii. 1-10] says Grant, form a necessary complement to the Aristotchan ethical system. taking a more practical point of view (allow opens) than that which would do de marking simply into the victors and the victors. Moral systems in general have perhaps too much neglected this field of the intermediate states; and general language has not defautely adopted the distinction between the "Intersperace" doiharrow j, and the "Incomment" [departs], as the use of the English words at once testifies, for we are evidently obliged to give a certain special and technical meaning to the worl." Intemperate," in order to make it stand as the representative of dishorts?" (% the Aldine Schohast on vii (not Aspasius but 'Anonymus rec.'see Rose: Commentare pur Ethik des Arist, Heimes, vol. v) fol. 117'- ή έγημάτεια ούκ έστι κυριώς ύμετη αλλ' έγγίζει τη άριτή . . . ή μεν γωρ έστιν ή έγκράτεια εκ προαιρέσεως γινομένη καλ περί προκτά καταγανιμένη, δοικεν άμετής ή δέ πάλιν οδα έστιν Ισονομία έπε των μερών της ψυχής άλλά μαχη τις και στασιασμός, άρετή ούκ έστιν ό γάρ έγκρητής έχει μέν των Layor apontaneoura biju anizeatas tim honeim tim ainzpur, top is inteθεμάτε έχει μή ικολουθούσταν τῷ λόγῳ αλλ' άντετεινουσταν καὶ τών αίστρώσ nčaváv árregeaflat aneúdovaní ékt di ráv áperáv igosujun vie éares mu où μέχη τών μέρων της ψυχής, ελλά ά σωφρών έχει μέν του λέγον προστοσcoura dele anexentin cue alaxoue ifavier sal eldes exel cie eschulur επασολουθουσου το λυγοι και μή αντιτείνουσαν . . . όμαίως δε καί ή εκρασια ή αντιενιμίνη τη άρετη ήτοι τη έγκρατεια έτέρα τές έστι κακια καμά τος άλλος τος άντικειμένος τους ήθικούς ώρετους ήγουν την ακολουίαν την δείλουν και τας λοιπας ό γαμ έκρατης έχει μεν των λύγον έρρωμενον ώτι κοιών

[&]quot;Incomplife" is perhaps the closest rendering of de Androv. He is the man who has no principle, and is an "incorrigible offender." "Intemperate," bewever is amply justified by the fact that declares is the regular contrary of cooperative.

έστι το μοιχεύειν, ήττώτοι δι έπο του παθούς, και γίγνεται καναύθο μάχη Τις των μερών της ψυχής της γάρ έπιθυμιας υπουδούσης δυτέχεσθαι τών airgown jannen, b hayor antireines nal firearus o de anchairtes than the έτιθεμίαν βιπουσιαν πρός τὰς φαίλας ἡδονὰς ευθύς έχει και τὸν λόγον inacoloudoura kal mh destretearra. Cf. M.M. ii. 4. 1200 a. 35 μετα δέ ταύτα αναγκαίου έστω έτεραν αρχήν ποιησαμένοιε λεγειν υπέρ èугратейне най акратою, Сотер до най ф архед на ф вокім автай сімсь άτοποι, ωσεύτων είναγευίον και τούς αγρί τούτων λυγούς λεγθησομένους icromore years due où yap opeia à apera aire éari rais addais. Er per yap ταίε Δίλαις έπλ ταίτα και ό λύγος και τα ποθη όρμωσε, και οίκ έναντιουνται alliflant, eni de ruitus évartationes allighous o te hayor sal ta noch. The paradoxical character ("o dropor) of depuria, to which Sociates first called attention, made the state a favourite subject of discussion. Thus the chief difficulties in the notion of voluntary action present themselves to the writer of the Eudeman Ethics (E. E. i., 7 and 8) in connexion with dysparsia and departa; the writer of F. N. v discusses the puzzle of self-njury with immediate reference to the depurise (E. N. v. 9. 5); the interest of the writer of E. N. vn. chapters 1-10 in his subject is, to a considerable extent, a dialectical one; and the same remark applies to the writer of the M M. in chapters 4, 5, and 6, who follows E. N. vii. 1-10 very closely, and probably (see Ramsauer E.N p. 425) had no other treatment of the subject before him, when he wrote. It is the circumstance, as it seems to me, that disposio him is itself to dialectical discussion, rather than the intrinsic importance of the subject -great as that si-which accounts for its remarkable prominence in the Aristotelian system, and more especially (as was to be expected) in the later versions of that system.

The accessite of assuming the custence of intermed ate states between the confirmed igen, doing and among is set forth by Alexander Aphred, in his amount and histories, iv. 3 p. and Ald "his histories pre and distant, and dates doping to and analog forthe telephone of the were no intermediate states, how, he asks, would it be possible to become virtuins? Everything consequently it is not fear too beaution then made would be poors, and doesn consequently maps grown. Therefore doing and made are differentiated in too parage.

CHAPTER I.

ARGUMENT.

Let us note pass to another division of our subject.

Performant to be avoided are three, 1) here, (a Inventionence '3' Bents'et; Virtue and Continence are plainly the contraries of Vice and Inventment the contrary of Brutality is not so plain; but may be taken to be superhuman enotine such as one discribe to heroes and to the gods. As this quie be expense is rare among men, so a its official bristarily offenced found arrang barbarrans, and cometenes even coursel by assense and mutilation. We about recorn to at afterwards—at present we are oncerned with those properly human dispositions who is his between the god and the brute. If the seds positions, & e e and Vertice have been a ready distanced there remain Incontinence and Amer, Continent and tendurance the latter true belonging to the same genus as I seems, but siften ring from it specifically, the former two bosons ing to the same genus as to a but differing from it specifically,

Let us conduct this enguery in our usual way - first staining the area a he'd regarding these dispositions, then young through the difficulties in fee vacua then proceeding to e tab it is of for this ad the execut backet by sugh sent com in or, at least, the most of them, and the we althort. for the purpose of the treat t well have been influently served if having removed certain confinence, ...

leave men's opinions to speak for themselves.

The following means, then, are head-

(1) Continence and endurance are good, incontinence and softness had.

(2) The continent man is he who abides by the result of his reflection; the encontenent, he who felts away from st.

3, The importances man act, under the influence of ferry, last no that what he does to had . the continent man, knowing that his drives are had, as 3) has reason and does not folious them.

- (4) The comperate mores continent and enduring, runtle the encer of one statement some ergo d as universally true, and others do not.
- (a Some we the terms 'smarrigible' and 'smontenent' in a namegaily others distinguish between them.
- (6) Some say that the pressent man council be encontenent; where say tweet prudent and clover people are sometimes incontinent.
- ? There is 'incontinuous' on anger, and on the parents of honour and of material advantages.
- 1148 a 15. § 1.] In this section we have six states (1) des speri, i imp delpunov, (2) doerij, i nat' delpunov, (3) izapirem, (4) depoars (5) susio, i sur' distribution, (6) squartes. Alchough the dorri ale se букратем эт part materia 18 оффрового для пер. газ выратывая

indicates an himse), and the rocal below deposts is declared I do not 1145 = 18. think that Grant is right in assuming, as he seems to do in his note on this section, that the terms open and racio, as here employed, are simply equivalent to and made and declared respectively. April here marks the character, as a whole, of the virtuous man, as listinguished from the god, whose attribute is represent openic, and some the character, as a whole, of the virious man, as distinguished from the beast. This seems to be the view of the Ald. School and for - it yap amin decreases to be the view of the Ald. School and for - it yap amin decreases a drawn rate influence in property of this section as it describes the aperit of this section as it depend it describes. Heliodorus describes the aperit of this section as it depend it is described.

0082 24mm m.t. A. 7 77. xxiv. 258.

a. 91.

§ 2 odbi bypioc . . yevot sakine C/ Pol. i 1 1253 a. 27 6 ft a. 25 ру бонарына компиней ў рубы бырына во иблирышь повых разак побыць. were & Espan & Pros Cf. Part. de Vite et Ports Homers, 133 persos eieni sal dypinu peyaner dechannos . . . riju judu depau operyo be'an special Campos , the de denier enclar bypaubles, is interes Apartoteles estatoe. The braies have neither apera nor easily, because apera and one's are states as juited by ha immitton (ifee); whereas the dispositions of last's are what they are pion. The Ald, Schol, and Heliod. explain this difference between man and the brutes by the presence of Logor in man. The Ald, Schol, says - tois per Opplose doeth obe τοτι διώτε ή ώρετη προιωρική έστιν, ή δε προιώρεσες των λογεκών έστίν: and Η είκ ε λίλο - ού γαρ έντι θηριου κοικα ή άρετη διά το μή μετα λόγου ποιείν à rapà ron hôyan i. e. man lives in, and is conscious of (hôyou), a moral environment (within), with the conditions of which be either may (opera), or may not (energ) correspond. But the brutes are born into a merely physical environment, with which they are, from the first, in perfect correspondence. God, on the other hand, has no derif, for dorri is a If e, or acquired capacity of correspondence with an environment, and represents the painful victory of organising form (keyor) over matter (\$\lambda_{\eta}\$): God's being is pure form despress dury diminime-regard enjarge—the formative principle in him is not confronted by an alien matter, but regards itself alone. This conclusion, arrived at by an a priori method in M.I. A. 7 and 9, 18 confirmed by considerations of a somewhat popular kind in E.N.

The expression requirepor operar 1145 a, 26 indicates that the

- 1145 s. 25. divine good is not a Ifin, which is merely draweron, but an drappea, which is elimont see E. N. i. 12.
 - a. 27. ἔτερόν τι γένος κακίας] The gentive κακιας depends on έτεραν: see Coraes ad los —διάφορου τι γίνοι παρά την κακιαν, διε έξηγείται ή 'Αργυροποίλου—diversum quid est a vitio genus.

On the construction incl... norw see Eacken, de Arat, disenderatione p. 30, who compares Pol. 1253 b. 23-33, and Pol. 1254 a. 31.

- a. 30 μάλιστα δ΄.. ἐπιδυσφημοῦμεν] '(1) Some men are born brutal: (2) others are made so: (3) in ters make themselves so'—Peters' note ad loc. Toby διά κακίαν ὑπερβάλλοντας, introduced by καὶ – δί, are distinguished as a third variety from (1) οἱ φύσει, ε. ε. βαρβαρει, and (2) οἱ διὰ νόσουν.
- a. 31. πηρώσεις) We are to think of bodily mutilations and defects, not, with the Aid. School, of a defective moral nature—slot yap runs, he says, πεπηρωμένου ήνοι βιβλαμμένου έχοιντες νό λογιστικών και νών αλειίων φρενών έκσταντες. Coraes, noting that Argyropulus has Δενταντες principal, suggests the reading πηρώσειε της άρχη, and compares the πεπηρωμένου πρόυ άμετην of E N. 1 g. 4 but the association of πηρώσειε with runs (frequent, as Fritzsche ad loc, notes, in the E. E and in E. N. vi) seems conclusive in favour of understanding the former term of bodily injuries or defects.
- a. 84. § 4. Vorepor] Vii. 5.

περί 8d κακίας είρητα, πρότερον] Ε. Ε. in. 2 (η Ε. N. in. 10', it κακία be taken here rather in its special sense, as δεολοσία, than in the general sense of the contrary of ήθωή δρετή. The Paragh.

probably takes it in the general sense: he says repl de maine cippen 1145 a. 84 moitepor, for mepl dueron enfoquen filiado.

over yap is neel tie aitier deur til apeti al til modencia and deutera attender attender attender, over in the extraordinary care essness of the writing here, and improves that the author, when he wrote neel, intended to use denter, as in the previous cause, but wrote inadministration instead. Coraes adopts the reading isometric for its organ. Ramsauer notes the carelessness with which inations is used in the singular number, all hough, on the one side, three dispositions (inpacia, malacia, and type) are enumerated, and, on the other side, two (inpacia, malacia, and capture). Comes about the careless writing of the text as it stands

Francism and aperi (here - authorating, apparently) belong to the same 5000, imaginach as both result in good acts, where certain bodily pleasures are concerned; but differ our eiler, in that the good acts proceeding from speed are done without, and those proceeding from eye, drese with, a strucyle. Similarly, departe and poxenper (= decharin) belong to the same yems, masmuch as both result in bad acts; but they d for and older, in that the bad acts proceeding from poxelipia are done without and these proceeding from depends with, a struggle. So also suprepia produces good acts, where certain bodily pains are concerned, but after a struggle; and thus belongs to the same yeros as derei, but differs from it nor elbor; and palanta produces bad acts, where certain bodily pains are concerned, but after a struggle, thus telonging to the same yime as moyenpue, but differing from it mr' older For the difference between the apparts and dechagene see E. N. V L 3. 2 8 min yap (sc. deshaoron) ayeran apoanpoinenes, sonigue del dep to move ifto diment to & (se departie) our outros pie, dimen de. The All. Schol, marks the difference by saying that in the eyepartie and especie there is a mixy res, in the suppose and andhastes an lovespia του μερίου της ψυχής: of Plutarch, de Virt. Morals ch 6 νου δε σωφρασίος μέν έστιν, οδ το παθητικόν δισπερ εθήμιον θριμμα καλ πρέον ο λογισμός images and perageopiferas, neps the encountry property breskouts had dexopersy vie yakisin sai sparaivre riju institution. Synparetan di alie altimas άγες, ολλί πειδομενήν, άλλα πλαγίων και άντιτείνουσαν, οδον ύπα πληγής και raduri arrafiafiperos ani disaspoine, dynnos de de lauri ani bopifiou pearies ease & Harrow Secretifes mept and the houne incolugia, toi response τρός το βελτιον ζυγομαχούντος άμα καλ του ήνλοχου διαταράττουτος, άντέχειν

1143 a. 36 δπ σω, και επτατείνειν έπο σπουθής δυαγναζίμενου δεί μή βαλη δυσυκος έκ χειρών Ιμώντας επτά Σεμωνιδην. όθεν οὐδ' άρετην αίτοτελή άξιαθωι την έγυματείαν, όλλ έλατταν άρετής είναι μεσατης γάρ ού γεγωνεν έκ στιμφωνίως τοῦ χείρονας πρώς το βέλταν, οἰδ δυήμαται τοῦ πάθους τὸ έπερβάλλου, οἰδο πειθύμενου οὐδέ δαολογοῦν τῷ φρονοῦντι τῆς ψυχής τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν, εἰλο λυπουν καὶ λυποίμενου και ευτε ργύμενου ὑπ' άναγκης, ῶσπερ ἐν στιατεί δυσυκοῦς καὶ πολέμιου συνοικεί.

πάλιο δ' όμος μέν θυμισμάτων γέμες, όμος δέ παιάνων το παλ ατεναγμάτων.

§ 8. | Un the method of the present enquiry. First, we must sea e what men think on the subject (edirent ed painipiese); then, review the diliculties in the various opinions (diagraphy agrees); but not in such a way as to overthrow any or, at least, many of them (often δεικνίναι μάλιστα μέν καντα τὰ ἔνδοξα περί ταύτο τα πάθη, εἶ δέ μη, τά nheioro aut repostera); for men's opinions about matters of conduct, if certain confusions he cleared up (in higher the Everyphi), will generally be found to be right. Cf E F i. 6, 1216 b. 28 aparentes μέν πάντας άτθρωκους φείενηθαι συνομολογούντας τοίς μηθησομετοις, εί δί pij, sponov zi sien navras, čnep perafilialijusta naijaovau. žija zbe έκαστος ολεδών το πρώς την άληθεσον, έξ δον άνογκολον δεικνένας πως περι αθτών τε γάρ των άληθώς μεν λεγημένων οθ συφώς δέ, προϊούσεν έστος καὶ τὸ σαφώς, μεταλομβάνουσαν ἀκὶ τὰ γρωριμώτερα τών εἰνθότων λεγευίλο ovykexpairer. According to this view, the function of the north philosopher is to introduce form into the matter already supplied by the common opinions of men. These opinions, often representing imperfect knowledge and states of feeling, and generally couched in mi-leading language, cannot, as they stand, combine to form a consistent theory of conduct. They necessarily conflict with one another at many points, if not in their substance, at least in their expression. The moralist has to note the points at witch they could t and to present the exact nature of the could ct in every case as shartly as possible in a striking drupia. When two conflicting opinions have been sharply defined side by side, the grounds on which each has been adopted will generally appear. Each is seen to embody part of the truth; each regards the same thing from a somewhat different point of view; or even perhaps it is not the same thing at all that is regarded, but two things which a word contenuda. The actection of the equivocation, or other cause of mistinderstanding, which has opposed two nearly correct

operions as the horris of an arops, immediately removes the dead- 1146 5. 2. link, and enables the moral st to use the opinions as materia's in the construction of his ethical system. Thus, if hours rife dropters eigeous form (L. N. vn. 2, 12), the hoose being effected, not by the eristic method of champlening the one searths and discrediting the other, but by the method of examining the truth in each-by discevering 'the grounds on which each has naturally approved .well, as Euden us pens it in a passage (E. E. vo. 2, 1235 b. 13) which Cook Wason (Arist, Studies § 65) compares with the passage before us - Antreas on тротов батее при фра то те докольта пер. тостых καλιτια αποδώσει, και τὰς ἀποριας λύσει και τας επιντιώσεις τούτο δ' έσται, οιο ειλόγως φαινηται τὰ όναντία δοκούντο, μαλ στα γάρ ομολογούμενος δ transvor datas Layor tose chasposévoir. Cf. E. N. VI. 14. 3 enel & no μονον δει ταληθές είπεω άλλα και το αίτιον του ψεύδους τυύτα γέρ αυμ-Sadderne upos rip utorus. Grav jup eddogor havit to dià ri hauserae adubis and by adoptice, merecous more, up adopte junkhow where herear den el passorus of superseal identi eigenverses. A good example of the met and all dealing with anoples recommenced in E. E. v. 2, is given in F. N is b. One hope, or view, condemns the photos, another that a man ought to love himself most, The drawtwois here is caused by the ambiguity of the term acros. The former vew tegands the lower and mere y sensulve solf, the latter the higher and ranonal self. Instead of being contrary views about the came thing, they are out to be views about entirely different 11 17

Moral science then being, as it were, the formation of common up turns 1 do a system, the moralist must begin by stating these in it. He must next arrange them so as to bring out clearly the 1 ic insistencies which they involve in relation to one another. He is then in a position to see more or less easily why they present themselves as into instent, and it suggests itself to him to reconclete inconsistencies by drawing needful distinctions—as when in F. F. v.a. 2 the discussion of the intopia whether ro disconsistencies by drawing needful distinctions—as when in F. F. v.a. 2 the discussion of the intopia whether ro disconsistencies by drawing needful distinctions—as when in the establishment of three sidy of diskin: or by applying an 'appropriate idea' instead of the map propriate the authority and in the establishment of three sidy of diskin: or by applying an 'appropriate idea' instead of the map propriate the authority and instead of the map propriate the authority and instead of the interpretation of the diskinguistic idea' insteading idea of ro percentar flying & (E. A. vii. 2, 10) was retained. Thus, by the method

1145 b. 2. of to diamophani (- Buseldein ras anapiae, see Bonks, Met p. 1371. the moralist hits upon the distinctions and ideas (together with the terminology to express them) which bring light and order into the rough material of popular opinion. These distinctions and ideas are not likely to be fanciful and arbitrary, for they have been forced upon the moral st by a careful study of the intricacies of his subject-matter. They will be observe have row apaymores (see & & i. 6. 1217 a. 9). In other words—i hours ris droping especies cores. As most assigned are largely due to the ambiguities of common language, an important part of the method of ri diamopiques is to distinguish of whenexes keyopeva. Thus, in Top. 1. 13. 105 a. 21 this is given as the second of the four parts into which the method of dialectical enginey is divided -- no be opyana be an edrophosper rain gullogiation ears terrapa. In hin 27 ubnauere gaben, gentadan ge eq madayus enagrar diyeras dimabas diedeur piror de ro ros diapopas sipeir, reraprov de if rov opulou melpie. The method sketched in the above passage, and fully explained in Top, a chapters 14-18, is increated in the section before us (E. N. vn. t 5), and fellowed, though not very system i ically, in the enquiry prosecuted in E. N. vii c rapters 1-10. in the section before us, riboras tà pandueva answers to to appraires hafter: and to bearing to erdofa (resulting from to diamogram) corresponds to the compin effected by the detection of amb guities (rd morague inarror higeral direadus dieheir), by the observat on of divtinctions which had been overlooked (và vàc διαφοράς εύρεω), and by the survey of the subject as a connected whole (a row applied energy) which the detection of ambiguities and the observation of dist netions render possible.

The value attuched by Aristotle to 4 διαπορήσαι παλώς is well set forth in the following passage, Mel B. 1. 995 a. 24 sqq.—'Ariyen πρας την δαιζητουμένην έπιστήμην έπελθειν ήμας πρωτον, περι ων ώπορησαι δεί πρώτον τοίτα δ΄ έστιν όσα τε περί αιτών δλλωε υπειλήφωσί τινες, πάν εί τι χωρίς τούτων τυγχύναι παρεωραμένων. Ευτι δί τοίς είστορία λύπις των πρότερον όπορουμένων έστί, λύτιν δ΄ ούα έστιν δγνοαύντας τον δεσμέν άλλ' ή της διανοίας άπορία δηλοί τοίτο περί τού πρέγματον' ή γάρ διαφεί, να επιση παραπλήσεων ακανόν τοίς δεδεμένοις' άδυνανον γόρ διεφατέρως πρωλότιν είς το πρώτους. διο δεί τὰς δυσχερείας τεθεωρηκέναι πώτας πρώτορον, τούτων τε χάρων ποί δεί βιαλίζειν άγνοιν σε, καὶ πρός νεύτοις οιδ΄ ποτε τὰ ζητούμενον εύρηκεν ή μή γινώσκειν τὰ γάρ τέλος τούτος φέν οἰ

έπου, το δε προηπορηκότε δήλου. Το δε βελτιου αυάγκη έχουν πρόε το 1148 b. 3
κρότι του πατιερ αυτιδίκου και των αμφισβητούντων λόγων απηκούτα
πώσουν.

Securáras] to establish."

b 4.

τά ενδοξαί Τορ. .. 1 100 8. 29 κιρη — διαλευτικός δέ συλλογισμός δ εξ ενδύξων συλλογιζομένος . . Ενδοξα δέ τά δοκούντα πάπω ή τοίς πλείστοις ή της συφοίς τοὶ τούτοις ή τοις πασιν ή τοις πλείστοις ή τοίς μέλευτα γυνορίμους καὶ ένδύξοις.

The conditions of moral and political welfare (as distinguished from the recondite laws of the physical world) are represented with substitutial accuracy in the common opinions of men, for if common opinions had misrepresented conditions so essential to its moral, the human race must have long ago perished. These common opinions, arbitrary and accidental though they may often seem, are really, like the colours of flowers and the markings of needs parts of the rational or 'nonmenal' world, not mere opinione 'phenomena' which hills it from our sight. Hence the moralist falfils a function of the first philos phical importance, when he detects and removes certain obscurities and confusions which prevent a connected view of the whole body of experience represented by tedaga.

the you . . . innowed The Aid Schol and the Par, take to b. s. bongs, & to mean false ideas—robe hayour rous ph couplinuouse vil adadeia (Par.) - onas pier run dofun exorns adadeias rairos daBeir, boas δι είσι πεπλανημένου και της άληθειας έξω τούτας έασαι (Ald. Schol); but higher to decrept curnot mean the rejection of false views, the reference plainly being to the hours rife amopias which is expense, or elempio. The diagraph here are evidently the diagraphia or drapos of the passage quoted above Blot B. 1. 995 a. 24 sqq., i.e the courses of the various anopion such e.g. as the reason why two ελοξο, each of which is apparently well-founded in itself seem to contradict and discredit each other. When this reason has been detected, then sarakeiserus và livdofa-each of the two Works is seen to be true from its own somewhat different point of new, and the moralist fulfils his function sufficiently if he states in grambiguous ferms the precise sense in which each is true. I therefore agree with Grant and Ramsauer, who explain day yhp λίηται το τά δυσχερή και κοτολείησται τὰ ενδοξα in connexion with

1145 b. 6 E. A. vii. 2. 12 al min non denomin romand there armidianower, to tron de tê me derdeir de cà de caradereir à pip doors the denomins expense corne. Here tà me derdeir and à door tre denomin answer to dur denomin ta door pepi, as these latter wor is have been explained above, and to de mondaire answers to saradeirques tà éviden. The words in F. N. vi. 2. 12 I un derstand to mean that these questions must be dealt with on the method of removing difficulties, and so leaving the truth (embodied in the évidefa) plain.

demoisses and dedesymines seem to be used here rather than the compound with any, because the dustrances συλλογωμός is distinguished from the disobservers συλλογωμός by being of άνδοξως, he disobservers συλλογωμός by being of άνδοξως, he disobservers συλλογωμός being if άληθων και πρωτων. See Lip i 1

§§ 8, 7] enumerate the passiques, todaço, or degistern abox b. 8. lyapurene, daparen, &c. These ladofa are generally reduced to sa (as by the Paraph.), though a more minute does in is possible. The Paraph, Las Anna by more if dyspores byother, only engrepes row anandnias und ras énairerais elem à de depunia robrastios. Cons de nece the dyaparatar nat raura uporon per, ore o tyeparite o air le fore ro épocee τικώ έντινι λογισμώ καὶ ἀκισητώ, και έγκρατεια τὰ εμμένειν τω λογισμώ, ακμαίνα δέ καλ δερατής τοθυσιστίου. δεύτερου, δτι είδως ό έγκρατής ότι φουλαι αί έπιθυμίος, αφισταται τυύτων και ακολουθεί τῷ λόγω, ὁ δέ ακρατής είδως απ Purcha squierre, dia riju ganiju ni neidera ra hoya" spirov, are mi d πώφρων έγερατής έστε και καρτυρικός, και δ ακόλαστος τούσωντίον τίταρτου, ori and mis cympure's amphone. Event de chaciere and var antaparit marra anadamente. αθ του θαθλαστου θαρατη εξυαί φασιν' άλλοι δε διαφερειο θλληλου' περιστου, des évdeneras podvipov sal desvor dura sal departy elvait éstou, des déportes depareis of made bupon impremeis, not of orbidga right not neglous discriptures. raina più niv elat marra axeddr rà degipera ment eyrpareine rol deportine ων περί έποστου σπεψώμεθα, και πρώτος περί τος πρώτος.

For the various views see the passages quoted by Fritzade and Grant from Xen. Mem. i. 6. §§ 4, 6, 6; iv. 5. §§ 3-7; it 1. § 1. I lato, Gorg. 491 D; Rep. iv. 430 E; Legg. ix. 869 A. and Iwa Demon. p. 6 c up is a partial and the passage and the partial and the passage and

- 15. 15. § 6. οἱ 8΄ οῦ] ε ε, they regard éyapirem as a term of w der extent than σωφροσώση.
- b 18. § 7. фроніцову битая най бынову] то най онт тов ўток (Al.l.

Schol.) It is because they confirmed primarie and describe (see E. N. 1146 b. 18. vi. 13. 9 for the difference), that they can, with any plausibility, speak of the operation as sometimes departie. In the words and describe we have thus a good example of the drops the dropfer.

CHAPTER II.

ARSUMENT

Having stated the vision commonly hold, 'et us need go through the arguments on them.

The first diffe uity is - flow own a man have a "explit conception," and yet act townscandly against at "His "conception," some maintain, edited by "true town electric," true townels for cannot be dengued about the a surve by passion it was not be it is a some by passion it was not be a survey town that some of "in outs more," or "along upon a townelsage of right" holding that synorance is the cause of men's doing what is wrong. Insisted is placely at carrante with istrones, the near who acts incontinently is certainly not "tenorant" before he is contained by theirem. "I must be the become tenorant, but how does no become tenorant? By where fault?

Convert again, admitting that "true knowledge" cannot be encrease by passion, or I as tout "observe" may, and that accordingly "observe about volunt is right" is the "con estima" at he exposes it oil unsuccessfully) to passion to the imantement man. The objection to this view is that by substituting "aponion" for "knowledge it is not not seen to this view he is not given if the enconstruct man have in's a weak principle with which he combat throng do very no onglit to be excused if they prevail, whereas we do not excuse him.

Then, it may be region, after the rejection of knowledge and opinion, furtime remains at the opposity "conseption", it is inverte a very strong from file. To that we have to vay that 'pendemic' and 'incontinence' are incompliced qualities on the united homester. How about to make the 'principle main, who is it only has all the virtues, but exercises there calcularly perform the word actions?

Another point is Commente necessarily implies the presence of strong and bod desert kince 'sentenote' and continent are not omiertalise terms—the temperate man has not existing or bod desert); for 'continence' opposing 'cook deserts' asplid not be the grout and noble quality that it is.

Assem, if convenence is adulting by any opinion false as well as true struitly cometime, or a bad thing; and if encontenence is ful engaged from any opinion, there will be a good hand of montenence, take that of Neoptelemens, when he did not arise by his intention of telling a lie, because it gave him pain to have to take it.

(Veher difficulties—and hard ones to note—are set freth in the following softward arguments—

to If a weak encontended mun is only stupid and experant encoura, he ex a vertuous character, for his openious are wrong and he has not trength of will

to act on them, but incontinently does what is right

(2) The man who pursues pleasure deliberately, communed that it is right to do so, is a better character than the man who does to from importance, and not because he is convinced that it is right. The former may make his conviction for a true one—come to believe that it is wring to make pleasure his coul—and then he will be a reformed character; whereas the latter—the incretional man—annot change his conviction for a better—he already believes that his actions are wrong, but he prosetheless goes on performing them; he is as full of sound knowledge as a drowning man is of water; and it does him no good. His case his hopeless,

Lastly, what is the strict sense of the term ' meantment' !

These, them, are the difficulties; too must now try to to remove them as to trave the truth bare; for it is in the resolution of difficulties that discovery consists.

1145 b. 21. § 1.] This § introduces the discussion of the anopam involved in the view ό μεν departs eidae ότι φαιλα προττει δια πιθοε α.τ.λ. th. 1. § 6. 1145 b. 12. Zell Fritzsche, and Grant quete Plato, Friday 352 B, a passage which the present writer evidently had in his mind—donei δι τοις πολλακε περί επιστήμης τοιουτου τι' ουν ίσχυρον οίδ' ήγχμονικόν οίδ' άρχικον είναι, οίδα όκ περί τοιούτου αίταθ δυτος διανουένται, άλλ', ένουσης πολλάκιε δεθρώπος επιστήμης, οὐ τὴν έπιστήμην αὐτοῦ άρχευς, αλλ' άλλο τι, τοτε μέν θυμόν, τοτε δε ηδειών, τοτε δε λιπον, ένιστε δε έρωτα, πολλακες δε φύθον, ώτεχεῶς διανουόμενοι περί τῆς ἐπιστήμης, διανορ περί ἀνδραπόδου, περιελευμέσης ἐπό τῶν δλλων ἀπόντων.

πῶς ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθώς ἀκρατεύεται τις] 'how it is pussible to have an ὀρθή ὑπόληψω and yet act incontinently,' or 'what is meant by the ὑρθή ὑπόληψω of the ὑερατήτ.' 'Υπόληψω is the generic term, including both ὑπωτήμη and ἀύρα (see note on vi. 3. 1 b. 17). Hence the writer goes on—ἐπωτάμενον μὲν κῶν κ.τ.λ. and (§ 4) ἀλλά μὴν είγα δόξα κ.τ.λ.

b. 24. αὐτήν] This is the reading of K¹ and NC accepted by Rassow. Susemihl, and Bywater, instead of αὐτόν given by Bekker and Ramsauer. Rassow advocates αἰτήν as follows (Forsch p. 63)— 'Far αὐτόν giebt K αὐτήν. Diese Lesart verdient den Verzeg, theils wegen der platonischen Stelle, die Aristoteles im Same hat, Protag. p. 352 B (1. e. διανουίμεναι καρί της ἐκιστήμης, ῶσκερ περί ἀκδραπόδου, περιελκομένης) theils weil es am Schluss des vierten Capitels (vin 3. 14) heist: οὐ γὰρ τῆς περίως ἀπιστημης εἶται δοκούσης

topology yearen và κάθος, ουδ΄ αδοη περιόλεσται διὰ τὰ πάθος, ἀλλὰ τῆς 1148 b. 24.
εἰπθητικής. Ramsauer, reading αὐτόν, explains—'quem scientia
liberum et quasi dominum reddidit.' I think that this is a very
strong delence of αυτόν: cf. Xen. Mem i. 5. § 3 άλλὰ μην εἴ γε
μηδο βοῦλον ἀερατή ἀεξαίμεθ ἄν, πώς οὐκ ἄξιαν αὐτόν γο φυλαξαπθοι
τονούνων γωνίνθου.

Zumparys mir yap alus . . . Alla di ayrotar . Socrates in leed b. 25. was entire'y opposed to the view (se, that a man may know the right and do the wrong), maintaining that there is no such thing as incontaience (re defined as-knowing the right and loing the wrong). See Nen. Mem. in. 9. \$\$ 4 and 5 Zopiar de Rai σωφροσύνην οι δωριζεν, άλλο τόν το μιν καλα το και άγοβό γεγνωσινότο χρησθαι αίτως, και του τα αίσχρα είδοτα εύλαβείσθαι, συφών το και σώφρονα lemme. Apareparament de, el rois interapisous pir, à del aparreir, somewas de rásoutia, ompoés se kal éyapareis elvas somisos; Dédés ye μάλλον, έφη, ή διεδέρους το και δερατείς. πάντης γάρ υίμοι προαιρουμένους έπ των ένδεχομένων, δ άν οξωνται συμφορώτατα αθτοίε είναι, ταύτα πρώτταν. σομιζω οδυ τούς μή δράως πρόττοντας, ούτε ατοφούς ούτε ακυβρούς είναι. Thon di eni την διεσιοσύνην καὶ την άλλην πάσαν άρετην σοιμίου είναι, τά το γώρ δίεσια και πύντα, δσα άρετη πρώττεται, καλά το καὶ άγαθά είναι: και ούτ' το τούς τουτο είδοτος είλλο όντι τούπων φυδεν προελέσθαι, ούτς τούς μή επισταμενούς δυνασθαί αράτνειν, άλλα καί, έδν έγχειρωσιν, άμαρτώνιν. ours not re nadá re nat dyadá rois per tropois aparteir, rois de pij coopered di devaatha, anna in in income, apapropere inci our ru re διευια από τά δίλλα καλά τε καὶ άγαθα πάντα άμετή πράττεται, δήλου είναι. ire and discussion and a Why same aperis outle fort. Cy. Plato, Prolog. 352 C ap our rai con romitron te mepl aurie donet, & unhan er einat if έπιστήμη, και σίον δρχειν του άνθρώπου; και έάν περ γιγνώσες τις τάγαθά και τὰ αικά, μή ἄν κρατηθήναι ὑπὸ μηθενός, ώστε άλλ' άττα πράττεν ή ά όν επιστημή κελεύοι, άλλ' ίκαυην είναι την φρόνησαν βοηθείν τῷ ἀκθρασφ ; Καὶ δυικί, έφη, ώσπερ σύ λέγεις, & Σωκρατές, καὶ όμα, είπερ το άλλο, αίσχριο έστι καὶ έμω, σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μή ούχι πάντων κράτιστος φωναι είναι των άνθρωπείων πραγμέτων. Καλώς γε, λήην έγώ, συ λέγων και άλνθη, οιαθα σύν δτε οι πολλοί των ανθμώπων έμοι το και σοί οδ medoren, akka noklove dans yeyeisanoras ra Hikreren ove ellikev neasrew, iSiv airois, άλλα άλλα πράτεταν Cf. M. M. ii. 6. 1200 h. 25 Barpairne pir our à aprophirme à definer dans une obne den departur elear.

^{*} If F F a g. 1915 h 2 and finitische a note. These Siras is a term of honour, and does not distinguish a senior from a junior Socrates,

- 2145 b. 25, λίγων ότα οιθείς είδως τὰ κακά ότα κοκά είσαν έλοις ἄν' ὁ δὲ ἀκρατής διας, είδως δτι φαϊλα είσαν, αξιείσθαι όμως, αγήμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ παθούς. διὰ δή τὸν τοιούταν λόγον οὐς ῷες' εἰντις ακρικοίως οὐ δη ὁρθῶς. ἄτοπος γὰρ τῷ λύγῳ τουτφ πεισθέντας ἀναιρείν το πιθινῶς γικόμενος ἀκρατείς γαρ ε΄ σω ἄνθρωπος, καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰδότες ὅτι φαῦλα ὅμως τοῦτα πράττονσαν.
 - b. 26. ὑπολαμβάνοντα] Spengel (Arist. Studien p. 45) would usert δρθώς before υπολαμβάνοντα. Rassow (Firsth. p. 126) thinks that there is nothing to prevent ὑπολαμβάνων standing alone, as οδων ευροξία does. I agree with Rassow.
 - 5.27 § 2. oùtos pêr oùr ô hôyos n th.] The view of Socrates (oitos ô hôyos) conflicts with the hologis, but, as Socrates in a great ratio, we must treat his béaus, or mapiliofor, respectfully, and enquire how the dynom, by which he explains away deputing, 'comes on' typeres the 29—see Grant ad low.) It is executly not a chrome state of ignorance, but an ignorance which 'comes on' like sleep or drunkenness (see E. N. vi 3.7), for the departs is not 'ignorant' before he is tempted.
 - b. 98. καὶ δέον ζητείν περὶ τὸ πάθος, εἰ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τἰς ὁ τρόπος γίνεται τῆς ἀγνοίας] Βι water suggests in h s note ad loc. (.f. l'outervalent p. 33) that perhaps γίνεται should be inserted after δεον, and out t ed after τρέπος. There seems to be some doubt about the use of δεον (t.e. δίον ἰστὶ, as distinguished from δέον the acc. abs., which is common) = δεῖ: see Index Arist. 8. V. δείν: In Ε. Ν. ii. γ. 1. 1107 à 32 περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἔκαστα αὶ πραξεις, δέον δ' ἐπὶ πούτων συμφωτείν. ληπνέων οἰν τοῦτα ἰκ τῆς δαγραφῆς. Κό omits εἰν. If the doubt is sufficient to recommend a change of the text here (vii. 2. 2. 1145 b. 28), I thìnk that it would be simplet to trad δεοι ῶν f ir δεον, t un to suppose that γενετω has been displaced.
 - b 30 οθα οίεταί γε] Alier ye NC and Ald. meet delo πρότνειο δ πρώτνειο These words must, at any rate, be understood: ef. E. N. vii. 9. 6 άμφδιτεροι de το σωματικό ήθει διωκουσιο, άλλ' δ μεν καλ οίσμενος δε υ. δ δ' οθα οί μενος: Ε. Ε. ii. 7. 1323 b 8 το γάρ πομ' δ οίεται βέλτιστοι είναι πρώττειο δέ ἐποθυμίου δερατεύεσθαι έστα: Ε. N. v. 9. 6 δοίλεται οίδείς δ μή οίεται είναι σπουδαιον, δ εν δερατής οίχ δ οίεται δεω πρώτειο πρώτειο.
 - 5.23. § 3. τὸ δὲ μηθένα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ δόξαν βέλτιον ούχ ὁμολογούσιν]
 Their argument falls back on the 'uncertainty of δίξε'—a common-place of Greek philosophy. They argue that, because δεξα is no;

so 'certain,' it is not so 'strong' as imariμη—a piece of reasoning 1146 b. 88. disposed of below E. N. vii. 3. 4 into γαρ πιστεύουσαν οίδεν ήτερα οίς δοξά(συσικ ή έτεραι οίς έπίσταντας δηλοί δ' 'Ηρικλειτος,

asses is not so 'certain' as improper, because the implifier of the dofosor are not about things taken in connection with their causes, as the inodiffere of the incorregions are. The truest inodiffers of he deficior are apt to run away like slaves, and leave him, because they are not bound by chains of reasoning to their causes. 'O δρθώς hofifor las, in short, 'empireal,' as distinguished from 'scientific' knowledge. This is how the 'uncertainty' of bigs is represented in the Meno 97 D. Fisculere Plato desentes the 'empirical' character of the knowle lige of the dogogou by making to notage too bries eat roo un bries the object of dofut see Bonitz, Mrt. p. 411or mat onem, bifer, a scientia P.ato, fortasse secutus Parmenidem, La dismait, ut quomodo generatio mestum inter ens et non-ens locum habet, i a diga medium quadriam sit inter scientiam rei et ignorantiam, ef. Conviv. 202 a έστι δι δηπου τοιοστον ή δρθή δόξα, perate duadiae nat opostaros: de Rep. v. 477 a obrobe inst int mir ro रेकरा पुरुवेत्यह मेंग, वेप्रथवनात हैं हैं वेर्ष्युप्रमुद्र रंगी भूमे वैनरा, नेतो रख्ने भ्रमान्दिने रार्णेत्वार parati ve not fargre in disposae ve not favorapas, et es ruygaves be raintrus; πάνο μεν ούν, "Αρ' ειδυ λέγομέν τε δοξαν είναι ; πώε γάμ οδ ; Theaet. 190 a, Soth, 263, Phileb. 37 a. Idem discrimen Ar, exponit An. post. 1. 33 bg a. 2 deinerat dogan elvat nepi to adapter uin nat betoog, indendeperson be and Milas from - Are yap do for adelianou, and a charte a romainών του μεν τοιμύτου δύξαν ούσαν, του δ' άναγκαίου έπιστήμην': cf. also Bonur, Met p. 142 vocabulo dofo , opinandi naturam incertam et meonstantem notat [Arist.], quae fere est vis Lujus vocabuli ubi emerging oppositur,"

§ 4.] C/ M. M. ii. 6. 1200 b. 38 dλλ' δρα γε επιστημη μεν οδ, b. 30 δυξα δε ; αλλ' εἰ δυξαν έχει 6 άκρατης, οἰκ ὰν εῖη ψεκτοε. εἰ γὰρ φαϊλόν τε πραττει μὴ ἀκριβῶς εἰδως ἀλλὰ δαξάζαν, συγγνωμην διν τις ἀποδοίη προσεδέσθει εἦ ήδονή επὶ πράξαι εὰ φαϊλα, μὴ ἀκριβῶς εἰδότα ὅτο [πὐ] φαϊλα εἰα κ, ἀλλὰ δαξαζοντος αἰε δε γε συγγνωμην ἔχομεν, τούτουε οὐ ψέγομεν ῶστε ὁ ἐκροτής, εἴπερ δόξαν ἔχει, οἰκ ἔσται ψεκτόι, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ψεκτόε.

§ 5. φρονήσεως όρα άντιτεινούσης; αθτη γάρ Ισχυρότατον] If an 1140 a 4 ήμεται ύπόληψει cannot, consistently with the circumstance that he is ψεσος, be ascribed to the departs, it follows then that an Ισχυρά (ποληψείς must be ascribed to him. Such is φρόνησες—πότη γάρ Ισχυρότατον: εf Ε.Ε. Η. 13. 1246 h. 34 το Σωκρατικόν ότι ανδίν του, it.

- 1146 a. 4. layupdrepow of possioners. It is to be remarked, however, that, for those who take their stand on the Socratic older lexuporeport opportcome, the position oppositions determined is really identical with the position imprappe impage (§ 1). Those who take their stand on the Socratic nider irrequirepor depositreme evidently do not destinguish between imoring and opologois. At stotle and his school, however, distinguish between them; and the reasoning by which the present winer refuses the position providence for determinions involves the special connotation which he attaches to dodonous as something thiffere it from emoraphy. The words over you logaphrator (§ 5), therefore, representing as they do the extreme Sucratic position are somewhat startling, as put in the mouths of persons who depart from that position (re per συγχωρούσι τὰ δ' οῦ § 3), and try to explain departs by distinguishing opposition from invertigat, and that too in a list which corresponds exactly with the Aristotelian division of τό νοιο, οτ υπόληψιε, 1010 επιστήμη, δόξα, Φρουησιε, 18 given in de An id. 3. 427 b. 9 to voile ie of fart to opdur ant to un indust th mer γάρ άρθως πρώνησες και επιστήμη και δυζα αληθής! το δε μή ύρθως τάκω-The Tourset and 427 b. 24 riol bi not along the inolighed tel. the wis ύπολαμβάνων άρθώς of E N. v i. 2, 1) διαφοραι επιστήμη του δόξο και opplygons oil to everia course. The farightest nees that the wider is concucting his of ponents through a formal list: he says incide οθτε δυξα έστιν ή γνώσις του άκρατούς οθτε έπιστημη, δοκει φρωνησιε είναι: αύτη γάρ λείπεται, καὶ ἐστίν Ισχυρά γνώστε.
 - 25. ἀλλ' άτοπον ἔσται γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς ἄμα φρόνιμος καὶ ἀκρατής] At er all, the position which the writer takes up here—that the φρόνιμος cannot be ἀκρατής—does not differ essentially from hat of S series οὐθένο ὑπολημβάνωντα πρώττειν παρα τὸ βελτισταν, ἀλλα δε' ἄγνοκαν—for φρόνησειε is an ἀληθηε υποληψει (Ε΄ Ν νί. 9. 7) involving the pussession (and exercise) of all the variets—dua γὰρ τῆ φρονησει μιά ὑπαμχούση πῶσαι ὑπαρξουσια οἱ ἀρεταί. The ἀλλά δε' ἄγκοισε οἱ the Socra te position means that the ἀληθηε ὑπόληψεις which Aristotle equally with Socrates regarded as incompatible with ἀκρασία, is absent.
 - e. c. mpôrepor] e e E. N. vi. 7-7 (apartude="one who tends to perform good actions") vi 8. 8 (row dogarous rie="one concerned with partial line")—vi. 13 6 (rae dokas kyas dosarous" one who has all the virtues") Rassow (Forsile p. 127) points out that the words entrae dokarous aparae do not belong to the causa. clause

τῶν γὰρ ἐσχατων τος, which he according y (followed by Susemili 1146 a. 8. and Bywater) makes parenthetical. It is inserted to explain προσφεριώς, εf. Ε. Ν. ε., 8. 8 τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστῦν, διστερ εξητιών το γὰρ πρωτών νοιούνου.

Perhaps we ought to read dord for the \$146 a. 9.

§ 8 τουκ έσται δ σώφρων έγπρατής ούδ' δ έγκρατής σώφρων] C/. a. 10. Ε. Ν. τι. ε. 6 καὶ του σώφρονα μεν έγκρατή καὶ καρτερικόν, τὰν δέ τοιοίτου οἱ μὸν κάντα σώφρους οἱ δ' οῦ.

το ayar] The Al I. Schol, seems to have read το ayraθa. His a 12. vetskitt 15-6 gap auchpur viel üdus ihre alauping floring informaturate είτος, αλλά του λόγου προστασσεντοι δεν δπέχεσθοι των ολογρων έδουών, ειδια έχει την επιθυμίαν επακαλουθούσαν αθτώ, καλ μένει ήμεμών ου γάμ του πωφρούος έστι το άγεσθας, ή το πολεμείσθαι ύπο αίσχρών ήδουών καί logopor. The Paraphrast Hellodorus may also have read ayorduc; he 2245 -el di à ampour form égroaries éfet quilas insolutias cal la gopus. έτερ ένοντίου εστί τιρ λύγω της σωφροστικής έν γαρ τω Επεσθαί τάς restante to day i amporish of austratus. C/ E N. vis 9, 6 6 to yap ezeparge ob e pigden napa ron debon did rae amparende ifdonde nacein and o ecopour, add' & ner exer & & oir exer poidas industas, eat & niv τοιοίτοι οἰας μη ήδεσθαι παρά τὸν λόγων, ὁ δ' υίος ήδεσθαι άλλα μη δγεσθαι. The bunder of the All. Schol may perhaps be due to a confused recollection of this use of +6 dyrotha. "Ayes is certainly right here, attle ugh this is the only place in the Aristotelian corpus given by the Index Arist, for is use, with the article, as a substantive.

dild up bei yel i.e. the importe must have strong and evil desires: of M M. is 6 1201 a 12 if pie oir iera importe, orpodoir before intermedians. The imports differs from the outpoor in having strong and evil desires in being strongly tempted by re piper idea and that the desires of the important must necessarily (ithelians differs) be strong and evil is plant, for otherwise it would tollow that important is not always the good and admirable quanty which it is supposed to be.

§ 7] This despite is solved at the beginning of chap 9, where it a 10 is 5 omted out that it is not 'any opin on '—πόση δύξα—which the έγερετές sticks to and the δερατής abandons, but 'the true opinion'— ή δράς δυξα.

The Paraphrast Heliodonas, following the order in which the saying are enumerated in E. N. vi. 1. §§ 6 and 7, gives his version

- 1140 a. 16. of vii. 2. §§ 7-10 δλλα πράττα 1146 b. t (answering to vii. t 6 καὶ δ αὐτός ἐγκρατης . . . ἐκστατικὸς τοῦ λογισμοῦ) first, then proceeds to give his version of vii. 2 §§ 1-6, and ends with vii. 2 11 δτι εί περι πάττα ἀπλῶς.
 - 29. Neomôlepos] See Soph. Philoci., especially 54-122, where Odyssel's persoades Neoftolemus to deceive Philocetes, and 805-916 where Neoptolemus tells Philocetes the trach. Cf. E. N. vii, 9, 4.
 - a. 31. § 8. έτι ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος [ψευδόμενος] dropia] ψευδόμενος has given much trouble to the commentators. I agree, however, with Rassow (Forsch p. 127) and others that it is merely a distograph of ψευδόμενος in the line above, and ought to be expanged from the text. There are insuperable objections to supposing, with Fritzsche, a reference to the logical fallacy, ὁ ψευδόμενος, mentions, associated with the name of Eula lides the Megarian, the formula of which s given by Aul. Gell. xvii. a Cum mention et me mention dico, mention an verom dico ε As Rassow remarks (p. 127), the article is indispensal le before ψευδόμενος if the mentions is to be understood, also, instead of συμεταία εκ τίνος λόγου § 9, 1146 8-7, we should require έκ νούνου του λόγου; and lastly, the argument which proves that ή άφροσύνη μετά δερισίας δρετή is not be mentions.

If retained, week passes must be taken, as by Zell to be a predicate qualifying 6 oodioriscle hopes- Again, there is the sephiatical argumert which causes cofficulty by conducting people to a false conclusion'; and Grant's very ingenious comparison with Sight. Fl. t 163 b. 12 may be accepted- Supposing, says Grant, "that \pusions page be allowed to stand, we must interpret it in a logical sense, not as fit had anything to do with the fallacy of Euliuhdes. The explanation of it is to be found in the Soph, French of Anstrace iii. 1-2, where it is said that the arms of the Soplists and France are live in number, Deyxos and perdor and napodofor and a Amanapos (making one talk bad grammar) not migrator to motion about a from (making one repeat the same thing over and over) . . . makers γωρ προιερούντοι φοίνεσθει έλεγχοντες, δευτερον δε ψευδόρειών τι δειστικά spiror sie napačajos ayuv e z.h. In the above passage we see that the writer has arought together two of these separate terms, speaking of napodofu elegacio. It is possible that he may also have

¹ For this fallacy see also Ritter and Prelier, Hot Prel. § 133 Exhalmen, and Unite weg's Logic, Eng., Trans. pp. 244-240.

qual fied the "sophistical reasoning" with another of these logical 1146 a 21. formulae.

rapáõos... alk(γχειν) to refute by merus of paradoxical con-a. 22. clustons.' The Flenchus' says Grote (Arrit ii. 69), 'is a syllogism with a conclusion contactory to, or refutative of, some enanciated thesis of proposition (δλεγχοι δί συλλογισμός μετ' άντιφάσεως τοῦ συμπερασματος Soph. El. 1. 165 a. 2)... the Sophissical Flenchus or Refutation being a delusive semblance of refutation, which imposes on ord nary men, and induces them to accept it as real.'

Sederat yap & Starota? The chitors compare Met. B. 1. 995 a. 24. a. 24 sqq. quoted above in note on vit. 1. 5. 1145 b. 2.

§ 9. Le rivos dóyou] i e, à supermise doyse mentioned above a 27. in § 8.

Sections 8 and 9, in their connexion, may be paraphrased thus—
'Aga n, there is the sophistical argument which gets some people into a difficulty, by starting from naons difficultion, therefore in the additional from the softwarf of the conclusion, which they see pairly to be false, and yet cannot refute—I mean the sophistical argument which proves that 'folly with incentinence is virtue.'

This paraphrase, it will be observed, retains verdoperor 2, 23 (='by conflucting them to a false conclusion'); but the sense of the whole passage paraphrased would not be affected if the word were omitted (and I think it ought to be omitted, as a dittegraph); for the words did pap of nopuloofa x.r.l. down to the end of § 8 explain the particular ûnopia produced by the sopiorus's lives in ques ion, as that of one who has been entrapped into a conclusion which he sees to be false, but cannot refute.

§ 10] This § contains another andiornode logos, similar to that a. 31. given in § 9, and, like it, starting from the assumption udons differ inararizate § departs. O the neutralnumperson . . . and uponipulperson is the suchagree, as distinguished from the departs. The departs a elsewhere in this Book carefully described as of uponipolymous, observement, of uponipolymous; see E. A. vil. 7. 3 ran 8i mi uponipolymous a.t. i vil. 8. 4 init & pie remoters also mit bid to uponipolymous a.t. i vil. 8. 4 init & bie remoters also did to uponipolymous, object of did to uponipolymous, upolywo dei drive tal dideparts and deideavare, important pier, diment di: vii. 9 6 diment dei deideavare, dideavare, d

1148 a. 31. oldperor deir, & & our oldperor Hence Rassow, Ramsatter, Susemila, and Bywater, following Kb, Mb T, omit ph (read by Bekker) before instructo 1146 b. 1, the meaning being - if the isparce acted did to nenciadas or surà sponipeaus, instead of acting, as he does, sapà moniferen or our eliment deir, then to peramined from would be investible in his case." The omission of my before anemators, however, necess tates he a sertion of of (or Jaka Ramsauer and Bywater) before meneroperos 1146 b. a, against all MS, authority, except that followed by the Vet. Interp. (1), which gives nunc autem non suasus See Rassow (Forsch, p. 64)- Es scheint mir keinem Zweisel zu unterliegen, dass mit den besseren Handschriften dieses Buches (MK), die Negation på vor enemore zu streichen ist. Freilich ist es dann no hig, in den folgenden Worten und Lambin. vir 6 od serenquiros za schreiben. . . . Die alte Uebersetzung hat die Negation an ers er Stelle nicht wohl aber an zweiter i si quidem enim persoasus esset qui agi, dissuasus unque quiesceret, nune autem non suasus rital minus taka agit.' The difficulties which the onission of pi and the insertion of of remove are (1) that of having to apply the term nemeropies to the departs, in opposition to the usage of vir attested by such passages as ch. 8, § 4 quotest above; and (2) that of having to understand énemerore and nemeropéres to imply a right conviction, whereas rescious at the beginning of the § must be understood to imply a wrong conviction. Ramsauer's conjecure (adopted by Βι water) νέν δι άλλα ποποισμένου ούδιν ήττον άλλα πραττοι (Βγκ. brackets alaa before aparred) seems to me to labour under the objection that it does not remove difficulty (1): it still applies to the depends the epit of meneration which seems in this Book to be retained in a technical sense for the dischauses alone. But the "nane autem non suasus nih l minus falia agit" of the Vet. Interp suggests a reading which, I think, threats the requirements of the case. The Vet. Interp. had doubtless before him viv di of meneropeops older heror remute aparers. For emoves read ed aird, and retain of before memorphies; the meaning being that the departs. will out rd nentiable, commits the same acts as the enchagens does with to meneroller: cf. E N vi., 8 3 of upp add duoud ye were tak upufus a.r.h. It seems to be impossible to decide whether the writer of the M M. had the text as given by Bekker (i.e. m) before ensurem, and no negative before minimpient) or as rendered by the Vet, Interp.: see M. M. 11. 6. 1203 n. 6 náregus de ediaroregos, o andharros à à departe : oùte pir oùt difest de ives oix à importe à yap

δαδλαστος εξευτύτερος εξ γάρ αξεφ λόγος έγγενοιτο ό διδοξων ότι φαϊλα, 1140 a 31. σύσετε προξεί τω δε γε υπρατει ξαάρχει ό λογος, και δρως προτει, ώστε δυ δ τοιοίτος δόξετεν άνίστος είναι 1.

As regards the proverb from rd Idop awing, ri del employer; -the de Danver, it is argued, acts from a wrong conviction, which he may exchange for a right one, and so secome a reformed character: but the aspecie does not act from conviction, but from passion. It is true that he has a right openion but it is not capable of influencing his conduct; his case is therefore hopeless, the proverb at plies to him " when water sticks in a man's throat, what can he drink to wash it down?" The true opin on of the depurie is ineffectual; and no truer and more effectual one can be found. This represents the interpretation of the proverbigiven by the Ald. Scaol, Stahr, Grant, Peters, and others. Rassow, however (Forsch p. 65), interprets differently. Das tertium comparations, he says, '1st die Fude. An richt ger Erkent triss (and diese ist es doch die mit dem Wasser verglichen wird) fehl es dem Zägel osen nicht, er hat davon the Ho e und Falle, man braucht sie ikm nicht erst be zubringen." If we accept this interpretation, we may perhaps render the proverb -'A drowning mun doesn't need more water to drink.' The Paraglarast's explanation leaves the sense in which he understood the fire wet do sat ul "Ore de à dominimos inorgeme rije diffe Behriau rou μή δυσημένου, δηλού ο γαρ τη ήπατησδοι το φουλα διώκων, ότι υπμίζει ayudu elem, Bedricer ever rob eldbrin ber buidu, auf debrorror b uer gip marquesos perasteradere divaras ayudes yeriadas, à de di anparias deunus, nal eithis are handa, at blustus tearipus row earner this year de tearnin, deel or direrus perceresolipas; & yas Edes yerworker, olde, kai eldus anpareveras, ασί ένοχός έστι τή παροιμιά,

*Oran to idap wrigg, of dei enterioren;

As regards the general significance of the \$\xi\$, and its connex on with what precedes—It is another proportion differ \$\eta\$ deposits decreased. It is another proportion along differ \$\eta\$ deposits decreased. In \$\xi\$ 9 is was proved paradoxically that, if the deposits be depose, and he a defoi false, he actions will be good, in \$\xi\$ 10 it is proved paradoxically that, if he have true differ, he is in a hopeless state—he has the nest possible dofai, but he is too weak to act up to them; whereas the exchanges, who is not decreased rips differ may, if sup-

^{*} Bywater ((out-so p &4) thins that the not Span aparess of the above passage is an ease of easer green aparess, without the data of our Mah.

1140 a. 31 plied with true dofor, act on them as steadfastly as he now acts on his false 8660. The paradox thus established by means of the inappropriate use of the idea peranturbijon in the context is left here by the writer unrefuted, as an example of those difficulties by grapping with which ethical theory advances. His answer to it is deferred to E. N. va. 8. 1; but it may be useful just now to peint out the solution naturally suggested by the terms to which the

difficulty has been reduced.

The point which accides us in favour of the departs against the dedlarger is that the end which the former ignores in his acre is good, whereas that which the latter acts up to is Lad. The argument maists on the point that the didharror follows the recommendations of his Moyor, while the departe does not But we ask, Why does the acologree follow the recommendations of his hopes? and the answer is-because it recommends that which is bad, the sophistical argument in E N. vii. 2, 10 keeps in the background, proceed by to theer that, as the declarers follows reason when it recommends the bad he would follow it with the same steadfastness if it could be made to recommend the good. But the truth is that we have not to do here with the reason or understanding, but with the moral character and habits. A false usate is raised by assuming that the dicharron will yield to atomments addressed to his understanding; and when it is argued that it is useless to try to reform the departs, because he already knows what is right, the possibility of strengthering has moral nature is ignered. But this is really the important point. What is represented as · false opinion of 'wrong conviction,' in the declarers, is really an inveterate moral blindness and depravity brought on by the repeated neglec, of that 'true opinion,' the possession of which is represented as putting the departie in such a hopeless position. The declarers was once departis. His so-called 'false opin on' or 'wrong conviction is merely an intensified form of the weakness of the deputys. The fallacy of the argument lies in its transformation of moral depravity into intellectual error. The intellectual error was called of the andagres is contrasted with the weakness of the departs intellectual error, it is argued, may be corrected, but weakness such as that of the deperfe cannot be cured. The truth, however, is that the so-called intellectual error of the industria, being ready investrate weakness or utter depravity, is incurable, whereas the not yet inveterate weakness of the departs may be cured:

see F N vii, S. 1, where acolagua is compared to a chronic disease, 1140 a 81 and deposite to a sudden passing seizure; see also E. N. vii. 8. 4 8 de (se. anoharros) nenscoras did vo votoiros eivas obre dianes avrás Whore the 'converson' or 'orinion' of the acadagrap is said to be the effect of this deprayed moral character. Thus the audiorious hoyos of vii. 2. to is guilty of a Torrigon upfrepon; it assumes that his convation or opinion is the cause of his had character that if we could change his 'opinion' we should change his character. There is nothing more striking in the Aristotelian teaching than its opposinon to this vulgar assumption. Of inion or Bellef, according to Anstotic, follows conduct -as a man becomes better or worse his benef becomes better or worse. The 'true opmion' of the deputys is a fevourable symptom so far as it goes, indicating that his character is not yet utterly ruined; the 'false opinion' of the dechorse means that his character is utterly rumed; it is a false opinion' which he will always stick to.

file des el mert moura . . . Turas dundes II departa be mani- b. 2. lested in anything (mert noura), i.e. in dunds, or in relation to adobte, or to repu, what do we mean when we use the term departs samply (andm), without aching any such qualification as dupoù or séphoue? We must notan that there is a man who is departs in some one special respect not explicitly stated, for we cannot mean that any one is departe in all response topethir of the Ald Schol—si replimente, five tou dupou sal ripe tiphe sal rd siphor sal dundes neplimina have, five tou dupou sal ripe tiphe sal rd siphor sal dundes neplimina have indeed paper departe superior, d'and first dupour departe bupoi, d'a departe superior disparte dupour, d'al departe superior departe dupour, d'ad departe superior departe dupour departe dupour departe superior departer superior departer de d

§ 12. See note on vii, i. g. 1145 b. 6. Cook Wilson (Arul. b. 6. Shelter I pp 60. 61) thinks that oraphirm de persen rise learnworse, for dors per de dighter f rè leyéperen, fore d' les of E. E. vii, 2. 1. 1235 b. 17. 18, was almost certainly written (by another writer) as an eluci latter of rè de soradurée of E. N. vii, 2. 12, 'which seems to have been understood by the author of E. E. vii, 2. 1 as meaning that some of the aropial must be done away with, and some left. The latter expression (coradurée) seemed paradox cal in connection with the sentence which follows— h yèp liver rès dropias

1146 b. c. expenie coru, because an aporia consists of opposing crimons whose opposition must be somehow overcome; the author of E. E. vis. 2. 1 accordingly wrote the passage conshine e.r. A. to explain it. "The opposit on (inarriance) must be allowed to stand (jumes), if what is said is true in one sense and not in another."" I think that Cook Wilson's rendering-the opposition must be allowed to stand of the words outstained be peres the inarrance places his view of their origin as an explanation of ra di corodineir in E. N vii, 2. 12 in rather too favourable a light. I take the words coussing de preux rat continuent, E. F. 1235 b. 17, to mean - "if the thing said be true in one sense, and not in another, the ersult it (oughnoss) that the opposition of opinion remains unreso ved'; he one reason why the opinions opposed in an original remain of posed -why, in short, an dropin is not resolved -is that the subject about which the opposite opinions are held has really two sides (from one point of view it is true to say this about it, and from another point of view that, as a.g. about to poloiperorl. but we have not yet succeeded in showing that it has two sidesin showing that the two opposite views about it are noth reasonably held (alkayor donotera E. E. 1235 b. 157 tout they do not realle contradict each other: the whole passage (E. E. 1235 b. 13 sqq) is. ληπτίος δή τρόπος όσεις ήμεν άμα τά το δοκουντα περί τούτων μαλιστο dnodwan, και τάς απορίας λύσει και τάς ένωτιωσεις. τούτο δ' Ισται, 🐲 είλύγως φαίνηται τὰ έναντία δυχούντα μύλυντα γάρ ύμολογούμενος δ τοιουτος έστοι λόγος τους φοινομενους. συμβαίνει δέ μενείν τός έκοττιώσεις. dur fore per de adapte fi ed devouevor, fore d' de of. It will be observed that I attach importance to the an unions marked by chaugen-i. It would be true to say-mushine de dococos rece έναντιωσεις, έδν έστε μέν ώς εληθες φαίνηται το λεγόμενος, έστε δ' ώς οδ. The anapla is resolved, when the reasonableness of a difference of opinion has been shown.

As I sad in my note on vi. 1. 5. 1145 b. 6, I understand the words before us, receive de ra per declair des rà de acaderie, to mean that these ques ions must be dealt with on the method of removing difficulties, and so leaving the truth (en bodied in the dedoca) plans. The words before as are, in fact, equivalent to the dire yis livering re rà document aci encourage rà dedoca of E. V vi. 1. 5, and, thus understood, correspond exactly to the ligation de romas dates qui des rá re document applications pullears direduces (= rà de caralance) and ràs direduce (= rà de caralance) and ràs direduce (= rà de caralance)

2 1235 b. 13 It is perhaps worth adding that robrow do rd per 1146 b 8 docker rd bi arrahmin does not mean that 'some of the dwoplas west be done away with and some left,' but that 'some things in the dwoplas must be done away with and some left'—e e the confessions, causing drarriwors, must be done away with, or cleared up in such a way that, as they are cleared up (dipa E. E. 1235 b. 13) views, hitherto merely drarrie, are left no longer as merely drarrie, but as obdoor docours.

CHAPTER III.

ARGUMENT.

No hove to enquere 1) is hether the incontinent mean' busins or not, and if he house, in what sense it is that he 'known.' In The relation to what theney a man to to be described as 'continent' or 's incontinent'—1, e, whether in relation to any planner or prin, or only in relation to certain definite planners or passes. (3) Whether "continence" is identical with "endurance," or it to be succeeded from it. These and copyrate questions we have to answer.

the enquery began with the question to be helber it is a inference between the respective second, or a difference between their attendes to objects (with or archivet a difference on the objects) which distinguishes between the antenent man and the inconvente man control outside distinguishes between the inference and incontinue are inversed with any objects—to with any pleasures or passes, or are leminal (as they certainly are when structly understood to the pressures and pains with which in overgible profugacy, or intemperatus, has to do—the difference between intemperature and incontinuous structures and do the objects—1 c. intemperature pursuing the pleasure of the moment "on principle" incontinuous pursuing the pleasure of the

To begin, then, costs the austron acoust for 'knowledge' involved in an ontraction. The subsequence of 'tems openion' for 'knowledge' does not make it saves to explain the perculance of possion in incontinuous, for 'agentom' is often as hard to move as 'knowledge.'

The distinction between "mercy hering knowledge" and "having is and tensions of so more really then that between "openion" and knowledge to hold be It week now came no energies is a num and agricust knowledge, which he has, but the not reasise. Of the two frames are of the Lentical Salingism, the masses ever so is evil may be fully realised, and universal proposition, on come access, and the man may yet are excentinently, because he does not realise the moments.

And not only have we the difference between the major and the minor-the to mer received by the incontinent man, the latter not realized—but in the major

esself we have to do longuesh two seles one relating to the agent and the other to theress. The form of the major is, "All agents who are such and in a, ought to do such and such thengs." To their consisted major corresponds a two-width minor—I have such and such, and this thing is such and such. The latter past of this minor a man is much more likely "not to bears," or "not to reals it "then the former part; but over this mirror had agnorance of the minor is enough to a cunt carrier for incontinence, or acting against fully realized knowledge of the major as universal proposition."

To much for 'having knowled'e,' and 'having it and enclosing it'; but there is a third kind of 'having' — having who is does not amount to knowled which may be considered in connection with invantance. It is in this third since that a mind or drunken man 'has knowledge', and the smoothness war, repeating moral thrains without 'knowledge', and the smoothness without knowledge what they mean, may be compared to a most man, or to a mon who is disant, or to an actor playing the gare as igned to

At M.

Hitherto our explanation of inconstinence has consisted in a general reference to 'mon realised knowledge'. Let us now try to find the introduce cause of smoot name. have st comes about that in the punitar condition of the inconsti-

nent man, knowledge is 'not realized.'

It were the way that the machinery of the Practical Splagnon is worked by Desire that we shall find the commentate cause of an important act. The major premiss, "excess is only which affords itself to Desire is not advand to recent without a round. Desire sets up another major,—"sweet things are pleasant, and is shut able to represent the incontinent act as a on to some way try drawn from premises. Desire marks its opposition to Moral Prompte by powing forward a maxim "recent things are pleasant which does not in well though it toes in it, consequences) confind with "excess is avil," the maxim of Moral Pronciple.

As for the question—from the incontinent man when the fit is over, recovers her brownledge, the explanation of this recovery would be the same as that given by the physiologists for "recovery" from the unconsciousness of drawkeemers or

zleep.

We are now in a position to define our attitude to the view of Sorietis. Socrates may be altered to say—' knowledge cannot be averpowered by fastion' —if by 'knowledge' be understood 'true browledge —' knowledge of the native sol,' The became it is universal, is not touched by fastion. It is only 'the knowledge of the rease farturalist'—and this after all is not 'knowledge' which enters into conflict with pastion, and may be conquered by it.

1140 b. 8. §§ 1, 2.] Rassow (Forsch. pp. 20, 21) points out that each of these sections contains a separate list of proposed enquines. The 1st given in § 2 corresponds, in substance and in order, with the center is of the following chapters, whereas that given in § 2 mentions only one point actually discussed afterwards with sweet

¹⁴ Knowledge of the major, as universal proposition' must not be confounded with 'the application of this knowledge to particular cases.'

of nept more derive depends and symptems of all 1146 b. 18. The two 1148 b. 8. passages therefore appear to Rassow and Cook Wason (Arist, Studes, Paragraphs 25, 28, 29, 61) to be independent duplicates not belonging to the same version. Cook Wilson seems inclined to regard that in § a as the earlier, and as having introduced a This opinion must be taken in connexion with vers on now lost. ha whole theory of the structure and authorship of the present chapter. He regards it as made up of passages from two very some ar versions, either of which & I fits equally, while & 2 fits penther; and with respect to the authorship of the chapter he s of opinion that 'whether the two versions [of which it is composed] are by the same hand or not, there is a strong probability that (a) re her is by Austotle, that (3) neither is by the author of the Endeman Ethics or at least of the second book of that treatise, and that (y) they are not by the same author as some of the most important parts of this book' (Arest. Studies, I. paragraph 60). He arranges the parallel versions thus-

$$\begin{array}{cccc}
A^{1} & & & & & & & & \\
B_{1} & & & & & & & & \\
C_{1} & & & & & & & & \\
C_{1} & & & & & & & & \\
D_{1} & & & & & & & & \\
D_{1} & & & & & & & & \\
P_{2} & & & & & & & \\
P_{3} & & & & & & & \\
P_{4} & & & & & & & \\
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See Aristoteaan Studies, I, Table I, and paragraphs 25 32, and 59-61.

That there is considerable confusion and repetition in this chapter no one can deny; but whether so much as to justify all the details of Cook Wison's theory may, I think, be doubted, Sections I and a seem to me to be clearly, and sections 3 and 4 probably, parallel versions: but §§ 5, 6, 7, and 8 six ke me as consecutive; and §§ 9, 10, and 11 can only be described as parallel to § 6 in the sense that, like it, they treat of the Practical Sylogism; for that Syllogism is analysed, and applied to the explanation of deposit, in the two passages from two different, though not inconsistent, points of view, in such a way that the two analyses and applications, taken together, seem only to present the subject extransively. The relation of §§ 9, 10, and 11 to § 6 seems to me to differ in an important point from that of § 4 to § 3; for whereas § 4 merely repeats the substance of § 3, §§ 9, 10, and 11 say something not said in § 6, and something well worth saying.

1146 b. 8. The circumstance that the treatment of the Prictical Syllogism is not continuous, but broken by §§ 7 and 8, is evidence of confusion in the structure of the chapter; but, as the considerations added in §§ 9 10, and 11 are so well worth adding, we ought perhaps not to have much difficulty in supposing that the writer of §§ 5, 6, 7, and 8 doubtless with some sacrifice of symmetry added them. On the other hand, it must be noted that the writer of the M.M. (ii. 6), in his version of this chapter, treats of the Practical Syllogism in one place, not in two places; but its treatment of it is so jejune and sight as to make it unlikely that, even if his authority had treated of it in two places, he would have followed his example.

Although I cannot accept in anything like is filmes, Cook Wilson's theory of the structure of this chapter, I think that his view of its authorship (that it is probably not by Anstotle, not by Eudemas not by the author of the principal parts of this Brok) has much to say for i self, and the remarks which he makes in the course of paragraphs 59-br in support of his view have also great value, independently of the immediate purpose to which he applies them, and I shall frequently have to refer to them in successfueral notes. According to Cook Wilson this chapter is probably not by Aristo:le, not by Eudemus, not by the author of the principal parts. of Book vii, because (1) these three writers describe the dispurie as the subject of 'an active struggle between teason (λόγος, somet mes specipeous = 'sat onal will'') and appetite (indupia) between the desire to do what is wrong and the conviction that it is wrong?" (Arist. Stud. paragraph 60, p. 46); whereas this chapter, by applying the distinction of actual and potential knowledge to explain asparia, makes a men al struggle impossible, there being no actual knowledge for appetite to struggle with and because (2) 'chapter 3 is an obsieus concession to the Sociatic planciple as the writer of the last section of it fel. (p. 50), whereas Aristotle, Indenius, and the wit er of the other parts of Book vii, are a rong y opposed to that principle.

The following (among other) passages are quoted by Cook Wison (paragraphs 39-61) to show that Acstode, Eudemis, and the writer of the other parts of Book vii regard the struggle in the ospories as an active and conscious one E.A. .. 13. 15. 16. 1102 b. 14-25; ix. 4. 8. 1166 b. 7-10; de An. 11. 9. 8. 4332. 1-3; de An. 11. 10. 6. 433 b. 5-10, E.E. i. 7 and 8. 1224 a. 30-36 and

1224 b. 19 23; E. V. vn. 2. 1-4. 1145 b. 21-1146 a. 4; E. N. vii. 1148 b. 8. 7. B. 1150 b. 19-28.

§ 2] Ramsauer, who thinks that this section is out of place here, b 14. and may have been the operang of an Aristotehan discussion which has not come down to us, remarks that the words ofre yap maps ener' and b. 19 assume as sertled what is e aborately established in subsequent chapters. Cook Wilson (Arist, Studies, paragraph 61) remarks that 'according to § 1 the first sul ject for consideration is that which follows ... storepor elderer & of, and mur elderer: \$ 2 tot only pure a different subject first, but omits it is at least in any distinct shape, from the list. Perhaps therefore & a belongs. to an earlier version which contained nothing about potential knowledge persessed by the departie. The water of § 2 may merely, as against Socrates, have maintained or presupposed what a implied in chapter a that in depond there is a strong and active consciousness of wrong-doing (la gopà buologues . . . der subooda), and have added that this conviction could be disobeyed, if not accompanied, as in phonone (of ch. i. § 5. \$140 a. 4 sqq) by a strong desire to realise it, but opposed by inflying. He may have ich no more difficulty in this representation than the author of the passages quited from the Je An and Nic Fthics [see end of last nixe seems to have done, and therefore not have dwelt on it further. . The above is somewhat countenanced by the conc usion of \$ 2. The first problem (\$\hat{q} \dip\hat{q} \dip\h elegate's and eyeparis are differenced by their objects or by their relation to them; the fact that the esparge knows he should not adopt the pleasant motive (à d'ube oferne pie dinner de) is assumed us subsidiary to the solution of the problem without any hait the fact itself is a principal difficulty awaiting settlement."

Perers expresses his view of this section in an interesting note (p. 215), which I quote to show how plausioly the obscure phenomena here presented to criticism may be accounted for on suit another hypothesis.— This section (§ 2) seems to me not an alternative to § 1, but a correction of it, or rather a remark to the effect that the whole passage both § 1 and the discussion introduced by it) ought to be rewritten, and an indication of the way in which this should be done. Of considerable portions of the Nicomachean Ethics we may safely say that the author could not have regarded them as finance I in the form in which we have them. I believe

- 1146 b.16. that the author made a rough draft of the while work, or of the several parts of it, which he kept by him and worked upon, working some parts up to completion; sometimes rewriting a passage without striking out the original version, or even indicating which was to be retained (e.g. the theory of pleasure); more frequently adding an afterthought which required the rewriting of a whole passage without rewriting it (e.g., to take one a stance out of many in Book v, vò deserves obts is an afterthought which strictly requires that the whole book should be rewritten; sometimes (as here) making a note of the way in which a passage should be rewritten. Suppose, if need be, that the work, left in this incomplete state, was edited and perhaps further worked upon by a later hand, and we have enough, I think, to account for the facts."
 - b. 19. δ ἀνλῶς ἀκρατής] The man strictly so called, or wit tout further qualification—ε, ε the man who is mountment about certain bodily pleasures (see th 4) as distinguished from the man so called with an added qualification (μετὰ προσθίστως)—ἀκρατής θυμού, πίρδους, οτ τιμης. Viewed as ἀπλῶς ἀκρατής, a man is viewed as rotated to the same bodily pleasures as the ἀκόλουτος: but the relation is not the same in each case. The relation in which the ἀπλῶς ἀκρατής stands to these pleasures is not so timple as that in which the ἀκολουτος stands to them; the ἀκολουτος is conceived as 'sumply related to them '—πρός τούτα ἀπλῶς ἔχεις: but the ἀπλῶς ἀκρατής is conceived as 'related to them in a certain manner —ἀδὶ ἔχει—in a certain manner which distinguishes him from the ἀκολουτος: ε΄ ε, the ἀκολουτος simply goes in for them: the ἀπλῶς ἀκρατής goes in for them —after a struggle.
 - b. 24. §§ 3 4] Imelmann (Obs Crit in Arit. Eth Nic p. 44), regarding §§ 3 and 4 as two independent versions, whill still be out the words emorthal defin in § 4, b. 29, on the ground that older honore infined ately preceding is equivalent to the older diaphine mode too higher of § 3, b. 25. 'Quaes to est,' he says, 'utrum contral pearm scientiam miniod of peecen, an contral opinionem: quam nihil faceroad rem Aristoteles indicat, quon am opinionem in ordum endem pertinacia atque scientiam defendamus et obtineamus. Quem sententiarum nexum duo verba aperte perturbant. Etenum older dioina interijun define propous sunt aliena ab hoc loco, cum, si quadem el dofolorer facilius mollitize indulgent, differre interipare differe

decendum crat ... quam mente autem illa idata sunt, manifesto, 1140 b.24. opinor, elucebit, st hic quoque duplicem exstate ejusdem sententiae conformationem it sa verborum collocatione demonstraverimushe then prints §§ 3 and 4 in parallel columns, omitting the words ixiorium delme. But a comparison of the corresponding passage in the M. M. (i. 6. 1201 b. 1 sep.) shows that the whole clause, wider dinives enterque diens, as it stands, is equivalent to obdie dispipes The passage runs thus -- to pie our the droplar mopέχοντα ταθτ' έπτίν άναγασίου δέ λύσαι τός όποριας. πρώτον μέν οθν res ini rie incorijung aranan yap iblices elean incorijane izanea enterno drofinder & percentures. & d'airès divos sal fel vis defes diffir pap dingleber gogen egne g eurachbab. ef Sab gatat i goge nchogig tie Belgeion when and apprehensioner, abdir decion the interfuge, a.t.h.: of the Paragibrast-ouphaire & wollance the bofar out Befalies cyntiabu bate mit durdiform incornium word to dorabairer tails incomplais. In the light of these commentaries { 4 may be paraphrased thus- 1 If you argue that doğa is weak, and therefore more I kely than impropy to be overpowered, we shall reply that there is no difference between Bofa and amorijus in the matter of strength, for some people, like Herachtus, are as firm in their dife as others are in their improvipa, Oicis dialous imerium difus is thus not to be understood, as it is upparently by Imelmann, as an inference from el ou . . . npofovous, but as an annexy to it; "If you argue it on, . . . missource, our reswer will be vider diaplace intering differ. Doubtless the expression obliv designs differ interigues would have been more correct than the oider discous incorning define of the text, difa, not immigua, being the proper subject of the argument; and it will be observed that the writer of the M.M. and the Paraphrant have adopted the more correct expression.

The exact scope of the argument oidle distort instring differ is well defined by Grant. 'Of course neither Aristotle nor his set ool would wish to do away with the distinction which Plato had established between diffe and instrings. It is only as connected with the will, and as ferming a ground for action, that opinion can be considered as strong as selence.'

§ 4. Sahai d' Hedukerros] The Akl. Schol. (who also instances the 5. 80. dogmatism of Democratus about its atoms) says—dahai de Ilpinkerros ota dora dofa iorir dolleris, incirce yap dofassus ore compres ou destro, ideque ore deputies olde, dei for ore non dofan vol. 12.

1146 b 80. Τχειν λίγωσι τὰν ἀκρατῆ κῶν ἐπεστήμην τῷ αὐτῷ ἀτοπήματι ἐμπεπτουστ. See Dieg. Laert. ix. 1. 5 quo.ed by Γείτεκε he and Grant—βεονσε το οὐδιτόι ἀλλ' αὐτον ἔφη διξήσασθαι καὶ μαθείν παντα παρ' ἐσυτοῦ: and Did. ix ε τ, where he is described as μεγαλόφρων τοι ὑτεροστητ: see also ut ετ passages collected by Bywater (Herael. Eph. Relij. p 33) under fragm. 1xxx. Peters (p. 216) supposes that the allusier in the words ἐηλοι δ' Ἡράκλειτοι is a general one, to 'the Heraelmean doct one, which Aristotle rather unfairly interprets as a deput of the most fundamental of all first principles—the law of contra liebou Cf. Met. iii, η. 1012 2. 24.

55 5-11] Rassow's view (with which I agree) of the relation of these & to one another is as follows (Forsch. 15. 12;-129). Aga not the Socratic doctrine that there is no such thing as deported, because no one knowingty does wrong, four considerations, confiled together by Ers, are brought forward-(a) Knowledge is not always actual. A man may have knowledge, without using it: § 5. 10) The reflection which precedes action may be reduced to the 6 cm of a syllogism, in which the general rule is the major, the particular case the nurer premiss. Now, the knowledge of the mane premiss may be consciously present, while that of the minor may remain latent; and so a man may do wrink, norwid standing the fact that his ayona is on y part al : § 6. (c) His passions may take such hold of a man that he may be said to have in a sense, and set not have, the knowledge of right and wrong his condition being like that of a madman, or of a man asleep or drunk: § 7, 8. The mponerge deponia, or mponerma of F. N vii. 7 8, is the form of deponent which the writer has in view in §§ 7 and 8. (1) The fourth consideration (presented in §§ 9, 10, 11) takes up the other kind of deposite distinguished in F. N vit ? 8, viz dollies o. The passions occasion ignorance or moral blindness, not directly, but by means of so; histical representations; they place, by the side of the major premiss which contains the rule of conduct, another major premiss which is not in itself false but in the circumstances is irrelevant. Hence, in acting from this true, but irrelevant, major premiss, the disparie acts and doyou now sai dofine. These according to Rassow, are the four separate considerations urged in this chapter against the view of Socrutes.

§ 5] 'The distinction between the possession and the appropriation of knowledge' is made, as the editors note, by Plato, Theast 197.

19% account price and missource of the meritares in unquestion of all Copy couples 1146 b. 32. ότε διττή ήν ή θημα, ή μόν πρίν έκτησθαι του κοκτήσθαι ένεκα, ή δέ κοκτημένος του λαβείν, καὶ έχειν όν ταῖε χερσίν ὁ πάλαι όκικτητο.

Biolose to Exorta per ph bewpourta be nat to bewpourta a ph bet b. 30. wparrer [rou exorra nai вешройнта]] So Bywater. Bekker and Susem II read dioures ed Tymera più più bessprivera de à pi bei espierren rov exorea on beapolism, which expresses the sense intended more nearly. The words sol so beapmare are given by all authorities, at parently, except Mt and F. On the other hand, all an houses seem to give the words bracketed by Bywater wood agore and despressed. Of course we cannot retain both the words om tied by Mb and r, and those bracketed by Bywater.

For the antithesis exores plv up despoure de see de An. ii. 1. 412 32 miry de (£ e. milyaros deredégela) dégeral dixús,
 ê, pelo de éntarfyn, i d' de ri dempele. pasepos ous les de inarrien es jun re inappers ens ψυχήν και ίπνος και άγρηγοραίε έσταν ανάλαγον δ' ή μέν έγρηγοραίε τῷ despece, & & Umor ve Tyer rai pà despreis e. r. h. Cf. Met. 8. 6. 1048 3. 32 disoner de duvines al ir ir er to bido Ponifi ent ir to ide the finiteire, ότε δεβαιρεθείη αν, και επιστήμονα και τον μή θεωρούντα, έδυ δυνατός ή benjamm Cf. Phys. vi.i. 4. 255 2. 33 fore de bunduse thing b рандины вненторым сав в бран бол на, пр внором . . . в удр бром in wright his Company be durines forth interspent nos, add oix his eat up in padeir. See Bonitz, Mes. p. 394.

§ 6 | Section 5 called attention generally to the fact that know- b. 35 ledge may be possessed without being realised in consciousness, and argued that there is nothing paradoxical in supposing that the departie acts against knowledge, if his knowledge is merely posserved, but not realised in consciousness. Section 6 points out further that there is nothing to prevent the departe acting 'against knowledge," if, while his knowledge of the universal is realised in το 1-c ourties (χρώμουν μίντοι τῆ καθάλου), his knowledge of the particular is not (dikke up vy sorè pipes). There is nothing inconsistent a this supposition, for, although knowledge of the universal includes knowledge of the contained paracular, it does not necessar ly entail the continuity rearred knowledge of the particular; see Ald. School and loc. of tes pip of your ness the authorise mairieur, eal the preparty if drivers you were burdues h everysia h you peous πρότασα und της and how προτιστώς περιέχεται. Not is there any difficulty in supposing that the departs, in acong against his nun-realised, or latent, know1146 b. 35. ledge of the particular, acts also against his consecously real sed knowledge of the including universal; for action does not be in the sphere of the universal, but in that of the particular-opened yes re καθ διαστα, it is 'particular things,' not 'things in general,' that are done see the Paragh. ad loc. apporipus olous is to the tuxi tux relation, ême dan intellupla tes ême te neup mangoir, aurificies ej per cadulou χρήσθαι ότι το κακύν αι δεί πρώττειν, καί θεωρείν ευτ' αίτήν τηνικαίτα, τήν δέ μερικήν, δει τόδε κακόν, έχειν μέν, οδ χρήσθαι δέ, οδδέ συνοράν ένεργεία, καὶ διά τουτο πρόε την μαχθηριαν χωρειν, διαπερ άποτυφλωθέντα, τουτο δε σίδε» θαυμαστάν, εί γάρ καὶ χρήται τῆ καθύλου προτάστι, άλλά πραττιώ οὐ giveres way the questinds by Shiptered any the rebred, and And court it mple row massion. Here the last sentence explains very clearly the words of the text order and see aparters and the fairthan . . . aparta yap và not inava. A man may consciously real se a general rule of conduct without realising that this is a case in which it is at pheable, and it is only by what he realises in particular cases that his actions, being particulars, can be influenced. The knowledge of the general releas not an efficient cause. It 'rests' as a final cause. Where it does not inspite efficient causes to act in its interest, actions (produced by efficient causes hostile to its interest) may take place: see de An. ili. 11 434 %, 16 awel & h pair authann hardante not dispos, h de nor mes Tauren (j pir yap déget bre del ron rombron ed embre aparence, à 20 des The rainus raideds, kaya de raidade), filh aury much à difa, aur à matihus ή αμφω, άλλ' ή μέν ήρεμούσα μάλλον, ή δ' ού. In short 'universal knowledge, being 'at rest'-not entering into the arena of particular conflicts-is no more affected by the passions which affect 'patticular knowledge,' and make it. latent 'than the Race is affected by the particular incidents of disease and decay which affect In I viduals.

The section then proceeds (from displays 1147 a. 4 onwards) to call atention to the circumstances in which course only real sed knowledge of the universal most frequently coexists with that thereby latent knowledge of the particular, which makes the prevalence of indupia intelligible. I agree with Cock Wilson (Arist. Statics, paragraph 31) in regarding as mistaken the view (maintained by Rassow, Forsch p. 128) that §§ 5 and 6 'do not refer to departic review § 7 show that the state of the departie is first discussed in §§ 7, 8.' 'This would be strange in liself,' continues Cook Wilson, 'and seems to be disproved by the sentence in § 5 distant to fixour pair my despoists de 4 my determines to favore and

Compares voirs yap done deurou, all obs et μή θεωρών, and the infer- 1146 b 35.

ence in § 6 and re by robinus divines robe represent divination date, acres
donar obre μεν eldinas μηθεν dronov, allows δε θαυμαντών: for these
mean that the distinctions made remove the apparent paradox
(compare δεωδν, δτοπον, θαυμαντών) that the departie acts against his
knowledge: for this is the paradox which is before the writer, as is
evident both from § t and § 3. It may be added that the writer
of M. M. i.. 6 1201 b 11 sqq. applies remarks parallel to those in
§§ 3 and 6 expectly to the departs. With Cook Wilson's opinion,
however, that it is wrong to argue (as Rassow does) on the supposition that the chapter is a whole, I cannot agree.

διαφέρει δέ καὶ τὸ καθόλου κηλ] ' Aber auch bei dem Alige- 1147 a. 4. memen macht es e'nen Unterschied, ob dasselbe etwas von ihm (Jem Mersel en) se bst oder von einer Sache aussagt. - Stahr. Not only is there the important difference, just noticed, between the un versal and the particular, but also in the universal itself (kai rd national) there is a difference according as the reference is to 'oneself' or to 'things.' This difference is mentioned, because it has a bearing on the 'latency of the particular,' by which the phenomenon of depusie is being accounted for. See the Paraphrast's note-tran you to nation ourse exp, wate neprezen about the σελλογεζομενον, ή τὸν όμουδή, τῆ καθόλου συγγενώσκεται καὶ ή μερική οδου, sance arthurnous phapeops of thhippops, wirds di helpunce, wird upa pha-Βερόν ο ελλεπορος ένταιθα τη καθολού και ή μερική συγγινώσκεται οι γάρ έσυτον δύναται άγνικεν ότι έστιν δυθρωπος όμοδως δέ κβν τους όμοιοδιές περιεχη, εύδε γαρ αύδε αύτους άγναείν δυνατόν, όταν δε ή εαδολου πράγμά νε ανριέχη τότο ούα διάγκη, της ποθολου γικωσκομένης, πολ την μερικήν γενωσικοθοι οίου, και ελλέβορος βλαβερόν, τόδο ελλάβορος, τόδο βρα Βλαβερών ένταιθα ούκ ανάγεη γινώσκεσθαι την μερικήν, της καθολου γινωacoutings

In so far as the un versal 'relates to oneself,' the included knowledge of the particular is not likely to remain latent; but in so far as the universal relates to 'things,' the knowledge of the particular is often latent, and vo depareered easily explained. As 'the difference in the universal' thus owes its importance to the difference which it involves between particulars, the Paraphaectually begins his note (part of which has been quoted above) on disapaper de mi to nabódos, with the words— al papinal di disapaperous the paraphaectually district name addition, the words— al papinal di disapaperous the paraphaectually disapaperous the paraphaectually disapaperous the paraphaectually disapaperous the paraphaectually disapaperous the disapaperous the paraphaectually disapaperous the paraphaectually disapaperous the particular is not indicate the particular is often as the universal transfer the particular is often as the universal transfer to the particular is often as the universal transfer to the particular is often as the universal transfer to the particular is often as the universal transfer to the universal transfer to the difference which it involves between particulars, the Paraphaectually begins his note (part of which has been quoted above) on disapaperous transfer to the universal transfer transfer transfer to the universal transfer tr

1147 a. 4. (then follows the passage quoted above). The Paraphrast's of person do diagrepown is quite in place in a commentary; but Ramsuner's conjecture diagreps di sai vi sand pipos for the diagrees.

present passage.

The lest expliration of the words diapipe de rai to andohou seems to be given by the passage de An. ni. 11.434 a. 16, lately quoted έπει δ ή μέν καθόλου ύπαληψιε και λάγος, ή δε του καθ έκαστα (ή μεν γαρ λίγει δτι δεί τον τοιούτον το τοιόνδε πρώττειν, ή δε ότι τοδε τοινών τυιόνδε. naye de randade), han airn neres à défa, oix à nerbohou à aupe, and à pir home on publice, if 8' of The formula of the universal proposition is fall men in such and such a numstances ought to do acts of such and such a kind.' To apply correctly a general rule drawn according to his formula, the agent must (1) recognise his own circumstances in the general description given—the general descript'on of circumstances being the ro co coroi of the present § : it is assumed that he will not find much difficulty in doing so, and in supplying the airds delignmes or adya di redode part of the minor. (2) He must recognise in the particular thing now before him the marks which the general rule gives as characteristic of the things which men in his cucumstances ought to do. These characteristic marks given by the general rule are the ro ini roo may purror of the present 6, where it is assumed that the agent may easily fall to notice in a particular thing the marks which characterise the things which men in his circumstances ought to do.

It will be observed that the one universal proposition of the de An, with its double reference—to persons and to things (de rivracion to reache apairted), is resolved, in E.N. vii. 3. 6, inco two universal propositions—(1) marti delpump acaptage, the spai, 'all sum are benefited by dry nour shment' (with its trinor obta delpump." I am a man'), and (2) super ed roidede, 'all things with such and such qualities are dry' (with its minor ride rounde, 'this thing may before me possesses these quanties'). The resolution, however, is more apparent than real, for the first universal proposition has already a reference to both persons and things, and the second universal proposition merely describes more fully the things referred to in the first proposition. Have despump supplier to supplie to spiral rule, expressing the relation of a class of persons to a class of things, which finds its application in the minor rade rounders sight disconde.

a proposition which has likewise a double reference—to a person 1147 a. 4. and to a thing. It is in the application, then, of the thing side of the universal proposition that, according to the present §, the agest's chief difficulty line (idd' it ride radiate, h a'x eye, h abe dispose 1147 a. 7). A man may know generally that acids are bad for barris people; and he may know that he is billous; but he may e intinue to drank sherry, not knowing that it contains a great deal of act. Its comfact might be described as under dronor. It would have to be described as Ourprover, if he continued to drink sherry, a ter his doctor had told him its real nature. The distinction, then, drawn in this & seems to resolve itself into that between knowing and not knowing the particular a distinction which has much more a guil ance in the case of the deporter than in that of the bihous patient of our example for there is that in the condition of the deports which makes it perularly difficult for him to interpret and apply the unversit—that is 'to know the particular'. The apparage is likely to find as much difficulty with the anyle de rownde, as with the role reidede,

autos ároparos) mirós is Rasson's reading (see Forich, pp. 65, a. c. 60) for lakker's obtor. Kb pr. and Mb have s miror, and Cambr. has a obtor. The Paraph, seems to have had obtor, and the reading is supported by the obtor of independent of the Proceed Syllogism in de Moto Anim. 7, 701 a. 13.

eard το δή τούτους διοίσει τοὺς τρόπους) Ramsauer notes that a. 8. thas το answers to δει τὸ διεω τήν επιστήμην δίλου τρόπου τών κῶν μήθοντων § 7 1147 a. 10, where another τρόποι is mentioned

ούτω μέν . . . άλλως δέ] (otacs has ούτω μέν ό νούς δ΄ ούν, a. 9. ώστε δοκείν μηδεν άτοπον τὰ αύτως είδεναι την επιστημην ώστε την μείζω πρέπεισεν επισταυθει μύνην καὶ τὴν καθόλου, τὴν δ' ελάττω και επὶ μέρους αγνοείν, και διά τούτο άμωρτώνειν άλλως δέ άτοπον δέ καὶ θαυμασταν τὸ είδοτα άμφοτερα, το τ' έπὶ μερους καὶ τὸ καθόλου, άμωρτώνειν.

§ 7. Its to executive emorphyse allow the row por posterior at 20. independent of desponding. The connection between this shall see and seems to one to be the following so explained the pilenomenon of incortnence by a general reference to the distinction between potential and actual knowledge; so going into detail, showed that knowledge of the particular is often potential, even when knowledge of the including universal is actual; so

2147 a 10, proceeds to point out that incontinence may be explained, not only by reference to the distinction, just considered, between potential and actual knowledge, but also by reference to a distinction which must be drawn within the Limits of potential knowledge itself-for knowledge may be 'potential' in the proper and positive sense of 'likely to be actualised,' and 'potential' in the merely negative sense of a not only not actualised, but unlikely, in the circumstances, to be actualised.' There are cases in which the natural tendency of potential knowledge to rise into actuality (cf. E. N. ix. 9. 7 & de divapus ele vipe despresar despresa) is impeded to such a degree that, while the impeding influences continue to operate, the knowledge can scarcely be called even potential z. c. it is potential in a merely negative sense. The Paraphrast expresses this view of the meaning and connexion of § 7 very well-"Ere, ob roong purp dampipovous of interaperou, to rois per igen καὶ χρησθαι, τους δε έχειν μεν, ού χρήσθαι δε, άλλα καὶ κατ' αὐτὰ το έχειν διαφερουσιν' ού χώρ δροίως έχουσε τές έπεστήρας οι έπεσταρενοι έστι χόρ бущий тым вистирую, рад булег обог, той кавлодонта, кай разгоровой, кай olumieros and tourns of the touton lyant the instringer and of it take πάθεσεν άντες μεθύουσε γάρ ύπο της επεθυμίας, και μαίνονται έπο τοί θυμού. Similarly Rassow (Forsch p. 128) 'Dort (i.e. in the cases contemplated in §§ 5 and 6) war das Wissen dem Menschen zwar nicht gegenwärtig, aber es konnte durch Erianerung und Zureden in thin erweckt werden; in diesem Falle (i.e. the fixtor spores of § 7) hat die Leidenschaft dem Menschen mit der Besinnung die Fähigkeit geraubt, sich zu sammeln und zum Wissen zurückzukehren. 50 lange daher die Raserei der Leidenschaft vorhält, ist er gegen alle Mahnung taub und vollkommen ausser sich.' Cook Wilson (Artit. Studies, paragraphs 26, 27, 30), holding §§ 7 and 8 to be another version parallel to § 5, and placing them unmediately after § 4, makes the words addor voinor run von protocour and superpourar in § 7 refer to what has preceded in § 4. There (s.e in § 4) the only kinds of "having" belief are having it doubtfully or having it certainly, in each of these the "having" being actual, §§ 7 and 8 add the case where the "having "is potential. He thus regards §§ 7 and 8 as explaining, for the 2rst time in the version to which they belong (see above no e on vii. 3 1-2, 1146 b. 8 for Cook Wilson's resolution of this chapter), the difference of explicit or actual, and implicit or potentia, knowledge. According to what seems the necessary meaning of the

words, \$6 7 and 8 explain the difference of explicit (or actual) and 1147 a 10. implicit (or potential) knowledge, premising that it has not been mentioned hetherto ere to exer the energiphe addor there in you inference aral, (paragr. 26 B). Now, as the difference has been mentioned in § 5, Cook Wilson argues that § 5 and § 7 cannot belong to the same version. Then, referring to the interpretation commenly given (as by the Paraphrant, quoted above, and by Rassow), he says (paragr. 26 B), 'some have thought . . . hat the intention of § 7 is to describe, not the difference of implicit from explicit knowledge in general, but a new species of implicit knowledge, distinct from what has been given (άλλον τμόπου τών νύν preinter), and defined by the examples reseider, passiperos, circumsor. It may be doubted whether this explanation would ever have been thought of, had it not been for the supposed necessity of reconcilurg § 3 and § 7, for it does not seem to suit either passage '-for, he argues, 'if addor rooms var our polition referred to § 5, that § must a so be the description of a particular kind of implicit knowledge; but it is a description of implicit knowledge in general, not of a part cular species." Nor, again, can the reference be to § 6. as that only uses the general notion of potentiality (our impyri) gven in § 5' (paragr 26) i.e. tapplies the distinction [of potential and actual knowledge expounded in § 5] to the action of the asserie through the Practical Syllogism (parage, 27 end).

Cook Wuson's statements—hat § 5 is 'a description of implicit knowledge in general, not of a particular species,' and that § 6 'only uses the general notion of potentiality given in § 5,' do not seem to me to put the matter correctly. I take it that §§ 5 and 6 are concerned, not with 'implicit knowledge in general,' but with two particular species of 'himing knowledge'—rol excur the interface. The notion of 'having knowledge'—'xan the interface with the notion of 'implicit knowledge'. 'the impact himing of knowledge' is one species of 'having knowledge' and the other species is 'the explicit having of knowledge.'

The first defense the insurface above the vie of follower of the naturally refers to \$\$ 5 and 6, because in \$ 5 two species of baving knowledge — the experience of the species and find the continuity of the species o

1147 a. 10. Syllogism, and the departie has been distinctly and to 'have' both reportions, the 'having' of the major being actual, and that of the minor potentia... - έχοντα μέν δμφοτέρος . . . χρωμένον μέντοι τῆ εαδολου άλλὰ μῆ τῆ κατὰ μέρος.".

To these two species of Zew distinguished in §§ 5 and 6 time exers of the of xpaperos and the exers of the xpaperos, \$ 7 a life set another species (of Ramsauer's note-teare to by rectour tois recinous 1147 a. 8: re istud ad re fre 1147 a. to. § 7 spectat, q to addos enforce ad litter'), viz. To igen nos an un igen, which differs from the normal from are ad beapen be in the manner explained at the beginning of the present note. If we keep it scenarily in view that the object of § 7 is not 'to explain the difference of explicit and implicit knowledge," but merely to call accretion to another kind rov free rip imoripage, the fact that this third hand rov free resembles one of the two kinds distinguished in §§ 5 and 6 in being implied need not trouble us. Indeed, without compromising the position taken up against Cook Wilson's view, one might admit (though I do not think that it is necessary to do so) that this third kind of Izer, being a variety of implicit from was per and not in the author's mind when he wrote § 5, but that he there thought merely of the broad specific difference between implicit Exert and explicit Eyent of, the opinion stated by Peters at the end of the following note, p. 217 'Action in spite of knowledge presents no difficulty (1) if that knowledge be not present at the time of action § 5, or (2) if, though the major (or majors) be known and present, the miner (or one of the immors) be unknown or absent § 6. But (3) other cases remain which can only be explained by a further distinction introduced in § 7, i.e. a man who has knowledge may at times be in a state in which his knowledge, though present, has lost its reality-in which, though he may repeat the old maxims, they mean no more to him than to one who talks in his sleep. Section 7, I venture to think, is thke § 2) not a repet ion or an alternative version, but an after hong it, which requires the rewriting of the whole passage."

In referring the words alto roomer ree ver interest to § 4. Cook Wisson says (paragraph 30) There (r.e. in § 4) the only kinds of "having" belief are having it doubtfully or having it

^{*} The words known all dadorines werk in § 6 are inflicient to show that not only the know also of nowares of, but also the name is thought of as known a point which flywater's reading and bracket in § 5, 2146 to 34 convent.

certainly, in each of these the "having" being actual, §§ 7 and 8 1147 a 10 add the case where the "having" is potential. Surely this view requires § 4 to say "there are two kinds of "having humidage"—rod their interfunct—having it doubtfully and having it certainly, in each of these the "naving" being actual; but § 4 compares interfunction and difa—does not mention two kinds rod drew interpupe, indeed says nothing about "having "—tree—either dofu or interpupe, indeed says nothing about "having "—tree—either dofu or interpupe. Whereas the words with which § 7 begins for it defends to imply that the technical expression from the interfupe does not occur here for the first time in the context, and that other modes rod tree the tree been mentioned before.

The izen an despriv—izen pir pi desprir di an i izen nor an pi izen of these 35 re all to departe des for for tors were inipperar—to deputer to departe desprise und dividue priver of d. Interp. 13. 23 2. 8 25. on which see Grote's Arist. vol. .. pp. 184, 185.

Before leasing the subject of the rooms roll Equivarily emeripant, I would call after ion to the expressions of Dempir and of xpoheros, used in §§ 5 and 6 to describe the state of the man whose thating is inplicit. Or opin and xphadus are terms applied the only to the man whose faculties are in normal working order, and the expressions of the pow, of xpoheros are intended to show that one who early could 'thank' or 'use' simply does not happen to do so as when an Linglishman who 'has' a knowledge of German does not happen to be reading a German book but the fact of § 7, which is practically equivalent to uh factor, and is defined, not by of Ampir, but by murdieros, is knowledge which carnot, in the creamstances, be produced at will sit is tied up, as it were like money in some bad unrealisable security.

§ 8. τους από της έπιστήμης] (γ. Μεί. Κ. 3. 106 t a. 3 Ιατρικός γόρ a. 18 λόγος και μαχαίριου λέγεται τώ το μεν όπο της Ιατρικής έπιστήμης είναι, το δε ταύτη χρήσιμον.

inη λέγουσω 'Εμπεδοκλέους] Besides the poem περί φύστως, a. 20. Empedocles wrote a poem called εσθαρμαί, in which the Agrigentines were exhosted to live prously and virtuously. See Mallach, Fr. Phil vol i. pp. 12 sq., and Ritter and Preher, Hist Ph. §§ 167 and 179.

- 1147 a. 22. συμφυήσω] Ald. Sch. olosek φίσω γωνίσθα την ίξω όν αλτοία. The reading of Kb συμφυήσω, which Sus. and Bywater a logs in place of Bekker's συμφύσω, is supported by A.d., C. C. and B', which have συμφυή οίνω.
 - 10. hunisus] 'Again, we may look at the more immediate causes of incontinence' e.e. we may examine the precise mechanism by which an incontinent act is produced. Il berto the enquiry has been conducted layers rather than doors the remote and abstract explanation afforded by the great Anstote ian distinction of disagns and dispyria has been addited father than the proximate cause or obeios hopos, which an examination of the concrete naute (dione) of the phenomenon will make known. (For the distinction horsens - process see note on 1. 3. 4 nemadate perce 1094 b. 23, and on van. 1. 6. 1155 b. 2) The proximate cause (oission köyor) of an incontinent act, or the precise mechanism by which it is produced, is not, however, given in the frem sees of the Practical Schogism, as such. The premisses of the Fractical Syllogism, as such, explain all acts generally (keyonic), not incont nent acts specially (dworker). The proximate cause of an incont nent act is to be sought in the special manner in which inchipies tives the mechanism of the Pra tical Syllogism to attain its own object, and §§ 9, to and 11, in explaining the sephistical use which imbiguio makes of the Practical Syllogum, give the weekshippe of one form, at least, of incontinence (informa; see vi. 7.8, and note on vii. 3. 5-11. 1146 b. 31), thus d ffering from § 6 1, which merely mentions the premisses of the Practical Syllogism in connexion with the remark that the knowledge of the universal may be consciously realised, while that of the included particular may, on account of causes not specially stated, be latent. Section :, with the observious, purposer andrider, prepares us for the obvious horse stated in §§ 9-11.
 - a. 20. Tran de mia yentra es acroir] t. e. when the conclusion resu to from the premises from de died vir nadador and vir mapaire despe delay rud armygroupe desar (Paraph.).
 - a 27 είθα μέν] εί μέν έστιν ή δοξα θεωρητική (Paragh)
 - в 28. мосутиваїв] =пристивів : cf de Motu Anim. 7 701 2 23 ві де

According to Cook Wilson \$4.9-13 are parallel to \$6; see Arast Student. Table L.

προτάσειε οἱ πειητικοί. The Ald. Schol. has εν δε τοῦς ποιοτικοῦς, 1147 a. 29. φτοι διν δε διστικοῦ δόξοι ποιητικοῦ φτοι πρακτικοῦ, οὐ δεῖ τὸ συμπέροσμο φάνου, ελλά πρόξου.

For the Practical Syllogism, see note on vi. 2. 1. 1139 a. 17, and Grant's excellent sect on on 'the doctrine of the Fractical Syllogism,'

Ethics, Exsay iv. pp. 263-270.

The de Mohs Ammalum, in the 7th chapter of which (701 a. 7 sqq) we find a detailed account of the Practical Sylog sin, is a late Peripatetic work (see Val. Rose, de Arist, Lib. Ord, et Auct, pp. 162-174); but the account does not seem to be in any way inconsistent with what we find in E N vii, or in de Anima its, of elsewhere, in works presumably earlier than the de Motu Anim. It is just what we might expect, however, that the doctrine of the Practical Sy logism, originating doubtless in Aristotle's own wish to find a next logical formula for action corresponding to that found for ratiocination, would, because giving a neat logical formula, be put prominently forward by his followers. Accordingly it is to a late treatise like the de Moto Anim, that we have to go for a detailed account of the Practical Sylogism. In reading this account it is important that we should look behind us scholastic phraseology, and remember that the 'major premiss' stands for the permanent organism of the animal (or the moral character of the man): the 'm nor premiss' for a scimulus coming from the environment and calling forth a movement (or action) the conclusion -in accordance with the nature of the permanent organism of the anamal for maral character of the man). Thus the major premiss compared to the fixed socket of the joint, is said ippaciv (de Anima in 10. 433 b. 21 sqq.), while the minor premiss is said some to produce motions (or actions) with a sweep, as it were, controlled by the fixed socket of organic structure (or moral principle). Without the point d'appui of permanent organic structure (or fixed moral principle), and the particular stimuli of sense, attimal motion (or mora, action) is impossible. In short, the movements of an animal take place, in accordance with the structure of the animal, on the occasion of sense-st mult. In the doctrine of the Practical Syllogism this physiological truth is put into scholastic form, and the formula applied more especially to the explanation of moral action.

The latter part of de Motu An. ch. 7 (from 701 a 36) and ch. 8 may be read for the 'physiology' of the Practical Syllogism. As a small movement of the rudder 1 radices a great movement at the

1147 a 28, prow so a slight physical change of movement in an internal part, caused by the heat or cold induced by a nufor is communicated through nerves and muscles, and resalts in the manifest movement of a linb; 701 b. 13 sqq. en de ro (op dinara rd mire eat percon ea. έλαττον γινευθαι καὶ τὰ σχηματα μεταβαλλειν, αίξανομενών τών μαρίων δω θερμότητα πολ πάλιν συστελλομένων διά ψέξεν ποι άλλοιουμένων, άλλοιούσε B' al parmaine est as aiabhasee est al irrotar al pir gap siadquese eidre διπάρχουστικ άλλοιωστικ τινίκ οθεται, ή δέ φαντασία καλ ή νόηστικ τήν τών πραγματων έχουσε δύναμεν' τρώπον γορ τενα τό είδαι τό νοούμενον τό τού Bermon & Puzzoi & idine & pattern - romvenu rrygaves by nine mer eni eme πραγμάτων έκαστον, διό καὶ ψρίττουσε καὶ ψυβούνται νοησαντικ μάνων rains of mores made and addresses state, address there is in the amount of μέν μείζω τὰ δ΄ έλαττα γινεται. ότι δέ μικρά μετοβολή γινομική έν άρχε μεγάλας πολ πολλάς ποιεί διαφοράς άποθεν, συκ άδηλων οίον του οίωπος δεαριαιόν τε μεθεστομένου πολλή ή της πρώρας γίνεται μετάσταστς. . . . care de rà dungoù sal goéa savra axedar perà pi fewe reva sal beputentre τυυτο θε δήλον εκ τών παθηματών. Θάρρη γάρ και φύροι και άφροδισιασμοι καὶ τάλλα τὰ σωματικά λυπηρά καὶ ηδεα τα μεν κατά μόριον μετά θερμότητος à thi fewe core, ra de and abor to ampa' propant de ant chailes, and e diabore prompense rois rombrees, ore per great ore di pallar airon two airons elase. war' eldigwe filg dapenupyeras en forde mit ed mepl ene appar rue δργανισμο μορίων μεταθιλλοντα όν πεπηγότων ύγρά και έξ ύγ, ών πεπηγοτα nal pudani nal vadapit ik addadam rovime de overfluwirtum vier trains τουτον, καί δει του ποθητικού και ποιητικού τοιαυτην έχδυτων φίσιν οίαν πολλαχου είρηκαμεν . Επότον μηθεν επολέτη ούτων έκπτερον τών έν τώ λυγο, मंगीयेह को प्रतंत्र मालाई को देशे मध्यपूरम है। ये कार्यक हैं विम्रव केंद्र श्रीमांक कार्य हैक πορευτέυν και πυρινεται, αν μή τι έμποδ ζη έτερον τα μέν γαρ άργουσε pepp napawervales eneradeine to nuch, i d' dintie tà nuch, the d' berter t Pauravia avry de giveras à did vonveus à de alvohoreus.

e. 33. § 10 auty be everyed) form de sal à perme dess un rêde phosé airy de à persen diffe despré (Ald. Schol.). So also l'eters "Now when you have on the one side the un versal judgment forbidding you to taste, an l'on the other side the un versal "all sweet things are pleasant" (ibb here corresponds to yever des de above: note), and the particular judgment, "this thing before me is sweet," and this latter judgment is effectively present, or, in other winds, appetite for the sweet is there.... Grant's rendering, however, is grammatically preferable, as referring even to the second universal proposition (i de), not to the paper desse under it—"When therefore there is in the mind one

universal which to bids tasting, but another which says "all that is 1167 a.83. sweet is pleasant" (having a minor) "this thing is sweet," and think the second universal is realised"—i'e, the second universal is applied in its minor.

Live taken this to mean—' for each of the 'Parts of the Sou."—

1. e depor and indepie—can move the mun', but I have no doubt that rise popular are the degeneral mips—' bouldy parts,' of the passage quoted above from the de Moin An m. và mir yàp degeneral mips napa
occupie interferent và nath, h de defets so nath, and that the Paraphote tight wish—h d' dustum merd the defets so nath, and that the Paraphote tight wish—h d' dustum appeared the description of dustum appeared to describe the describe and the passage dustum appeared.

Section 10, as I said, gives the proximate cause of an incon ment act, by exposing the rophistical use which influin makes of the Practical Sylogism.

On the one sace, we have the maxim of Reason - h air raddhou h realization prisedles, and on the other side, the desire of sweet things, But the departy, unwilling to apply the maxim of Reason, and yet arxious not to seem to act without Reason, presents his irrational desire in the disguise of a rational, or true, proposition, which he makes the major premiss of a new Practical Syllogism, and his mcontinent act, though really proceeding from irrational desire, seems to be the conclusion of this syllogism, and to be performed funder the influence of Reason' work organization and halyon must not differ departe could be the new tendy tastes something sweet, and then that's in justification of his act the authority of a principle which he can represent as a rational one; for it is certainly true that "all sweet things are pleasant." It is not qual frue that this principle is contrary to the other principle that of Right Reason or Temperance—i nation i subjourn yeiterbar, but que imprying the deure to disobey that principle. The two general propositions * Immoderate a dulgence in sweet things is evil," and 'Sweet things are pleasant, are both true, and, so far, there is no contrariety between them, but when the latter is put thus in its true colour, "I must have sweet things " then its contrariety to the former becomes evident. "H pupuij dofa-"tristhing is sweet," and the corresponsing autohou-' all sweet things are pleasant,' are placed in an attitude of opposition to the principle of Temperance by their

- 2147 a. 85. association with desire, although in themselves they are not opposed to that principle—here supficien ind dayou was not differ departmentes. ούκ έναντίας δέ καθ΄ αθτήν, άλλα κατά συμβεβηκός—ή γύρ επεθυμία έναντία άλλ' oùy à δύξο-τώ ἀρθώ λύγω. The λύγος, under the influence of which the departie is said to act incontinently, is simply his principle of uncontrolled imberia transmated into the true proposition - all sweet things are pleasant. But it is not the truth of this proposition that is in dispute, but its value as a principle of conduct, It is no justification of an incontinent act to say fall sweet things are pleasant," when this only means "I am passionately fend of sweet things,' and the point at issue is- Ought I to yield to my passion?' The Ald. Schol. has a good note - win trurin & dorn καθ αίτο ή δήξα ή μερική ή λέγουσα ότι τοδι γλυκύ έστι τῷ λόγφ τῷ καθύλου τῷ λέγοντε ούδενὺς γλυκέος ἀπογεύεσθοι δεί: ποιαν γορ εναντιοτητα έγουσε: genores di évaria karà ouplisfiqués, deles gên ouplifique en inclume συνελθείν τη μερική δόξα καλ καταναγκασος την γεύσιν γεύσοσθαι τούδε τού γλυκίος '-i' ε. ή μερική δύξα, ' this is sweet,' is the occasion of contrariety to the moral law, by arousing desire, which is directly contrary to it. Then men attempt to excuse themselves by pleading the 'rationality of their desire'-by transmuting endouse into mar phone fol. Die Sophist k der Begierde, von der unter 16 10. 11 die Rede uit (says Rassow, Forsch, p. 129, note), macht sich naturlich noch auf anderen Gebieten geltend, als dem der amaria, und sie ist um so gefährlicher, je mehr sie das feb in eine sittliche Form zu kleiden weiss. Der Feige, der sein Leben nicht preis giebt, weil er sich für seine Kinder erhalten will, der Hurgernde, der stichlt, indem er dem sebenten Gebote das Gebot der Sell st. thaltang gegenüberstellt, sind derartige Soplasien.' Cf. Flut. de Virt. Mor. 6 συφιστικής ούν ψυχής ή departa.
 - b. 4 § 11. τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατή] becutse ἀκρασια impliex a κιτιρη between ἐπιθυμία and λόγοι, and the brutes have not λόγοι. They have no principle 'forbidding them to taste'; they cannot even construct a spiritums λόγοι by transmitting τοιτί γλυκό it to σὰν γλυκό ἡδύ. They have nothing but the impression or idea of the particular οὖου ὁ ὁνοι ἐνειτιον τῷδο τῷ βυθρφ, διὸ και ἐκτοτε ἐδῶν τὸν βοδρων φωταίτεια ὅτι ἐκτῖ ἐπισν καὶ ἀκαφεύγει αὐτόν (Ald. S. h.). C. Ε. Ε. ἱ 8. 1224 α τὸ οὖ γὰρ ἔχει τὰ ἄλλα (ῷα λόγον καὶ ὅρεξιν ἐναντιαν, αλλά τῆ δρέξει (ῆ΄ ἐν Ε΄ ἀνθρώπος ἔνεστιν ἄμφω.
 - b. 8. § 12. φυσιολόγων See Grant's note ad loc. He quotes Sext,

I mpor Adr. Mrth.vii. 129 on the theory of Herachus, that in sleep the 1247 b. B oladoveral object are closed, and the rove is cut off from its connex on with the repurpor. The treatise de Somno also gives a physiological account of sleep and waking, in which deadeparases, produced by to Geopar, and riving to the sleeper's brain, play an important part. The Ard Schod, probably with a recollection of this account, speaks of the deadeparases of drunkenness in his note on the present passage.

4§ 13, 14.] If Ramsauer's very plausible conjecture— of after b. 0 raters b. 10—be accepted (it is accepted by Sisembil), the words one b. 9... open b. 14 make the protasts, the apodous beginning with not inside b. 14: if Ramsauer's conjecture be not accepted, over b. 9... weakness b. 10 in the protasts, and vaters b. 10... Examples the state apodous of one sentence; while not do b. 13... open b. 14 is the apodous of one sentence; while not do b. 13... open b. 14 is the protasts, and not force b. 14... open down to be apodous. Bekker's punctuat on—a comma after Francockious, and a full stop after open—must, one would think, be due to the printer. It gives no construction.

I understand §§ 13, 14, in their connexion with the whole thap er, as follows—To depareion due has been accounted for by the laten y of the knowledge of the particular, and it has been carefully pointed out that, although the knowledge of the particular is latent, that of the universal is actively present in consciousness - "governer" εμφοτεριες ούδευ κωλύει πράττειν παρά την επιστήμην, χρώμενου μένται τη audohov alal ui, ry sura pipos § 6-if a man's knowledge of the particular viz. that 'this particular act is wrong' be rendered latent by passion (see §§ 7 and 8), there will be nothing to prevent has perforning the wrong act, for it is one's view of a particular act, not one's general maxim of conduct, which is the immediate antecedent or efficient cause of the performance of the particular act, without the defa aladymo the act could never take place see de Amous in. 21. 434 R. 19 fon avry ever à dugu (i.e. à rou not) ienara), αίχ ή εαθιλου, ή δρφω: ikk' ή μεν ήμερουσα μάλλου (ε e as a regulative principle, and point d'appui), & 8' ob. Now, à dofa sintegrou i a pla rue apifice (e e, their efficient cause of acentacy situs), which is rendered laterally passion, is a fusinor premise, and since the knowledge involved a the nation premise is no really imming, as a that involved in the major premiss, we can see that 1.47 b. 9 the Socratic position is not without foundation; the passion which prevails in incon incise is not matched directly against real knowledge (no yap the tupine interipos than damione mapadone vineral to without § 14'-real knowledge, though consciously present in the mind of the assuring, is not near enough (of a spaying) to this tomen to be buffeted about and suppressed by it (oid airy repulsered by the widos); it is only the knowledge of the particular (i) via Byear) over στήμη = δοξο αίσθητοῦ) which stands near enough to the passion to be affected by it, or, indeed, is of a nature to be affected by it - \$.c. suppressed and rendered latent by it. But this knowledge of the particular (that 'this particular thing is wrong'), as we said, is not really knowledge (entergen): so, we have explained annuals (knowing the right and doing the wee 2) was out entrely discrediting the Socratic position. This is a result in perfect keeping with the principle of procedure laid down in vit 1, 5 to the ... deserving paleura pay navra ed Teduca nep. rains ed nuch el de po, ed whetera and applicate, I am accordingly unable to agree with Co k Wilson that an 'obvious concession of the So rate | me ple' (Arist, Sud. parage, 60) is contained in the 3 generally, and in \$\$ 13 and 14 in particular, which contributes to make it pre ballo that the chapter is not by the same au hor as some of the most two portant parts of E. N. vii. I would put the case, as between Socrates and the writer of this chapter, thus Secrates denied the existence of argania, because impring cannot be compared by wine The writer of this chapter of poses the view that deports these not exist; but 'concedes' the point that true issuring a unit be conquered by within. He is enabled to make this 'con ess, p' by drawing a distinct on-the departy has actively present in Lis to 1 the true internant the general proposition that 'it is wrong to said to millor, but this community to quote the expression used in it An iii. 11 434 a. 20 hepei passor, and can touch action only through the intermediation of the dife alodges. "to do this particular act would be to yield a nudoc. This dofo oradifor, however, is to a true imminute and its latency, caused by millor, sufficiently accounts for the occurrence of an act of impaoria, without old garg tes to ar, against Socrates, that true immerizing is affected by mader. The claume of gap the neptus enemyings eleas bosovers may ever yiers is to mades I understand to mean that 'the affection (rd departmental) does not occur in the immediate presence of real knowled e--treal knowledge,' though actively pre-ent in the conscious cas

of the coparie dues not operate as an efficient course (ob more de An 1167 6 9 in, 11. 434 a. 20) of action, and so does not come into conflict with Only particulars can come to close quarters with orabiquia, particulars. Only pepecial dofut are sopius the me fewer, and the propery duga, ' this is wrong,' is defeated by another proper ?6fa - that of enisonia- 'it is pleasant.' While I am at one with Cook Wilson (parage 66) in thinking that the context does not allow us to understand egr seguer interipos to mean the presence of both minor and reason premises? I cannot accept his view that of you the replace interfuge eleus donnouns mopologic with, in any that the Socratic op nien about asparáa agrees with the theory just given, masmu has knowledge proper has not been allowed to the departs ': and consequently I cannot follow him in a difficulty which he expresses a few lines below- 'The reason (which the present passage) assigns for the absence of knowledge proper is 'that the misor prepare is not so much of the nature of true knowledge as the major. This must mean that the departe has not true emoriphy, because he has only the mone and not the major, which of course s in direct contradiction to the beginning of § 13 and to the rest of the chapter."

According to the view which I have attempted to state above, it is not argued in § 14 'that the departs has not true interiors, but that the true interiors, which he has—and has consciously—is not in a position to be affected by maker, because it is universal, and so does not enter the areas of particular action.'

While the word nanovane may be thus, I think, eat slactorily est in ned, I have considerable doubt as to its genuineness. The homocotel aton dossions nanovans is suspectus, and the awkwardness of having to take rd wides in a different sense of er givern and do respectively—as "the affection viz. deparate" in the first case, and as "passion" in the second case "—seems to suggest that there is semething wrong in the text as it stands. I offer the conjecture, I confess with hes taken—for what it is worth—that napovane regions is now at d a distograph of the termination of Boxodons, the

^{*} Ransauer understands the words to mean this.

[•] CCC and NC, however, have rip noplan close bosedans imarifying napodans,

^{*} Ramanuer anys ' to nados va. 16 is telligias to ans depodes and fit has to and on the translates the test nados by Learnhaltzankett, the second by Learnschaft. Both Count and Peters making a lighthough to render nados in each place by phrases containing "condition," or "passion."

1147 b. 9. dittograph overs having (by a blunder which sometimes appears in MSS) i is reted itself between the περι and the visera of an original περιγίεσται. The deliberate alteration of the resulting περισύστε into περισύστε would then be natural, even if περιγίεσται had not, before the insertion of the dittograph overse, taken the place of περιγίεσται, by a blunder which often a occurs in MSS. The sentence then would originally stand of γώρ την περίως επιστήμης είναι δοκουσης περιγίεσται τη πάθος, σίδι αίτη περίβεσται διά το πάθος, άλλα τὰς αλοθητικής is governed, as is της ευρίως επιστήμης, by περιγιέσται — gets the better of.

The following is the Paraghrast's explanation of §§ 13 and 14 It seems to me to be a very sat stactory explanation of the text as it stands. "Orne de de tij núdic general à departe, the électro aportant, the repeat the aportion of all executions aportant, the repeat the aportion of all executions exist dense of perdientes sat of particular des each another exist dense exist dense of a flatture aprende along the surface of a flatter appropriate exists describe about the surface. Surface along the explanation of the explan

b. 14 § 13. Afres | 'sought to establish ' (Peters).

b. 17. § 14. της αίσθητικής See Grant's note: he quotes Sext First Adv. Math. vii. 143 on the επιστημονική αίσθησες of Squasques, which is described as ή μεταλαμβάνουσα της εατά των λόγων (ε ε των επιστημονικών λύγων) άληθείως.

CHAPTER IV.

ARGINETT.

Let us now determine the sphere of incontinues, strictly so called.

It is place that continue and endurance, incentimence and seffness, are relative to pleasures and pains,

Now the things which cause pleasure are either necessary, such as feed,

^{*} I have come ed in E N veright cases in which repd and reps are confined by NC; and in two out of the four places in which expapsions occurs (associated to Grant's index—to the E, N, repsylveras is the reasing of a $M \times MSS_n$

or not necessary, but describe in themselves, such as honour, or wealth. These then who, again t there own sound judgment, exceed in relation to there were sources of practice, are not distribed as Incontinent' simply. The term is ended appear to them, but not in its etrect sence, only with a qualifying assistant in entenent a cut honour or about wealth. That exconssence has different meanings as acrested on the one hand to the man who greats man at his persones it is the persones of grating honour or wealth, or of guerre tent to his an ver and on the other hand to the man robo yields against his med ment to the pleasures of touch and taste, is shown by the circumstance that the same it in the latter case as a form of thee but not in the farmer ease; and also by the arranmetance that we call people soft an relation to the sensations of ten h and turne, but not in readien to however or western. One common on, tion, it shat she term "ancou them? to abjut I must'y, and without quasifying addition, to the man who errs, against his judgment and resolve, in relation to these placement and pums of tench and taste, in sent on to which the in sees he so intemperate man errs teleberately, and the temperate man wherees received in. Non a absence excess on the guern I of smith objects as tomour and want a feed and describle to themselves is mournemed with a the strategy survey as here to add a good fronting of the apply the term "incontinued" to one who yields to the annatural pleasures which may be served from the economies of three good and decreable in themselves . Inch. to we told to the quality attornaise to the man who cannot recrease his anger; without qualification only to the man who exceeds, against his In Cover and remove in section to the normal piece uses of touch and to it

§ L. idetije] See ch. 3, § 1, 1146 b. 9 eira e.r.d.

1147 5 23

§ 2. ἐπεί] here='whereas', see Cook W.Ison, Arist Stud palage 6 28 to The apodexas begins with robe μεν σύν προς τούτα b. 3 t. Cf. Simplician (f.d. 56 b) quared by Trend on de An. 1. 3. 1—εν δί τῆ λεξιε τ.ε. de An. 1. 3. 1) προς τον δεεί υπθέσμον δεά μακρού ἀποδέδωνν δει κ.τ.λ. 1 . 2. διὰ τῆν διὰ μακρού ἀπόδοσων τὰν οὖν προσθείν σύνδοσμον.

λεαγασία. Sec Ref. 5.8 βοίλει οδυ, ην δ΄ έγω, του μη σκοτεινώς b. \$4. διαλεγωμεθο, πρωτον ορισωμεθο των τε δυαγκαίους έπιθημως και τος μή;... οίκουν θε τε ούκ δυ οδοί τ' είμεν άποτεθμα, δικαίως δυ άναγκαίαι καλοίντο, καὶ όναι όποτελούμεναι ώφελούτεν ήμῶς; ταίτων γαρ όμφοτερων έφλοσθαι ήμων τῆ φύσει ἀνογκη.... ότ γε τις απαλλαξαίεν πυ, εὶ μελετώη εκ νεου, καὶ πρὶς οὐδεν ἀγαθὸν ἐνούσαι δρωτιν, εὶ δε καὶ τουκαντιον, πάσας ταίτας εἰ μή ἀναγκαίους φαίμεν είναι, ἄρ' οὐ καλώς δυ λεγοιμεν ... προελώμεθα δή τις παραδουμα ἀκατέρων, κῶ εἴσεν, ῖνα τύπφ λάβωμεν κύτῶς ... ἄρ' οὐν οἱ χ ή τοῦ φαγείν μέχρι ὑγιείως τε καὶ εὐεθους καὶ αὐτοῦ σίτου τε καὶ δψου ἀναγκαίος ἄν εἰη; ... ή περα τουτων καὶ ἀλλοίων ἐδεσματων ή τοιούτων επαθυμα, δυστή δὲ κολοζομένη ἐκ νεων κοὶ σπεδευσμένη ἐκ τῶν πολλων

3147 b. 24. ἀπαλλάντεσθαι, καὶ βλυβερα μέν σώματι βλαβενά δὲ ψυχή πρόε το φρότησο καὶ τὸ σωφρονείν, δρά γε δηθύε οὐα ἀναγκυία ἐν καλοίτο;

For the Ar stotelian use of derivation, Raszow (Forsch p. 22, no. 01) compares E. N. i. 9. 7. 1099 b. 27, x. 6. 2. 1176 b. 2; Pol. 1333 a. 32, 2338 a. 13 and 32.

b. 28. (θεμεν) E. E. ni. 2, or E. A. ni. 10. When we use the term departs simply by itself (desker) without qualifying sold ton we signify the man who yields, after a struggle to those bound pleasures (of touch and taste), the deliberate parts of which constitutes deokasia: but the man who pursues g in mount nearly can be called departs only with a qualifying apiadeous departs nephous also the man who does not succeed in controlling its anget is departs with a appearance. Θυμοῦ

Rassow (Fersch, pp. 21, 22) has called attention to the cream stance that § 5 goes over the same ground as § 2; and Cook Walson (Arish Stud parties, 6-9 and 37-42) resolves the whole chapter into duplicate passages forming different versions. its resolution (Table II) is as follows:—

A § 2 (Introduction common to both versions).

 B_1 § 2 έπεὶ , , , ήδέων $=B_2$ § 5 έπεὶ , , , ξπερSαλλεικ,

 C_1 to de prive où ϕ = C_1 § 5 Δ 10 . . . § 6 marén. D_1 § 3 vive dé—§ 4 λ únas sival = D_1 § 6 Garrep— ϕ apin.

Both columns, may be cook Wilson p. 8, begin with i di de, and a will be seen that either may be read after the first section of the chapter, A. with equal coherence both in spinax and subject-mater. Thus each of the two orders A.B., C., D., A.B., U. D., yields a chapter on the same subject as the other, and very like it. I controlly gree with this statement of the case. I also agree with Cook Woods concusion (parago, 42) that there are differences in style and subject matter between the two columns which 'point in the direction of diversity rather than of unity in the address p. The discrepancy also between E. E. in and E. N. in on the one site, and thought on the other, with respect to the object of madpinaling and embassion is a point of great interest noticed by Cook Wilson (perag. 39), and I am inclined to think with mithant proves that this chapter is not by the writer either of E. E. iii or of E. N. iii.

to 34 mail topoul 1 The parties of departs tepart in the 4, sers Conk Wilson (parties, 70), its not without obscurity, for these cannot be called prove alprove prove two sakes and dyades, alprove and aird, in the

same sense as the examples airdot, ring, slan: it is not classed with 1147 b.34. these higher istin, and deports in respect of it is associated with departuin respect of them without explanation. Perhaps the oversight occasioned later the in roduction of a separate proof in the vithat isposes sepose is not so blameworthy as separa of bodily plasmes and it is worth notice that § 3 (ch. 6, 1149 b. 19) artis, as corolors, the assert on that it is not properly (and it) deputing wishout reference to the result of chiliv which may well have been thought asufficien.' The suggestion here made by Cock Wilson seems to be supported by a passage in M. M. i 6, 1202 b. 3 tel ried to by Rassow (Forsels p. 47) in his clicussion of the place efth 6 in E. N. vii (see below, note on vii. 6. t, a. 24)? Forth yill were observe an human the assessmine & handles departed, dishow be one errereten, bre neză enveu î depautu inst pop pereix à depurie, Pecra eleu de. ra inoxamera, tihu min ogn uni goba ani ginah uni nhungara col acul gou Due deporte a deportus, obe close herri, of & floral of suparical harries den electrone à mest emisar du maddeu roll decurres, ouvres demente redeine degrere. energy de core rier megit ru adan unjuncion degapelous fi megit rips έργην οδιτά δερασία ψεκτοτική, πότερου ψεκτοτέρα έστιν ή περι την δργήν ή i er, i eas ibones; - then follows a passage founded on E. N. va. o

ένπιρ ανθρωπος ό τὰ Όλυμπια νικών ἐκείνω γάρ... όμως έτερος ήν] ο 35. Bywater restores moun from Kb, in place of Bekker's nemerous, Cambr is, so far as I know, the only MS, which agrees with Kh in g. g main I explain the parsage as follows, making hispannes a peed cate-" The Olympionnes" in the school example-"The O year; ionices is a man," will illustrate the distinction between the the sarge delive and the deputie and apportlemen. * The Olympionices, t outle described generally as "a man," has also, gud "O ympiorice ," a notion of his own, which differs, slightly indeed, but yet of the from the notion ' man" Cf Politic 2 1276 b. 21 (quoted 1 3 7-11, τών δε πλωτήρων καίπερ ανομικών άντων τήν δύναμεν (ὁ μεν γάρ for a fairing & de restantions, & de trapperes, & d'addin rich Egue rougerne έπαντη το) δηλου ώς ό μεν αεριβέστατος έκάστου λόγος ίδιος έστοι της Specie, apolius de sai emale res écopadore nacio. A yap ourapla tas auvilλίσε έργης έστε αίτων πάντων' τυντου γαρ έννστον ύρεγεται των πλωτήρων. The writer means that the man who is incontinent in relation to certain bod by pleasures is departs without quadication, and the man who is incontinent in relation to money is departe with that equal hear interpretars desposoror, when unquel hed, saines for Good Loyinor

1147 b. 35. Genre's, but when qualified as a re Ohiguna racio, stands for five house droped allhaphoon. So the Paraph. "O we our moss of item inequalities τά μή άναγεσία ου λέγεται άπλωε χωρίε προσθήτης άκρισής, άλλά άκρισης dulys, h daparts nhulton die errous do incient rod expens and drient άτρατους, όνομαζομενος δι άτρατης δια τινα πρός έττινον όμοιστητα' καθοπορ διαφέρει ὁ δυθρωπος ὁ τὰ 'Ολύματια υπυτητως τοῦ Απλως ἀνθρωπου καί γερ el ud purphe fere ed diapopar abede, all bour diapope, un feeper fore did env apportions. Clearly the parallel here is not an exact care the Olympionices is called a man, because he has blocky me the nature of man, and is included within the class man; whereas the deports embour is not include I within the class of the deporter delice but belongs o a class which is exordinate with it. Under the general notion of inpures fall (1) o row augustain ifdores augusty = 6 and we departe and (2) & explose (or reply) departe b und we departe dex 3 not include o kiphers departs, 34 o andres de Operas in clarles i en Odepara rucio. Rather in the expression dispures applies, the preper meaning of he term deporte is metaphorically extended, as he proper meaning of man (-1 uman being is extended in the expression 'wild man of the woods' (=ape . Nor do I think that the parallel between the dipurperary application and the Olympion res would be made more strict if we accepted the incredible and planty 'ae iological' story about the Olympun victor wasse proper name was "Audpointer - see A ex Softh Elench 310 a 34 Surney and a Odoppinering desputero abri robro "Ardpunos. Alex. Tip. 262 b. 14 άνθρωπος ήν γάρ και ίδιον άνομα τοίτο τοι Βλυμπιστικου πύκτοι εξ έν Howite furquireners. Sindas & v. dubporne. Aubporner to a porty operation ral "Androwes idion dunma of the officie Americaling paymenties. I astali. 21. A. p. 847 και Ολυμπιονίνης τις κατά κυριονυμίαν εκληθη "Ανθρωσος. Mich Pph on Fith Nic v in t ful 56 b & 80 mpareners apres (1) ή κατά μέρος δικοισσύνη) δικαιοσύνη μέν λεγεται καὶ δυσμάζεται τῷ τῆς δλης Busicotives designate benjua & theor and techniquesta, and water terms & όλυμπιονίτης οὸ Σωκρατης οὸ Ηλ σων οὸκ "Αριστειδην, αλλα τφ κοινφ ποιτών άνθρώπων δνοματι δυθρωπος δνομαζιτοι, οδτω καλ ή παροίσα άριτή δικαιιστος makiras to come the okye diminatorye disquare. Ald behal on the present passage- hanen edi fir rie ricijane ele ed 'Okiunia edi femer Ανθρωπος, ώσπερ ο δείνα άκεύει Σωκρατης ή Πλάτων, έκείνου γορ ο καινός λόγοι ήται ο καθολου δυθρωπου ήτοι το έφον λογικον θυητόν μικρου διεφερε TOO BOOK ORDINGTOR SUPPORTER YES AND OF THE SHOOT HIS AND THE SPECEDING ποιεί την διαφορών οι μελλυντες γάρ δηλώσει αύτον και διαχωρίσσε αύτον анд чом выводом, проистевом бые в довршить в на Одирны менеция.

This story is accepted by Michelet, Williams, and Stahr. Stahr 1147 b. 95 indeed adds a finishing touch to the myth which is worth recording (p. 240, note 2) 'Anthropos mit langem o heisst auf griechisch Mensch Tier Sieger in den olympischen Spielen hiess nur ebenfalls Anthropos (vgl, Saidas s.v. "Ardyonos), aber wahrscheinlich warde sein Name mit karsem 5 gesprechen und geschrieben. Grant's suggestion that the historical tenses διάφερεν and he gave fire to the fiction about a person called "Audpointer is probably cutrect; and his further remark that the past tenses ' must be understood to mean a reference to some previous logical discourse with which the school was familiar' I accept, substituting 'grammatical example' for 'lynal discourse'; see the grammarian Apollomus, repl orwrafewe Book i & Ad - nylinor desponde reserve et Chipmia A. de énedebenquer er rip nepi fiquitore, al noveelueras obr traveiless, unouverdopareer the explose disopares distributors dyours the inastroduce guide Spenou desorgiones audionos binquis delenges. The circumstance, vouched for by these passages, that Istpones evange of theprice was a grammatical example in use seems to me entirely to dispose of To "Andpower toy, he as accepted by Ms belot and Stant and to make a unnecessary to have recourse to Peters' conjecture (p. 221, note) 'As we do not know the facts to which Aristotle a lades, we can only conjecture his meaning. It may be that the man in question had certain physical peculiarnies, so that though he ' passed for a man " he was not a man quite in the common meaning of the name. So Locke asks (Essay iv 10, 13), "Is a charge ang a man or a beast?"

σημείον δέ] τε, τοῦ διαφόρειν τὴν ἀπλών ακραπίαν τῆς μετά προσθέσεως 114% a. 2 deposites (Corace).

h and there is not to upper and adors the companies analogues a a hand there is there in relation to all bodily in lulgement, et a one of them, is there I not merely as a built, but as a form of vice. The Ald. Schol, and the Paraph, are wrong in taking about with susia, tristend of with departs as above, and in thus making the words before us mean that 'departs is blancel..., either as reden such (i.e. sasia dador obus) or as dynforous the sasia (i.e. sasia sará to uipos sobot)'

§ 3. repl & heyoper Those men loned in E. N. iii. 10 and 11. a. 3

nat the humphe pedyon sc. ras imposite. Instit of union standing ris unificials, Ramsauer suggests the insertion of in is after rise hangpier: 'tdes sunt andharras et aspareis quod il sam voluptacis absentiam tanquam misenam ferre nequeurt' is the reason which he gives for his suggestion; and he refers to E.N. m. 11. 5, and to § 4 of the present chapter (& i publov . . . opolya). and to vii. 14. 2 inurios d' . . The brephologe. Similarly, Rassow (Forsch. p. 78) suggests the inscrition of ru pirpus before run Aumpion, comparing the sai devyes perpiae himse et § 4 below. His words are- Sehr auffallig ist run humpion. Der, welcher die Uebermass des Schmerzes flicht, ware en deparfie? Ur mighen kann dies die Ansicht des Austoteles sein. Jeder vernanf, ge Mensch flieht das Uebermass des Schwerzes, und nur der, weicher auch vor mässiger Unlist zutückschricht, ichn isparijs genannt werd a Rassow seems to find support for his suggestion in the fact that Bekker's re before how a. 7 (I genuine Bywater ounts t. it is not given by Lb, Mb, r, CCC, or Ald) is wrongly placed, as the sentence stands; the please and the humpan, on accent of the different verbs φεύγων and διώκων in the two clauses, cranot, he thinks, be connected by to mai: but the te friend dishout the inter-Budde, sai tà pitpia ton distribun deigen would be gratumatically correct.

Ramsauer's ότιοῦν and Rassow's τὰ μέτρια seem to me to originate in a misunderstanding. The passage what Ramine quotes from ili. 11. 5 describes the dicharres, not the departs. and the presage which they both quote from via 4 4 describes the decharges as avoiding perplacitimes. But the character cover is t here (§ 3) is not the deblances, but the departs of my re = numpe com dibrior . . . win program the man who struggles with strong desires (pleasures and pains), and who succumbs his es indequir of the because he has been overtaken by a manuel, indicide and might res you avayeauw indicae homy laxupa (§ 4 below. It is not brown ris λυπηρών, or the μετρίας λέπος, that such a person yield's to but the denyour rus inepholas. The passage, again, which they body (and Bywater, Contrib. p. 55) quote from vo. 14, 2 is not, as 1 understand it, intended to describe the digiarge, but the disches (cf. \$154 a. 16), s.e. the discharger, who is the subject of proper enaisions d'ani the homme on hab and invidulin derver any obest of páp fore rý únepijoký kóny isavela ákk á ro diákares rys ine inkiethe andhorse pursues excessive pleasure, and averis, not only

caccasase pain (as the departie laces), but any pain even the absurd 1148 a 7 pain of absent passure (see E. V. i.i. 11. 3)—a pain which on y an hall und follower of excessive pleasure, like himself feels at all.' See note on viii.4, 2. With regard to Rassow's remark—that every rational man avoids excessive pain, I would say—surely the dynamic and engrepsies del berate y endure it, and the departie and makasis try to endure it, but fail.

datas rai voxous] Cook Whon (parigraph 39) remarks that a state doctrine of the present passage, according to which the ded-house has to do with the panes of heat and cell, 'disagrees as much with the Foleman as the Nic. Filacs. According to Nic Eth. in to and 11, the company and decharge have to do with pleasures and pains, but the pains are only those of unsatisfied desire for pleasure. Compare Nic. Eth. id. 11.5, 6, 1118 b. 28-1119 a. 5.

*But its chapter (4 of Book v) gives as examples of pains within the sphere of outproving and discharge, a news, better disc, and things. The last two of these are obviously excluded by the definition of Book u in they are not pains caused merely by the desire for pleasure; it cannot be said of them the kimps note if history.

*Two other passages in Nic. Eth. it show how much a ress the au for lail on the excusion of all pains originating independently of magical pleasure—th. 10, § 1, 1117 b, 24-27, i.e. it is plant dy of pleasure and only secondarly of pain so far as pain may be "caused by peasure"; ch. 12. §§ 2, 2. 1119 2. 21-25. If the account of outproving in the Fadem in Il has (in z), which answers to rac abive part of Nie Eth. 14, showed the same deviation from the Nacmachean version as Book vii, ch. 4, there would be some growed perhaps for referring the last to the author of Fush Fire in But on the contrary, the Illa lemman account (ii. 2) I dle we the Nicomachean (), 10 and 11) in meanining no other pain as of ject of outpooring and neatonic save that of dust islied desire for pleasure: compare Lul Eth. 1231 a. 30-32 and obe elem of de heyoren anoharrar of the trees known to xerpen maken of the trees not himsendar andhow & he as roys worrer. The pains of alien and wigh are referred to (I ud. I h. 1229 b. 5) in the chapter on ardysia, and not in any connects in with amproxim and declare a, but associated with the objects of deduction and de Na. To the passages quoted above by Cook W. son from the Nu. Eth. may be added E. N. m. 10, 11 où

- 2148 a. 8. περί πῶν τὸ σῶμα ἡ τοῦ ἀιολαστου ἀφή, ἄλλὰ περί των μέρη: by this limitation the pains of ἀλόπ and ψύχη are excluded.
 - § 4. palanoi decharron, the reading of CCC, Ald. Sch., Heliod. Ald., is accepted by Cornes and Michelet : but unkned is obviously right. The fact that people are perularly called (keyorrar) matorial in relation to apparent and not in relation to applor &c. (mos the non obligate), is a organism in layour of the correctness of our view that in the apparisal we have a very definitely marked off and important class of objects or motives, which warrants us in distinguishing people who are departie in relation to them as depured dubies, from people who are depured in relation to ober objects or moves. Cook Wilson (Arist, Studies, p. 47) remaiks that these words on you pulared historic he locture of ch. 7, in which pulsaria is archnically d'atinguished from depocia, as the yielding (after a struggle) to pain from the yelling offer a struggle) to pleasure. And on p. 73 he writes- The way in which poliness occurs \$148 a. is (vi. 4 4) s remarkable; it is said that the pains with which the deputye andoe has to do ate both 3, and a sign of his is that prople are called palaron of yelling to them: whereas according to ch. 7 . . . makers in the proper name for such characters. This difficulty admits of explanation. . . . It has been pointed out (parage 39 g) that the third book of the Nic. Ethics and the Euden an book corresponding a counte unharm with cowardice, and not with desharm, and that there is no trace of the definite coordination (see ch. 7) of engrepin and pullent with sudposing especia &c. The author of vii. 4.4, though deviate; in one respect from Fud Eh. a and Nie Eth. in cr.e. as to the painful motives which concern σωφροσόνη and deskagia), has not advanced to the development of he theory of palasia four danch. he merely on is after from to the fact that the groom work term palorós is applied where men yield to bothly pans, to show that such conduct is hold specially bad, and belongs therefore to acquire proper, and not to departe earl sportlerer. I am not suce that it is safe to say, with Cook Wesen, that 'the author of sn 4. 4 . . . has not acvanced to the development of the theory of

to In Nic. Eth. In so and in there is no thought of separating the desire he pleasure and the pain of such desire as if ferent motives, and constitutive of different characters, he time and constitutive of different characters, he time and constitutive of Cook Wilson, Arist. Stud. p. 47.

palacie found in ch. 7. We must temember that in vo. 4. 4 1148 a 12 it is only the popular denotation of the term palacos that the writer at peals to, in order to show, by a organise, that the sphere to which he has assigned the deposite delast is very definitely marked off from other spheres of so-called deposite. His immediate object closs not tequate him to give his own theory (stated in ch. 7) of the connotation of palacia.

of per modepourtes of 8' of modepourtail The modephous of the a 17 asokarros sides with his inibonia, and he is said to act apparationers tather than emdopier, whereas the departer new endopier but not resuperperent from mere desire and not from deliberate choice в бератір інпвирым рем приттец проверациями в об Е. N. 111. 2. 4 . We can unders and what is meant by the nonopeace of the dysparfix which opposes imposing and prevate over it is dysportly de . . . пропробранот рев причесь, втоборов д об кай проператы или стоборог morrowing, at h (E N ... 2. 66 4 and 5); but what is it is approperts of the dechagree which sides with inducta? The object of inducia is present pleasure at such strely it is the finet on of apospecie, as Books much species rive upos on relieve, to look at present pleasure, not as such, but in relation to a system of afe? Is not the very note a of spongeons, then, travestred in a definition like this -vii. 7, 2 8 µm the inephalate division two admin to and inephalate to did apealorace, di olede sai poles di lespos anoflaisor, anihavros ? Il it in true that à per είπεθημια ήθεσε επί έπιλύπου, ή προαίριατε δ΄ αύτε λυπηρού αθε΄ ήθεσε (11t · 2 5't how can it be appollowing as cistinguished from endopia, in the authorise, which makes present pleasure as such, its object? Indeed, except in a somewhat recondite sense (to be not ced ifferwards), the outlinary declarers cannot be said to act apsurposperor, any more that the daparys. The ord pary dishagres was once dapares. Strong including after a stripple, Lave their own way in the deputy. As time goes on the same man yields to keeble instigular without a struggle. and is called isolveron. This he does habitually—i. a he always, with perfect consistency, yell is to feeble indula, without struggling or the king it wrong to yield. The consistency of his conduct, as compared with the inconsistency which exists between the theory and practice of the departs, secons something rational and del berate. be may even get credit for strength of character, and hows may be entertained of his referrance, if he would only listen to good a lyag. But this 'comsistency' of the diobnovos is only the wealtress

1148 a. 17 of the departs in an intensified form, and become chronic. Such a man is after a linear correctly conceived an acting in θυμων, than as acting προπρεύμενος: tinless it be said that, since action breads belief, he eventually acquires a false λόγοι, or theory of life, in virtue of possessing which he may be conceived as acting προπρούμενος—as deliberately choosing means to the end which that false theory of life holds up before him. This is the recondite sense, just now referred to, in which he may be said to act προπρούμενος—ό μεν γορ deditaries θίγεται προπρούμενος νομίζων del δείν (his is his theory of life) το πορόν ήδο διώνειν να. 3, 2. But after all it is his long indeliged craving for pleasure, rather than his false theory, which makes him act as he does. And in the set to ice just quoted note the contrad ction in the terms—δίγεται προπροφέρους. Man is an αρχή in his προπροφέρεται it is by his επιθυμίου that he is led—άγεται.

So much for the ordinary Johnsons—the declarers who once was deporte. But it perhaps ought to be admitted that there are also born declared—men in whom hopes, or consciente, was never effectively present to near the pleasures of indulgence by its shadow who never viewed these pleasures arkance, as fortaiden fruit, but a ways calmly as pleasures; and so have been able early to make them objects of the nice comparisons and deliberate preferences and rejections of the connoisseur. Such men may be destribed as a magnificant with more correctness than the ord nare disclared, or chronic weaklings, with whom the Seventh Book is, I believe, chiefly, if not exclusively, concerned.

Still 'The conjunction bill says Cook Wilson (Arist Stances, p. 73), may of course be taken in a sinon platine use but even thus it must at least be equivalent to "and so," and implies that the subject which it introduces has been in some way prepared for: but it is by no tiems prepared for, and succeeds most abruptly. The subject of the whole chapter is the distinction of the dispuris andias from the dispuris cord upondiscus, which is wound up in § 4 by the statement that the dispuris andows has to do with the same please as and places as the disharros, dysparis, and cooppose, and has the characters so associated differ as regards up subjects: It is clear that the special depraying of the disharros and obest little or to dishards is put in no sort of connection with this. I confess I cannot see any culticulty in taking did closely with the words of pie upontpowers, immediately preceding:—

the districtor is προυρούμενος; and this is why (hd) we ascribe 1148 a 17 discharder to the man whose acts of indulgence are not attended at ail, or not to any considerable extent, by δευθυμία, than to the man whose acts are consequent upon strong δευθυμία: the acts of the furnist, not being explicable by σευθυμία, must be due to προυμέντες. Σημείον δευ μάλλον γάρ might have taken the place of δεθ μάλλον without changing the sense of the passage.

It is to be observed that Cook Wilson, as quoted above, takes makler with declarers mencharrireport te speaks of the special depray by of that declarerer who has butle or no endogen. Similarly Ramsauer speaks 'de diversis quasi gradibus ros okolucios'; Grant says 'at is more intemperate to pursue luxury, &c., in cold bond than to do so under the influence of passion. Conses has sai toù decharrov decharrirepas, at d Peters trandices- And o a man who without desire or with only a mederate desire pursues excess of pleasure, and avoids even slight pains should be called more profligate than one who, &c. This, I think, is wrong the couse, as I understand it, means - And this is why aredages is aserbed to the man who, wi hout desire, pursues excessive prostres, rather than to the man who, &c. Degrees of arohama are not distinguished but anohamia is distinguished from depotes The router derie at 19 is the departs. That it is is the meaning of the passage is clearly shown by a comparison of it with what is probably its " duplicate " vii 7 3 marri & an Safrie gripun சம்படி சட்சாச மற் கொலியாம்உர் நீறக்குக ஏற்காரல் சடி விருமுக முறி கி சரிபக்றம் காவிடியில், sai el mi deperimente rentas h el deperimente el pie de entre en nalle de, bid & dubhaoros xeipur tou daparous On the 'duplicate' character of vil. 4. 4 did . . . layopá and vil. 7. 3 marri . . . deparous, see Russow, Forsch. p. 23 and Cook Wilson, Arish Stud. p. 71.

§ 5] dmik r.h.] A 'duplicate' of vil. 4. 2. see rate on vi. 4 = 22 2. 1147 b. 28.

Bekk r and Bywater make rive yis goine in a close opens at 23, 24 parenthetical. I prefer to make rive yis holive at 23, 24 residence at 25 parenthetica, thus referring the examples animal expinara and signor and elegan and ruph to rive rapical endas and amountains at 23 (27der adore alpero). The ra sp yield and all expudits or radical alpera of this section correspond to the alpera not aire of \$2: the invaria rooten were not mentioned in \$2: they are the power of chapter 5: while ra preafer so called, I think, simply

- 1148 a. 22, because the present list is a threefold one, whereas that in § 2 was only twofol I—answer to the disagreed or superiod of § 2 Rassew (First. 6, p. 70), followed by Bywater, inserts the before to a significant inserts the before to a significant inserts the before
 - n 26 πρός άπαντα δέ] Zell, Bekket and Ransauer (Ransauer reading δή) begin the apodosis here. Bywater (making διό δασι n. 28... μωραιτείν b. 2 parenthetical and apparently following the Ald Sch in understanding the constitution to be διό δασι μιν παιδι τόν λύγον πρατούνται... ψέγονται) seems to make the apodosis begin with μοχθηρία μεν ούν b. 2. That this is really the apodosis is clear, I think from the "day liene" passage v.i. 4. 2, in which the apodosis begins b. 31 with τολε μέν ούν πρός τούτα (ε. τὰ μεριαπαθιαύτά).
 - a. 28 τῷ πῶς καὶ ἐπερβάλλειν] Dekker omits καὶ with Kh Mh, but ma (approved by Rassow, Forseh, p. 66) is necessary. The meaning is ψυγονται τῷ πῶς επεθεμεῖν ἤτοι τῷ ὑπεριβάλλωντων ἐπεθομεῖν Τ.b. O', NC, CCC, Cambr., Bt. 1.2 give καί.

On the relation between § 2 and § 5 of this chapter Cock Wilson (Arist. Stud. p. 6) has the following remarks- & z divides objects causing pleasure into two classes . . . § 5 gives the same under different phraseology ... The examples too of the first class in § 2 are repeated in § 5 . . . But § 5 ad is a third class not found in § a. ... They amounts to a correction of § 2. In § 2 it is said of the aimer's end airs hat they admit of excess, unplying that they are wrong in excess, ... In § 5 the same that g is put in a clearer and better way: "it is not susceptifully to these, nor desire and many for them which are bad, but a certain excess in them." .. The bachess of diagrafia or owners a when a dulged in to excess is not stated in § 2; though half implied by the term drayania, and assorted lower down in the same column (§ 3) In § 5 the fact is expressly mencioned. From these considerations it is evident that § 5 is not a me e recapitulation of § 2 for it centains more; that it is not a mere ade fon to § 2, for it corticas the same thater as § 2. it is ta her ar ent re reconstruction which makes § 2 quite a mercesser." Then o spp. 33, 34 he save In su ject matter the second version, as already seen, expans the main statements of the first. The additions (in the second version) seem a true advance . . . Of two versions of the same subject, the more advanced may be by the

same author as the other, and written when his mind has developed \$148 a 28 further, but among other alternatives it is possible also that the advance may be the work of another and even inferior writer representing merely the general progress of philosophy since the first author, or the advantage which the second author had in having the works of the first before him. The latter hypothesis will be the more probable, if, while the advance is so has might be made by an inferior thinker under the conditions afteresand, there are found real traces of inferior philosophic ability in the second sersion. And the inference will be much strengthened if there is a considerable falling off in style, . . . In the case of the second of the two versions now under discussion, though the improvement is such as word in all probability not be retraced by the same and or if once made, it is not too great to be due to the less able philosopher reflecting on the work of the abler. And on the other hand there do seem to be marks of less ability -e g, the writer of § 2, w sling to chash idential and indeplies, begins with a division of of its ca in the first are (notoviera istorije) and gives rung, rung &c as examilles of these objects; the writer of & 5 begins will hopen was industrial and a volves lauself in the maccuracy . . . of giving blic and the Aperra, seen, ruph &c., as instances of honel and inclusion, which of course a avoided in § 2" Here I think Cook Wilson is a little hard on the water of § 6. Although the writer of § 5 leads off with seen de rain ghouse eat embepase at pie, he goes on elel rain reyims estaw and, which really means 'since the objects of some pleasures and les res are to be classed as noble and good, . . . This wroter, equale with the writer of § 2, seems to me to have a classic heats n of to notours idosis primarily in view. Although, however, I dat a from Cook Wilson on this small point, I agree with him in think re that § 2 and § 5 are probably by different authors, of whom the author of § g is probably the later.

διδ δουι . . . μοχθηρία μέν οὐν οὐδεμία κ.τ.λ.] I have said that I this k that the apodosis of the sentence έποι στλ. a 22 is μεχθηρία μέν οὐν εἰδεμία πειὶ ταῦν ἐστί: but the passage διλ δυσι a. 28 . . l. 2 μαραίσιο, made parenthetical by Bywater, is not the writer with he comes to this apodosis: for ταῦν lu 2 is not the δυσιτα και τὰ τομότα (χρηνισιο, περδος νίκη, τιμη) to which the words διδ . . . μαραίσιον confine themselves.

- The meaning is- Those who pursue rd diari alera to excess are not μοχθημοί, ι.ε. ἀκολαστοι-because their objects are not avoyenia, it augustica, but those alpera: and for the same reason (dpoint § 6) they are not departed dalas their objects are deter alpera, the excessive pursuit of which is progress but not sincily there's, as in the excessive pursuit of the apportune. They are, lowever, called dapareis at & openfrora. Ramsauer is of opinion that the reason platech ber chiare run objectus enarch care & nich is not sufficient to prove anything air our videnia med rain into it seems to me to be sufficient, if un lerstood as above - their objects are boom alpera, as recently distinguished from appearing the of jects of porthypia or dealacia." On the words with which § 6 spens, Coak Wilson (p. 35) says- In § 2 the fact of the greater gualt in true άκρασία is clearly expressed in the sentence ή μέν γήρ άκρασια ψέγεται wix he apaptus popos adda and his made the: the corresponding presse It's 6 6 your departed of person departer addit not raw yearing form is much weaker and gets the author into a confusion, for here he makes wigners the differentia of the depurie and he from the depurie core προσθέσεν, whereas above (προς αποντα δέ και τὰ τοιαίτα και τὰ μεταξυ . . pryorm) the term pryraba is used of the error of both' I am included to think that, whereas the verb proportion may be used popularly and vaguely, row weeror- the class of to weed - is a technical expression, and marks that severe consure which we pass ομ ύπερβολαί in σωματικά.
 - a. 34. Edropos! The stories given by the Ald. Sch. and the Paraph (different stories) are not worth transcription. There were kings of Rosporus of this name. Isoc. reportfusion 3 to b. mentions Salyrus I (B.C. 407-303) as continuing his father's policy of favouring Athernan gram-shippers. See note on v. 5. 13, b. 8.
 - 6 7. § 6. περί ἐκαστον] Restored by Ramsauer, Sasembl and Pywater for Dekker's περί ἐκάστοι. 'We use the term departs by analogy, adding in each case what the departs is in' λέγουσε την departur προσευτεθύντας τὸ ὅτι περί ἔκαστον.

CHAPTER V.

ASQUMENT.

There are things which are it maturally flearant, either at generally or for certain kinds of animals and kuman beings and a things which are not nature y present but a become fleasant for constitutions depended by mutilateen or habit, or (b) are pleasant for constitutions originally ead

To the different worts of pleasant things' enumerated under (2) will correspond to freent dispersions, retail may be dissinguished as brutish (e.g. cash astem, as caused by definite diseases thus is was mental disease which made the made the man sat his federe recurrents liver, and as generally 'marke' or due to fewerted hovel e.g. est as earth, unmatures laid. In its fare of he has and great have if up to one of these dispositions, a man is outside the boundaries and what we call vive, for vice is relative to normal human desires und is so far as he has one of these on positions and keep: It winder control, or is mastered by it he canot 'universal for 'president' in the sire times of the term but in a great read sense, just as we have seen that the man who control his anger is "continent" in a qual fied sense. We more quarify the terms vice and Decontinence when we use them in relation to the 'pleasant things' enumerated under (3) and afeat of bout the or morthal or morthal incontinence

Introductory Note.] This chapter goes on still further to limit the sphere of h hadder departs. If a man have unnatural desires (whether (t) connate, or (2) induced by (n) disease, or (h) habit), and keeps them in check, or yields to them, he is not sympthy or appartly dudies, but so and aphother—i e, the unnatural desire which he checks or yields to a ust be specified (just as séphere &c. mast be specified in the cases mer tioned in ch. 4), for the terms sympassic and departly, ever, in relation to communic, are applied at actly (dudder) only to the man whose desires are natural. As Grant says. In states that are cet rely morb d, whether originally so, or from the effects of an ill-regulated life, the distinctions of right and wrong are no longer applicable.

(§ 1-8.) The writing of this chapter is very careless, and has 1148 b. 10 given much trouble to the critics (see Rassow, Forsch. pp. 79, 80, and Imelianna, Obs. Crit. p 22 note); but the general meaning is than:—Unnatural propensities are (1) θημωδιω—bestal (ε.g. carnital sm), exhibited, for the most part, by savages. These θηρώδια έξαν are connute, belonging to the μοχθηρά φώσε of the

1148 b 15. mee, or of the individual: (2) magnarabets—morbid propensities. These comparible if it are e ther (a) due to supervening disease. bodily or mental of di did (omit re after dia with Kh Lh; see Rassow, Forsch. p. 67) obvour ylovern and did (insert did with K1. see Rassow, I. c.) provine evine e. t h. \$ 3, h. 25-cf. below & 6, a. 11 of de del vissour, alor ries enchanneds, & partes resquariders; at (b) voonjunedders, in a specific sense, as being morbid constitutional states -boots air air divers circa & 4, b. 31. From the voonparadess ifees m this specific sense must be distinguished (c) or (3) at of these how closely, however, the two kinds are connected is shown, not only by the express on at de manuaraders & if wor § 3, b. 27, but by the difficulty of determining how far the ifere adduced as examples (now roccos appears § 3, b. 27-29) are the to constitutionally morbid conditions, and how far they are habits the formation of which could have been avoided. The expression 6 4, b 33 rol firm roomparador lynum of ithe spame to show that the distinction most prominent in the writer's mind was that between constitutionally morbid states, and morbid states produced by bad habits. The question-how far bad habits can result in morbid states, where there is no constitutional bias-he does not go ir to. He merely says, with special reference to the last instance in his list b 27-29, that these unnatical propensities are one sametimes to phose, sometimes to idos—role pile pile pione role if if ibove overdalvovous § 3. b. 29.

The foregoing explanation of the distinctions intended in ofer may dynadere b. 24—al di did visione viroren b. 25—al di manuaradere — h if idone b. 27 renders unnecessary, I think, while it practically gives the same sense as, Rassow's conjecture (adopted by Suxen al) al di vorquaradere h (diam h) if idone (Fore h p 80), and also shows that the omission of h before if idone (K!), approved to Imelinana (Ods. Crit. p. 22 note), is a blunder.

b. 33. § 4. handrug be and book promparables example b. about 5. about 5. Eywater's correction for the role of the MSS. Rassow (Freed p. 80) says—' Gedanke und Sprache fordern gleicherneise den Accusative handrug de uni role promparables example de control de cont

It may be noted that cannibalism, which werens to be the typical equilibries, is instanced here as due to supervening disease or madness.

bemuht einen anderen Ausweg zu entdecken.' The meaning is 1149 b 33 undoubtedly that expressed by Rassow's conjectural reads g.

I had made up my mind, however, to acquience in roir, supposing that the writer intended to convey this meaning, but, instead of correctly employing the accusative, blundering y wrote bouries of and rois to correspond with booss are of above. But now Bywater's convincing boos removes all difficulty.

§ 8. τον δ' έχοντα πρατείν] By wa er teads τών with Kb instead 1140 a. 2. of τό. I prefer τό, notwithstanding the τόν in a. 3.

ερατείν] We ought to have είχ ή ἀπλή έγκράτεια answering to a. 2 this, as είχ ή άπλή ἀφασία απενικτέ το ερατείσθαι.

angry feelings in this relation (i.e. in a relation of inferiority to their—approximate) incomment in respect of those feelings (row madous i.e. row θερού άκρανης), but not incomment without qualification. I thus read row madous άκρανη, εκρανη δ' οὐ λεκτέον with Lamb., Coraes, Sien Ill. Coraes writes madinep... τοῦ πάθους άκρανη, ἀκρανη δ' οὐ λεκτέον προσύθηκα το πρώτον Δερανή προσθετέον είναι καὶ έτερων κρυκιντων ό γαρ νους καὶ ή συναμτησίε, καθώπερ καὶ τὰν έχουτα περὶ τοὺς θερούν τοῦνον τὸν τρόπον τοῦ θερού (μετὰ προσθέκης δηλονότε) καὶ οἰκ ἀκρανή (ἀπλῶς καὶ δίχα προσθήκης) λεκτέον.

§ 0] In this section is φύστως is of posed, as the characteristic a. 7. of a θηρωδης έξις, to διά νόσος, which is made the characteristic of a νοσηματωδης έξις. There is some confusion in the opposition. A θηρώδης έξις is φύστι as belonging to the μοχθηρά φύστι of a race or in lividual; but, as we have seen a νοσηματώδης έξις may also be φύστι. Only those νοσηματώδης έξιις can be fairly said not to be φύστι which have been contracted solely by έθος (if that is possible), or are due to νισοι δημληματικοί or μανια—supervening disease, as distinguished from a morbid constitutional state.

την γαλήν] Cf. Plut. (?) Fragm. (ed. Tauchnitz vi. 341) εί ένω καὶ α. 8. ἀνδρείοι όντες όρως φοβουσται φαυλα όττο, οίον γαλην ή αλεκτρυόνα ἀπ' ούδεμιὰς φανεράς αίτίας. The γαλή πι γαλή seems to have been the polecat, and only in later writers the domestic eat. See Liddell and Scott.

roomparides] The construction of course is—al di dià vidrous, a. 12. ofor ras incharracie, & paries addresses deres eles eventuatedes.

- 1140 a. 13. § 7. triors pêr péror] Bywater adds per with Kh and Mb. Although évore péror sands a Cambr, there are signs of correction.
 - a 33. § 9. āλλο etbos deparias] i.e. answering to other objects (the φύσκε σίμετά of chapter 4 and the φτοκτά of chapter 5, as detinguished from the δουγκαξή) there are states 'specifically distinct from departs, to which the term δερασία is applied in an extended, not in i.s proper, sense.

CHAPTER VI.

ARGUMENT.

Incontinence in anger is not so disgraceful as suconsinence in ce sees for angre indeed lends on ear to reason but in supprehendials undered and a che a hasty servant who runs away to execute his master to here as head restricted to hear them out, anger eaches off to take orp in a st examine or evaluation only suggest that insult or slight has been offered-the more suggestion as enough to make anger such off with the interest that the insu't wast be forthworth avenged. Better, on the other hand, ruther off to every study of easy I has anger zers ze ex rem reason or sense have said that something is pleasant in a manner, while desire does not. Again, anger is more con t internal and even he was very, than but desires are and the store the man who years to it is more termable, also, anger is open—not, fine desire, an insulative from he plotting was not the last race of reason. Marganer, it is fain to. A makes a man vent reconger; but pleasure robult actuates the wavenues of us ore and wantowness conses our just and great on eather then each se of anger. Sin e, as we have seen, bodily fleasures are either normally human, or truce h, or morbid, it as with the first class only that temperance and interaccourse are concerned, and the brutes are not to be described as et her temperate or extenparate—except perhaps by a metaphorical transfer of the term.

Brutanty is not in h an earl at time for in brutality francistic rangely does not exist, has not been destroyed but it is more formodable.

6.24. § 1. δτι δέ και ήττον αίσχρα άκρασία ή τοῦ θυμοῦ ή ή τῶν ἐκιθυμιῶν, θεωρήσωμεν) Apparently ή τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρασία, απ σεστιμνική 4 printain position among the other kinds ποτά μεταφορία λεγαμπία (see note on vi. 4. π. 1147 b. 34), is nelected here for comparist n, 'from a moral point of view' (Grant ad toc.), with ἀκρασία μπορετίς σ. especially M. M. n. 6. 1202 b. 3 (quoted in note on vii. 4. 2. 1147 b. 34) a passage which Rassow (Forsik p. 47) accounts for

by the dexire of the writer to give some reason for discussing the 1140 a 24 special question of the superiority of departs disposed to departs dishort

η των επιθυμιών, when already it had been established that the forms of deposite κατο προσθεσία generally (deposite θυμού being one of them) are better than dκρασία dπλων. I gather that Rassow regards vi. 6 as interpolated. Susemill brackets it.

Toine yap & dupòs axover per te tou doyou, mapanover 86 (/. a. 25. Prebl ket. 3 949 b. 13 dià ti depareie depourae norà the entitulae prison, obons the departue and nept the double; h ote departs per eater o πορα τον λογον τε πρώττων, καὶ ἀκρασία ή παρά τον λόγον ἀγωγή, εἰσε δὲ αἰ μεν έπιθυμίαι δε επίπαν είπεω παρα του λόγου, αι δ' όργοι μετά λόγου, ούχ ώς κελεύσαστος του λίγου, άλλ' ώς δηλωσαστος τύν προπηλικεσιμόν ή την circar. In E.N. vi. 3. 10 the departer proper is said to not ino dayor in a sense, just as here the departe depart is said dealers or rot Noyos. Moreover even within the limits of the present passage hopes is try resented as influencing embryon no less than begon to proyas dayos i i partagia 1149 a. 32 . . dadharaw 1149 h. t. al hough the water proceeds immediately to contradict himself by adding 1149 υ. 1 ώσε δ μέν θεμός ἀκολουθεί τῷ λόγφ πως, ή δ' ἐπιθεμία οῦ. The wrong is thus very careless and corfused, but the sense intended is true. The hoyar upon which inclupia acts is the soph stry of the sellish passions in the departs, or the he lonistic theory of the diohagroe, whereas that which prompts begin is an alea of justice, however wild that idea may be'-Grant ad loc. Arger and Desire, in themselves, are equally irrational; but Anger coexists with a certain consciousiess of what is due between man and min, whereas Desire thinks only of its own gratification. * Anger is a less immediately selfish passion than Desire. It is less decaya y in the long run to the character.'-Grant ad los. Cf. I' ato, Rep 440, where Copier is said to aid higos against embruie. Resentment is roused by the thought of base and selfish acts; see note m u. 8. 10, b. 23. Cf. also Butler, Sermon 8 Upon Resentment : * The only way in which our Reason and Understanding can raise anger is by representing to our mind injustice or injury of some kind or other. . . . Since . . . it is necessary for the very subsistence of the world that injury and injustice and cruelty should be pun shed, and since compassion, which is so natural to mankind, would render that execution of justice exceedingly difficult and uneasy; margnation against vice and wickedness is ... a balance

- 1149 a 25 to that weakness of pity, and also to any thing else which would prevent the necessary methods of severty. Those who have never thought upon these subjects may perhaps not see the weight of this; but let us suppose a person guilty of murder or any other action of cruelty, and that mankind had naturally to indignation against such wickedness and the authors of it; but that every body was affected towards such a commal in the sume way as towards an innocent man: compassion amongst other things would remeet the execution of justice exceedingly painful and difficult and would often quite prevent it. And notwithstanding that the principle of Be revolence is deried by some and is really in a very lim degree, that men are in great measure insensible to the happ ness of their follow creatures; yet they are not insensible to their misery, but are very strongly moved with it: insomuch that there plainly is occasion for that feeling which is raised by guilt and dement, a. a balance to that of compassion. Thus much may, I trank, justy be allowed to resentment in the strictest way of moral considerate at
 - b. 6. § 2.] φυσκαίς] It is more excusable to follow there δρέξειε, βρίξει is the generic term covering θυμός and ἐπιθυμία) which are φυσκαίν, i.e. κοιναί, ποι ίδιοι καὶ ἐπιθετοι (see Ε. Ν. iii. 11. 1). And ἐπιθετοι that is (καί) ἡ χαλεπότης (= ὁ θυμός ὁ καθ΄ ἐπερβολήνη, is φισκευτερον than οl επιθυμίαι οἰ τῆς ὑπερβολήν. Θυμός ἰη, as Grant plus it, it one constitutional, and is even heredtary: as the Ald. Senot κανε ὅτι δὲ φυσικαί ὁ βυμός δηλον διότι κατὰ γενελε ἐπακολουθεί. Of course the writer's elsewi ere-expressed view—that ἡ ὁπλῶς ἀκρανία, thurch concerned with al ἐπιθυμίαι οἱ τῆς ὑπερβολής, is nevertheless confired within the limits of man's normal φύσιν, must not be regarded as in any way modified by the present passage.
 - b. 6. 6 dnoλογούμετος] Cf. M M. i.. 6 1202 a. 25—he was acquired?
 - b. 10. § 3 δολοπλόκου γάρ πυπρογενούς] a lyric fragment of unknown authorship. The editors compare Sappho—

σοικιλόθρου άθώνατ "Αφροδίτα σαί Διόε δολόπλοπο, λίσσομαί σε.

words [pdsra] "the embroldered (seems to suitch) gir he "

b. 17. Ounpos] 17. xiv. 214-217

ξ, και δαθ στήθισφιο έλύσστο κιστόν ξμάντα, ποικίλου Ένθα δέ οἱ θελατήρια πάντα πέτυπτο ένθ ένι μιν φιλότης, έν δ' ξιερος, έν δ' δύριστύς πύρφασις, η τ' εκλεψο κόσο πύκα περ φρανεύντων. 1149 b 17

§ 4. δ δ' δργή ποιῶν πῶς ποιεῖ λυπούμετος, δ δ' δβρίζων μεθ' ἡδοκῆς] b. 20. Grant observes that 'the argument is similar to that used Ith. in. 12 2 to prove that intemperance is more voluntary than cowardice'. In Khel. i. 2. 1378 a. 31 δργή is defined—forw δή δργή δριέω μετά λύπης ειμορίας φαιομένης διά φαιομένην όλυγωρίου.

cl our ole . . Object The reasoning here is—(t) that the b. 21. indulgence of an opicis which involves pain is less voluntary than that of one which involves pleasure, and consequently, if wrong, less injust: therefore doubt is less unjust than object—(z) since the object of anger is supposed injustice (see E. N. v. 8. 10 int pairousen obtain i ippr ioni), that which raises anger with greater justice is more unjust than that which raises it with less, we are more justly angry at object, than at excesses of doubt which do not involve object therefore here the pair are more unjust than excesses of doubt.

In short, "Jper is worse than xahendens, because (1) xahendens is part to, and "Spie pleasant: (2) we do not feel so indignantly angry at acts due to xahendens, as at acts due to "Spie.

It may perhaps be thought that the question is begged in the words on doy/(words palitorn binaser, radra dbinarepa. The truth however remains that, roughly, things are wrong or unjust in proportion to the indig ration they rouse. This is all that the writer means by the unfortunately worded statement that "they are unjust in proportion to the justice of the indignation."

but if we suppose that the expression sur' douds must refer to the beginning of the present treatise on departs, we may adopt the view of Cook Wilson (Arrs. Stad. p. 15) and others, that the reference is to ch. 1. § 3: see Cook Wilson (A. S. p. 14)—' The phrase domag sar' dought does not seem to be used when the "beginning' referred to is at such a short distance (the preceding chapter) as ch. § would be in the present case; but only when it is so far off that it is better for the sake of clearness to take this rather than a more general form like damag doping. This is borne out by all the passages collected in Botatz's Index'—where, according to Cook Wilson, the intervals are of 83, 22, at least 15, 12, 9\frac{1}{2}, and 4\frac{1}{2} pages (Bekker) respectively, "the smallest interval being about 350 hnes.' Grant, however,

- back to ch. 5. § r. and gives colour to a suspecion that the back may have been put together out of separate pieces, and perhaps lectures, one of which may have commenced with the 1th chapter. So Sadar (Eth Veherr p. 248, rote) Der Ausdruck " zu Arfung geht auf den Anfang der "heutigen" Vorlesung. Denn die Aristolel schen Schröften tragen durchaus den C. aracter mundlicher Vorlesungen und Vorläge. Without expressing any opinion on the point of 'the oral character' of the Librar, I would say that I have little hesitation in referring the present objeto ear appear to vil. 1.
 - b. 31 Sid not to oppin n. th. The connexion seems to be this indposition are called supposes or incharrow in respect of a termion states sting between monoprose and indposition ind position, but independent and independent ind position, in described as suppose or analysis, industrial thence is dopin are not described as suppose or analysis of a race distinguished by extraordinary toractly or last industrial are described as distanced; for (1) their industrial figures are described to man with his normal luminal desires and rational principle, not to the irrestral figures with their bruish desires.
 - b. 32. Ten. If we read row it must go with 53pm—' remarkable for wanton iess, it may be, or leckery' (Grant): but Bywaer's suggestion m is preferable.
 - b. 35. ¿ξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως, ῶσπερ οἱ μαινόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων] Ramstaer is wrong, I think, when he makes τοιαῦτα γίνη τῶν έφων the subject of εξεστηκε, and adds— Cog ti ur igitur genera is quardam emmum animalium sana natura, a qua nortulla genera (πορά φύσων) degeneraverint. The subject of ἐξέστηκε is the same as that of εχει in the line above—v.z. τὰ θηρω—all brutes generally, an i the recaning is that the normal condition of brutes resembles that of ma line in being without the consciousness of those limits which define the 'nature' of rational beings. The term φυσεων must be regarded as coloured by its proximity to πρωέρεων and λογωρών, just an φυσεων above is coloured by its proximity to πρωέρεων από λογωρών. The Paraj h. brugs his out in his vers on—olduμων έχουσι (τὰ θηρια) λόγων αλλα πώντη τῆν φύσεων ταύτης ἀφιστηκών δοπερ οἱ μοινόμενοι των ἀνθρώπων.

Sandarly the All. Schol. - οἱ τοίτο φησὶν ὅτι ἔξω τῆς φύσεως τοῦ 1140 5 86 ελογου εγενατο, καὶ λογικην φυσιν ἐλαθαν, ἀλλ' ὅτι τα θηρια ἐοἰκασι τοιν ἐξεστηκόσε τῆς φύσεως ήτοι τοῖς μαινομίνοις.

§ 7. Charron & θηριότης κακίας] Rassow (Firsch. p. 81) roads 1150 m 1. Thurron & κακόν θηριότης κακίας, quoting the Paraphrast in support of the insertion—du roaro καί έλαττον κακόν ή θηριότης τής άνθρωτίνης κακίας, εί και φοβερώτερου.

όμοιον . . . θηρίου] Rassow (Forsch. p. 23) regards όμωιου α, 3 a. 3 . . . dori a. 5 and superdiview a. 6 . . . Ospies a. 8 as duplicases. 'The last passage,' save Cock Wilson (Arish Stud. p. 16, 'is evenent y a bungler's work, for the comparison outplakker admin where independent agrees is an unformnate substitute for infregor our-Bedden spot lesbegos, and can hard the by the same author.' It is to be observed that the Paraphrast does not notice the clause maparhimor a. 6 . . , minim a. 7: his commentary is good - Aid σεωνο επί έλαντου επείν ή θηριότης της άνθρωπίνης κακιπε, εί και φοιδερωτεσον. Η μεν γάρ ανθρωπίνη κακία το βελτιστον τών έν τῷ ἀνθρωπφ derple pe., dohardre rur hayor, of de supering undapast ou yap exce hayor ώστερ και το άψυχαν κακον έλυττον του έμψεχου κακου" τό γορ κικών το έχον αρχήν, ήτις αυτό κινεί, πλαβερωτερον του μή έχυντος το γάρ ακίνητου many averthrepay too significant sugar, sufocor Edutror divotas bour. ώστερ ούν το έμψυχου κακόν χειροκ του άψιχου, ότι έχει άρχην εν αυτώ τήν ψιχήν, ήτις σέτο κινεί, σύτω και το λογικου, ότι του άλάγοι μάλλον ερχήν Tate, Shadepure, or sai gripor auptondia a yap ar nuijarier acopanas kands Especial The Aid Schol, I can ever, comments on maganhagian . number in a matater watch amply bears out the truth of Cook Wilson's remark that the compassion suppablicar admin upor desposou advour to an informate selectante for offeren auffahler spor epigune. The Scholast's comment is to the following effect- That the unjust man is huriful in proportion to the degree in which he participates in Injustice: therefore Injustice, as the source is worse that has ut ust it at (el yap to apareyy) for the and deputiera, solde puther form to mip deputesport. On the other hand, Injustice is a lifeless thing in itself, unable to hur, unless realised in the unjust man, and in this sense is not so bad as the unjust man?

CHAPTER VII.

ARGUMENT.

The man who struggies against those pleasures and point of their and to to which dechange and outpoorny are related, may exhibit either more or less that the average power of coping with them. If he exhibit more than the average power of coping in h the pleasures, we call him expansion, more than the average power of coping with the paint, nuprepaint, if he exhibit less than the average power of coping with the pleasures, hopeing, with the pleasures, hopeing, with the pleasures, hopeing, with the pleasures, hopeing, with the pleasures,

On the other hand, the wan who eve not struggle against the 'ne en ary' passures of touch and taste but guernes them excensively of decrease observes of ducknown that ex' successfully for he is not the man to feel regressive had be dues, and so so incurrable opposed to him to the man who decreases indulges too little in these pleasures, while the mappoint expect the mean. There is also the man who cannot induly passe, not because he is impacted in a struggle with them, but detiverably. He is not exactly palmon for perhand is the non-declarate availance of passes but it is a test of palmons by palmons illon pakked which he exhibited. Those who do not set from we wrest is have are so set detailed as the man who is led on by pleasure and the man who are so set defined the pass of musicified desire for pleasure. The man who does considered when the pass of musicified desire for pleasure. The man who does to include when who does it unster the influence of a strong desire. So the dishlutters in worse than the departs.

The rest opposite of the impurity is the traparty, and it the pulmoin the naproposite "Replacation to a higher quality thin happoon, for it remains upported to better than occurry to had one's ground (involved). In our the head of pakania may be brought touries effectionary, with its void out on the risk arise and may be pardoned who after a struggle is everywhe by fourtful factors or passes like I himstelds or Congress in the first, or like Amorhanius, who could not restrain his laughter, but there is no excess for one who, authors analitational or morbid weakness, years to what meet forms on result.

The man who is very fond of answement is sometimes than, he if as hind a tron, has he is really pakanon, for aminement is religiation from the pain of work, and it is this pain which the man who is very food of anim ement thinks.

There are two species of anymous—that of the empetuous "welson hadic" sempersonent, and that of the weak characte. The weak man decreeness and then fails away from his resolve under the influence of passion, whereas the impetuous man does not decree use and as therefore carried away by passion.

1150 a 11. § 1. Bespioth] sc. einen of yireaden (Zell).

core per obrus exer . . . a. 16 xespous] Grant less a good note.

Here the terms 'continent' and 'incontinent' are fixed 'relatively 1150 a. 11. to what is, as implying more or less continence than people in general have. And yet diere is evide itly some reference beside to the standard of what ought to be, else it could not be said that people in general verge rather to the worse side. To represent the majority of mankind as possessing a mediocre moral character, neither emmently good nor bad, but inclining to weakness, was in accordance with the Greek point of view. Widely different from this was what may be called the Semina point of view, which, regarding than with greater religious earnestness, attributed to a me "desperate wakedness." The latter feeling was not confined to the Jews and to the pages of the Bible, but in some degree made steelf known to the world in the Stoical philosophy."

• Si nepì λόπος μαλακός δ δὲ καρτερικός] Cook Wison (Arist, a. 14. Studies pp. 33 and 73) points out that E N iii, and the corresponding E. E ii, associate μαλακία with δείλια, and καρτερια with δείλια, and καρτερια with δείλια, and καρτερια with δείλια, and καρτερια with δείλια, and that there is no trace of the definite co-ordination found in via 7, with σωφροσύνη, &c.

§§ 2 3] According to Rassow (Forsch p. 23) these §§ contain a 16 an innecessary discussion of the difference between declarm and dispose, which repeats what has already been said in ch. 4. §§ 1-4. The conclusion of the passage ch. 4. §§ 1-4 8.6 μολλον 114% a. 17... loχτρι u. 22 presents a striking resemblance to that of the passage ch. 7. §§ 2. 3 north δ' αν 1150 a. 27... dν πάθει δν a 30, and outlang would be lost by the omission of the whole passage ch. 7. §§ 2. 3. the words dντίκισται κπ.λ § 4, a 32, following naturally after upon του χείρουν § 1, a. 16.

§ 2 inci 8' ... iAheises] 'Since some pleasures are necessary (where others are not), and the necessary pleasures are so only with a terrain limits, their extess and defect not being "necessary" (i.e. being weerg). see Stahr -- wir haben ferner geschen, dass einige (renusse nothwend g sind, andere dagegen es nicht sind, dass ferner fine ersteren es nur his zu einem gewissen Grade sind. Grant is wrong in referring auf uégot russ to uf 8' us, translating—'Now, as some pleasures are necessary, but others are not to be called so, as heing (au) only necessary in certain degrees.' The words of 8' of are really parenthetical.

homas | Rassow (Forsch. p. 132) conjectures doyas, referring to a 18.

- 1150 a. 18. § 1, where we have including an project, and to the verbs because and private which follow in the present §.
 - 8.10. ὁ μὸν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδέων τ ἡ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς τ ἡ διὰ προσύρεσων] See Rassow (Forsch. p. 142): 'Si her ver ferbt and the Worte: καθ' ὑπερβολας ἡ διὰ προσώρεσων. Nicht bloss ἡ, das man in ἡ order εἰ lat ändern wollen, sonde n and καθ' ὑπερβολας ist anstössig. Was man erwartet, findet sich in der Handschritt M: καθ' ὑπερβολήν καὶ δ α προσύρεων. So ite diese Lesart eine Correctur sein, so ist sie weingstens wahrschein, her als die neunen Aenderungsvorschläge.' I think that Bywater's suggestion ἡ ὑπερβολοί for ἡ καθ' ὑπερβολός—is good; the meaning I take it, bring that 'he paisues excessive pleasures, because they are excessive, that is (ἡ) di überniely'; but nothing would be lost to this meaning it seems to me, by the simple omission of the words ἡ καθ' ὑπερβολάς ∯.

The Paraphrast's explanation of the text as it stands (the second apparently omitted) is satisfactory enough—by my the imeason's dimension the flower physical delignment flower, and hy the chieve physical delignment flower flower the physical delignment for all the physical states are in although the physical special special special special delignment for although the states, he shows, all although the states, he shows, all although the states, he shows, all although the states, delignment for the states are shown that the states are states as a state of the states of the states are states as a state of the states of the sta

- e. 21. Δεάγκη γάρ . . . Δμεταμέλητος δείατος] These words seem out of place here, unless the suggestion thrown cut be Grant be accepted, that they 'lay some stress on the etymology of the word isohours'. Ramsater places them after δεριστοίς § 3, 3, 3, 3
- 6. 81. § 3. τῶν δη λεχθέντων τὸ μὰν μαλακίας είδος μάλλον, δ δ' ἀπόλαστος] These words refer to the distinct on drawn in § * hetween δ μων τος ἐπερβωλὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδίων . . . δια προαίρεσων—ε. ε. the deliberate pursuat of bodily pleasure and the deubera e avoidance of bodily pa n are distinguished, just as the non-deliberate yielding to pleasure a distinguished from the non-deliberate shrinking from pain. For nendeliberate action, according as it refers to pleasure, or to pain, there are appropriate technical terms—ἀκρασία and μαλακία: but there are no appropriate technical terms to mark the similar distinction which obtains in del berste action, and the writer is obliged to retain the term ἀκολασία for the deliberate pursuit of pleasure, and to describe the deliberate avoidance of pain as 'rather a kind of μαλακία'.—

palaciae elles pallor no as palacia simply, for that term is tee au- 1150 a 81 cally retained for the non deliberate avoidance of pain: see Rassow (Forsich 1p 132, 133), who explains as above, and Cook Wilson (Arist. Studies, paragr. 77, p. 69).

The intervention, however, of the passage row of un mooninguisms 2 25 . . deporous 2. 31, which relates to non-deliberate action, has induced many crains to suppose that you by keydirror must be the deputys and makinds, and hence that & 8' dadharros a. 32, the reading of all MSS, should be & & departe: see Michelet ad for, who reads and defends occurrie, and Spengel (Arist. Stud. p. 213), who proposes to 8 impurios. The intervention of the de mi mooning person a 25 . . deperson a. 31 is certainly aukward, but I co not think that there can be any serious of jection to treating the passage as a parenthesis, so far as its length is concerned. Of course if he passage is an interpolation, as Cook Wilson argues (Arist Studies, parage 78, p. 70), all difficulty disappears, the 31 dexterior following imme late y of er aponiperio § 2, a, 25. In the first place, says Cook Wilson, "the sentence navri & av difere u.r h. (a. 27) interrupts in the most irrelevant manner a context which has for its object to explain the characters of seprepia and makasia, and in the second place it is equally difficult to keep the first part of § 3 in the text, because it makes the pain to which the advants yields that of this satisfied desire, which by no means suits the description of the paharoic in §§ 5 6, where the examples are certainly not of such pains.' Holding the distinction drawn in § 3, 8 mis n. 25 8 86 a. 26 . . . wore biogipoeous addador, to be between two sorts of arpar a proper (see paragr 83) hat in which he mo ive is pleasure ard that in which it is pain caused by the absence of pleasure-not between approve and the palmie of which instances are given below in § 5. Cook Wilson supposes the original locus of vii. 7. 3 rov & μή προαιροιμένων n. 25 . . . deparol's a. 31 to have been somewhere after the passage worm 1148 b. 9 . . . donie b 14, 10. 4. 6, which and 11. ? 3 tou de un monipoupéror a. 25 . . . departois a. 31 he presents (Tab. IX) as tragments of a duplicate of va. 4, §§ 3, 4 vor 8i sept 1148 2. 4 . . . logopó a 22, a passage-also presented by him as somewhat fragmentary-in which the deputie is said to yield to bodily pleasures and to avoid bodily pains. The bodily pains enumerated in vii. 4. 3 sie, it is true, those of main, differ, dain, whereas those mendioned in vii. 7. 3 are only those of unsatisfied desire; Cook Wilson notices this discrepancy between

1150 a 31. vii. 7 3 and vii. 4. 3, but does not find it serious as between dight cate versions (see Arist. Studies, paragr. 83); while between vi. 4. 6 and vii. 7. 3 rise 8i µn appearantinum... daparent, which he presents as parts of the same version there is no such discrepancy, vii. 4. 6 merely describing generally the objects of daparen as the same as those of daparen.

I offer no opinion as to the correctness of Cook Wilson's view that the original locus of vi. 7. 3 ros de ph nounouseus . . . departors is after vi. 4.6. I limit myself to saying that, with Rassow (Arrich, p. 23), I think that the whole passage stall 1150 a. 16... declarates a. 32, vi. 7. §§ 2. 3 interrupts the sense, being a repet to a (especially in the latter part of § 3) of what has been said before in vii. 4. §§ 0-4.

a. 32 § 4.] dyaparie s the proper opposite of daparie because dyaparie involves ro apareir (at d daparie, ro apareirdae); and supreptate is the proper opposite of palanos, because ro carreprir involves ro deriger—'bearing up' against the pressure to which the polaros, or 'soft' man, yields. There is no value in the distinct in drawn here between the dyaparies and the supreposit, on the ground of the difference between 'victory' and 'bearing up'. It may surely be said that the dyaparies' bears up' against pleasure, and that the supreposit is 'victorious over' pain; at any rate, both succeed in adding well one in spice of pleasure, the other in spite of pain: the supreposit is not fairly distinguished from the dyaparie mere'y by the passession of the negative virtue of 'bearing up.' If he 'bears up' it is in order to act well.

Cook Wilson (Arish Studies pp. 17, &c., and pp. 45, &c.) regards § 4 as part of a version parallel to § 1 (see Table IV). In § 1 the relation to one mother of the departs palares, desparts and expression is determined. The first two of these yield derived to the bad impulse, but for the departs, this is given by plasure, for the palares by pain. The last two agrees so far as both overcome (apartic) the bad impulse, and differ, like the first two, in its nature. Represented a common to the sympatics and suprepass, derived to the palares and expression, derived to the which apartic belongs to the dyspans alone, and not to the suprepass, whose action is more arrigent; and this difference is made a teason for preferring the former to the latter, because epartic is better than ply derivation. Two such opposite views cannot have been interacted.

for the same context ' (p. 17). The version to which § 4 belongs 1150 a. 32 Cook W ison regards as composed of §§ 2, 4, 5, 6, and hells it to he 'the work of an inferior thinker who, in attempting to make advance on the other [i.e. the parallel version § 1] only acids subtleties, partly confused, partly fadacious' (p. 45)-i. e. he adds a character standing to dechards in the relation in which pulsued stands to expansia, calling this new character somewhat confused.y allos palaxías páldos and yet is silent as to his reason for not comricting the symmetry by a kling another character differing from sapregia 28 σωφροσυνη .tom lyapáreta. Another unsuccess ul attempt to refine is the substitution by the second version of derigan for sparrie as character stic of suprepla; for this so far from being an improvement is a fallacy . . . derexes could only mean a balance of motives, when the spent is quite undecided and no action results. but this is not the meaning of supreple, nor is there any ground in the context for believing such a meaning here intended. And if it were, the division ought to have been carried further, and a currespending character put on the side of pleasure, differing as only withstanding pleasure, from the eyeparfie who overcomes it. The author probably thinks of the coprepade as "end in g" (coprepay), or " holding out (drrigor) against' pain which cannot be annihilated .. and in that sense cannot be overcome (spercial). But since this " hold be out" means that the man does not allow the pain to octermine his will, it is sparely in the fullest sense; the other kind of epercer which he has not, is of no importance morally, because it is not in the sphere of his will at all. It is quite n istaken therefore to rank eyspargs higher than suprepieds, on the ground that the latter does not "overcome" in the sense described (Arret. Studies, p. 45).

I emirely agree with Cook Wilson in the enticism which he passes in the last sentence; but I cannot see why the writer of § 4 should not still be the writer of § 1. Having said pero§d d' § son whiterou i § 1, the writer of § 1 would very naturally go on to explain, as is done in § 4, which of the four departs, expairing, palaria, eaprepia, are really derives perou, or said dens to which. Appealing to etymology, and the usage of language (copreprio means derived—to resist pressure, 'to be hard': expairing and departs are both compounds derived from epartic), he shows that it is the expairing, not the exprepario, not the exprepario, of the palaris. It so happens that his appeal to etymology and popular usage betrays him into the error

1150 a. 82, of representing the supreposit as inferior to the dyname in not achieving 'victory'; but I do not see why the writer of § 1 should be deemed incapable of falling into this error, which, after all, I are not come into conflict with anything stated in § 1. As I read it, § 1 only says that the dynamic and supreposit are stronger (spectrum) and the departie and makens weaker (firrors) than the average main, where pleasures and pains are concerned.

If I have explained correctly the nature of the appeal to etymology made in § 4. Cook Wilson's conjecture (Arist. Studies. p. 70) derivered be of new deports of makende, of the departs of correspondent cannot

be accepted.

- b 5. § 6. δμοίως δ' έχει καὶ περὶ δγκράτειαν καὶ δκρασίαν] επρτεριο and μαλικία are relative to ή τῶν πλειστων έξες: so also are εγεράτεια and δερασία: then follow explanatory remarks—οὐ γάρ εί τις κ.τ.λ., which concern both δερασία and μαλικία, as is plain from the words ήδουών ήτεῶται ἡ λυπῶν b. γ.
- h 9 Ocobierou] Theodectes was a theterican and tragic poet, often mentioned and quoted by Aristotle e.g. Rhet. in \$3, 1400 a 27 55 the author of a piece called the Ajax: Rbd. IL 23 2397 b. 3 of 23 Alemacon: Rhet. in. 24. 1401 u. 35 of an Orester: Rhet is. 23. 1399 a. 8 of a Socrates: Pol. 1. 2. 1255 a. 36 of a Helené. The Rhetoric of Theodectes (probably founded on Asis offes lectures) is alluded to in Rhet iii. 9. 1410 b. 2 al d' doyal ros nepubber ogrades ir rois Gendenreloes ignpidunerne. He was a native of Phaseles in Pamphylia, but spent most of his life at Athens, where he was the pupil of Isocrates and Aris ofle (see Te clinitiles, Line muche Fehden, pp. 260 and 266: he deserted Isocrates for Arestotle: and, in fact, seems to have put Aris ofle in possession of some of the secrets of Isocrates' rhetorical teaching). Aristetle condently thought very highly of him. The writer of the Rhit ad Alex. 1421 b. 2 a lades to an Aris ofelian il etonical freatise with with the name of Theodectes was associated in role in inoi rigrais Genderty yendrimme. He seems to have died at Athens. Plut. (3) Oratorum vitue, Isocrates, quoboren & olegi . . . ent Evodierre 6 Tarnhirgs o tas trayendas varepor yearens, or fort to prope est ter Knapited morenously and the ispan odon the in 'Execute, taken acrepapropulsor. With regard to the Philocoles mentioned here the Aid Schol, has the following . & Orodierns rpaymor for mit rapayer ris gripe δεδηγμένου τον Φιλοκτήτην ύπο δήνως και μεχρι μεν πολλον καὶ διντενεινε

πρόε τὰε λύπας και τοὺς πύνους, ὖστερον δὲ ἡττήθη καὶ ἐβάς κόψατο τὴν 1150 ο θ.
ἐμήν χειρα. Αςματικο (p. 133. 6. Heylbut) has:—οἶον εἶ τις ὧσπερ
δ παρά τῷ Θεοδέκτη Φιλοκτότης ὑπὸ τῆς ἔχεως πεπαρμένος κρύπταιν βουλύμενος, τους περὶ τὰν Νεοπτάλεμον μέχρι μέν τινος ἀνέχει, ῦστερον ὁ οὐχ
ὑπομένων τὰ μέγεθος των άλγηδόνων ερανερὸς γίνεται.

6 Kapairou ev vij 'Along Kapaiss' There were two tragic poets called Carcinus, one an Athenian, the other an Agrigentine. In Rad to 16, 1417 b. 18 the Ordipus of Carcinus' is mentioned; in Rhet, in 24, 1400 b. 9, the Males . Poet, 16, 1454 b. 23, the Toyestes: and in Poet. 17. 1495 a. 26, the Amphiaraos (?). In this last passage Aristotle refers to a blunder in the acting of the piece, which displeased the spectators very much-organier of refree inempiore Kapning & yap 'Authidpans if lepad dries, & mh downer row Bearge ikirbuser, int de the acquire ifinede, duagepassieras touto tor beards. From this passage we may infer that the play men ioned was acted at Athens, and that its author was the Athenian Carcinus. We may assume that in the other places where Caremus is men, ioned by Aris, otle the Athenian dramatist is intended. With regard to the Alope, the Ald. Schol, has the fellowing: - & Kaprinos τρογικός δος δ δε Κερκύων είχε θυγατίρα την Αλόπην, μαθών δε δει έμοιχεύθη ή είτου θυχιτηρ Αλόκη, ήρωτησεν αυτήν τίς ήν ό μοιχτύυας, λέγων εί μικ ruino de cinuis, vid Thes de homodie. cira cinocians sins Abonns roe altique μαχνώπουτα, ούε ότι ό Κερκύου ύπο της λύπης δίβερε ζήν, άλλα και το ζήν anthron. Cf Nanck, Fragm. Trag p. 619: and for a discussion of the myth of Kereyon and Alope, as represented in art, see Miss F Harrison's Introductory Fssay to Mythology and Monaments of Ancient Athens, pp. cv-cix.

Ecropderty] Alexander is said to have had a musician of this name, b. 12.
who may have been known to Ansiotle: see Seneca, de Ira it. 2.
quoted by Zell—'Alexandrum aiunt Xenophanto canente manum all
arma missee.'

dan' el τις) 1. ε ού θαυμαστάν εί τις ίσχυρων ήδουων ή λισών ήτταται (b. γ), αλλά θαυμαστόν εί τις πρός de οί πυλλοί δύνανται άντεχειν, τούτων ήττατω.

de τοῦς Χευθών βασιλεύσω. It is not necessary to suppose with 5.14. many commentators that the reference here is to the infirmity

There was a comic Carcinus too he is mentioned by Aristophanes, Aud 2262, Par yet.

- 2160 b.14. mentioned in Herod. i. 105. Nor do I find, in the detailed account given by Hippocrates (maple dipor iddraw roman 21, 22, ed Litté, vol in pp. 74 sqq.) of the physique of the Southians, anything answering to the makers of the present chapter, which is maple himse. The dria roman is indeed and by Hippocrates to attack the richer classes especially, but it has nothing in common with the makemba here mentioned.
 - b. 15. καὶ ώς τὸ θήλα πρός τὸ ἄρρεν διέστηκεν] The point is the natural inferiority of women in the power of bearing up under pa n.
 - b 17 § 7. η γάρ παιδιά κ.τλ.] The παιδιώδης—the main given up to amusement—is thought to be ἀκόλοστος, but is really μαλακός, for παιδιά is an άνεσες πόνων. This relaxation from πόνος the συιδιώδης pursues excessively. He is therefore μαλακός, or too fund of av. 1 ng πόνος, not ἀκόλαστος, given up to ήδονή. The true use of παιδιά is given in E. N. x. 6. 6 παιζεω δ' δπως οπουδαίχ, κατ' 'Αναχαρούν, δώδως έχειν δοκεί.
 - b 19. § 8 οἱ μἐν . . . οἱ δε∫ οἱ μἐν τείετε το ἀσθένεια, από οἱ δε το προσένεια. Cf. M. M. ιϊ. δ. 1203 8. 30 εστι δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀκρασίας δύο εἰδη, β μέν προπετικη τις καὶ ἀπρανόητος καὶ εξαιφυής γυνομενή (οἱον ὅταν ἱδωμεν καλην γυνοίκα, εὐθέως τι ἐπαθομεν, καὶ ἀπὰ τοῦ πιθους ἄρμὴ σγενετο προς τὰ πρέξοὶ τι ὧν λαως οἱ δεὶ), ἡ δ' ἐτέμα οἱον ἀσθενική τις, ἡ μετὰ τοῦ λαγου οὖσαι τοῦ ἀποτρεποντος. ἐνείνη μὲν οἰν ονδ' ἀν λίαν δυξειεν είνοι ψεκτή καὶ γῶρ ἐν τοῖς σπαυδαίοις ἡ τοιαύτη ἐγγίνεται, ἐν τοῖς θερμοῖς καὶ εἰνβιείσεν ἡ δε ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοῖς, οἱ δὲ τοιούτοι ψεκτοί.
 - b. 22. ἔτοι γάρ κ.τ.λ.] This clause is added to show the value of rh βουλεύσασθαι, which is absent in προπέτεια. The implication is that the προπετείε, as distinguished from the doθενείε are strong energh to able by the results of deliberation, if they deliberated at all, which they do not.

προγαργαλίστωτες It seems to me that we must supply delece, not (in Zell does) decreit, with προγαργαλίστωτες and understand the reference to be to a ackling match, in which the aggressor has the advantage. The reading of Lt, Mb, CCC, B', NC, Asp, Hel, is προγαργαλισθέντες: ef. Probl. LE 6 965 a 11 (quoted by the editors) διά τι αϊτόν αύτον ούθεις γωργαλισεί; ή ότο και όπ' Δλλον διντον, ίσε προσίσθητας, μαλλον δ, δε μή όρφ; διοθ ήκιστα γεργαλισθήσεται, όταν μή λανθώη νούτο πασχων' έστι δὲ ὁ γέλως παρακοπή τις και δετιση.

pelayxologi] See Grant's excellent note ad loc. in which he 1150 b 25 refers to the carious disquisition on melayyohood and the miland gold in Ar. Probl. xxx, 1, to show that 'both passionate impetuosity and cold sluggishness were considered by the ancient physiologist to be different mainfestations of the same strange temperament." . . . With the moderns,' he adds, 'the term "melancholy" is restricted to the cold and dejected mood; while the ancients much more commonly any hed the term prhayzokade to denote warm h passion and eccentricity of genius. The opening sentence of Probl 1, 953 a 10 presents the polaryolish spoors as associated with genus did to narrey date nepartal pryorders dedies of ματά φιλοσοφιαν ή πολιτικήν ή ποιησεν ή τεχνας φαινουται μελαγχαλικοί heres. In these cases the person rold (which may be either call or hot) is moderate a hot. Where it is too hot, men are given up to their passions, and tend to madness; where it is too cold, it authorizates and aggravates the childing effect of the thought of danger and trouble, and makes men dejected and timal, and drives them to suicide In de Memor, 2, 453 a 19 the pelaygolikol are send to be easily affected by ideas, and images of the mind -rorow yap darramana movi paktora; and in the treatise non the kad unvov partings 2 463 b. 16 they are said to be great dreamers-four and to be distinct dreamers withour post and capable of divining the future in their dreams-2, 404 2, 32 of de pedaggodicol did co σφοέρα, διαπερ βιλλαντες πάρρωθευ εύστοχαί είσε και δια τό μετιβλητικου, τοχώ το έχομενον φαντάζονται αυτοί: δοπερ γάρ τὰ Φελαιγίδου ποιήματα και αι έμμαντε εχόμενα του έμετου λεγούσε και διανοσύντας, είον "Αφροδιτην" και οίτω συνείρουσεν είς το πρόσω. έτε δέ και δια την στροδρότητο ούκ exponerae mirws a singue och erepar surfaces; on this passage are Themises for 105 b (vol. ii p 296, ed. Spengel waren yap to Φελοιγίδου ποιήματα μη έχαντα μεταβολάν προσώπων καὶ διηγημάτων personness del exapera rat apolar diaronieras sul erresponder, dar el res Αφρούτην ου τοις άρχαίς είνα και μιχρι τελούς ταύτης έχεται, ούτω και οί imparie examen tor emoise dumoverat all princera. In short, the perhappedison are persons of strong passions and vivid imagination, who allow themselves to dr ft down the torrent of their fancies and fee ingst-if. A. N. vii 14. 6 of he pelayzolucit the divine diopeni des larpeine sal yap to adua danvouseur Bearchel did the aparen, sal del le ορίξει σφοδρά είσίν.

CHAPTER VIII.

ARGUMENT.

The dichards, as we said, it was the man to repent of what he has done, but the disparts is always ready to repent. Hence it is not the disparts as was suggested in 2 \$\frac{1}{2}\tau_0, \tau_1, \text{the disparts without summation. Anothering is the a thronic disease, such as droppy or consumption, disparts like a temperary secure. In host they differ generically -disparts is present in its subject without his histograp, but the disparts knows that he is disparts.

(If the two species of axpania, that of the impetuous character is the letter

The decreative and the departs are then distinct characters, the former whing as he does from deliberate choice, the latter acting as he does against delikerate chairs. What they do, however, is much the same: as 'the Mesessans are not unintelligent, but do the things that unintelligent geogle it; is the departs to not anakarren, but does the things that the anakarron does had since the character of the dupartie or such that he follows budy pleasures sumederately without thinking it proper to do so wheeter the sucharron trinks that it is proper to follow them because it is his character to follow them, our conclusion must be that it is the departy, and not the backwarm, who can he easily induced to think differently"—the imports may still be referred, because he still has the Principle of good conduct within him-that Principle who h worked do on the odoppow) preserves intact, and vice in on the doodners.) destroys—the good end which in conduct is the permisple, as the assumptions we the principles in mathematics in mathematics it is not a process of reasoning with a leads to principles so, in combined it is not reasoning if any kind, but surface natural or acquired by habit, which gives a right even of the Prop of a The owpour, then has the right very, as the dechaoror has a faire view; whele the duparns, though constrained by passion to feelow bediev frequences omenader. ately, is not constrained by it to believe that it is profer is as in. He is not tehally bad; for that which is best-Principle—it alies in him. Opport to the duparty is the dysparty, in whom seriou prevails agreed to sion.

1150 b. 20. § 1.) The writer now passes naturally from of \$\mu_i\) dunivores (cl., 7. § 8) to the disobserve—dunives who ris wrongelows.

women (λέχθη] A reference (bracketed by Susemall) to ch. 7 § 2 1150 a. 21 ἀνάγκη γὰρ τοῦτον μὴ εἶναι μεταμελητικόν, ὧντ' ἀνίωτον ὁ γὰρ ἀμεταμέλητας ἀναστες—2 clause which (as noted ad In.) comes in awkwardly in its context.

b. 31. ἡπορήσαμεν] Ch 2. §§ 10, 11. The appropriate conception μεταμιλητικον είναι solves the ἀπορία which was cause i by the in appropriate conception μεταπεισθηναι αν ch. 2. §§ 10, 11. The

aspurie, after he has gratified the desire of the moment, ceases to 1150 b. st look back upon the gratification with the same sat sfaction with which he regarded it before he effected it; the idea of the desire is now weak, and the sense of the harm done by its gratification proportionally strong. This means that he now 'regrets' that he has gratified the desire. But the dechorror acts under the habitual influence of desires so comparatively feeble, that if the ideas of them occur to his mind at all after gratification, they must occur with a varidness little infer or to that which they possessed before gratification. If it seemed good to gratify them then, it now seems good to have grat fied them. This means that the deixogras does not feel 'regret.' Indulgence has become so habitual to ham, that it is no longer in each case, accompanied and followed by the consciousness of a system of life which is being sacrificed. Acts of indulgence are no longer regarded as involving the agent in a serious responsibility, but are performed as it were mechanically, and in unconsciousness of all but their momentary pleasure Thus if per suria hardwee, if d' depursa où hardires 1150 b. 36expanned by the Ald. Schol, if piv waria from if declarin hardwee integer of yudater pap bered parteber nator date, dad we dyalor abid οίνται ή δ' άκρασία οὐ λανθάνες ήτοι οὐκ άγνοτί ότι το μαιχεύειν κακάν έστι.

(2) Cook W bon (Arist. Studies, 1 p. 25 and 66) regards this § 1151 a. 1 as interrupting the ane of thought begun in § t, and parsued in § 3. Grant, on the other hand, says-the thread of reasoning goes on continuously from the end of the preceding chapter, and so there is nothing remarkable in the writer's now reverting to the two kinds of incontinence, as if he had never digressed from discussing them.' I am inclined to endorse Grant's view, which seems to agree practically with that of Ramsauer Adjungantur haec (1 1-4) hat d'abeno quidem loco, sed tamen ita ut una Istà sententia ab că disputatione quae per reliquum capat obcinetar devertatur. Ita vero jam agatur, ut men et praecessent 1150 b. 19-18 et codem respie atur verba vix încilegi posent.' Although § 2 opens rather awkwardly with airwir bi roorur, which are not the discharges and deputys as might perhaps be supposed, but the dispersic thermselves (of degradual being the appareris, and of ph commerces the authoris of ch. 7. § 8), I cannot think that its subject is out of place. Section 1 has solved the old dropic of ch. 2 §§ 10, 11 by pointing out that the dedauros sales to his bad principle

the an denuitewe vor hopen. What, then, mo should supplement § t by showing that if λόγφ are thus better than of εμμένοντες το ψ.

εί μή άναμένοντες τον δρθου λόγον? Rainsaner notes that of decruración ch as distinguished from the doloris, whereas

icororisos a. 20 describes the departe gener dotheris. This is one of the reasons whis Similes, p. 26) thinks that ch. 8. § 2 and Intended for the same context, but see not

Grant observes that the terms Tromons, are frequently used in Probl. A, in connexio The analogy between the pshaygohiel space also insisted on in Probl. A. चेत्रचीवरका दि. को मने बेम्मबंध्वन्तक.

Spotos yap & departs n.t A | The Paraph the of & natu tipe dadovi departur departie, 21 i yop doburge deporte us. This must be the it is very careless to use the generic term thi

§ 8. 433à mỹ lous] Ramsauer brackets th tairly interrupt the run of the sentence. (Bywater makes them parentheneal), the sen plant, then, that deposite is not seen (= de garded per se, or as what it is in itself; ye that they are the same secundum quid; viewe las want it is in uself, is morn aponipen aposipeour, nevertheless they are much the

eal of departing above up our civit, dougloous of Rassow 1181 a. 10 (Forch, p. 133) shows that sal stands for core sal, and that Bekker's full stop after deforms a. 10 should be replaced by a comma. Susemild and Bywater follow him in this punctuation. Bywater introduces adiagnosis, the reading of Kh CCC, and Cambr. I prefer the adiagnosis of other authorities, so far as the sense is concerned; and suspect that the preceding slave may have given use to the form adiagnosis.

14 μη διά το πεπείσθαι] See note on vii. 2. 10. 1146 m. 31. α. 11.

5 be neneroral bid to tolautor elval olog bidnely autdel Tite a. 13. conviction' or 'theory' of the dioxuoror is plainly said here to be the result of month depraying see note on va. 4 4, 1148 a 17. To be 'convinced' as the acchaeror is convinced, implies the kiss or moral character, which is irreparable; moral character is not produced, like the conclusion of a syllogism, by a process of resenting (6 hoyor a, 17), nor can it be reinstated by such a process, it is rather a Life (analogous to the life or nature of a past or an mal), inherited in germ by the undividua. (фисией фрему a. 18, and largely developed by him (lotory a. 19) in correspond nee with the conditions of his special environment. If this life be once lost by the individual it is lost irreparably. But the asparies has not yet suffered that it eparable loss, he still thinks that his acts (which, as acts, are much the same as those of the and harme) are wrong the still has the principle of moral life in him (ting), ro of trem a. 16)—the conception of conduct, and is objurdwester (2 14), e.c. amenable to moral influences can still be tenched by reproof and example, and still has some regard for other people, and for his own better self. It is true that he has no need to 'change his conviction,' for it is already correct: he nest charge ms act; and t is the possibility of his doing this which is conveyed by the term elperaneoror-used here, I think, not because it is the most appropriate term, from the writer's own point of view, to express the conversion, or reformation, of the apparate, but because peraneurdarat occurs in the pure c, left unsolved in chapter 2, §§ 10, 11, and disposed of here by means of considerations which make a possible for the writer now to quote the term, without being misunderstood :- "if," he in effect says, " we may use the misleading term eductionarder, it is the depurys, moi, as our of ponents argue, the decknotos, who is elucrometores."

1151 a. 10. Somep de rois madquarenois at durabloses | imobiores in the souse of the bease, or peculiar appear, of mathematics which are operation is not in accordance with strict Aristotelian usage. According to the doctrine of the An. Post. the Gioru, or immediate princ pies, of a particular science (as distinguished from the of square or immediate principles necessary to all sciences) are either imodiante or opiopici. Ynotimes are times which assert existence or non-existence, while opiousl are biene which state formal essence. Mathematical science has, as its peculiar appai, bions of the latter kind, e.e. because which are not unobegers, out opiquel. See An. Post. 1. 2. 72 4. 14 *Aporton & aprife auddichmetunge fliair per dorm fir pit fare decem, und άξιωμα' έστι γάρ ένια τοιαύτα' τούτο γαρ μαλιστ' έτι τούε τοιούτοις είν Caper Groups Liver. History & if her chareporous the popier the and φάνυτως λαμβάνουσα, οδον λέγω το είναι τι ή το μή είναι τι, υπόθεσις, ή δ άνου τούτου άρισμός. 'Ο γάρ όρισμος θισις μέν έστε τιθετοι γάρ ό apidunemic momina ed adiasperon elmu kard en norder unidamis & aise fore to you to dots mores not to that mondo of raition. See also An. Post. 11. 7. 92 b. 15 ri per yap experient to theywood chapter & graphit, of on d' dore delevou-on which Them se us has ful 10 a, vo. i p. 77. cd. Stengel) λομβάνοντες τι σημαίνει το τρίγωνον ότι περιίγεσθαι ύπο τριών ευθειών, ούτω δεικυύουσιν ότι έστι, συνιστάντες αυτό εκ τριών coduser: see also An. Post. i. 10, 76 b. 35 of per ove spor our ciniv brobleces, orgen hab spar if hy strat yellower " . . . sope & obort himor Eurication den. cours & only insoferant, it up not the ansient insoferent the diones sha. Accordingly, in the passage before us (E.N. v. 8 4), if the opiopol of mathematics are meant, the employment of the term emotione to convey the meaning is against strict Anstotellin usage.

Grant observes that the term inideaus is used in precisely the same way in the E E. as here—viz. E E ii 10. 1227 a. 8 rept per tol téhore videis bouheires, addit toir lath appl au inchare, adner in tale diapprecies intoripuse intolesses (ciprou de repl obtin è per toir is apprecies, is de voie inadurents de applicies), and E. E. u. 11. 1227 b. 28 worse pair toil desprecies al inudious applic, out a coir nontrinas to those applicates. Now, these passages both agree with hat before us (E. N. vii. 8. 4) in additing the inchares of mathematics to i lusurate the rélos, or of issa, of apière, for which bouhevoir fin is means. Remembering that it is with mathematical analysis that botheous is compared in E. N. ii. 3. 11.

12 (where see notes), we may ask the question—Is it probable that 1151 a. 16 the writer employs brudience here (E.N. vi. 8 4) for byropel, or the digat of the synthetic process in mathematics and consequently violates strict Aristotelian usage: May be not be employing the term quite accurately, to denote the assumption of the thing to be proved, from which an analytical proof in mathematics starts? I am include to think that he probably employs the term broken in this sense. Of course the general statement which immediately follows—ofre different didagraphics the probable to point the other way.

του δρθοδοξείν] governed by διδασκαλική understood. A man's a. 10 end' is given by his character; his 'end' is the assertion throughout life of a character, just as the 'end' of an animal or glant is the assertion and maintenance of its particular organism. Cf. E. N. iii. 5. 27 broids not seaurds duri, roundes and to redot onlessue ere: or as the same truth is stated, more generally, by Spinoza (Fith .ii 6 and 7). Unaquaeque res, quantum in se est, in suo esse perseverare constut. . . . Conatos, quo unaquaeque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, n hil est praeter ipsius rei actualem essentram." It goes without saying, in short, that the good man's 'end' or 'principle is good, and the bad man's bad. Cf. E. N. vt. 12 10 οι γώρ στλλογισμοί των προκτών άρχην έχοντές είσιν, έπειδή τοιώνδι τό τελος και το άριστον, άτιδηποτε δυ (ίστω γαρ λόγου χαριν το τυχόν)" τουτο δ' εί μή τῷ ἀγαθῷ, αὶ φαίνεται: διαυτρεφει γὰρ ἡ μαχθηρία καὶ διαψεύδεσθαι word weed the mountains doxies: und E. N. vi. 5. 6 of per yap appul the προστών το οδ ένεκα τα προστά. τό δε διεφθαρμένος δε ήδονην ή λύπην εδθυς er paserai appi, oldi dele rotrov ivenes node dui rold alpelodai navra nat πρωτειου έστι γαρ ή εικία φθυρεική άρχης. Οπ φυσική and έθιστή (or mpia) apresi, see E. N. vi. 13. 2, 6.

Parametre (de Virt. Mor. ch. 6) illustrates the difference between the deductor and the departs from the poets—

"Amelagrap pip alle durai.

τία δε χύρις, οι δε τερπιδυ άντυ χρυσής Αφροδίτης (τεθνούμι ότα μοι μηκέτι τούτο μέλει.

and drepos"

τό φαγείν, τό πιείν, τὸ τῆς ᾿Αφρυδίτης τυγχάνευ, τὰ ἄ ἀλλα προσθήκας ἀπατὰ τῆν καλὰ . . . BOOK VII: CHAP. 8: §§ 4. 5.

204

1151 a. 18. φησίν αι δε της δερασίας δτεραι απι διαφέρουσαι. γνώμην δχωτά μ' ή φώσις βαίζεται,

ites

οΐ οί, το δη θείον διθρώποιε κακάν, διαν τις είδη τάγαθάν, χιήται δε μή.

and

έλειο με γάρ βδη θυμός, ούδ' έτ' άντίχις, Βινώδιο δε Αγκιστρον άγκύρας συλφ'

θενώδιε δηκιστρου οξ φαίλως λεγων το μή κάτοχου του λογισμού μη έ δραγός, δλλά μανότητε της ψυχής, και μαλακία προϊέμενου την κρίσευ, οδ πόρρω δέ της εξκόνος ταύτης κόκεινα εξοητοι.

> υσύς ώς τις έκ μέν γής αναρτηται βρόχοις, πυοί δ' ούρος, ήμιυ δ' ού εροτοί τά πειπματα.

πείσματα γλη λέγει τας άντεχούσας ερίσεις πρός το είσχρων. το γιη έντι πλησίστιος μέν επί τας ήδανάς ό ἀκάλαστος. Σωμμασίνη lie ill 25 trates thus (de Vert. Mor. ch. 7)—

> δή του δπειν' άνεμος μέν έπαύσατα, ή δε γαλήνη έπλετο σηνεμίη, αυμισσε δε κύματα δοίμων.

, . , πάσαν δρμήν εδήγωγον οδισαν,

άθηλον ίππφ πώλον ώς άμα τρίχειν.

20. § 6 ἐκστατικός] Cook Wilson (Arist. Studies 1.20 sharks that § 5 and § 2 'were not included for the same context.' In § 2 'the terms ἐκστατικοί and μὴ ἐμμανοντες κ.τ.λ. are opposed as denoting different species of the same genus'—i.e. προσιετία an hardwood, the two species of ἀκρασία: but in § 5 'the passages 115t a. 26 ὁ ἐμμανοντικός καὶ ουκ ἐκστατικος διά γε τὸ παθος of the ἐγκρασής, and 1251 a. 20 ἔστι δι τις διά παθος ἐκστατικός παρά τὸν ὁμθον λόγον κhew . . . that the terms ἐκστατικοί and μὴ ἐμμανοντικό [= 0, τὸν λόγον ἔγοντες μὴ ἐμμανοντικό δι] are identical, and not opposed to one another. In § 5 excluterm 'is used to that a crise all ἀκρασία, and not a species of it.'

The circumstance that § a and § g differ in their use of the term. enorarises (µ) inhapperises does not occur in § 2) is noticed by Ram sauer also (see above note on § 2, 1151 a. 1), but he does not draw Cook Wilson's inference from the circumstance. I think that the significance of the circumstance may be easily exaggerated. The use of interaction in the generic sense, as in § 5, is of course the regular use of the term in this book; but I confess that I do not find much

difficulty in allowing the writer of § 5 to use of interaction in § 2 for 1151 a 20 of an inquirement rin hospin, as opposed to of the hospin factions derived from interacts and interpret naturally place the interaction, as additioned, in opposition to it the hospin 2, as addition to write of § 5 should not be allowed to yield to these associations for a moment in § 2.

Cook Wilson is of opinion that § 4 intl a. 11 . . . the doxin a. 19 and § 5 σωφρών a. 19 . . . φανλη a. 28 are parallel versions (Arist. Studies, pp. 35 sep. Table vi), § 4 being the later, and by an inferior thinker.—'at least there are confusions in it from which § 5 is free' (p. 30), viz. in § 4 'the sentence excions . . . outer in fles that the departe has doern't the attribution of dotto-Bossiv sept the diggie to decoun aperty 'is quite against the tenor of the doctrine about deared opera which is given in Eth. vi. 13. There it is distinctly said that drown does not belong to the before-Takér but to the idinor in the soul' (vi. 13, 2); lastly the substitution of the more determinate eigeruneioroe (§ 4) for Bidriwi (§ 5) disturbe the text awkwardly." I cannot see that it is implied in § 4 that 'the dispuris has dorry.' What the writer says is that doesn't see. in the σωφρών, ment oned at the end of the f-in a sentence with which Cook Wison begins the parallel version contained in § 5) works one dogie, and what he implies is that the depuris has not yet lost the appy which aporty (in the adopour) keeps permanently safe. As for the attribution of to opposition replied by apply to the oral special being against the tenor of vi. 13, because downed appropris said (vi. 13 2) to be ong to the ήθικου and not to the δοξασνικόυ—18 not vi. 12 6 ή μέν γαρ άρετή (ε.ε. ή εθιστή) του ακοπόν ποιεί δρθόν equally against the tenor of vi. 13, 17 Both kinds of aperi belong to the journ. An intellectual function is ascribed in vi. 12. 6 to i idiori; dom's -inaccurately, no doubt, if we insist on the point that it belongs to the house pipos: what, then, is there to prevent the writer of va. 8. 4-inaccurately, but not against the lead given in vi -aser bing an intellectual function to quoted dperf-especially. I would all, in a clause in which the two kinds of open are mentioned so closely together, in one Lreath, as I were -all aprent hyporest h idiorn?

With regard to the use of the term elperanterers in § 4 see note on that § 2. 13.

CHAPTER IX.

ARGUNEKT.

To revert to a former difficulty Is it may view and choice, or the view were and choice, that the traparts abides by I

Is it may view and choice, or the false view, and viewy wait, that the

departe facts to abide by ?

Our entropy must surely be, that per accidens it may be any tack to those, but orientially it is the true view and the right chance that the one about by, and the other fails to abide by.

There are certain people described generally as people with strong runs -who hold very firmly to their own opinions, and are very beed to some int of error. Their quality resembles byspareia, but it is operates; for the byspares while maintaining an um hanging attitude towards presson, is visibly to yield if need be, to the permission of reason, whereas these people with iteracy views are not actuated by reusen but by dearer - they are ignorant element h people with views of their own," who are actuated by the pleasure of not being leaten by those who try to persunde them—they are unangry of they have not their con way, like a democratic assembly. They have resemble the heparas rather than the typourin.

There are others, again who do not abide by their resolves and yet are not Aspareis e g the Neoptolemus of Sophocles dut not about by his realise to tal. a Lie at was pleasure which made him abandon his resolve but mobile pleasure - the plassure of telling the truth It exemly where the pressure who he determines action to bad that we speak of duchasia and dupania.

Just as emperously seems to have only one contrary-drohube, be suit the man who avoids fred use from decherate resolve is section met with, so experient seems to have only one contrary—beganio, because we wistom see a man whose resolve to sech the due amount of pleasure is overpowered by a dissin hination towards pleasure. Such a man, however, when he occur, is to be accounted bad

We speak, in a loose way, of the Continence hypphrica of the temperate man (roll adapoves)"; but we must always remember that, although both lyapange and supper are men who do not transgress the law of rossen sender the influence of bastily pleasures, yet they differ in this most important respect that the Typparks has bad desires, and the suppour has not, the suppor this not feel those things to be pleasant which transgress the law of reason; the type rine feets pleasure in them, but does not let them lead him away.

So also the Superin and the Subhastas resemble, and defer from, sach other They both follow bodily pleasures, but the antibargeon thinks, while the disputan does not thenk, that it is proper to do so.

1151 a. 29. [1] orongoon, i.e. good or had, as the All. Schol explans. Fritzsche and Michelet (but not 'Aspasius,' a.e. the Ald. Schol., as Grant erroneously states) carry on impress from mi impiess to 1181 a 20. govern righted high real. But, as Grant remarks, 'this will not clo. The departie cannot be said "to abile by a false opinion." Hence the reading right headri high said righted properties vi info for (mi instead of mi headri vi instead of mi headri). I prefer to leave the text as Bekker gives it righted high and righted managines right instead of mi headri high said right production of instead of mi headri high and right production right instead of mi instead of instead

δ έμμένων

δποιφούν — τῷ ἀληθεὶ

δ μὴ ἐμμωνων

τῷ ψευδεὶ — ὁποιφοῦν.

Does sticking to one's opinion or purpose, right or wrong (orospoir), character se continence, or does the continent man stick only to a right opinion, or purpose? And does not sticking to one s opinion, or purpose, right or wrong characterise incontinence, or most we say that the incontinent man does not stick to a false opinion and wrong purpose? Here, I think, the desire for symmetry has led the writer to ment on a case so inconsistent with the notion of deputes (although, it is to be noted, vii. 2. 7 shews that it was regarded by some as possibly a case of deputes) that critices, among them Rassow's have thought it necessary to rescue him from inconsister cy by changing the text which rests on the authority of all MSS, save Lb.

Somep fromfit modrepov vii. 2. 7.

4 32,

† nord μεν συμβεβηκός κ.τ.λ.] moral strength (το έμμενειν) is the s. 33. general characteristic of the continent man, moral steakers (το μὴ έμμενειν) of the incontinent man. It may sometimes has pen that moral strength is the cause of a man's sticking to a mistaken purpose or opinion (κατά μεν συμβεβηκον όποιφουν), but, as a rule, it

³ Ramow (Forsch, p. 100) approves the emendation of Muretus—δ τῷ dληθοί λόγψ και τῷ τροπιριστι τῷ 5ρθη, believing that the passage has been corrupted in deference to the view that the opposition between δγεράτεια and depasta makes it necessary to give λόγον opposite predicates.

tist a 35, is a good purpose, or right opinion, that moral strength enables a man to stick to, and we apply the term continent strictly (soft oirs or dulai) to the man who sticks to a good purpose, or night epinian; for the man who sticks to a bad purpose, or norms opinion is anohabres (see vii. 8 1). Again, it may sometimes happen that moral weakness is the cause of a man's departing from a had purpose or wrong opinion; but such an exceptional case is not contemplated in the term 'incontinent,' which is strictly applied only to those who do not suck to a good purpose, or right opin on (δύξα άληθής, οτ λόγος άληθής). We must remember that it is the declarore and the depurys who are distinguished in respect of dogs, or hoyes, that of the anotherror being weedie, and that of the deputies being dayling, but it is not in respect of hogos that the departe is distinguished from the eyeparte, but in respect of strength of character (inniversand ph innivers) -- as Zeller parts at (Phil. d. Griech vol. ii, 2. Arist. p. 659 third ed.) 'Aristoteles . . . unterscheidet beide (r.e. éyapirem and dapnoin) von den stinchen E genschaften der Selbstbeherrschung (σωφροσόση) and Zügellosigkeit (awahanta) durch das Merkmal, dass die Beherrschung oder Herrschaft der Begierden bei diesen auf einer grun isatzagben Willensrichtung, bei jehen nur auf der Stärke over Schwäche des Willens beruht.

The sentence of you are a. 35... soft of the 3 seems to be merely a logical note introduced to explain the difference between soft of and sort our between which hardly needs explanation—and to enable the writer to wind up with the satisfactory formula for per be... dnhos. The article before in dhost b. 4 should be omitted see Rassow (Forsch. p. 100) and Ramsauer and Inc. It is bracketed by Bywater.

- b. 6. § 2. eisi δέ των οἱ έμμεντικοὶ τῆ δόξη eisiv κτλ] The eypparhs 'sticks to' his true opinion; but there are people who resemble him in 'sticking to' their opinions, but differ from him in that their opinions are often wrong. The obstinate man or iσχυρογνώμων is related to the eypparhs as the συστοι is to the ελευθέρων. Both συστοι and ελευθέρων 'spend,' but the συστοι spends foolishly, the ελευθέρων wisely. So both συχυρογνωμών and eypparhs' stick to' an opinion, but the opinion of the ίσχερογνώμων is often foolish, while that of the eyepparis is necessarily true.
- b. 0. 6 dynpartis In both places where & eyepartie occurs, here and in

b. 10, it seems to be interpolated. Susembl brackets it in both 1181 b. 9 places: Bywater in b. q.

οί δέ ούχ όπο λόγου] ες, μεταβαλλουσικ.

ь. 10.

indicate ye hardwood, and dyortal noblot one they flower] b. 11 for they (i.e. the obstinate) often enough conceive desires, and are led away by their pleasures. The expression individue ye hardwood occurs in E. E. iii. 2. 1231 2. 28 natter yap toutass phase as gapover, and instructes hardwood.

§ 3 [Scorphinares] 'elev de of Paddiori audobaros opinidires' b. 18. (Cornes).

of per longrapores. The per contrasts the longrapores with the b 10 appetrs and the appearer who however, are not characterised.

ώστε μάλλον τῷ depares doixaσιν ἡ τῷ έγρατες] because they are b to two nuch influenced by peasure (χαίρουσε) and pain (λυπούνται). They are apported took river, however, not departed delab.

[4] To abanden a bad resolution, so far from being an b. 17 indication of weakness (asparia), may often be an indication of moral strength and the power of principle, as in the case of Neoptolemus: see vii. 2. 7. Zell refers the point raised in this § to the ques ion mooted in § t of the present chapter-'an etiam is impotens sive incontinens dei possit, qui falsam et perversatu sententiam susceptam non tueatur?' This he does believing that in § 1 the question conveyed by the words \$ 6 re words ara, as they stand, is inadmissible, and that what the writer really means to sik is "whether even he who, like Neoptolea us, departs from a wrong purpose, is nevertheless to be called incontinent —as if the text stood & rad o vo vooder a r.A. Ramsauer, in his note on § 1, after giving his approval to the emendation ή δ τφ αληθεί λόγω and τη προυφέσει τη δρθη, a f.b. - ' ne enim lev ore currectura eadem quaesto quae prior crat alas verbis iterum efficiatur f and o reψειδεί λόγφ «αι τή προαφέσει τή μη όρθή, dissuadet, si non ipsa sententia, at lex concinnitatia."

ander] 'imo abr@ had for an ander' (Ramsauer).

b. 20.

od ydo πάς κ.τ.λ.) The lest deserven have their own καλαί ήδωναι b.31 which sastam and perfect them: thus ο θros del μίων και δηλήν χαίρει ηλουχω F. Α. να. ε4. 8. The καλή ήδουή which attends the function

VOL: IL

- 1161 b. 21. of collaporia can never lend itself to intemperate uses; nor can the pleasures of sight and hearing, athough perhaps they may sometimes he pursued to a somewhat reptel excite extent; wer E. N. in 10. §§ 2-6; with which compare Plutarch, Sympas, vii. 5 deponds μου έφη και οίνδε άναλύω το φιλησούν κοι φιλισθαίμου οί, μην "πραταξείω γε συμβέρημαι καινάπασι, ταύταις μόναις φοσιούν τοίε ήδοναίε το καλώς έπιλεγουδη. από γαρ δψα καλά καί μέρα εαλούσι, από εαλώς γεγονίναι λέγουσι, δειπνησαυτες ήδώς και πολυτελών δοκεί δε μοι μηδ' Αριστυτίλος αίτία δικαία τὰς κερί δίαν και δερόσουν εύκαθείου υπολύσιο άκρασιας, ών μόνας ώνθρωπικός οδοκεί το δλογών έχοντα χρήσδου και κοινωνείν' όρωμεν γάρ ότε και μουσική πολλά κηλείται τών άλογων.
 - b. 23. § 5. Enci & don . . . ploog 6 dysparfs In b. 24 liekker, following all the MSS, reads xalpane. Muretus, of jecting to the participaes after recovery view, wishes to read guipers and our imprises, forgetting, as Rassow (Forsch. p. 134) points out, that impieur would require μή. Susemili and Bywa.er adopt χαίρων (which Asp. seems to have read), retaining appiror. Zel, and Coraes, on the ground that the Aid, Schol, speaks of the Akcinon as arompas, and the Paraph, of the Adeirovon this as decorpor, think that words to that effect have dropped out of the text and Zeil suggests that these words may have justified the partic ples goipon and inpursor. Kassow. however (p. 134), quotes M.M if 9, 1208 a. 1 for the participle after romires clas - à de romires de cles incornadquerés es sur ayactes mode và più civat aira, ain du dufete takot nal ayafot cion. I cio pot think that the Ald. Schobast's remark that the Thirings is again, or the Paraphrast's that the Alemoura if is are in any means makes it even probable that either commentator had words to that effect in his text. Each makes the remark, indeed, at the place near the beginning of § 5 where Zell suspects that the words have dropped out of the text; but repeats it later on in connex on with the statement alla did to the b. 30 . . . th departs b. 32. The Paraphrasi's words, in this connexion (he has already said at the beginning of his remarks on § 5 h bi (Ahelstown ifer avinous) areüll' öre y elleinavaa efes dreivung nae eligeara avulaires (anavan yaa οί ήττου τού διουτος χαιρουτιε τοις σωματικας ήδουοίε) διά τουτο μέση ή deputia donii irarria elem, bri ij hadibrys daryime eipiterras. Here the use of the word armerupor is naturally suggested to the Par. and Ald. Schol, by the words or alliyou sai aliyous, and goes no way, in the circumstances, towards proving that it stood in their text. It

would be very rash indeed to found any inference here on the 1151 b 23. words of commentators who are so careless as to say, as they virtually do that 'the ifes is downware and it is called historie'.

I see no reason for supposing that downware, any more than histories, stood in their text.

All MSS., except Mb read 6 instead of Bekker's § (Mb has §) bekere received b. 24. The reading § receives seems to me to give exactly the sense required wix, that there is a character defined as eleparting from consciously realised dictates of reason in the direction of the avoidance of bodily pleasures, which stands to the transitional states departure and departs in the same relation that circumfiguite star ds to the fixed states supposition and dischards: see E. N. ii. 11. 7. Of course Mb is generally an unsufe authority, but I think that here it has made a safe emendation. All MSS, seem to give reserve b. 24, which Bywater (reading 6) brackets:

of his Contributions, p. 57.

pieces à dynparies] 'It is plain,' Grant says, 'that éyaparene is not b 26 a mean in the sense of being a balance or harmony of the mind. It is only imperfect temperance, it is temperance in the act of forming.' The writer samply means, I take it, that the éyaparés 'stands between' the daparés and the firms of differences comparations.

ούδε δι' δτερον] ' τὰ λεγόμενου οὐδε δι' έτερου συντίτακται κατα τμήσεν δ. 27. συνήθη τοίε 'Αττικοίε διτ' τοί δι' οδδέτερου, καθά καὶ ήρμήνευται καὶ έν τή ΑΡΓ, οδ πειώτεκπ" (Cotaes).

§ 6. sei ή έγκράτεια . . . ἡκολούθηκεν] 'We come to speak b. 53. metaphorically of the continence of the temperate man' (Peters). The writer probably uses ἡκολούθηκεν here with some consciousness of the technical meaning of the term, for which see Bonitz, Met. p. 42' verbo ἀκολούθεν pariter ac verbo ἐπεσθαι Aristoteles denotat prae I cari aliquian notionem de altera, ita in hac posita illa etiam potienda ετι, εf. Γ. 2. 1003 b. 23 et de interpr. 13 passim.'

CHAPTER X.

ARGUMENT.

The next faint to notice as that the name man cannot be took opposition and apparent, for opposition, as we have seen, emplies goodness, and es art next knowledge, but knowledge which essues so good actions whereas the disputes not one who performs good actions. Clesceness—bending a seeded computer with incontinuous, hence because histotype and opposition are marrix related. All 12.559, to a entities that families they are nearly related, but from the most of turns show suffer, some have taken up the notion that opposition must dispute a ten transfer ampatible. But we for it depends from have compare the apparent with one who is accept the upon that the ought rather to compare the apparent with one who is accept or drawd. Of course he act voluntaristy for he know after a fait to desire the does and why he does it, but he character as me but for his desheave choice is good, his balances is thus only parties, and he is not me must, for he was not do call deliverator being either a week vector but may who fails to aline by the result of desirentian, or an imprison, occur who derivers as all

The encontinence of the impotence man is more easily encod than that of the terisolate mane, and incontinence, one to habit, is more easily encod examinational incontinence; although hubit may become a sound mature.

So much for continence and incommence, endurance and softness,

1152 a 6 § 1] takes up vis. 1. 7.

- a 7 dua yap .. bibicurae or See E. N. vi. 13 Province s the clear consciousness of one's moral nature, as an organic whole it maures the maintenance and proper function of the moral organism.
- 5. 9. § 2. τῷ πρακτικός] sc. circu. The φρόνιμου not only knows what is right, but app ies his knowledge, or acts upon it. He is overadains τὸ ἡθος s.e has feel ngs and desires have been so accust sened to move in harmony with his knowledge, that what is technically called πράξει may be always locked for from h in. Πράξει is 'moral action,' or 'conduct.' It is deliberate, being the outcome and expression of definite organisation or λόγοι. Isolated παθη do not produce πραξεις: hence Ε. Ν. ν. 2. 2 αlσθησει οὐδεμαῖι ἀρχή πράξεως δηλον δὶ τῷ τὰ θηρια αίσθησειν μὲν ἔχειν πραξεως δὶ μὴ ποινωνείν. The departie, although he possesses the general knowledge of right and

wreng (vò siòira), lets his nabn prevent the application of it. His 1162 a 9 at the are more responses to esclated nabn, not nonfere nav aperin - à à accurrir où nourrete 2. 9.

The di decede audie depart eleat See E N vl. 12 9, 10. a. 10 Amorps is the eleverness with which the means to an end are discovered and employed. It does not give the end, or make it g od or had the ag a purely intellectual faculty), but merely pursues it cleverly when given. If the end be morally good, eleverness in the pursuit of it, having become habitual, is called opposite: and wareveyor, if the end be bad. It is only when the end is not one which can be viewed morally as morally good or bad that the neutral term durring can be properly used. How then is the deputies here said to be sometimes below? This end is good, and he is blind to the means thereto. This difficulty a limits of the following a issuer, I think It is the steady influence of a trovally good end which converts the divages of devirge into the few of pointage, the steady influence of a bad end which converts it into wasorpying the the dends, as such, is clever and ingentious, and doubtless shows his eleverness in many ways in non-moral matters, but it requires 'a good or bad end'-a steady inducement appealang strongly to his will and emotions-to make him show and use his cleverness hab tually in the moral sphere. Hitherto, we suppose, his eleverness, so far as the moral sphere is concerned, has not been habitually shown-i. a it has existed merely as the disaper of eather polynous or varmopyla. Now, the departs has 'a good end'. but it is inoperative in him-in his ill-regulated pattire it does not appeal strongly enough to his will and euctions to make him show, in the moral sphere, as polygous the devotors which be probably shows in non-moral matters, where the ends are suffielect thy exteresting to him to make I im exert his natural ability for the discovery and employment of the suitable means. The end of the desires is good, but not good with the constraining power over conduct which, in the onordains (the man who is 'in earnest' about good conduct), presses the morally neutral devolene into the service of morality. Thus the apparais, in space of his so-called 'good end,' remains merely down, his devorys being inferred from his nonstoral activity, and doubtless, as time goes on (for the deporter is on the downward path), from incications suggestive of incipient waroupy.a. The Faraph. has a good note-Kara του αύτον δε τρόπον

- 215% c. 20. και τινας άνρατείς φρανίμους δυσματουστ καθ΄ όμοιότητά τενα πρότ τη φράνησιν τινός γάρ των άκρατών δεινοί είσων ή δε δεινότης έσικε ή φρανησει καὶ γάρ οι δεινοί κατά την γνώσεν το δέοντος έσιασσε τούς φρανιδιοις άλλ' οἱ μέν γνώσενται μουον το δείνα, οἱ προσιρουνται δε πρώτεικ υὐδέ πράττουσεν' οἱ δέ φράνιμας γινώσευντες τὰ δέον και πραττουσεν' καὶ δα τοῦτο ὁ μέν φρόνεμας σπουδαίδε έστιν έκρατης δὲ κάν δεινός ή, φωλλάς έστι καὶ ψέγντας.
 - 2. κατά μεν τον λόγον έγγης είναι, διαφέρειν δέ κατά την προαίρεουν 'as far as reason goes they are closely allied, though they differ in purpose (Peters). This translation in hit be understood to stopp that δεικότηι involves purpose (προσερεσίε), though a different sort of purpose from that involved in φροσφετεί hat δεικότηε (το far as morality is concerned) is merely a δύναμες τών έναντων, not a προαφετική έξιε. The meaning is δεικότηε reactibles φρόσησει in being an intellectual faculty, but differs from it in not involving moral choice. The Ald. Schol, is wrong in two points in his comment here κατά μεν τύν λογον ήτοι τόν δρισμόν εγγυε έστων η φρόσητες καὶ ή διινότης... mi γιρ ή δεικότηε έξιε ήν έφευρετική των προε τά τελες, διαφέρουσε δέ κατά την προκάρεστεν τοῦ μεν γαρ φρονιμών ή προαίρεστε έγαθη ... α τοῦ δὲ δεικοῦ ή προαίρεστες φαύλη.
 - 6 8, odbe bit we d elbes . . . olumperos se, departitue Asp., frairo. à departer Ald. Schol. Notwithstanding his formal possession of a good end,' the departie keeps his intellectual endowment at the level of dóropis, so far as moral maters are concerned, a e, he is denvir, not ppolymor, because his good end is office, and dies not interest I an sufficiently to call for h his density into its service, and transform it into polynous. of the Paraphrast's note - and you of an yundres ed dens (6 departes) all mix dorrep à sposition despreix femples καλ χρώμενος τη έπιστήμη, άλλα κυθαπερ εξηητοι, ώς ο καθεύδων καλ αίνωμενος: did tubeno di the quartenta d deevas apparies oppirques avapaleras, en fecer φροκρφ. See Cook Wilson (Arist, Studies, p. 27) on the difficulty of connecting the worls odde dit do eldur and Grapas with what goes before. He thinks it 'probable that the end of the book (ne ch 10) is made of pieces not belonging to each other.' I ywater connects oldi di ana. closely with 6 d' departe od epartede § 2, 2 9 making the intervening words for de decrée a, to . . . sponderger a, 14 parenthetical.
 - a. 16, wai drive per . . . if yop moniposes directifs] The departs acts

voluntarily, because influence is the cause of voluntary actions to see 1152 a. 15. E. E il. 7, 1223 a. 37 & & deputhe & nard row emideular napa rov λογισμόν οίσε πρώττειν . . . έκδιν δρα πράξει και έκούσιον το κατ' επιθυμιαν. There is some confusion of language in the statement if you mana prover incresis (as also in the statement to new yap maps appained in vit. 8. 3), because appainers is the act of cherce, and the departs of course does not 'deliberately chaose' (appainting) what he does, but Lets from millor. He is, in fact, distinguished as mi nounneigners from the andurers, who acts apomporpriors. We must suppose that apompeter is used loosely here for the good intenions which are overcome by mades in the departs. Bookgoes would have been more correct then appaired it: see E. A. v. 9. 6 anda the Bookhaw abatter of departs? aire pap Boukeras videst & pij vierot einas omnudaine, o ee departie vin d ourse deir nparrece nparrece. Aspasius sees the ankwardness of & yap monapaore écución: he says (141 6 Heylbut) -monipento de maleo à the dayor elegant & our airs and the Boldevarue.

παὶ οὐκ ἄδικος οὐ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος] (f. F. N v. 8. 8 ὕταν δὶ εἰδως α. 17 μεν μὴ προβουλεύσιε δὶ, ἀδίκημο, οἶον ὑσα τε διὰ θυμὰν καὶ ἄλλα πάθη, δσα συγκατα ἡ φνοκεα συμβαίνει τοις ἀνθρώποις ταυτα γὰρ Ελαπτοντες καὶ ὅμαρταναντες ἀδιεούσι μέν, καὶ ἀδιεήματὰ εστιν, οὐ μένται πω άδιεοι διὰ ταὶτα οὐδι πουηροί οὐ γὰρ διὰ μυχθηρίαν ἡ Ελαβη, ὅταν δ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἄδικος και μοχθηριος Αγκιπ, below (v 8. 10), the ἄδικος is described as ἐκιβουλεύσας.

On ob yap instruction here in vii. 10. 3 Grant remarks that 'though list, as compared with anger, is called instruction (if, ch. 6 § 3), yet it is true on the other hand that the incominent man is not a designing character.'

"Αναξανδρίδης] a comic poet, a native of Camirus in Rhodes: a. 22. remainmed by Aristode three times in Rhol in, viz. 1411 a. 18, 1412 b. 16, 1413 b. 25. A honorus preserves (p. 374) the following passage relating to Anaxandrides from the medi κωμφδιας of Chamachera of Herzelez — Αναξανδριόης διδάσκων ποτε διδύρομβου "Αθήνηστες εικήλειε τφ' Ιπποι. και άπηγγειλε τε τών ές τοῦ ζισματος. Αν δε τὴν δήτεν καλος και μεγας, καὶ κόμην έτρεψε, καὶ ἐφόρει δλουργίδα καὶ κράσπεδα χρισά, πιερικ δ' ων τε ήθρος, έποιει τε τποιστον περί τός κωμφδιας, ῶτε γάρ μη νιαφο, λαμθανών έδωκεν εἰι τὸν λιβανωτών καταιτεμείν, καὶ οὺ μετεσκεύες κανωριο σε πολλοι. καὶ πολλά έχοντα κομψώς τῶν δραματών ήφωνες, δυσκολαιών τοῖς δεσταίε διὰ το γήρας. λέγεται δ' είναι το γένος "Ροδίος δε Καμείρου, δυνμάζω οὐν πῶς ά Τηρεὐς περιεσσεθη, μή τυχών είκης, καὶ δελλα δροματα των

- 1182 a. 22. oposser vod abvod. Chamaeleon, the writer of this passage, and a Peripatetic philosopher, one of the immediate disciples of Aristot. Take. Corner thinks that the line before us is from the solve of Anaxa dedictes. Athenaeus (p. 299) preserves fourteen lines of this piece day. The present line is quoted also by Cyril, de Tren ii p. 96 1000 Area Manaele, Fragen. Com. vol. a. p. 200). Anaxandi des section to have unitated Europides (apud Ae. in, H. A. ii 74)—"Operat per action of the piece frage passive day.
 - 6. 27 § 4. εὐιατοτέρα . . τελευτῶσαν φύσιν είναι] This passage Common Wilson (Arist Studies, Table V) places after via. 7. 8, and regarding as a duplicate of via. 8. s.
 - a. 29. φυσικών] Ramsauer suggests φύσι.
 - a. 31 τῆ φύσει ἔσικεν j Zell and Fritzsche quote de Mem. 2. 452 a. 27 διατερ γιρ φύσει βλη τὰ ἔθικ. δεν ὰ πολλάκις ἐννοσύμεθα ταχὰ ἀνημμυσιεν κυμεθα΄ διατερ γάρ φυσει τόδε μετα τυδε ἐυτίς, οὐτω και ἐνεργεία. το ¾ πολλάκις φύσει ποιεί.

Eύηνος] There seem to have been two elegiac or gnomic per s. I this name, natives of Paros. One of them (whether the eller or younger is uncertain) is said to have instructed Socrates in poerry Flato refers several times to Euchus an a teacher of rheteric, in somewhat satirical terms—Apol. 20 A, Phiedr. 267 A, and Phiese to D-61 A. In Met. 2. 5, 1015 a. 25 and E. E. 4. 7, 1223 a 31 he is named as the author of the line non-paper invitation manipulation and physical and property, which is also quoted in Rhet. i. 11, 1370 a. 10 without has name. See Schwegher, Met. vol. 11, 1203. For the verses of Euchus see Poel. Gnom. (ed. Tauchn. p. 109).

CHAPTER XI.

ARGUNENT.

The subject of Pleasure and Pain is one which the Political Philosopher anute consider, for he is the Architect of Logo, he gives us the Lad to a back me viter token we call this good and that bad.

Moreover, it is necessary to consider this subject, recause we assigned moree

exercis and over to the field of spoon and pleasures, and recause most people after a less connexes between Happiness and Pleasure.

There are three opinions which (following our ordinary method of caring the opinions held on the subject under discussion) we begin by noticing—

1) That no pleasure it good, either per so or per accident.

. 2; That room pleasures are good, but most of them bud.

's I have even if ale are good yet the chief good cannot be pleasure

The first opinion a supported on the for orang reasons—a all pleasure is a power is no convenience is toward material projection, and accordingly is it elf interested. A the temperate man owneds frequences; a the princent man sieks presence of pain, not pressure, a pleasures hunder thinking, a there is no net of pleasure affecting there would be an art of it, to exist and brutes follow pleasures.

the reand of man is supported by reference to the bad, disreputative and hursful to course which admissionly exist.

The treed openeous as held on the ground that fleasure t not large men or Frut, out treess.

No man's for the myrnigh an thre subject

§ 1 wept be hooving nat himse The discussion of hour con- 1153 b 1 tained in the last four chapters of vii, and that contained in the first five elapters of a, follow the same general lines, but arrive at different results in some points. The mere circumstance by itself that two treatises on howh exist side by side in the E.N. raises a strong presumption in favour of the view that the corrus of the E N, as we have it, is the result of editing: for either the two treatises on Month were composed by the same author writing at different times, from somewhat different points of view-in which case it seems highly improbable that he would publish them both toge her in one work, though a later editor might do so; or they were composed by different authors in which case the hypothesis of an ed for is of course necessary. So much for the antecedent presum, tion in layour of the Lypothesis of an editor raised by the there circumstance of two treatises on idoug coexisting in the N comachean Corpus. But we can go further than this, and say that an edi or is certainly accountable for the Nicomachean Corpus, as we now have it. There can be no doubt that E. E. iv, v, vi (=F N v, vi, vii) belong, in thought and style, rather to the E. E. than to the E. N.1 It is impossible to account for the fact that these three books are common to the E. N. and E. E., by supposing

It may be sufficient to refer the student to Grant's Lethier, Essay i. pp. 50-71, and Jackson's Book V, Introduction, pp. 22il-222il.

1162 b. I. that their original locus was in the E. N., and that they were transferred thence on bloc into the E.E. We must rather behave that they were compiled, subsequently to the composition of the E. N., from materials already to hand, and were transferred in the from the E. E. into the F. N by an editor of the E. N. who wished to supply an ong hal deficiency in that corpus, or, more probably, to repair a loss which it had suffered. But it may be asked.-Why did the editor of the E. N. adm t the si perfluous account of \$800)? This difficulty suggests the supposition that, when he inserted v, vi, vii, he did not find x attached to the Nicomachean Corpus. It may have attached itself at a later time. That this supposition is not gratuitous seems to be shown by the fact that the writer of he E. E. (or perhaps I ought to put myself in order by saying—the writer mairly responsible for the composition of the E. E. - who apparently had Nie machean materials before h m in the following order-

(a) E. N. i-iv.

- (b) Books on the subjects of E. E, iv, v, vi. 1-10 = E. N. v, vi. 1-10.
 - (c) A treatise on idori perhaps adenti al with that in E. N. x.

(d) E. N. vill, ix sopl piliar-

ends his work with two chapters (appended to his lengthy if scussion of \$\phi(\delta)\delta)\$—one on alregia, and the other on salwayaba—wit ten without reference to the contents of \$E, N. x. 6-9. It is difficult to suppose that the Nicomachean work, which he follows very carefully up to the close of its discussion of \$\phi(\delta)\delta, can have ended with our \$E, N. x. Even if the huderian writer differs from the Nicomachean, as Schleiermacher and Fritzsche suppose (see Fritzsche, \$Eth. End pp. 262, 263), in treating Ethics as a subject distinct from Poures, this does not appear to me to account for the Functional writer outsting to reproduce were supposed of the latter part of \$E, N. x. had that book been accountly before him.

The suggestion, then, which I venture to make is this. When the Eudemian compilation was made, the Nicomachean Corpus ended with part (d); and when, parts (l) and (l) of that corpus having been afterwards lost, an enter supplied the gip by inserting E. E. iv, v, vi, the treatise on flowin contained in the last-named book, was inserted with the rest, because the Nicomachean Corpus still ended with (d). Afterwards, however, the missing Nicomachean

treatise on hom, or one very like it, was recovered, and, its original 1162 b. 1 locus immediately after the discussion of hopen being now occupied by its Fudernian equivalent, it was placed, together with x. 6-0, at the end of the composite edition, thus completing the Nic. Eth, as we now have the work.

I offer this suggestion for what it is worth. Much uncertainty, I take it, will always remain as to the exact circumstances in which the two treatises on idom; found their way into the Nic Films.

To pass then from speculation to facts—it may be useful here, at the outset, to state, without detail, the chief points in which the two treatness on hoof differ and agree.

In the first place, it may be noticed that the present treatise gives nomewhat more prominence to bodity pleasures than that in x. This I do not attribute as some do (e.g. Benchaen Demerkungen sum S denten Buch der Nik. Eth. Philologus, vol. x. 1p. 270-921. to the difference between the positions of the two treatises—that which has those to say about the communal glowal following immediately after the discussion of departs, and that which has less to say about them leading up to the discussion of sidaumua fer I think it probade that the one inal position of the treatise in x (or of its archetype) was that now occupied by the treatise in via -viz. immedately after the discussion of agracia. It seems better to explain the greater prominence of the σωματικώ ήδονοί in the last-mer honed treat se simply by the preference of the writer. The subject of deputes involving as it does that of the communical fidewin, had a greater ir terest for the writer (or wmers) of the Eudenaun Corpus, than it had for the waver of the L.A. This is very evident, for instance, If we compare the Fuclet can treatment of to imimor with the Nicomachean'. It is not necessary, then, to go to the position which the Eudeman treatise or hown occupies after the detailed discussion of departa to account for the greater prominence given in it to the That the subject of ideal is closely connected with that of ispece in the mind of the Eugenman writer, and that his special interest is in the monarcial adomai, is shown by a passage, E. E. a. 2. 1231 b 2 (referred to by Fratzsche, E.E. Prolegom, p. x.v. and Spengel, Arul. Said. p. 197), which promises a more accurate account of the good when dysporms and deprois come up for special

See introductory note to vii.

1162 b. 1, discussion—depisterrepar de repl vou yerour vou aboror dova discussion de role deposition ver de deposition and deposition.

It would be a mistake, however, to think that, because the present treatise has more to say about the ownersen identifican that in x has, its connexion with the subject of ridagooic is less vital. The words with which the present treatise opens (vii. 11, §§ 1, 2) are as explicit as those with which the treatise in x opens, in declaring the intimate connexion of the two subjects of idoms and aidaquoria. Moreover, there is a highly interesting passage in an earlier part of the E.F. (quo ed by Fraziche, E.F. p. 179, and by Grant on su. 11. 1), in which the writer promises to discuss the relation of obosis to endamona, with special reference to the apparatus founds. It is E. E. i. 5. 1216 2. 30-36 voiron d' à pin mepl và vapara nol vàs " ave-Ausgres fådorg, and tis and mein tin ylvetar and did throw, our dankar, work 📫 Tives ein't der forem across, all el aupreinount re mone endarmonan à my cai núe appretonnat, ná nárepou el del nponanteto to lijo sadás globas time, ταύτας δεί προσάπτειν, ή τούτων μέν άλλον τινά τρόπον άνάγτη κοινωντώ, erepat d'escriv glovai di as erhôpus viverat von sidiripana que glices uni pa power oximus. It is worth noticing, too that the writer of the M.M. introduces his account of jour in the following terms M. M. L. 7. 1204 & 19 pera de raura decreou du cin megi idanne enconnen imajo cidas posine darly 6 hoyor a.r.h. I accordingly disagree entirely with the view that the two treatises on isoon in vi and x respectively were writ en with different objects—that in vis hoory is considered merely as the platerial of consuence and incommence, in x as sweetering eidasporia: see Coraes akkas di quase in aportias dis vor pikoumper περί συτης γραψει, ένθειδε μεν οίων ύλην περί ήν ή έγκρατεια και ή ακρασια the hoosie buar Benerou de de rois legs (i.e. x) de girenouiene Des th eidamoria dempoirra. The object of both treatizes is one to show how how its related to evolution of the dyadon-how it his lers, and how it furthers, the performance of duty. Thus, after a few increductory remarks, the trea ise in x opens its subject with the words οι μέν γαρ τάγαθον ήδουρυ λεγουσε, and that in vir with role μεν ούν donei o'denia howh elem dyadir. 'Is Pleasure good?' then, is the chief question for both treatises. The answers, however, seem, at

* For να σωματα καλ νάς ἀπυλαύστα ought we not to read νάς σωμανικός ἀπολαύστα ?

Perhaps, however, we ought to read, for roo prome, reserve two proofs, referring to re files re elegandes root alothesia 135t a. 38. If so, the same would not promise a treatment of flooring enerally

first sight, to differ toto coclo. According to the water of vii a 1169 b. 1 pleasure may be found which is identical with the summum bonum (vi., 13, 2); according to the writer of a (3, 13) pleasage is not the summum bonum. No two positions surely could differ more widely. The writer of vit must be a 'Hedonist.' But he is no more a hedomst than the writer of x is. The difference between the two positions, in fact, reduces itself to very moderate limits, when we examine the scholastic ground on which it rests-viz, on the fact that according to the writer of vii plove in evipyers, whereas according to the writer of x it is not everyene, but attends and 'perfects' n-the formula of vit being injured dispression of hone (vit 12 3). and that of a redered the belowens & house (x. 4. 8). If the writer of vir inters iripyea and islavin are convertible terms (where vital functions are concerned), hen the evipying wexile nor aperily, or водащания, will be a вдому. Plainly, this position (identical, it may be noted, with that of the writer of Ald. A. 7, 1072 b. 16) differs only verbally from that of Aristotle in E. A. i 8, 12 audie di apondeirae της ήδονης ο Βίος αυτών (ε. ε. των ευδαιμόνων) ωσπερ περιίπτου τινόε, αλλ' Le vip goodp in invero. Both master and disciple are fundamentally at one both connect the most desirable pleasure inseparably with the life of virtuous activity against the helonists who connect it with the passive life of personal enjoyment. Perhaps I may venture to formulate the difference between the writer of vii and the bedonists in this way. - The writer of vii says- the Good (meaning the strenuous performance of the highest duty) is Pleasure': the hedunats say - Pleasure (meaning the pleasure of sense) is the Good.' The writer of vii comes to the subject of pleasure with a firm grasp of the Anstotelian definition of the Good: his identifigureau of joors and trapped is a piece of scholasticism which does not affect his position as a mora ist. It is because he does not see

^{*} Ramow (Forsch, pp. 48, 40) believes that the treatise in vii, as distinguished from that in a, has a "hedonistic character": he says—'Buide Abnandangen differiren in den weventlichten Puncten. Im reducte Buche wird die Laist von der Thatigkeit gesondert (1175 b 32), so dam sie nichts als eine blosse Qualität derselben erscheint, im siebenten wird sie als érspysin derperderen definiet; das zehate Buch behampft die Ansicht, dass die Laist das hoenste Gut met, das siebente nicht, wie sich bei seiner Grundanschauung erwarten laist, wahrscheinlich zu machen, dass infodestens eine Art der Lust das deutzer zu. Schon diese Ansicht genügt, um die Abhand ung des siebenten Buches als unecht zu kennanichnen; dem sie wirde der Aristotenschen Lithik einen bedon stischen Charakter aufdrucken, der mit inten annstigen Anschauungen unvereinbar ist." I differ from this view in [1] at-

1182 b. 1 this that Aspasius (151 Heylbut)—who turns out to be the whier of the 'notable schohum' discovered by Brands in the Variean (quoted by Fritzsche, E. E. p. 189, and by Grant on vi. 13, 21—thinks of 'Eudemas' (to whom he conjecturally attributes the treatise mept fidurie in vii) as merely airing 'a probable opinion' (interpret indiffus ine inde airin to diffure degree), and not given his own real view, in the statement (vi. 13, 2) here in he ris fidurity risapprops.

Howig, then, is discussed here in the seventh, as it is in the tenth at the book, in relation to the good-i e. not theoremally, as interesting - as from a physiological or psychological point of view, but with practical reference. In other words, the object of the enquiry were not to tell us what pleasure it, but to tell us what it does-low to a lunders, and how it helps virtuous action—in short, to place the si relation to the practical end in a true light, as against the erroneousv.ews of others-extreme Platon sts, on the one side, who held that s. af 1 pleasure can only hunder morality, and hedonists of the Cyrenasstamp, on the other side, who held that passive enjoyment is the eff chief good. It is true that the following chapters abound wath a second extremely abstract considerations, which might easily be mistakers for what a barren scholasticism has to offer as physicism and a scholasticism has to offer as physicism has to offer as physicism has to offer as physicism and the scholasticism has to offer as physicism has the for what a barren scholasucian has to the an abstract a helastic psychology; but we must remember that an abstract a helastic psychology; but we must remember that an abstract a helastic psychology; psychology; but we must remember that are the writer to the treatment of the subject is, in part, forced upon the writer to the treatment of the subject is, in part, forced upon the writer to the treatment of the subject is, in part, forced upon the writer to the treatment of the subject is, in part, forced upon the writer to the subject is, in part, forced upon the writer to the subject is, in part, forced upon the writer to the subject is, in part, forced upon the writer to the subject is, in part, forced upon the writer to the subject is, in part, forced upon the writer to the subject is, in part, forced upon the writer to the subject is, in part, forced upon the writer to the subject is, in part, forced upon the writer to the subject is the s nature of the arguments which he has to meet and the same turn to the doctrine concerning howh which may be extracted to > > ay the E. N. and E. E. elsewhere than from the tremises in the Area we find that, not being advanced in a polemical from a second we find that, not being advanced in a polemical from a second with the second se this cussions in vii, and also, though perhaps in a less better in a. We must be careful, then, not to a mounter the design three vii and x worthless, because vertal c difficulties so cleverly exposed ?

taching great importance to the distription and visitify closely to Platoniam, who connect the nedomets, because it suits Platoniats, because it and (2 in regard in despitable and 44)

his Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy. Mill's 1152 b rith is relevant only against writers who profess to give an aswer to the purely scientific question. What is Pleasure, as a hysiological or psychological phenomenon?' Mill has little lificulty in showing that the formula eripping disputiblizers, as reniced to 'Tleasure is the result of a pleasurable state of the sense ad a pleasure-giving quality in the object presented to it," is pien ifically worthless. But he fails to see that the real of jert of he writers is, as has been said, to explain what pleasure doesow it helps or kinders the aminment of the ethical end-g out perije despens. It is inseparable from empyens, enhances evipyens, t expyrer, was the formula in which Aristotle and his school sumand up the results of their practical enquery. This formula cannot e taken out of its setting in the practical enquiry, as it is by Mill, nthout being entirely misrepresented. Its true significance, missed y Mill, is that it asserts the opposite of 'Pleasure is your or punkipowous' that it maintains the paramount importance, in iman life, of the pleasures of active function, against those who acred them—the helorists, because they wished to recognise the pleasures of drankapaous or passive reception, as worth thing-the ascetle Platonists because they wished, in their ment against the hedon sts, to dwell on pleasures which could be shown to be unsatisfactory.

Things are called good or bad in the strict sense, when b. a. sided as means, or hindrances, respectively, to the attainment δαιμενία. When they are called good or bad in relation to it ends, the ends have to be appeared; the terms good and bad in, in, has case, he used by themselves—anλώς or simplicates—in further specification.

Hepere E. E. i. 4. 1222 b. 38.

b. 6.

του χαίρεω | Mutetus conjectured and του μάλα χαίρεω, and b. 7.

με ο τοι μωλιστα χαιρεικ. The Ald. Schol. has από του χαίρεω

μείρε, το Γ μακαριος were μακροχάριος. Asp. has του εὐδοίμουα

μείρες μάλα χαίρουτα,

A's pleasure is good. This was the view 5, 8

(as Asp. notes): see Aul. Gell. ix. 5
ence summum malum diett esse volupbum est μανέην μάλλον ή ήσθείην. Cf.

- - b 10 τοῖς δ' ένιαι κτλ.] This, as Fritzsche observes, is the view of Place (Philes. 48 A, sqq, where αληθεία, καθαραί, έμναινε are distant guished from ματαί and deαθαρτοι ήδοναί).
 - b. 11. Ere κ.τ λ.] Plato's view, expressed in the Philipus, and teletred a to in E N. x. 2, 3 rouning δη λύγφ και Πλατων άνοιμα ότι οἰκ ἐστωκ τήδουὴ τὰγαθάν. The view of E. Λ. x is αικο μὴ ἐνδέχευθαι «ἐκαι τἔ κατον ήδουὴ».

For Bokker's synthem in big. Bywater reads so synthem with King. This is not to be understood as the summum human, but simply and "that which is good." They think that no pleasure is good, etter in itself (as the special are good in themselves) or relatively (as largerial are relatively good); for "good" and "pleasant" are not the same."

b. 12. § 4.] The Paragh. explains the connexion between this § and § 3—rà μεν οῦν δοποῦντα περί τῆς ῆδονῆς ταῦτά ἀστι ἔρητίου δε δι δ ἐδότει.

όλως μέν ούν σύκ άγαθόν] τ. ε. σύδεμια ήδονή είναι άγαθών ο 8

b. 13. δτ. . . . olnia] The reference here cannot (or, in justice, ought not to) be to Plato himself, for he did not regar lass pleasures as yenisms; see below note on vii 12 3, a, 8. The phrase persons ele φύσω αίσθητή does not occur verbalim in Plato's writings (alchoigh divardipmois αίσθητή does in Phieb 5t B. see Fritzsche, E. E. p. 182); it was probably used in the Platonic school, however; perhaps, Fri zsche tranks, by Speusippus. It may have been borrowed from Aristiquus (who is probably referred to in Phileb. 53 C does upi ήθονης οὐκ ἀπραφαριν ώς ἀκὶ γένεσει έστιν, οὐσία δί οὐκ ἔστι τὸ παραφαριν ήθονης); an expression of his preserved by D og. Last. ii 8. o. 85 (quoted by Frazsche, E. E. p. 181) resembles it - Αρώντεπου τίλος ἀπέφαινε τὴν λείαν εἰνησιν εἰκ αἴσθησιν ἀναδιδομένην,

The Paraph, gives the following version of the words before us 1152 b. 18.

(older... ning)—of his odn legiones hyderian hoody dyaddu state whose exceptions adapt hoody placed daring the placed dyaddu state of the phone years son parameter of older alabeth, hoody daring primare, ho de givent dyaddu dyadan placed of the proposes, hoody hoody hoody and win states drawdow dyadan give the proposes, and to present any drawd dyadan placed of the proposes, and the proposes of parameter of the proposes with the proposes, and the proposes of the

In a subpar perye the hords. This argument must not be b 16 are thed to Plato h meets. He recognised the value of the pleasures which attend the virtuous life: see Philob. 63 E Illias de hours dispose soi sotopie de exter, subcut oiseles have popie, en more soiture tue ped équies en souppouve, ent de ma francisme destine destine end tou outpouve, ent de ma francisme mary, subset p'yeu' tes d'ése per dépossions ent ens dille promodous mary, subset p'yeu' tes d'ése per dépossions ent ens dille subcide malaire malair nou divosis to per provious. Those asceties who argue that 'pleasure is had because the suppose avoids pleasure' fait into the error not ced in f'. I' it 3 5 did ea designer ses operas ésastics sub dei ent bre, ent bou Dia spossibles.

in δ φρόνιμος το άλυπον διώκει, οδ το ήδα] See ch. 12. § 7. The Parif h. has -δ φρόνιμος το άγαθος διώκει, την δε ήδονήν εὐ διώκει. But the good which the φρόνιμος seeks is not an abstraction; it is always given con retely in the έλη of the human affections and passions. It is therefore incorrect to say that the φρόνιμος shuns pleasure for the absence of γ sin. Pleasure for pleasure's sake he shurs; but not pleasure as the vehicle of duty. The dictum of Antisthenes expresses fretty exactly the Aristotehan (and hudeman) doctrine of the relation of φρώνησιε to ήδονή—'Αντισθένης δί την ήδουψε άγαθος είναι φοσώνει προσέθηκε την δρεταμέλητας: Athenaeus 513 (see Mullach, Fragm. Phil. ii. 286).

In durotion n.r.h.] But the pleasures of thought stimulate, do not b. 16. binder, thought, as will be shown later on.

τή τών ἀφροδισίων] Susern.hl and Bywater read τη with Kh, Mh, ti 17 Cambr., for Bekker's τήν.

En 14x19 (1) No argument of this kind in Plato, according to b. 18. Sper gel, p. 525, quoted by Fritzsche,

VOL. II

- 1162 b. 19. En musica e.r.h.] Children and brutes seek pleasure by an errotional impulse (disymmetric proposed Paraph), and that which is thus sought cannot be good. From this very fact, that oblished and brutes seek pleasure, the Cyrena cs, Fritzsche cluseres, drew the opposite conclusion—that it is good.
 - \$ 5. τού δε μή πάσας σπουδαίας | sc. αίτων είναι τινες εδιξαζεν (Ald. Schol.).
 - b. 22, νοσώδη] ' unhealthy.'

CHAPTER XII.

ARGUMENT

The premient mentioned in chapter 22. 44.4.5 do not prove that pleasure 21 not good as even that is 2. not the Chief Goods for 12, they remove the last that a termy may be 'good' in either of two senses—either 'good associasely,' There are doubtless many pleasures which are good resistancy to bad or impassed states and natures, and which are consequently has, but there are also pleasures which are good absolutely.

(a Therespone the fact that the term good may be applied to an actual function ar well as to a state or condition. It is arrest that pleasure is "mu good" be used to an impaired state, but the permitted of therefore are forgotion, which are not processes towards the restormists of impaired delea," one functions put forth by a perfect state. Even the pleasure attendance the satisfaction of a mostly vant is really a "function put forth" by an assumption in the state enquiring restoration.

The "goodness" of a state, then, is not the only or the highest "goodness there is also the "goodness" of function proceeding from state, and true is in-

higher kind of goodness."

Thus if is not necessary to suppose that there is conceiving better than Plazure, as the end is "better than" the process towards the end, for process into a "process towards" nor are all pleasures even a societal with "process" of it rather a "function proceding from"; it is an end reasized by the curved with decay constitute, not you undergoing a process und it to be depend, nor as a "process of which one is conscious," but as "undergoined functions,"

There are some again who, groung another measure to 'process, estensive pleasure and process' because, they argue, pleasure is an done y good. They

confound 'procest' and 'function,'

To argue that pleasures are bad because some freasunt things are bad for health, is absured for even themsing is sometimes bad for health. Neithro thought nor any faculty is hindered by its own pleasure, only by alice pleasures.

may the pleasure of thinking and training makes us think and learn all the

As for there being 'no are of pleasure' that is just what one might espect art with the orietious of the performance of a function, not with the actual function itself, as such,

As for the argument that the temperate mean shows pleasure used the process man seek the lefe described pain rather than the lefe of pleasure—we anisoned as alway, by descriping preasures; the pressures which are associated with painful crassing the exercise body pleasures. The temperate or product man andeed shows; but he has his own pleasures—those of the good lefe.

§ 1. μη είναι dyaθόν μηδέ το άριστον] As Michelet notes the 1152 b. 26. present chapter deals with μη είναι dyaθών, and ch. 13 with μηδέ το άριστον.

πρώτου μέν . . . καμνόντων] The apodos s begins b. 27 with sal al b. 26. powers. The term declared preserve must be understood to mean, not only that the general distinction, formulated in the protasis, between ea and me dynoon and to rive will be found approache to dynool operate and ifen, with the s surfaces and yeners, but also that a corresponding general distinction between to dake daulor and to tire may be inferred (on the principle laid down in E(N, v) 1, 6 dioloods δ΄ ών έπι το πολί, έων θύτερον πλευναχώς λίγητας, καλ θύτερον πλευναχώς Aéyenbas), and that it will be found applicable to porhas piones and For, with their accious and persons. The Paraphrast sees the-*Οτι γάρ ούε άνάγεη διά τούς εξρημίνους λάγους μή εξναι την ήδονην άγοθαν. μηδί το άμιστον, έκ τώνδε δίλον. έπει γάρ το άγαθον διχώς λέγεται, το μέν άπλως επί επθ' σύτο και ευριώς ώς ή άρετη, το δε εύχ όπλως μίν αγοθάν, τωλ δε άγωθύν, ώς το λωποδυτείν τώ λωποδύτη άγαθύν, ελκόλουθον έστιν ότι εκί φυσιε πάσα, καί έξιε, και πάσα κινησιε, καί γένισιε, ή μίν έσται δυλώς syndy, h di ran. duning and int rad morou meninces yep, and you occe and Terr, at ure paidar andur, at di rim, ant ros publice ruit and at ues and nel paikal rus, al de sorá rusa recerer, ani okiyou pedror.

The argument in this & directed against of layourer up along dyalous the hoose, may be explained as sollows. When we say that a thing is 'good,' we mean, either that it is good without qualification good nuself this W selom is good in uself, w thout qualification—or that it is good in a qualified sense—not in itself, but in relation to something class: thus the venom of a snake is good in relation to the welfare of the snake, the amputation of a limb is good in relation to the survival of the patient, but they are 'bad' in themselves—of. M. M. a. 7, 1205 a. 29 fore yap & door parks, ofer & rese

Now, those who say roundly that 'no pleas ires are good ' reguint a excusively monous and processes (surpose on yesters), with at a 'good only in a relative sense, and 'bad' in themselves-wiz. that . motions and processes which belong to bad or impured and ir (m and) and states (ifne) The motions and processes (equivalent in the view of the philosophers here critic sed, to the pleasures) bad natures are good for the possessors of the bad natures the their own pleasures, see E. N. i. 8, 10), but are n themselves had i.e. unworthy of luman nature: the minutes and processes of remedial kind which restore impaired natures and states to the normal condition, are good for the possessors of the impaire of natures or states, but had in themselves-i.e not characteristic of healthy human nature: indeed they are often not even felt as pleasures by the patients, but are only thought to be pleasurer because they remove pain. It is from looking exclusively, then, at these 'preasures' the 'relatively good but 'intrinsically bad motions and processes of (1) bad, and (2) impaired natures and states, that they draw the sweeping corclusion - no pleasures are good.' They ignore the existence of picasures (indicated in the next §) belonging to the free activities of the rational nature of man, which, as rational, is good in itself and suffers no lesses needing painful repair. The argument of this §, as given above. is summed up later on by the writer hunself-vii. 14. 4 en of anaudaiae dy dance à filosof die déa raina, Sanes expres, are at per mailes Directe eles apageis . . . al d' larpites éviceur.

On the ground that the quaku suppose out it to be subdivided in the same manner as the anordian, Rassow (Firsch pp. 81, 82) confectures that after a pir divide parkets b. 29 the words of 84 rmi use quaket have follow out, and instead of unde standing divide with alread 8' of b. 31 (as Bekker's godror, alperal 8' of requires—if. All Sciol, wirel 8' and airele alperal nine view), he conjectures godror aleres, dei 8' of. The last conjecture excepted by Sus, gives, I think a good meaning, and is palaeographically probable. Brusher's algorithm (durker) 8' of b. 31 does not seem to me to bring out so well the centrast intended, who his between the andoir durket all is quite as man him favour of supplying die as durkets—of 8' obts aform 140, also were in favour of supplying die as durkets—of 8' obts aform 140, also were

cias to voccupie topai na ierpean tire ore more, dribne de cia eight aperal 1152 b 26. olds del oi de of I cannot, however, accept Rassow sother proposal the insertion of al de rivi mir paidan in b. 29 (accepted by Sus. .. This would favour Russow's, I trank mistaken, view that delast is tised in two serses in this \$ -in the chause to me you danne to do tive in its orderary sense, as defined in Top. in 11, 115 b. 20 to d' aghine ear o de photoco apoaredioros opeis ari oudan éven h và évantion-s. e.= per se, in tseif," wishout qualification," "in the al stract," "ohne Emericankung, schleenthin'; but in the clause of per andor arch. h. 29 in another sense, meaning 'generally,' 'in the majority of cases," as opposed to rivi, "in an exceptional case. For this second meaning of dahar Rassow quotes E.A. v. 1. 9 1129 b. 2 wept νόγωθα Ιστοι (τε. ό άδιερε), ού πουτο, όλλο πυρι όσο ευνιχία και ανυχίο, δ cors par andier del dyadd, reel d'obe del. But if andor in v. 1, 9 mouns "keneraly," 'in the majority of cases,' as distinguished from 'in t self - why is decaded? The writer of v 1. 9 means, I take it, that 'thoney' (e.g.) it inclif, or in the abstract, is always regarded as something good; though when we view it in the concrete qualified as "the profligate's money '-we may think of it as a bad thang. So in the present § (vi., 12 1) dahar may, I salmit, be translated 'per se' in both places where it occurs.

of \$' oos' showed 'median apera' (Runisauer). The motions 5, 31, which proceed from a barl nature, though good and pleasant to trial rature, as being its own motions, are in themselves bad, the motions which are called forth to aday pain and wart are not good in themselves, or even pleasant, but are chosen merely as less exils than the pain and want which they also. No wonder that these who confine their attention to motions of these two kinds arrive at the conclusion that 'pleasure is not good.'

1152 b 33. 'good' they have to consider in this connexion is that of the test of They argue the ign, as end, is 'good' and real', therefore the -- casure, which is a viveres a nationaria ils me during ifin, is not "good and or 'real' in its own right. This is the argument for which Socrat # ### gives thanks a Philab. 54 C. D obsolv flowing, charp years for we wan event revor advices of deapthys gippost he . . . advance the purposaure to the ήθουης πέρι το γινιστεν μέν, οδοίαν δι μηδ ήντικουν αυτής είναι χαριν έχο δεί δήλου γώρ δει ούτος των φισκόντων ήδουήν άγαθου είναι κιτατί 🗀 📥 But the "good" of the Eur is not the only "good" to be considered. 2110 this connexion. The ign is for the sake of the inciprio which price to ceeds from it, and the wipyou is 'good' in a more embert server the than the ig.s. What if pleasure be, not a 'motion with a generalra es (nonne - yevene) the ife, but a furction which proceeds for --1. - if rijs decreases ifour everyone, and so the true obour of the items? I his, it is suggested, is a point which is overlooked by of higgeries as είναι άγαθαν την ήδονήν.

> It is thus in the form of criticism that the writer introduces Lo own theory of pleasure as everyeen the note from efewer. And is to to be no ed how completely he makes his own theory occupy the ground hear the very first. Not only are the idoral of thought which involve no pain or craving, orgynal the nord doors ifent but evett al nongere and ac projects al nudicianant ele une fouriere efer-tie generative motions which restore a ign depend on the unimpared part of the ific or the ific qual unimpaired (h evidence ific) - per forming an delipyon and it is his delipyon of the at, a paired part of the Her, or of the Her quel unimpared, which is the pleasure wherefore no merely secondary and apparent pleasure-expensed in connex on with the yearner, anandipuous or largers, by which a water is satisfied. If the itis were entirely destroyed had no remaint of vitality left in it, it could not be restored. 'largers implies the ris midicatrix naturar. The pressure experienced in restoration is thus the random of the organism, and unimparted, against the juin and want of its partially impaired conducts. There are, howeverother pleasures which are the spontaneous actions of their Herr.

> The pussage (in b 33...obors a. z) may be paraphrased as follows. Again, the term "good" is applicable to a function and the state:—the natural state being "good" the motions which restore a man to it are, of course, "good," and "pleasant" demant vely. If these "motions" are what we are to understand by "pleasures," then our opponents have made out their tase—no

pleasures are "good." But we must not allow them to stop short 1162 b 33. at the "goodness" of the more state. The "goodness" of its function is higher; and when desire for restoration is being satisned, the state, in so far as it remains partly un impaired, performs a function: it is this function which is the pleasure experienced in he restorative process—not but that there are pleasures without accompanying pain and desire for instance the functions of thought, proceeding from a state, or faculty, which lacks nothing to the famess of its nature.' Aspasius has a good commentary (145. 1 Her thut) inci de rou ayabou ro min evépyem ro de effe, un effe per agodor auty, die ériggen de à car aperir érepgen, and ainthus per uryattur des éfer (dayo de aladherer refe dévapar, & de nor érippeaux aladheres eyather is impresa), i fidori dyather inter on it is ifte and is drippera the present nara angifetigues de ai drankapuante nal anomerannament, al sinte eis the chance, fidelice uponymulieus uie yap holipella dia to despreie the φυσων τριφορανών ήμων λογω δέ φύσιν την ψυχην, ένεργεί γορ τότε ή Εμπτική, επό διά τούτα ήδυμεθα, συμβαίνει δέ τα τηνικαύτα και άναπλήpour yesiadar. Far. de fi jedant entryera rus bradainos en quin piasous απι έξεως. από γορ ένδεεις ώμεν αυτό το σωμά την γε φύσεν υπολελειμpiene sai devapingo io aitij iospysie sunper (hate Diele) aveno avpnaudoras airi ras virias sal vas nuras incepçãos, sai je pie nonsi) sar ενώγγεων, εστά συμάτητος δε, ως φησιν, άνσελήρωσες γίνεται νου ενδιοντές ev To ampata

al national so al empone had al person—(a sort of henciallys) b 34.

"the ampone which produce and restore ifers' to be carefully distinguished, as district free vii. II. 4 observe pieces supprise role reduce), from the dispyrate, or functions, which proceed from the ifer. The mixer's point is that his opponents, not locking beyond the good of the ifer, forget that there are dispyrate proceeding from the ifer twhich are better than the ifer), as well as augment (—preven) leading up to it. The tendency to acquise in the good of the mere ifer is one to which the Austotelian school offers of position all along the line—if. E N is 8 9 rip min yap ifer independent in approximation in the phrase at authorizons in the purishe iffer Fritzsche quotes Philib. 42 D ile bigs the airon phone disar maliaritan, rading at the nationary hoods are holder as how there are disarbed as applicable at the phrase airon phone are how allowing a transmissions in the process in the process of the process is the process of the process of the process of the phrase air are process of the process of

done &' h delegates de rais dusbunious rûs ônoholuou exemp nal b. 38 divers] 'but what performs the function (i.e. actually experiences

1162 b. 35. planure), when the desires are being satisfied, is that which ich of the natural state. 'Enipsia is used here in a way which seems to anticipate the identification made in § 3.

TRONOIROU (Kb, NC, Asp.) bicans 'temanarig,' left untructby the decay which has destroyed the rest of the state of we 14. 7, which is a complete commentary on the present passage - we 474 de nara evypletymus idea sa larpevinsa. Ore yap avythume insperience 100 broughteneros cycour aparromos re, deu rouro ide donce come pare d' se des. à stoise spossie ege tonarde diurene. The realing of Mb, CCC = 201 Cambr. - 6 solomo (adopted by Zed, Coraes, and Michelet), 75 plausible on account of himse in the line below, but nust by d sinisped, 13 mechasistent wit I the the imprepared byone of the 24 Nor can the meaning given I) the Ald. Scho. and et sers 10 omodainos, viz. 'defective' (frat egs dastafapsing fristene and es content obaye spourirou Ald. Set)-suggested apparently by air islande along 1153 a. 1-be defended, implooned can mean only this behind 'left untouched,' 'remaining.' Lb and Ob have carboros, and " apparently takinobe (indigentia et imper/ecti).

Grant gives the gist of § 2 excellently when he says. The argument is that it is only life, and the vital action i before iffe in course original) which is good and pleasant: the restorative processes are only secondarily, non-essentially, and by a sort of a freence preasant. . . . The argument goes on to add that, even in these restorative processes, there is vital action (evipped), namely of those organs that remain unimpaired.

- b. 30. [seef] The transition marked by incidence may be brought on thus. In restorative processes the pleasure is the reaction of the vitality left in the igic. but a mast not be supposed that all pleasure is reaction, for there are pleasures which are spontaneous actions. For this are of incident attouch, and out that processes, vii. 12. 7 6 company designs various, and along flood and companies.
- 1158 a. 3. σημείον δ΄] εε, τοῦ καὶ ἄνου λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας είναι ἡλονός (Fritzsche). Cf. M. M. 11 7. 1205 b. 20 όπει δ΄ οῦν ἐστεν ἡ είναις και καθευτηκύας, οἰον καθευταμένης μεν αὶ εξ ἐνδειας ἀναπληρωσεις, καθευτηκύας δὲ κὶ ἀπὸ της διγεως κοὶ της πεοτε και τῶν τοιοίτων οῦσαι, βελτίσες ἀν είμαων αὶ καθευτηκύας τῆς ψετικος ἐπργεωι ὁ ηλρ ἡδοναὶ καν ἀμφατέρονε λεγόμεναι τοὺς τρόπους εντητειαι κίνων ώστε δήλον ότι αὶ ἀπὸ τῆς δίγεως ἡδοναὶ καὶ της ακοῆς καὶ του δωνοκιστέι βελτιστικ ἀν είμαμν, ἐκοὶ αὶ για κωματικαὶ ἐξ ἀνακληρώσεως.

Both pieneures—that of disordifferent and that of disordiffer—are 1188 a. 2. impress—vital functions proceeding from their respective states; but the former is and to be confused with the accompanying disordifferent, while the latter is ignored by those who, on the streng had the confusion, conclude that 'pleasure is not good. The circumstance, however, that there are plainly two classes of things called 'pleasure' (nôtes)—the one indefinite, the other perfectly definite—indicates that here are two kinds of pleasure. The first kind of pleasure is related to anything which, however temperately and superficially, relates the freezing want (e.g. to determ to handle, really parameter (to pure or dishort of nones), the second to things really parameter (to pure or dishort of the entire case of healthy functions, and the special circumstances in which and in which alone—these functions are manifested in their full perfection.

The following passage in M. M. n. 7, 1204 b. 6-36 renders the clockrine of vii. 12 2 excel ently, showing (1) that there are some Be casures, viz. how and rot dropen and those of seeing, smaling, and hearing, which are obvious y not yearer, and (2) that, after all, no pleasure is a yourne even the pleasure experienced in eating or drinking is the lvepyou of a part of the work, and accompanies, but is not to be confounded with, the process by which tanger or thirst is releved fore yop aparon per of name admin porente à yan and toi fempelo hand penquire our inter perent, and à and ros dissources un (ideir not) de partificate ob gap de cirdrius γιοομίνη, ώσπερ έπε των άλλων, οδον έπ του φαγείν ή πιειν. εύται μέν γάρ ik irdelae oal ύπερβολής γίνουται, τῷ ή τὴν ενδειαν άναπληρούσθαι ή τῆς ύπερμολής άφπερείσθου διό γίνεσες δυκεί είναι, ή δ' ένδεια και ύπερβολή Abung. Abung odo seranda duda ijdonie zineare. Int de zu roi ideir nat διούσει και διοφρανθήνη, οδε έστιν προλυπηθήναι αυδείε γάρ ήθομενος τώ don't to document a morningly. Spains di and int the during fore θυσρουστά τι ήδισθαι άνευ του προλυπηθηναι. Ευτ' είη ών τις ηδονη ή ούκ έστι γένεσες εί αθν ή μεν ήδονή, ως ό λόγος αίτων έμη, διά τοιτο οίκ מישילים, בירו קוֹבּפּטנג, פֿנדי לפֹ דני וְלַסְינוֹן, אַ סְנֹיה פֹנדיני עְנִיפּטיני, מנֹידין בני פּנק άγοθάν, τὰ δ' όλον οἰκ ἔστιν οὐδιμία ἡδονή γάνσισ' οὐδό γάρ αὐται α[dud tob payeir sai mich famal out eid. yeridere, akka bianaptarouter of πώτας φασκοντις είναι τὰς ήδουας γενίσεις. αίονται γάρ, ἐπειδή τῆς προσdespite garmange garren fidang, did rawa gonean einar fore & ob. energy yap dore the Punge to popul of hochebu dia th upumband de lugie bediebt, τουτο τό μοριου τής ψυχής ευτργεί και κινείται, ή δε κινήσει αίπου και ή ένεργεικ έστιν ήδονης διά δή το άμα τη πρασφαμά έκεινο το μόριον το τήν

- 1163 a. 2. ψυχής ένεργείν, ή διά την αύτου ένέργειαν, οδουται γένεσον εξοαι την ήδους το την προσφοράν δηλην είναι, τό δε της ψυχής μυρισκάδηλαν. Εροιον εξους εί τις τον άνθρωπον οίεται εξους πωρα, ότι τουτο μεν οίσθητάν έττικ, ή δυγυχή οδ΄ έττι δε γε καὶ [ή] ψυχή. Είναιος δε καὶ έτὶ τούτους έττιν γόρο μόριον τι της ψεχης ψ ήδομεθο, ὁ άμα τῆ προσφορα ένεργει. Βιο οίπ έστιν ούδεμία ήδου) γενεσις.
 - 2. διέστηκεν] The MSS, have συνέστηκεν, but a correction in CCC anticipates the conjecture of Banitz—διέστηκεν, indepted by Bywater.
 - § 3. Fit our drayen frepor in elect βελνιου της ήδονης] The Paraph, is wrong in thinking that the writer passes on here to discuss the second of the two points indicated at the beginning of this chapter—on δ' οὐ συμβωνοι δια τούτο μη είναι όγουου μηδά τὸ ἄριστον, ἐκ τῶνδε δηλον. He is still concerned with the first point and does not deal with the second till vil. 13, 2.
 - wower rives face k.r.h.] The argument 'that there is something "better than" pleasure, e.e. something for the sake of which pleasure is chosen, because pleasure is only a yourne, falls to the ground, far pleasure is not a yerrors. For the distinction between the vides or olom) and the yearse, on which this argument relies, see Philip. 54 C (queted by Zell and Fritzsche) doub leading viscous diana Dans ούσιας τινός έκαστης ένικα γίγνισθαι, (υμπασαν δέ γενεσιν ούσιας ένεα ylyneador founcage, ornor ifteny ye, einer yevene inter, inexa two outlink if draying yeyout ar. It ye may no deem to draw too yeyoperdel ylypost de, de tij tod dyadoù polog excled date to de teris inta γιγνομενον ε ε άλλην μοιραν βετερν. δρ' ούν ήδονη γε, είπερ γενεσίε ίστο, είς διλην ή την του αγαθού μοίραν αυτήν τιθέντες δρθως θημορέν, δρέσουτα μέν οδν. οδκούν τῷ μηνύσαντι της ήδονης πέρι το γενεσιν μέν, οδσίον δε ijdovije dyadde cieae karayeda. Here Plato trianks others for the fixmula yeman inter i idom. See a so Philele 53 C apa and if toris oil οπηπικιμέν ώς είτε γέσταις έστεν οδοίο δε ούκ έστε το παριπαν βδονής; παιψικ yap by rues [generally thought to be the Cyrenaics: see Grant, Ethier vol. 1 p. 176, Lesay r] où rouror rou hoyan intresponne pagement have all dei gaper agent. The formula then was not invented by Plato and he did not apply it to the pleasures of thought and of the higher senses, except in a way which deprives it of the significance which it has as applied to those of eating and

denking for although he thinks of the former pleasures as 1163 a. 8 δυπληρωσεις he disanguishes them, as καθαραί και δείν λύπης from the latter, which are δπαλλαγοί λυπης: see Kep. 584, and Phileb. 58, 52.

Grant may be right when he says, speaking of the argument delease to reloc ris presents criticised in the present section. In all probability the school, and perhaps the actual writings, of Speakingpus are here alieded to."

od ydo yevereis elvir odbi perd yeverews navai navai, of course, a o refers to orde part yearness only. No preasures are yearner, although be me are però yestatue. The words aidi yunquinun authainapas, equisalers to on you prevent riole, must be translated so as not to Can eached the truth perà persone rivie fourar eleat. Toutaires. as in the formula of the syllogorn Top i. 1, and as one sense of the term is defined in Mel. 2. 30, 1025 a, 30 (Negrou de sai without antiquest, ofth oan empties suff and quarte his on all orders Sera clov red rpsyweg ra dec apthat lyou), marks necessary consequence, as of the effect from its cause, the property from the essence. It 25 if the sense, and not in that of accidental concomitance, that it must be understood here. Gant's result from trings his out well- 'they do not result from our coming to our powers (yourseless). but from our using those powers (xpoperory.' The subject of yere perso and χρωμένων is ήμων. Pérecu is sometimen materially neceseary to the appears (e.g. the brokomos igs of the hungry man feels pleasure, on the occasion of eating), but is not to be identified with it.

αλλά τών είς την τελέωσεν άγομένων της φώσεως] = των επθιστασων 8.12 είτ την φυσικήν έξεν, αποστάπες το Ramsauer είνε άγομένων is mid île, and its subject is κυήσεων understood. This is the view of the Paraph also, who has—Ked γορ τών ένεργειών όσαι μεν είν τελεωσεν άγουσε φύσεως, ολε αίταί είσε τέλος, ώσπερ ή καθ έξεν ιατρικήν ένεργεια τώσε έχαι την άγειαν άσηι δε αίτα άγουσεν είς φυσικήν τελείωσεν, αλλί αίται είσεν ή φυσική τελείωσες, δήλων ώς αὐε έχουσεν άλλο τέλος, άλλά άλλων αὐταί είσε τέλη ώσπερ εί τις κατά τήν τελείν έξεν τής άρειης εκργεί.

I are inclined to think that the writing is very careless, and that exercises is passive, its subject being the persons whose nature (rips forces) is in question. I think that it is easier to suppose care-

kesmess of this kind, than to take dyouteur = dyour or.

- Side act of nation as 1. The definition rejected on 1 h keeplu 21 grounds here (and, so lar as yinger is involved, also in x, 3 g) 20 21 very different from that accepted by Australe as accepted for the more popular purpose of the sculent of theton. -Rick. 1. 12. 1369 b. 33 inconsiculus δ' ήμιν είναι την ήδουην κίνησίν των της ψηγής σώ επασταστασιν αθρούν και ολαθηθήν είς την ίπαρχουσαν φυσω λίπην δε συναντών. Ramsauer (p. 487) quotes two other passages in which Aristotic describes presente in terms which recall there of the define non here condemned, viz. Probl. 878 is 11 ή είς το αυτο φασο άδον ήδε, είν η αλαθηθήνη, and Ε. Ν. is 9. 9 το δ' ολαθην δυναργών εν άρχων από αντό (ήθυσε γαρ όγαθον ζωή, το δ' όγαθον δυναργών εν άρχων αλαθανοθού ήδε).
- 14. dλλd μάλλον λεκτίον δυίργειαν α.τ.λ.] 'Aristotic,' says Grant, 'when writing accurately destinguishes pleasure from the moments of life and consciousness (δυίργεια) from which it is inseparate Cf. x. 5. 6. He lowever, does not more spec feally define it than as insyrpaperor το τίλος (τῆ συγγεία) Eth. x. 4. 8. Ludentus does not preserve the distinction, but samply says that pleasure social bedefined as "the unimpeded glay of life." Aristotic homeif occursionally writes in this way: cf. Med. xi. 7. 7 (x. 7. 1072 b. 16) income flowly if δυίργεια τούτου."
- dνεμπόδιστον] dνεμποδιστος occurs nowhere in the <math>E(N), and order here and in ch. 13 § 2 in the E. E.; but in Pol. & 9. 1295 a. 35 the following wares occur-ei yap eakor in rais ifficult suprat to run ebdalpura Blov eleas for aut apethe dreamobiotor at A. Hence B 7digen (Benerkungen gum siebenten buch der Nu machis ben Ethit : Philolog. x 199-210, 263-292) maintains that Anstone must refer to E. N. va, because it is only in E. N. vir that the term derpendiores occurs: consequently, that E.A. v.a is by Amstotie. Against this view Spengel (Arest Stud pp. 189 sqq) has title difficulty in showing that the reference in the Polities is not to the defin tion of Gori given in vii, but to the doctrine of E. Al i and x, according to wł sels endarmonia is éngrycin Przijs war apergy rekelar én Boy rekelig son toly early dyadole learns sexupplynues, the term distinibutor being employed to sum up what is there expressed by a dis videos and τοίν εκτον σημίδους διανώς ειχυρηγημέν $\phi + f \in \mathcal{E}(N, 1, 10, 12$ τα δε μογώλο (run arvignurun) . . . epwedifer undhais enpresais. See also Grant, Ethics, Essay i. vol. i. pp. 55, 56.

¹ Met. A is post-Aristoteaun : see Rose, de Arrit incr ent. et ma cr p. 242

The dosproblemes despress of vil is, after all, not very different 1153 a. 15 from the related hi the integrant of fibers of E. N. x (4.5). According to E. N. z pleasure perfects, or is the perfection of, an irripyerasuperver es upon il, or crowns il, as beauty crowns youth (x, 4/8)various pleasure an impyrio is, in fact, dribin-falls short of the fall vitality which it is its raison d'être to realise. In the planeology of E N vii, such an inequal is 'impeded,' that not free play.' I leastire is the free play of a function in E, N, vii; in E, N, x it is 'the perfection of a function.' As in Pol a. 9 decumodiores takes the place of the ediment of F(N) in the statement of the clostrate of education, so in E. N. vi it takes the place of the reduct of E. N. x 4 6 in the statement of he doctrine of isonic. Undue importance has been attached to the difference between the douptodecres everyour i idoun of vir and the reduced the evipyour if howin of x, because the doctrine on he rie glory to amoror (vii. 13. 2), logically necessitated by the former formula, has been thought to mark the writer of vir as a 'hedon'st.' I have fired to show (note on vii. 11. t. 1152 b. 1) that his ethical position is substantially the same as that of the writer of F N. x. He differs merely to attempting to do note with the term before, as a symbol of thought, than the writer of E. N. x attempts, and he perhaps strains its use. He is, in short somewhat scholastin, but a no sense a 'hedonist.' And, as has been noticed above, he does not stand alone in identifying ndery and evipyen The writer of Met. 1. 7, 1072 b. 16 describes God's I fe as impyria, (w) discrep, and olding, using these expressions as interchangeable. It may perhaps be said that it is natural to fall into a more scholastic use of terms in describing the life of God than in describing the life of man, and that while Met. A 7 is not in obsistent with Aristotel an principles, the present treatise s, being 'hedonistic.' To this we may answer—that it is not 'he I mism' o i lent fy the highest pleasure with the highest function Hedonism' takes no account of the pleasure of act on; its highest good is passive enjoyment. Aristote-innism represented by the writer of vil as well as by the writer of x-places pleasure in a position of philosophical dignity which it does not occupy in any other Genk school As eldagionia is Life what a man does, not what he recover—so bleasure is not more relief, or even passive enjoyment, but that who h sustains fun tom-or, as the writer of su says more stroply, it is function. So intimately is it bound up with Lafe, that it is cafficult to say which is chosen for the sake or which

2183 a. 18. (E. N. x. 4. 11). All living beings striving after fulness of the acceptaing to their kinds it is in the consciousness of successful life—r.e. in pleasure—that, for man and the other animals, the fulness of life is actually given. Life and Pleasure therefore carrect be separated as outer and inner—

Natur hat weder Kern noch Schale: Alles ist sie mit einem Male.

The high position thus assigned to Pleasure by the side of, or rather in implication with, Life, or the Chief Good, marks the theory contained in vii and x as one to be viewed in a practical, or mora, rather than in a scientific light. The question, as I have said, which the theory sets itself to answer is (in spite of superficul appearances to the contrary) not 'What is pleasure as a physiclogical or psychological phenomeron?" but Is it good? And if so, how?'-i.e. What are the relations of the values pleasures to the good life?' Some of them don'tless hinder it; but otheragain sustain and heighten it. The hedonists placed the wrong pleasures-those of passive enjoyment-highest; the Platon sts unduly degree ated pleasure. To show, as against both seloothat the pleasures of virtuens function, or Duty, crown life with perfection, seems to me to be the object of the Aristotelian theorya practical, or moral, object, which is misrepresented by Mill when he points out (truly enough) that the object of a scientific perchokers has not been attained that no answer, or worse than no answer has been given to is question, 'What is pleasure?' See M.H. Excenmation of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy ch. 25, p. 486. As strake's theory, which, as understood by our author, differs little from his own, is presented by Sir W. Hamilton in the following words (Lechaer on Met. is. 452): "When a sense, for example, is in perfect health, and it is presented with a suitable object of the most perfect kind, there is effected the most perfect energy, which at every instant of its continuance is accompanied with plasare" The same holes good with the function of Imagination, Thought, &c. Pleasure is the concernitant in every case where powers and objects are in thermelves perfect, and between which there subsists a suitable relation." The conditions whereon upon this showing pleasure depends are the health ness of the sense, and the perfection of the object presented to it. This is simply making the fact its

This is the theory of E. N. x rather than of wit,

own theory. When is a sense in perfect health, and its object 1153 a. 15. perfect? The function of a sense is twofold—as a source of cognition and of feeling. If the perfection means be in the function. of cognition, the doctrine that pleasure depends on this is manifirstly erroneous: according to Sir W. Hamilton it is even the reverse of the truth, for he holds that the knowledge given by an act of sense and the feeling accompanying it are in an inverse proportion to one another. Remains the supposition that the perfection of which Aristoile speke was perfection not in respect of cognition but of feeing. It cannot, however, consist in acuteness of feeling, for our acutest feelings are pains. What, then, constitutes it? Pleasurableness of feeling: and the theory only tells us that pleasure is the result of a pleasurable state of the sense and a pleasure-giving quality in the object presented to it. Ar stotle and Sir W. Hamilton did not certainly state the doctrine to themselves in this manner; but they reduced it to this by affirming pleasure or pain to depend on the perfect or imperfect action of the sense, when there was no criterion of imperfect or perfect action except that a produced pain or pleasure.' Mal is perhaps right n has contention that our scientific knowledge of the nature of pleasure is not curulied by the statement that 'it is the concomitant of perfect action,' But as a protest against those who said 'all pleasure is evil," and those who made passive enjoyment the end, be statement is of great ethical importance. An interesting account of the Plateme and Aristotelian theories of pleasure, and notices of later theories, notably of Kant's, will be found it. Ham I on a Le tures on Met Lect. 43. Kant's theory of pleasure and rain is thus stated in his Anthropologie § 60, as rendered by Hamtion, Met 1 472 - Pleasure is the feeling of the furtherance (Beforderarg), pain of the hindrance of life. Under pleasure is not to be understood the feeling of life; for in pain we feel life no less than in pieusure, may perhaps even more strongly. In a state of pain life appears long, in a state of pleasure it seems brief, it is only, therefore, the feeling of promotion—the furtherance of life which constitutes pleasure. On the other hand, it is not the mere hindrance of life which constitutes pain; the hindrance must not only exist, it must be felt to exist." These definitions of pleasure and pain,' Hamilton observes, 'are virtually i len it il with those of Aristotle, only far less clear and explicit.' But Kant's theory soon parts company from Aristotle s, as may be seen from another passage

1153 a. 15, in the Antheopologie, which, however, I quote to show that Kant, though differing from Aristotic in important respects, is at one with him in having a practical purpose to serve with his theory of pleasure; and I would suggest that the Kartian theory of pleasure is as analy to be imprepresented as the Anstotelian, if treated as a contribution to 'scientific psychology.' The passage is given by Ham lion (Met in 472) as follows- If I leasure be a feeling of the promotion of life, this presupposes a hindrance of life; for there can be no promotion if there be no foregoing Lindraice to overcome. Since, therefore, the hindrance of life is pain, pleasure must presuppose pan.... When we cast our eyes on the progress of things, we discover in ourselves a ceaseless tendency to escape from our present state. To this we are compelled by a physical stimulus ... But in the intellectual nature of man there is also a standas which operates to the same end. In thought man is always dissatisfied with the actual; he is ever looking forward from the present to the future. . . Man is urged on by a necessary of his maure to go out of the present as a state of pun, in or ler to find in the future one less inksome. Man thus finds himself in a never-ceasing pain; and this is the spur for the activity of human nature. Our lot is so east that there is nothing endaving for us but pain. . . . Pleasure is nothing positive; it is only a aberation of pain, and therefore on y semeth ug negative . . It is certainly the racution of Providence that by the alternation of pain we should be urged on to activity. Here Kant applies his theory and is significance hes in the practical application lie makes of it, not in the scientific meaning which may be extracted from the terms in which it is couched | No one can find a heasure in the continual enjoyment of deaghts; these soon pal upon us ... There is no permanent pleasure to be reaped except in labour alone. . . . Labour is irksome, abour has its annovances, but these are fewer than these we should experience were we without labour. As man, therefore, must suck even his recreation in toil uself his life is at best one of vexation and sorrow. . . . Men think that it is angraveful to the Creator to say that it is the design of Providence to keep as in a state of consumt pain; but this is a wise provision to order to urge human nature on to exertion. Were our joys permanent we should never undertake aug at new. That life we may call har py which a furnished with all the means by which pain can be overcome, we have, in fact, no other conception of human happiness."

A very different conception this of life and happiness, and of the 1183 a 15 relation of pleasure to I fe and I appiness, from Aristotle's: my object, however, is not to contrast the theories, as such, of Aristotle and Kasat, but to illustrate by another example the danger of taking a theory of pleasure (and the remark appares to any particular theory activanced by a great moralist in the construction of his ethical system-r. g. to a theory of Conscience such as Cardinal Newman's, or of Will such as Kant's) out of the context of the ethical system its which it is embedded, and of wating it as a contributionvaluable or worthless - to 'psychology.' Thus Kant's 'theory' that 'pleasure is nothing positive' may be accepted as a valuable Psychological truth (as by Schopenhauer), and a whole system of Psychological truths' may be deduced (to the psychologist's satisfaction) from it; or it may be rejected as 'psychologically unten-"Labe" But plainly our view of its significance as that which helps want to express, in yet another figure, his deepest thought in Dreserce of the problem of life, is not affected in the least by the favourable or unfavourable verdet of 'scientific psychology,' I mideed, 'tantenable psychology' matters as little in Kant as untentake Professive cosmology in Milen. So with Aristo les theory of Deasure Mill's or ticism may effecturely dispose of it, as absertacted by H is alter from its ethical centext, and presented as a contribution les psychology; but it is not a con'ribution to psychology. It is an ** ** ategral part of Austotle's theory of duty - 'The performance of drity,' Aratocic tells us, 'has its own pleasure, which ensures and perfects The performance. All other peasures are inferior to this pleasure. The ascence who say that pleasure is not good, and that we can do Our duty with but aid from pleasure, at I the hedonists who say that the pleasures of passive enjoyment are the only pleasures worth becking, are wrong." Mill's criticism misses all this.

deri de rou alabara desundoisteror of the term alabaran. In substitute the term desundoisteror for the term alabaran. It goes without saying that, being an irregion frequent fixed, it is alread or trained in consciousness, but unless it be desundoistero, it is not real sed as pleasant. The term alabaradas is wide enough, according to Aristotelian usage, to cover the consciousness of thought, as well as that of sensation. I therefore think that the Paraghrast goes off on a wrong line here, when he says if yap is roughly design indoiring the deriv alabara.

vol. II.

Somei de yeverie rivin elvai, dei nuplue dyabor This refers that c the Platonists hitherto criticised, but probably to the Cyrenauts. and yirens must be here understood to mean the enterme of operation of a ice, not the process by which a ice is formed or restored, as the term was unferstood by the Platonists. The hedonists here referred to maintain that Pleasure is really of perfectly good (audior dyadór), hence that it cannot be a igo, which is only potentially or imperfectly good, but n'ust be a yimou tre real sation or operation of a Her: of E.N. 1.7.13 (quoted here by Ramsauer) riv and integrated between augustrepor yap actin describility action. Instead of the term yierous, the writer suggests the term impyers at better fitted to sign fy the operation of a fee Rassow (Fort. A p. 100) reads row for the vir of the MSS, after yieron, on the ground that the clause mentions a view which has not hitherto been alluded to. It's words are. Diese Worte vid voll gunverstand of . wenn man sie auf die in dem vorhergeben len Satze bestrictene Platomache Lehre bezieht. Man hat daher wold nist Grant an de-Cyrena ker zu denken. Damit es aber erkeunhar wird, dass man es not einer reuen und noch nicht besprochenen Ansicht zu than hat, ist wie ich glaube, das obne dies auffal ige me nach giveen in riob zu an lern. Diese von mir schon, Observ Crit p. 28, von reschlagene Aerderung ist von Bekker in der kleineren Ausgabe von 1861 (and by Susena d and Bewater) aufgenommen worden 1 ve Paraphrast, der die Stelle richtig erklärt, hat vielle cht ring gelesen: γένεσες δι έδοξε τισιν είναι ήδουή ότι φουτο την ήδουήν είναι το αυροπε ayabbr sai vi aprover vo de supios ayabir irrepyerar ciras irrepyerar le καὶ γενεσιν μηδεν άλλήλων διαφέρευν το δέ ούχ ούτως έχει."

- 19. ταύτη | πριις χρηματισμέν. He means that both idea and insuit
 may be bad αυτό συμθεθηκός—in some particular relation, but ther

are not, on this account (acrá ye roiro) bad in themselves- poils 1158 a. 10. delas

f 6] answers vi. 11. 4 fr. immodior vi diment of fibord, on the 20. lines of E N. x. 5. 1/4 1-7, where it is laid flown that every function l. is our (olec's) pleasure, which stimulates and perfects it, and that if a function is good (as judged, we must assure, not by the subjective standard of pleasurable feeing, but by the objective standard of correspondence with environment) its pleasure is good. It is by thus connecting pacasure with function, or correspondence with convironment, that Aristotelianism meets bedomen and exercisism. It is to be observed that the writer here speaks of he its being impeded or stimulated by history: whereas the writer of F N. x. 5 speaks consistently of the deopysia (d stinguished by him from the flow) being impeded or stimulated.

*nd not in the restricted sense given to it in Book vi.

§ 6 refers to vii. 11. 4 fre régen oddeula hdovés: galvoi már dyadós 4. 23.
Tágens épyse.

εύλόγως συμβέβηκεν] 'is but natural' (Peters): 'is just what one & 26 Enight expect to find ' Tixen is concerned with the ordering of the Conditions (vip dominion to rit) of a performance (irriginal), but not with the performance uself. See the Paraph, obligue begreen rights forth «ἐπατέλεσμα" αλλά τήν μέν δυνημική τέχνη, ή δε δύναμες προυγει την ένεργειαν. 🤁 μεν γώρ περί την ποθερνητικήν τέχνη είται έστι του δύνησθαι παθερνήν το δέ δύνασθαι ευβερνον αίτιον έστι της κατά την κυβερνητικήν ένεργειας. So close is the connexion between rixm and dimper, that such region as intopen, Larpush and dudestuck are often simply called doubless. They are the desapore of perit hispor of Met. O. 2. 1046 b. 1, which are said to be concerned with contraries and al pie para disyon name ran Frarrier of abrai. So long as alternatives are open-so long as this possible arrangement, or that, may be preferred—so long as preparations have to be made, rigor rules; but the result of these preparations,—that for the sake of which they have been made, when once it is realised, is something definite, which rixen cannot medify. Art may instruct a man how to hold his bow and point his arrow straight for the mark; but the évépyen of all this instruction-the flying arrow-has already escaped beyond the reach of 2rt Cf. M. M ii. 10. 1208 b. 1 ονδί γάρ άλλη έπατήμη οίδομία τήν poğow sapadidusın didd top öfin.

- nairos nai n.r.h.] We have here what the Ald. School describe 1157 a. 20. as an Gornous brought against the appropriate-offmore nin for respective advanced by the opponent. It is submitted that arts of peasuremain are popularly recogniced. This Travarage however is obvious y now at 80 seriously meant as the derivaparance (MI. Sc.), or rejunder contained in the first part of the §. The writer of M. M. 1. 7 1206 a. 26 oddly omits entirely the weighty rejeinder all you -Takne ineppetat observice rizon dorin, daka rie dimineme, and consider Limself to the captious frequence. The words are alknow for higher inabbipua intarnun natei nonen. Tort bi abbi raire abnete ai yap intare notoi kai ari pavanotoi kal ol propessol sidevije elat nointerat. dada da reci 🕳 εθλίαις επιστήμαις ολα έστιν ή ήδονή ώς τέλος άλλα μεθ ήδυεής νε επί εξουρο dues hours. Force and butterfung mulgrach younge. This is all that the sale writer has to say in answer to the these obdepin descripe we -in ndowny.
 - pleasure ignore the distinction be ween different kinds of pleasure ignore the distinction be ween different kinds of pleasures, the one kind being of the nature of life, and the end, at different good in themselves (§ 3); the other kind being course of which inferior conditions of our nature, with pain, want, etc., and being therefore only secondarily and accidentally good (§ 2). This is a kind of pleasures, and excess in them, are made the ground of reproaches against pleasure in general.

Tor support peryers se, the fidures.

- a. 28. The Onpie Swierr sc. The hoovie.
- n 80. Δπλῶς] Fritzsche beleves that this word has crept into the text from a schollun, thus the Ald. Schol. has nῶν ἀγαλοί ἦτοι απλῶν and πυρίων.

τάς τοιαύτας] τὸς μή όπλως άγοθάς Ρατ.

- a. 31. καὶ τὴν τούτων ἀλυπίαν ὁ φρόνιμος] αν διωτε. These words seem to form a parenthesis. The φρόνιμος tries not to be parted by Δε αδιστικο ο ο these boddy pleasures. ὁ γορ φρόνιμος τὴ ἀκουσίς κο σωματικών ἡδονῶν βούλοτας μὴ λυπείσθαι (Ald. Schol.).
- a. 35. ἡδονοί «αὶ σώφρανος) τῷ γὰρ δικαίῳ ήδονή ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δικαια κιώττιο καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείᾳ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ ἀνδρεία καὶ τῷ σωφρανι ἐκ του πρωτεκε τὸ σώφρανα ήδονή γίνιται (Ald. Schol.). Cf. Ε.Ν. ά. 3. τ ὁ μιν γω ἀπιχόμενου τῶν σωματικών ήδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τουτῷ χαίρων σωφραν.

CHAPTER XIII.

ARGUMENT.

That form is evil and associated (evil in itself, and as imposing function) is estimated. Now, that unlack is contrary to what is avoided (quit avoided and evil is good. I wanter therefore, as the contrary of piece, jok aborded and evil is good. -for there is nothing in the argument of Securipius that, is a ster, thank contrary to less which is unequal, is not therefore equal to pressure.

though contrary to pain which is cuit, as not therefore good.

As for the view that pleasure in the shief good—there is nothing on the enemy tens that some preasures are bid to present us heldery it was not enough held to, if we define preasure as "unimpeded function" for Haptonics of the end good is 'highest and best function, and it remaid not be 'highest and best' of it voirs' impeared the three will be a fleasure, who 'the highest and best' of it voirs' impeared the three pleasures being bad, if you like, in them to be a proposed function, other pleasures being bad, if you like, in them to be a partie of fleasure with that of Happonias the notion of persent function they returnedly annot separate from that of intentioned function. These tenses for twee voke maintain that of intentions is previous affect that of the proposes is previous in the first that of the five twee colors and every one cather intentionally or universal and every what is universely and Happoness to propose and Happoness by those who forget that every prospersy, when ten great, "impeded" as well as adversity.

The fact that all creatures beauts and men follow pleasure, foliase to its being the interference. If all do not follow the same pleasure, yet it is put we that they all follow-way, perhaps at bottom the same pleasure, for they are all

members of the our desire gitten

the son, y preasures' have appropriated the monte, he are entimenes free were there, and many mon know no others.

furives, where pleasures, we function, be good, the Happy lesse need not be pleasured for pleasure is inferilliance, if not pool—nay, the Lingdon less might even be parague — for if pleasure is not functively good, then passed not posterely but but membrah and there is no reason for avoiding it. Thus the such membes have be resee for avoiding it.

- § 1. 'Aλλά μὴν ὅτι καὶ ἡ λύπη κακόν, ὁμολογείται, καὶ φεικτόν . . . 1153 ὁ τ ἀνάγκη οὐν τὴν ἡδουὴν ἀγαθόν νι είναι] This is the second part of the argument of Eudoxus given in E.N. x, 2 3.
- त है। को को कि किक्किकारकों] The words as they stand cannot, I b. 2. th nk, be translated otherwise than as they are translated by Peters—'partly had as in some sort an impediment to activity,' or by

diarien.

1158 b. 2. Stahr- theils ist er (der Schmers) es (ein Uebe), insefern er uns irgendwie behindert :- - rie ni sprodiorini, ic elmi) forming a unghexpression in which we qualifies emoderne i - as hin ferrig in some way or other. But the balance of the clause requires \$ 3c mi, "y spandierung (river)- Pain is partly had a itself (ankor), part y had in relation to something else (#1) - sand re) i. c. masmoth as it hinders good activities' re immoderacji (circui being ejexegi tical of my Hg is frequently opposed to andme by Aristotle but the Index gives no instance of ro no where no slone would be sufficient. Of course wh like and we, or any such term, can be converted into a substantive by means of the article; but this use of the article would plainly be out of place here, where the meaning of the formula my is not explained, but the formula a used. The Para phrasi seems to have read with right like version is - h per all aire êure chevern, de fi înt dineji dinn, h di no, de fi int (qua von dinn, free pevery fore earn es, ore éparadifes en beupia Sittemary the Ad. Schol ή δέ ουν έστιν δηλως κακόν, άλλα τη κακον και фенетов ήται καδο έμπο-

b 4 we pap Incourage a.r.h.] The best commentary on this chountly brief reference is E. N. x. 2. 5, where the argument is given more

fully but without the name of Speusif pus.

The Paraph, explains the present reference thus -of you dem-Snevalanov house and he incoraqueros hier incyrept souds the hopes our do ver ty adadeig that you it nadages to pe for eat to thereor increase रंतररे रक्षे क्षाक, बक्त कारे रक्षण बीतारक्षण रचे अवह र्वव्यास्तास क्षाप्तास, रक्षण बाराज्य केन्द्र rponou nal rý dlumin aurinecrae á ádouá noi dong, á per de pectar á de den οις έλιστουν και έστε ή μέν άλυτια άγαθόν, ή δε ήδουή και ή λιαση αικου.... obras yap & hoges naurehus adofis earer vidert pup à jamit condu don-Similarly the Ald. Schol. Theyer & Inevainner on his re- wifer weitneural top skiltrom nat top iatop, nat to pier dupo from to person nat the Thatton of maxis, to de misson from to have dyadon of, ourses and a charge duraceren en adunia unt en denn, cal eit per flesa fren à diun unt à about e et enea, rà de person froi à adomia ayadhin ji :- e e Spette p pies ang med that, 'as greater and less are both contrary to equal, and therefore both unequal, so pleasure and pun are both contrary to the ticutral state which is good, and therefore are both evil." To his the writer of x, and the present writer, reply-'I leasure is a t in uself (owep) evil. We appeal to universal experience against you You make a wrong application of a useful formula (some to pr (-

To Charron son to Top bearing) to Pleasure: of. E.N. x. z. 5 1183 b & Adjource rains of eneme, all pipe int ye ray elements diabetimize

The formula thus misaj fied by Spensippus is given in Cal. 11 13 b. 36, with the careal that it a applicable only within narrow litties, drawior be tour dyada par le drayens nand" now of oblor in and economic drayens, who bying range mid diamograp ideals, and and eighted diamograp of the name of the name of the parties diamograp of the parties diamograp of the parties of the name of the parties of the caution conveyed to these words. On Spensippus see Grant, Ethios, Essay in vol 1. Ipp. 217, 218 and Ritter and Prelet, Hint, Phil. §§ 289-294. It is theory of Pleasure is thus stated by Aid Gell ix 5—Spensippus, veturque comis Academia, voluptatem et dolorem dus maia esse dictuit opposita inter se bonum autem esse quod utrusque traedium foret.

who do do doin one and in along the horself. Grant says—by We are probably to understand m, with the Par. and Schol. Spens frus would have said that pleasure is an evil: of. Eth. x.

2. 5. I am not sure that Grant is right here. Spens ppus would be created that pleasure is an evil accidentally probably be would have said that being evil is an 'inseparable accident.' of Islandare, but would be have said that it is essentially evil? It seems to me that the word only (see next note) makes it possible to understand Spensippus as the subject of poss—which is, of course, what the run of the sentence naturally suggests.

int pleasure is in itself and essentiall, an evil Eustra ius n his that pleasure is in itself and essentiall, an evil Eustra ius n his thate in £. Λ. νι, 4. 3 and δ ή οίκοδομικη τεγρη τίε έστι, καὶ όπερ εξίες τις μετά λάγου ποιητική εκ lans correctly the technical inclining of there is δε διτρ δηλούν κείται τὸ υὐσωδώς κατηγορείσθαι τῆς οίκοδομικῆς την τεγρην. See Alex, ad Top 11 τ. 273 a 14 (quoted by Boniz, Alet, p. 176. q. ν οι. the use of δπερ) τό διτρ αὐτῷ τοῦ κυρίως ἐστὶ δηλωτικών, καὶ ῷ δε προστεθῷ τὸ δπερ το κερίως ἐκείνο εἰναι σημαίνει, οἰναίπερο ἀκθρωπος ὁ κυρίως ἀκθρωπος Οι, which Bonitz remarks— 'excludit into pronomen διτρ quaecunque tei accidant, includit unice ex quae in substancia, εν τῷ τὰ ἐστιν ejus, insunt ... οποιπο το (ε. ε. Its δπερ) denotatur tid ipsum quod res est, τὰ τε ἐστι, νεὶ ἡ

- 1153 b. 0. overla rol ngayuares, Kuplus, or 'cesent ally,' being the fur damental meaning of these, the term is often used as synonymous with your as in Top. 1. 1. 120 b. 23 ofte pip if xide onep herade, debrep of piper TO RELEASE THE RESPORT WEST IN MAKE ENDOPMENON STREETHER & mitt environne but this only, as Bonitz points out, and as is plain from the terms of the passage just quoted Top. 120 b. 23, because ro ускор Вподетах то ті тата сприйним как притом інстиветах так се ту δρισμό λεγομίνων Τορ IV. 5. 142 b. 27. Accordingly, with Water (Organon, vol. i. p. 467) simply to say that onep and vises are synonymous is unduly to narrow the use of the former term. 1. may be noted that the Ald, Schol, on the present passage narrows the sense of onep in the way deprecated by Bonitz: his works ate-ordeit ür ha'n rip hönnyn einen imep ranin, grot ür in genes änngenben τῷ κακῷ καὶ είδος τοῦ κακοῦ την ἡδουὴν είναι. The Paruplerast brings out the fundamental sense of the term better - oldels you do pair the ήδουήν αθτήν όπερ έστι κακόν είναι.
 - b. 7. § 2. τῶριστον τ'] The MSS, have ὅριστον τ', οτ ὅριστον δ'
 The conclusion τῶν τις ἡδοιη το ὅριστον formulated in this ἡ ==
 irgually necessituted (ἴσων δε καὶ ἀναγεσίον κ τ λ) by the identification = <
 of ἡδοιῆ with ἐνέργεια; but, as I have tried to show, it does now =
 involve any neparture from Aristotehan principles, in the direct or < zi.

 of 'tailousin.'</p>
 - b 8 Samep and imstriphy the dries fadder obser? (f. M. M. n. 7, 1205 a. 3t δροίως δ' sint sol instripus faidou, oier al fluorace at. 12 δρως οὐ διά τοῦτο φαθλον ή επιστήμη, άλλ' dyades τῷ γενει. But 1 he parallel drawn in the passage before us requires us to think of 1 tertain instripy (pidosoph'a Ald Schol.) not as instely grad, but as possibly the summum bonum. This is seen by the Paup'i, which is be 82/3—και γάρ παλλών φαιλων οῦσῶν ἐπιστημών οἱδίν παλνει τὸ άρωτ τον είναι τὴν ἐπιστήμην. If then, a certain ἐπιστημή is the āparace, do 1 it may be asked, can a certain ἡδοιή also be the āparace. The probably right in thinking that we need not take the parade, ν το straitly: but the water, if asked to defend the apparent incons intency, would not have much difficulty in desig so, for design a ἡδουη on his principles.
 - b. s. loug bl... rouro d'dorde flores] It is only if un n peded the s' desputidation) that the profile desputia nor destre, which we can eddenous, can be described as aforeuring; for, as he ways below

οδδεμία ένέργεια τέλειος έμποδιζομένη b. 16 If then είδαιμονία, απ 1253 b. Β τέλειος and αίμετωτατη, 18 ελέργεια είνεμπόδιστος, 11 18 ήδονή, for ηδονή has been defined as ένέργεια ένεμπόδιστος.

eid ή πασών (νέργεια έστιν εύδα,μονία είνε ή τινός αὐτῶν) ή τινός b. 10 σύτων is right y explained by the Alc. Schol as θεωρία for which he refers to x (see Ε. Ν. x. 8. 6).

The Anstotel an doctrine of redainarin does not, however amount to the exclusive acceptance of either of the alternatives here presented off ... offe ... These alternatives mark rather two points of view from which eidaquoria may be regarded. If it be regarded as an isolou ellor-as a life concretely realised, it presents uself as the barmonious play of all human functions, intellectual, moral and loddle as the expression, in many wass, of the concrete unity -mens sana in corpore sano. But since such a concrete result cannot be produced or maintained without frapia, or the organisary and regardive agency of Reason is in fact rolling but the ma enal man festation of Bropin which is its Form, Law, obtain here these or it he elem: and since the Form or Law is the thing, 11 dosop scally considered (see Mel. Z. 6, 1031 a. 17 fearrow re over De doces close the immod obsect and to the close diverse close h éclarou ocean) it follows that ellergemen, consulered formally or philosoperally is dentified with the part its form or Law. It is especially in E. N. x that redaments is so then ted. But we must be careful not to full into a somewhat natural in similers anding of the language employed in such passages as L. V. v. ch. 7 and en. 8 \$ 1=8. When the writer says (L. N. x 8. § 8) wer' sin de th e da power beaper en, he means that evans more formally considered is Compin. He does not mean that if we look at the coolingon in the concrete, we shall find that he is essentially a planosopher or man of scarce, spending his whole life in the exercise of his intellectual faculties, as such, in some department of knowledge on the contrary, so to cultivate the intelect, as such, that the other powers of the harn in ensemble are allowed to lie fallow, would my ly, in the we ter's op non, a narrow and partial conception of life would, in fact, indicate the absence of the 'comprehensive view,' the survey, the regulative agency of reason," or tempta in which reduiporta esecutally consists.

We may say, then, that in the passage before us the clause «lo" i name despyrin form abdumnia indicates the more concrete way of

- 1183 b 10, looking at the Happy Life, and the clause of a fire of most nices the more formal philosophical way which sees that is true nature, see Med. Z. 6 quoted above, and of. E.A. in 8 6 descripte one nices with the acquairarov palsor' class decil and min dhha average, ofto an declarate lit is quel rational that man so organises the exercise of all in powers, intellectual mora, and bodily, as to be Happy: we may therefore say that Happiness is in emptyment of Ireason—dropsa.
 - b 13. φαύλων οὐπῶν, ἐἶ ἐτυχεν ἀπλῶς] Ever if most pleasures are bad, and, if you like, bad in themselves.'
 - b 17. διό προσδείται απ.λ.] C. L.A. 1 8. 16. x 8. g. Ernzsche quiese. Cic. de Fin ii. 6 19 Armoteles until usum cum una perfectae prosperiale comunix t, and A.c.x. περί ψυχίς (3) p. 137 A. I describes εὐδαμονία 25 συμπλήρωστε τών άγαθων.
 - b in δτως μή δμποδίζηται ταῦτα] The All, Schol makes roots the subject—ῦτως καὶ ταιτα βεω τα έκτος άγαθα, ἀπόντα μὰ καριμποδιέως τὴν ενέργασε τοῦ εἰδούμονος: but it is better to take ὁ ειδούμων as the subject, and make τοιτα=κατά ταιτα, 'in respect of body, or estate, or fortune.'
 - b. 19. § 3. rpoxilóneros) Zeli quotes Cie. That, v. 9 la collido quem ser part (Theop maxius) de vita beata in quo mul a dispet de quar obrem is qui conjuntar que crimenti heitus esse non passo. In colenam patatur dicere in rotam bea am vitam non escenderes non usquam id quidem die t omnino; sed quae die t idem valen. The rpoxis is described by the Seliol, ap Series as feducio is in il despuoliparos of obsirus diodiferro.
 - φdonovers The Creace. Thus Antisthenes Fr. 38 april Mullich,
 ii. p. 284 αξταρκή γαρ την αρτήν είναι προς εξδαιμονίαν, μπότενε προσδιομένην ότι μή Εμπρατικής Ισχύος (Diog. L. vii. 11-12).
 - b 24. § 4. πρός γάρ την εύδαιμονίαν ὁ δρος αὐτης] ' her good ferture can only be defined by its relation to happiness' (Peres). το γάρ είναι της εὐτυχίας έσταν ἐν τῷ συμβαλλευθαι πρός εὐθαιμονίαν (Patay h.).
 - b 25. § 5. sal to Suisser S' anarra a r.h.] The argument of Euleaus quoted in x. 2. 1.
 - b. 27. φήμη κ.τ.λ.] He siod, έργ καὶ ήμ. 763. The second line continues φημίζουσε θεός ου τις ίστι και σύτη. Here, as State remarks, we have the origin of vox populi vox Dei.

§ 8. Δλλ' έπεὶ ολχ ἡ αὐτὴ αὖτε φύσες αὖθ' ἔξες ἡ ἀρίστη αὖτ' ἔστω 1150 b. 20. σῶτε δοκεὶ] 'since however there is no one nature or state which is, or is thought to be, the best for all, so reather do they all parsue the same pleasure...' (Grant): πασω, necessary in the protasis, is carelessly ometed, perhaps because the writer looked forward to πάστες in the apodosis.

dad the author noute yap poses exec to befor It all pursue b 22 "the same pleasure," it must be because they have "the same neuro' fan laneatally. It man this is poor, resulting in the func i in of vogote or beopia of en characterised as 'divine.' But the same organising principle, which appears in man as some appears in the irrational animals (and in plants) as a misus impelling their to purity the specific form or eller, from the incidents of individual decay and death and make it eternal in the race (see de An i., 4 415 a. 29). While individual animals seem to live and nather for themselves, and to satisfy merely their own immediate wants, there s all the while at work within them 'an eternal principle no then selves (this ri), by which their behaviour is regulated in conformity with a plan which includes all Nature on combigs diggies Torneus & suparore sai if quote (Met A. 7 1072 b. 13) The Aristotel an God is the abstract of all the various modes of the organism g mens in Nature. He is described as hippen diling eternal function and this elerral function is also said to be flown (Met. A 7. 1072 b. 16). Ittasmuch, then, as the lives, or drippens, of all creatures are particular cases of this one impyrio aidios, which is ήδονή, all creatures may be said την αθτήν διώκια ήδονήν

befor] Cf. de An. ii. 4. 415 a. 29, where it is said that living creatures propagate their kines wa row del and row below parexwork from the commen.

mapaβάλλειν els adrás] se. Jasrois according to Michelet, bu, b 84. the Index takes it intransitively=" to pass over to ' to me me to ': so the Ald. Schol, of πλείονιε πρός του συματικώς μάλλον βάπουσε.

διά το μόνος οδν γνωρίμους κ.τ.λ.] Cf. the situde M M ii. 7. 2205 6 88 b. 23 αλλ' οί φάσκαντες είναι την ήδυνην ού σπονδαίων, επόνθασαν οίαν οί μή είδιτες το νευταρ οίονται τούς θεούς οίνον πίνειν, καί ούκ είναι τούτου ήδιαν ούθίς τούτο πασχουσαν διά την έγγναιος οίς διαιον πεπάνθασαν οί πασκε τλς ήδυνάς γενέσεις φυσκοντες είναι κοί ούκ άγαθόν, διά γαρ το μη



1153 b 35. είδεναι ύλλας ήδοναι άλλ' ή τος σωματικάς ταύτας το όμαν γενέσεις το οίνει 🕳 🚍 col μή απουδαίας όλως συα σίονται είναι την ήδουή» άγοθον.

252

1104 a. i. § 7. et uh hoord dyaddr and h trippend. The subject s hoord and hid hopen, and the predicate is dyaddr so the Paraph, and Ald. Ald School. Susam hi and Ramminer, on what appears to be weak MS authority, read of up a (Mb Oh Asp.) hourd dyaddr and drippend (Mb Seems to be the only authority for the omession of h before drippend in making dyaddr and drippend both predicates.

CHAPTER XIV.

ARGUMENT.

Those subo so decements between 'noise pleasures' and costen pleasures as to measurement that, while the former are good the ration, or they are the volumerary to these pleasures are not, must be ask if to explain when the percontrary to these bodily pleasures are had. I set only so, good a six entered. The truth is that the covery pleasures par about 1 he mature of the boarly so, and motions such which they are associated—isoses and not entered which which they are associated—isoses and not entered point, but and be and that four for other and that for entered a trate or main up to a certain point, but and to entered for a total for the trategood, and meaning pleasure and not admit of excess I willy fleasures are good, and meaning pleasure further absenced, around, not excess by the in emposite man, who is easy to further absenced, around, not excessive pleasure, but prime in the low the absence.

Subject is only pleasure)—a pain which only intemperate people feet.

by showing has an erronaver view about the bodely present energy experience of the erronaver view about them has naturally experience at the fifth erronaver view in that the bodely pleasures are more convenient that the bodely pleasures are more convenient to far time! Became the the ever are bodely pleasures housed fain they are argery ringed at a conveyant and restoratives. I became they are the only the armondative to imperior natures and here we are remainded of what was organizated above the 12-that there are the two points. It extain pleasures belong to have a thick are brought forward by some to support the equally temperated nature which are brought forward by some to support the equally temperate nature fleatures to the product that the bodely forward to the most described, and that which maints us that fur are is not good teners the extrema of pieu were which do not esting of even and one a survey and not as it has a far and one a survey and not as. The extrema are viewed and not of things to preasure per necessary.

vectoratives who have up resuperative activity in the cound part of an imported correspondent that is taking recoily, or materially, pleasant things a back will test to the familian of an immediated organ or material

It is because man is a companie and correptible being that the acceleral fles were the "pessure of energe" - particle a large part in his "ife the gure mature of God in the performance of its one unchanging function enjoys etermally one pure pleasure.

- § 2. Sià rí oùr air h.] Aspasius, the Paragh., and the Ald. Schol. a 10 seem to connect this quest on more closely with impremess 2, 8 than Bekker, Sus and By we, with their fell stop after diohagrer at 10, the Those who say that bodily pleasures are not good, must be presared to meet the question, why then are the contrary pains hal? Surely bad involves good as is contrary. Aspashis hasrois of raira degroom encourement, did it at evantua dinas max Onput; the Faraph, has-iropquese d' un rie, el rivie gonna dyabai elai sui alperai, τινές δέ φαίλοι, διαπερ οί σωματικώ περί δε δ δεύληστος, διά τι πάσα λύπη μοχθηρά έστε και φευκτή δεί γλρ την μεν έναντίαν ταις άγαθαις ήδοναις you do do dig signition of the same duty are induction and the same did incoτίου άγαθον' εξ de και αίντη ή λύπη πονηρο, δύξετεν Δν τός σωματικόυ ήδουάς apollor clear. Similarly the Ald, Schol, miles immorei res . . . die ий вышитикий провый боль коной, химетик бра то быштбом пров так хотик dyador elem hour or al amparical hours for elet kneal, and obde kuplus uyudui, ahh virur ear iyudul as uh nunul nal ar arayunin, nal ire ir posig rouran douir . . . dripa hinter fifte nal apentuar fi eloir al outareoù goval ayadal pexperade. Grant uncerstands role heyovar a. 9 to be 'that section of the Platonists referred to above ch. 11, § 3 role d'Iron per eilen al de nodder paidan. Ramsaner follows Grant: I agree with Grant and Ramsauer against Zell and (apparently) Entracke, who understand hair with role keyovore. The writer having discussed the makel fiboral of the obbainer goes on as he (?)

their nature a little more carefully. If they are bad, as they are the nonly in excess that the body pleasures are bad.

n. 12. al draynalas] i.e al ouparinol: cf. vii. 4. 2. The All Schol ha arraynalas de rios ed objectora word eal ories.

Of the two suggestions in roduce I by f(a 11 ard a 13), the latter gives the writers opinion. The boddly pleasures are not metal negatively good 'good in the sense in which the absence of evil is good'; but positively good up to a certain point beyond which however, they become bad.

- a. 13. των μεν γάρ εξεων και κινήσεων] αίσν της έξεως της θεωρητικής ίντροβολή ούκ έστεν (Ald. Schol.), and the same may be said of any diverges such; its notion involves definite form, and excludes excess of the negation of form. Cf E N ti 6 20 σωφροσιώνες καὶ ἐνλερώνες οιν έστεν έπεμβολή καὶ έλλειψες διὰ τὰ τὸ μεσον είναι πως θκών . . . όλως γαρ αθθ ὑπεμβολής καὶ έλλειψεως μεσότης έστεν, ούτε μεσότητος ὑπεμβολή καὶ έλλειψεως μεσότης έστεν, ούτε μεσότητος ὑπεμβολή καὶ έλλειψεως μεσότης έστεν, ούτε μεσότητος ὑπεμβολής καὶ έλλειψεως μεσότης έστεν, ούτε μεσότητος ὑπεμβολής.
- n. 18. Evarrius δ'. . διώκοντε την ύπερβολήν] 'But with pain the case is reversed: not merely the excess of pain, but pain generally is to be avoided; for the opposite of excessive pleasure is not painful for except to the man who pursues the excess (Peters). Sin high your Stahr 'Entgegeny setz: ist es mit dem Schmerz, denn hier fletz for der Mensch nacht das Ueber nass, son dem den Schmerz (ther) tipt is der Schmerz ist nämlich nicht das dem Uebermasse Intgegengesetzte, ausser für den, der dem Uebermasse nachtrachtet.'

Grant, after translating to the same effect, adds—'This argument goes to prove that bodily pleature is in itself, good, only when in excess is it evil. On the other hand, all pain is evil—Pleasure and pain, then, are opposite terms, the one being good—and the other evil. To make the doctrine of Steung pus (ch. 13—§ 1) hold good, it would be necessary to make pain and the excess of pleasure opposite terms. But they are not so, except perhaps in the mind of the intemperate man, who thinks that the only alternative is between excessive pleasure and a painful sensation.' Fritzsche has—'Contra se res habet in dolore, nam haps non fugimus quod nimium est; sed hunc fugimus in universim

ltaque contraria sunt dolor, t_iua dolor est, et voluptas, qua voluptas 1164 a 18. est, non qua nimia est.º

According to these interpretations (which agree substantially with those of the Ald. Schol., Zell and Michelech vor universtood is the sulject of deciver at 19. I think that & danhor at 16 (= 6 dec-Accros) is the sul ject : see note on vii. 4. 3. 1148 a 7 This is the view of the Paraglimest, whose comment seems to me very good-Dom raine inte Andhours to Scor duchal eing ani sarà raines à andharris εστι, καὶ ὁ ακρατής: κατα τὰς δε έναντίας λύπας ακύλαστος οὐ περί τὰς ὑπερ-Βολικάς έστιν, άλλά τως μέν ύπερβαλλούσες ήδουάς διώκει, τας δέ μικρας himas priyer borre chavepar ore rais impobladdoirais abarais at in reотключь антиграми кото обу бтербоким голь, акка ратрин, то ве οίδελε δε ψέγοι των οπουδοίων, ότι οίδε λύπαι είπεν άλλα τώ διώκοντι την eneptishije raie ijdorās akyeseis donei rā perplas nai sarā kūyse airais The packet is assumed to err both in his pursuit of χρησοσθοι pleasure and in his avoidance of pain. The unratural contrary which he sets up to excessive pleasure—the pain which those who pursue moderate pleasures do not feel at all-helps us to appreciate the moral difference - ignored by of heyourer un elvas dyaffar ras commence ifdurar between the excessive and the moderate pursuit of bodily pleasures.

§ 3. 'Enci... aiperirepai] The apadosis of this sentence begins a. 22. with Gave 2. 25.

those of the delepseas sur' destive. That the latter are better than a 23 those of the delepseas sur' destive. That the latter are better than the bodily pleasures is ridigle which the writer seeks to corroborate by pointing out how ro decide came to be believed—did ri delevate by pointing out how ro decides came to be believed—did ri delevate by pointing out how ro decides came to be believed—did ri delevate is a conformal delevate allowed allowed allowed allowed the Phitomete [Ramsauer erroneuts] supposes that it does] that bodily pleasure is an evil, but takes up another question already partly anticipated ch. 13. § 6. namely, How is the vulgar error to be accounted for, which gives so much prominence to physical pleasure in the scale of pleasures? —i.e. this § returns to the eldiphous ray roll deducates adapterplan all comparess if flowed e.r.h. of 13. § 6.

§ 4. διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον φαίνεσθαι] το αίρετάς, suggested by = 30. διώνονται. * They seem good by contrast.*

nal of onoubalor . . . our onoubalas] These words, suspected by a 91-

1154 a. 31. Zell, are bracketed by Ramsauer, as interrupting the flow of the sthe argument; Ramsauer says-tet quie ante ista praecedunt, et pui a aucinsequenter, co spectant ut intelligator dia ri Sentorto al apparera anni haec vero ipsa fere in contratiam senten fam d'spu ala sant on reσωματικών ένεκα ή ήλονή όλως φαύλη είναι δοιεί. Νου chabi o equale - Sem quin e medio tollenda sint.' Grant observes "This paragraps a suph reverts parendictically to the opinion of the Platon stall I am am inclined to take the paragraph as the writer's parenthesis suggest a wated by the mention of larpelas immediately preceding. Some charge warners n. 32 refers to ch tz. § r, and the dec en ma n. 31 are (1) on of & Z men φαύλης α.τ.λ, a. 32, 2nd (2) at 8 larpein ledeois a. 34. Ranssau & sucr. I think, does injustice to the water of the paragraph, when accuses him of saying, first, hat there are new reasons, and the Then enumerating three, viz. (3) of de could drove redecontinue b. 1 The words at de orphainours redecupérous merely expand what is that I to the impean in the sentence immediately preceding, and to introduce a third class of pleasures, see Coraes ad los, of darpelais duviai rair ifantair vid abrai annohalai darobare elem diori 🙉 ένδεστε είσεν αμπληρωσεις αλ γαρ τοιαυται πληρωσειε σεμιλευσικώ rais redemonieres, rourious rais and rais leditas els rae adipulous apologica

> Admining then, that he paragraph is parenthereal and verloosely attacked to the context, I think the connexion of the winer's thought may be satisfactorily traced as follows. Bod by paragraph though inferior, are sought after more than other pleasures. Why? Because they are good remedies of pain by reason of their excesive character. And, in passing, it is interesting to observe, that the very qualities which recommend them to the vulgar—their excessive character (in the durby durn), and their suitableress as remedies, are seized upon by certain theorists, mentioned before to establish the sweeping general sation that Pleasure is not good.

a 34. at 8 tarpeias [571] tobeous] Bywater's omission of 600 removes a great difficulty: but how 600 got in 0 the MSS. (and 1 do not think that we can be sure that it was not in the MS. used by Aspasius) still remains a difficulty.

Exert] to be in a natural state (ife).

and of tole verelesquerous !.

Bywater Control, p. 58), taking this view of the position of al & ora-

τελεουμένων] Cf. vii 12. 3 και τίλος ού πασών έτερον τι, άλλά των είς 1154 b. l. τήν τελέωσεν άγομόνων εής φύσεως.

§ 5. [11] The argument, broken by the parenthesis and od onou- b 2 delor a. 31 . . . b. 2 enoudain, is now resumed.

δίφης] Zell, Ceraes, Michelet, and Grant take this meta-b. 3. phones ly, of artificially produced desires generally, imparing ral industria as they are called by the Paraph. Fritzsche follows the Ald Schol in taking the word literally—βοιλομονοι πίνου δι΄ όλης της ήμερας έσδίουσαν άλμερά τινα ίνα διψιότεροι ούτω γίνωνται. So also Aspasias. I am inclined to think that it ought to be taken literally as a special example (incroduced by γου) of the length of μή δυσμονοι διλλαιν χαιροιν will go in the pursuit of excessive piesstres. Perhaps, however, rusis is against the literal interpretation.

άβλαβείε] Νοι δίψας παρασκευάζωσι, Ιπι ήδονας παρασκευαζωπ.

b. 4.

ours ydo u.r.h | This clause explains paidor: 30, Aspanus.

b. 5

τό το μηδότερον ... φοσίν The mere absence of peasure is b. 6. pair fel to many men by reason of their temperament (διὰ τὴν φόσιν the inference is chiefly to the μελαγχολικοί τὴν φόσιν about to be their tioned): for 'physiology' teaches us that Life is a continual struggle, to the pain of which we become accustomed' some of us, however, so imperfectly that when the pleasure, which generally aids 'custom' in deadening pain, is absent, we feel this absence of pleasure (which to perfectly regulated or 'accustomed' minds ought to be a neutral state) positively painful, i.e. we become aware again of the fundamental pain of Lie, which has been kept beneath the level of consciousness by the aid which pleasure gives to in perfect 'custom.' Aspasius ascribes the aphorism del πονεί τὰ Come to Anaxagoras.

§ 6 έν μέν τή νεότητε . , . δυπερ οί οίνωμένοι διάκεινται] Grant b. 9 appositely quotes Goethe's

Trunken milssen wir alle sein; Jugend ist Trunkenheit ohne Wein.

He refers to *Probl.* xxx. ch. 1 (A. 953) as the best commentary on the present passage. There 'a frequent comparison is made between the effects of wine, youth and the melancholy (or billous) temperament, in producing desire. . . . The principle of alliques in

YOL. II.

1164 b 9 youth is represented as producing the same results as it o humeurs (χυμός δ μελαγχολικός—ή της μελαιην χολής πρώσει) in the baseus temperament.

The account which the All Schol, gives to the operation of the principal and the principal accounts the All Schol, gives to the operation of the principal accounts and principal accounts and the principal accounts accounts and the principal accounts and the principal accounts and the principal accounts and the principal accounts accounts and account accounts accounts account account accounts accounts account accounts account account accounts accounts account accounts account accounts account account accounts account account account accounts account account accounts account ac

- b. 16. ἢ τ' ἀνωντία καὶ ἢ τυχούσα] Αγμετικε (156, 16 Πεγθαιε) has the at following comment—καὶ τον 'Αναξηγόραν αίτωτας Θεύφροστος ἐν Πέν—— το καῖς λέγων δει εξελαύνει ἣδωνὰ λύπην ἢ γε ἐναντία, αἰαν ἡ απὰ τοὶ πενικ τὴτ ἀπὸ τοῦ διψήν, καὶ ἡ τυχαύσα, τουτεστιν ῆτις οὖν ἀν εἶη ἐντροῦ, ἀσιτ Ενίντε πείναν εξελαύνει και ἀκοης ηδανή, ὅταν ἀσμασικ ἢ ἄλλοιε τιτικε ᾶ το ἀκούσμασι διαφερώντως χαῖρωμέν.
- b 15 ἀκόλαστοι καὶ φαυλοι γίνονται) It is not ital to suppose that e = α μιλαγχολικοί are specially intended. Let it is possible, v the Λ η ascer = συν (καὶ διά ταυτα ακολαστοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι), to understand the remark with generally.
- t. 16. § 7. τών φύσει ήδέων] See note on i. 8. 11.
- b 10 480 Bokel elvan] 20. vo larpeles Out; the restorate a uself seem ** ** pleasant (Peters).
- b 20. phoen d'hôle, à noue npatur tips rouade phoenes. There it not which effect drankhoware, or it largebratur, are pleasant in tree it the relative y of the nature which is being restored; the nature was have a sin indicate lest in it and languageror dynose; of trackers with 12, 2), otherwise it could not be restored at all. But there things which stimulate the such one of a completely sound nature (the rouade phoene) are in the uselves pleasant—as the language puts it points di hora of identification the defense tips diames, allow motioners apagin across our despreaders the correct meaning of the restore phoenes "quae taus est qualis est, nec corrupts nec egens." Peters has an instructive note here, which I take the liberty of quality. I am sick and take medicine, hangry and take food (which weens

to be here included under medicine); but neither the drug nor the 1156 b 20. fixed can of their selves cure me and restore the balance of my system - they must be assim lated (for the body is not like a jut that can be fale I merely by pouring water from another jar), e.e. part of my system must remain in its normal state and operate in its normal manner. But this operation, this delegen rise such please Ecoc, is pleasure (by the definition given above 12, 3), and n Ignoran e of the process we transfer the pleasure to the mediate and call it pleasant. The weakness of this account is that it overlooks the fact that, though the methone cannot itself cure without the operation of the total disaw ifene, yet on the other hand this 25%, this faculty, cannot ope ate in this manner without this stimulus; so that there seems o be no reason why the med cine, as setting up an everyour the anth chimas should not itself be called given job. But the whole passage rests on the assumption that there can be activity without stimulus, s.e. without want an assumption which has become inconceivable to us."

It is pullage true that, on the whole, Anstonchanism takes noo little account of stimulus, where the higher functions are concerned; but I think that the present passage with its open object. A noise noise will remove the case to ignore it. The dense of a constitute the environmen with which the healthy organism torresponds; the said outsigned office, or the imprisoner, are the circumstances in which an impaired, but not ruined organism, recovers its health.

§ 8. uh andived re-virence of E. A. x. 7. 8. In man's composite b 21 time the principle of Form asserts itself with difficulty against Matter. Names, the purest expression of this principle, cannot be long kept up, for it is soon clocked, and the pleasure attending it destroyed, by the resistance of the material part of his nature. Before vigous can be resumed, and its attendant pleasure experence togain, the material resistance must have had time to subside in interinist have its own way, for a winde, and be allowed its own pleasure. Thus the life of the individual man is broken up into short periods of voice, properly so called, alternating with times during which the material vericle asserts itself on its own account: and this experience of the individual is paralleled, on a great scale, in the life of the race, the specific form of which is not realised in one immortal his available, but asserts itself, note or

1154 b. 21. less perfectly, for a short time in the adults of one generation, is ecopsed by their decay and death, regains force in their young descendants, and again asserts itself, more or less perfectly, in these when they reach adult age. But God is not thus discrete. The the higher moments of man, or the individuals of a species. He is CORT BUO 18 (wh and rider growings and dilling branger to be (Med 1. 7. 1072 b. 29). His nature is and : it is irripyed and duringer Form not confronted by Matter-Form in itself always ac ually achieved, not again and again to be imposed, by fatigating efforts, tipon rò desersion. His ήδονή therefore in άπλη. Thus the concrast 🚁 ... between the immutability of God as pure Form, and the mitterbility of the individual man, as compounded of Form and Matter, is the burgen of the closing sentences of this treatise on Pleasure. But we must remember that Aristotel anism thoes not really acquiesce in this contrast. Man has-if I may verture to use there a expression his cternal and immusable moments - the moments of rogous which he enjoys, when his Form-God's Form-assensitself victor ously in his Matter. These inciments have immeasurable worth and dignity dinywyd de inver ola re fi apiery purpor process ήμων (Met A. 7. 1072 b. 14) or, as Alexander (Met p. 671 ed 🗜 🗝 Bont a) says (in a passage which shows how easily Aristotle's theology lends itself to neo Platonic doctrine) & purepor mis time μες ών τὰ νοητά, όταν έκ τής άκρας έπιστήμης καλ τής άχαν είζωλες ενεργεία. убирган та вограй, тоте вашен тре арботор под ракоронеторы под таборон ήδουης επέκτινα ζωην, ήτιο λύγφι μέν έστιν άντρμηνευτος, γινωσκεται δε τουμτο μακόριον τουτί ποθούσι ποθος.

- b. 29. δταν δ' iσόξη . . τὸ πραντόμενον] iσοξη intransitive—'An I where the two elements are balanced, the result appears neither painful nor pleasant' (Grant). The Paragh, (followed by Coraes, Michelet, and Fritzsche) is wrong in thinking that the 'balance' mentional is the δμόνοια of the virtuous character, in which reason rules, and sense cheerfully obeys. The actions of the virtuous character are pleasant, not neutral. The writer is thinking rather of the effect which custom has in dalling the pleasure and pain of acts. see above § 5, b. 6.
- 5.27. Animains] God or inspyring and dividuous, in described an acommon in Met. A. 7. 1072 a. 25 fore to be ob accommon news, differential observations of the most on of material that is a space as not uself

motion, and is not itself a material thing in space: Met. A. 7, 1164 b. 27.

1073 π. 3 έσευν οὐσία ἀίδιας καὶ ἀκινητος, καὶ κεχωρισμένη των εἰσθητων

- . . μέρνθος οὐθέν ἐνδεχεναι έχειν ταίτην τήν οὐσιαν. Δλλ' ἀμερής καὶ

ἀδιωμετάς έστιν. Cf. Met. Γ. 8 το 12 b. 28 ἀνάγκη τὰ δυ μεταβαλλειν

(ε ε ἀναγκη δυ τι εἶναι εῖ τι μεναβαλλει Βοπιία, p. 217)' ἐκ τινος γὰρ εῖς τι

ἡ μεταβαλή. Δλλά μην οὐδί πάντα ἡρομοῖ ἡ κινιῖταί ποτε, ἀιλ δ΄ οὐδέν

ἔστι γαρ τι δ ἀεὶ εινεί τὰ κινούμενα, και τὸ πρώτον κινούν οκίνητον αίτο.

When we are told that the eternal energy of this imma erial Principle is Pleasure—iddarf i dispress rostrov (Mel. A. 7, 1072 b. 16) we must ask no questions. The language is not that of science, but of poetry. As poetry we must accept also the words before us here (vii. 14, 8), notwithstanding that they begin with a "wherefore"—did 6 6 or did plan and antique galactic flowing b. 26.

nal hoorh μάλλον δυ hρεμία doriv ή du nurjou.] because the parest hoorh is that of θεωρητική ενίργεια, or νόησιι, and the νοητου (with which voices is identical) is a fixed intelligible system, as distinguished from the fluctuating crowd of sensible paraculars. Thus in An. Post. ii. 19, 100 a. a το καθίλου (the object of νόηπις) is said hρεμήσαι iv τή ψυχή: and in de An. i. 3, 407 a. 32 we readified source foreign to τού καὶ επιστάσει μάλλου ή καήσει: ef. also E. A. x. 4. §§ 1-4, where it is slower that hôσκή is δλου τι, and therefore not a κένησιε. Equally irreconclude with its being a καιησες, or being is καιήσει, is the doctrine of this Bock that it is discursionare entrysea, or perfect function; for είνησει is always in the self imperfect: ef. Phys. ii. 2, 201 b. 31 ή το κίνησει δεύργεω μέν τις είναι δονεί, ἀτελής δε.

μεταβολή δὲ πάντων γλυκό] Eur. Orest. 234, who has μεταβολή b.28. ποντων γλυκό. Bywater restores γλυκό to the text here. The MSS. bave γλυκότατου.

† δεομένη] Rassow (Forsel. p. 101) argues that ή must be b. 30 either expunged or changed into ήμων: δεομένη is the predicate 'As the bad man is changeable so our nature, being neither simple nor good, needs change.' If we retain ή, then πονημό must be understood as predicate to the subject ή φύσιε ή δεομένη μεταβολής, and the clause of γάρ άπλη οὐδ΄ επεικής (= δεδ πονημίαν τικό) is superfluous.

§ 9.] Probably the work of an editor.

BOOK VIII.

Introductory Note | The space given to pole in the Erics is 2 Is very large, at d doubtless indicates by its execut the importance of I and the sulpect to Aristotle's moral system. It must be remembered. In however, that Anstotle's policies a wifer term than Friendship and I and that, although the latter is discussed at considerable length, these same two Books treat also of other subjects under the general best of polar

The wilch of the field covered by the treatise may be estimate. — I from the range of the two questions propounded respecting policies in These are (1) What is its Natural H story? and (2) What may too five done with it in the interests of the H gier Lafe? As discussing the first of these questions the treatise amounts to 'an enjury concerning the Principles of Sociology'; as discussing the second and question it is 'an Essay in the Metaphysic of Ethics.'

Examining the Natural History of dikin, Aristocle finds that the server are various forms of it, all note or less old our phases of be all his gregarious instinct, to which, rather than to a perception of il so the advantages of co-operation at distribut of labour, society ones in outsin at distribut of earlier of the area of supposed from noderator. Sid not upder disputers ris not address of physical old disputers of upper dispute as to according to the problem according to the supper supplication of the supper dispute the supper supp

The earliest form of the gregarious instinct in man, as in it is lower animals, is that natural affection, or oropyo, which uses a med parents and offspring, and generally those closely related by lace a cool

that 'n thing a more clear toon that the present tractise on the data.

I have been, so for as so ject and treatment are concerned. At any restrict tractise an independent treatment are concerned. At any restrict or granific an independent treatment among Arastotic's revealer, it soon has seen a post on assigned to it immediately after the Books on the desired departs, and flory. It must be assumed, I take t, that the writer of the E. E. found it in this position.

"H may were pilia (vill, 12, 2) is the primitive pulin. As the Family grows mo the Village, and Villages are organised into the City, persons more and more distantly akin are thrown together, and find picasure and advantage in association. The aggregates so produced not only crystal se as wholes, into postical forms (Snockein, approximation, representation) which retain traces of the original family relationships, but the individuals composing the aggregates contract, as in hyre cals, muon I relations in which either social pleasure or private advantage is the more prominent feature. Where social pleasure is the more promin in feature the mutual telation is called densping phone (stil. 5. 3); where private adsantage, & palie & dai ro appropose. As sothe's method is thus to generalise the not on of piker. Not only is there seemed piker, but there are also ongressing didia, noticent didia (x, 6, 2), and if didia it did of apression (vii 3, 1-4). Two men become friends, or enter t to a business contract, not only or principally because they now agree, as individuals, to be friends, or to make this particular bargan, but essertally because they are members of a social order or community which was constituted and is held together by h low first g-by duorous of nodering pidis. Rodering pidis in its turn may be traced back to ovygening pikin the tratural affection binding together parents and offspring, and kinsmen generally; while organish policy uself touches the First Principle of Nature. being the consciousness of that endeavour after vo der not vo beion, which he statle recognises as dominator in all creatures. Contract and the days on of labour, effecting public and private advantage. (a) appripar, ad outpeper), can operate only among persons who already occupy the status of members of an established community, and feel confidence in one another. The expression & wikia & did to garagior marks Aristotle's recognition of the truth that the and vidual cannot secure his own private advantage except in so fir as he is the pixor of those with whom he deals. He cannot secure his own advantage in a state of war of every man against every other.' Men are naturally 'friendly' to one another, and therefore secure advantages to themselves by fair dealing, not by plunder and murder. The thought of the private advantage which he buys reacts upon a man's 'friendly' feelings, and gives these the colour described by Aristotle in his account of & gualin & did to apprepart yet, save in a society ultimately held together by 'friendly' feelings, private a lyantage could not be bought at all.

M. T Due

The rules of Justice express the various ways in which my advantage may be reconciled with yours in such a society. Justice, as a habit of the mind, is a preparedness to act according to the which are established to secure the good of the community, and, through it, the good of its individual members. But the extreme of such rules, and of the preparedness to observe them, imply that, on the whole, the good of the community is desired, although individual members may be often tempted to disregard it. In other words, there would be no disautoring a thout plane. Takia, which is it not outfor appropriate (Pol. ini. g. 1280 b. 39), is the in hydrest interest in reasonful proprietor, and reasonful or pupilipar is the standard of Justice—see Pol. in. 4. 1279 a. 17 outs pix notices.

From one point of view, then, Aristotle's treatise sopi policies of an Enquiry concerning the Principles of Sociology,' containing, as it does, his whole theory of the natural evolution of the State with its political forms and institutions, its rules of universal and particular justice, its economic laws, and its various associations for pleasure Lusiness, and culture

From another point of view, however, this treatise is 'an Essay in the Metaphysic of Fibics.' The end or final cause of the social evolution which has been traced is the friendship between great men. This beautiful relationship is the highest product of social life. In it the chief end of man—frappers is impress—is truest fully realised. Each friend sees in the other a second self,' in whom he can 'contemplate' the law of excellence more clearly and continuously than he can do if he regards it only in timeself.

One recognises in this view of friendship the influence of Plate's doctrine of bioleculois. In the conversation (bioleculois) of surpathetic friends, Plato held, the truth is touched, as it can be in no other way. Nigoris is called forth, and the Idea of the Good is seen. Similarly, Aristotle's Perfect Friendship is a Dialectic (like Platos Dialectic, the last product of culture) by which a few virtuees and fortunate men in each generation are enabled to see the Chief End (what Eudemus calls 6 oxonds 6 vis rolongyables) more clearly, and keep it in view more continuously than their contemporaries. It refor the sake of these 'chalecticians' that the City exists.

CHAPTER I.

ARGUMENT.

We must next discuss friendship, for it is a virtue, or involves virtue materiore, it is necessary as a means to rousel life without it the rich could not preserve and use the revealth, or the foreceful their influence, it is the rejuge of foresty and minfortune; it guides the inexperience of youth, and succeed the recessary as a means in social life we do not imply said this are not provided by such at it is natural to man? In social life we do not imply said this are natural officient which a sixth between parent and officient which a sixth between parent and officient which a sixth between parent and officient which he are the between parent and officient which he will be freedly friendly to one or mather, as we see when strangers meet on a journey, briendly friendly to one of method of ice ity. The integree truths it more important than further if the bend of ice ity. The integree truths it more important than force if the integral of one mother, and of one mind. If they are this, they will be just to one another in the highest tense.

So now A for the necessary of foreinship but it is not only necessary as a means to round life. It is and an end heavisful in theif

Mony them have been put forth about it. Some people say that it is irrelarity, and quots' First of a feather. List others oppose this view with 'Rival Fetters' Then, there are those who go diefer, explaining Friend his on converse with some theory of the miture of things.' Thus hungides speaks of Farried carth in lave and ranny sky' and Heraelistee tests us that 'time as parent of all' athers again, as himpodocles, maintain that 'I she week like' We stall not follow those who this carry the enquiry back to the ultimate 'mature of things.' It is the' nature of evan' that was are concerned with—man's feel aga and dispositions and the presence which we shall set are there was a feel aga and disposition, or can but men not be friends!' and 'Is there only one species of prevaling only a terres of gualitative and his functions. We of species, we may at the same time be aware of friendling, are missioned in these inferences on paring stong a series of qualitative and instinctions. We of species, we may at the same time be aware of friendling maintitative differences.

§§ 1-5.] These sections suggest the chief points in Aristotle's 1155 • 3. account of φλία. Friendship is necessary to rich and poor, young and old. Without it life would be impossible; and, even if possible, not worth living (§§ 1, 2). It subsists naturally between parents and children, among the lower animals, as among men (§ 3). It is the bond which holds society together, and, as such, is the basis of

- 1158 a. 3. fustice (§ 4). But not on y is it thus necessary to the existence of bu man society (representing, as it does, the force which, originating in the family, caused the evolution of society), but it is also make t§ 5). The higher life requires what may be called the Dialecta of Friendship.
 - § 1. Fore yap aperfives figure? deerifs] while is the wide acceptance of the term is no, itself an aperfix it is that sense of being a more less of the body politic without which the individual could not have the various aperal include I under the general designation of fixed account of the politic without a sense or the fixed in the most emment way, may be discribed as lover to also as perfugerify, because it mannests itself in association with related aperfix. Of course the disposition described in in 6 to our alluded to here.
 - a. 14. § 2. βοηθείας] So Sas. and Byw. instead of βοηθεί preferred by Bokker. The weight of MS, and on yie in favour of sonθείας, which is given by Kb, Lb, Ob, Cambr., NC, CCC, B, B*; For the construction suffers. Perhaps we ought to read βοηθεία and make the depend on σίσσαι, the subject of βοηθεία being τοὺς φίλους.
 - 2. 15. σύν τε δύ έρχομένω //. x. 224.
 - n. 17. § 3. πρός το γεγεννημένου τῷ γεννήσαντι καί] em. Kb. which, however, reads προς το γεννήσαν τῷ γεννηθέντι. Ald and CCC margin (hand I think, which wrote the text) agree with Kb in giving το γεννήσαν τῷ γεννηθέντι (they omit πρός believe τὸ γεννησαν), but read the words omitted by Kb (CCC omits the first πρός in i.e. 17). All other authorities, it would seem, omit the words (κος) τρος το γεννήσαν τῷ γεννηθέντι. Susembli brackets them.
 - a. 26. § 4. not filor per order of the first seriously, bisaice 8° ores appositioned filias, not row bescher to printer filiate besch when men are friends, no pressure is required to make there are justly towards each other; they rather we with each other in beneficence. Indeed, mere pressure could never succeed, in the long run, in making men out justly. Friendly feeling nade men invent the rules of justice at first, and must always be present if they are to be applied rightly; for to be applied rightly, just two must be equivally applied, and equity, which is the perfection of justice (row denies of guilton) involves Plandship (change rise discr) and fellow-feeling (cf. v. t.t. t denies to denie applied on oxygonome).

It is better, with Zell, Coraes, Fritzsche, Grant and Peters, thus 1155 a 26. to unders and two demises to makeren of to incides (of F. N. v. 10. 3 τούτον έρα δίσμον από έπτετείς, πολ ύμφούν σπουδιώσεν δυτουν πρείττον τό miners, and vi. 11. 2, quoted by Peters, th pap entering could the eyel we άπαντων έστεν εν τφ πρός άλλον), then, with Aspasius, Lambinus, and Gilanius, of ro noderinor discion. Aspasius writes nodau yap the row decation, made and they be the true and a uniording, alon to maderially και τὸ πατρικόν, και τὰ δεσποτικόν τυντων δι τὰ μαλιστα δίκαιον έστε τὰ πυλιτικόν, όπορ όμοιου τέ έστι τῷ φιλικῷ' κατ' ἐσότητα γώρ έστι τῶν converses. At stotle has, inneed, just used the words Josepha and roce when ouriging heals, but we are not therefore of head to dentify rior discourse vo unitaria with re-wolveston discours. Indeed, to do so would be to make Anstotle merely repeat himself; whereas, if we anderstand him to refer to 18 images, something is added to what has been said. He begins § 4 by pointing out generally that Justice in the State—that system of vonos which we call to makerson discourwas produced and a upheto by dubin or sustaine; he ends it by intimaling that the highest man beaution of this justice the application of the general rule in its spirit and not in its letter to the tearthcular clase-ro frames involves a special degree of police, or t fellow-feeling, elsewhere called συγγνωμη & A. vi. 11. 1 τον γώρ ежнику радинта фирен обног опручнуваниями, как етнике та бреги терб была wwyyrwane. It is only the continued working in is of the constituive principle of fallow-fieling which can preserve the habit of jastice against our inclination to take too formal a view of the rights of others, and to make too much of our own rights, and he real was best the spirit of taking (row diamor to paking) who, from regard for a hers (pales or anyyman) of en declines to tress his own strict right E. N. v. to 8 6 py unpidodicator int to helpov all inatturents, υσίπερ έχων τον νόμον βοηθέν, επιεικής έστι.

§ 8 οὐ μόνον δ΄ ἀναγκαίδε ἐστεν ἀλλά καὶ καλόε] ¹ This is repeat- a. 29.

1. 3 in other would that friendsh i is ἀρετή τιτ' (Grant). Fritzsche ad ἐστ. quotes Ε΄. Ν. 11, 7, 2 το καλόε τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς. The clause τους γαρ φιλοφ λους (Γ, Lb, A d., and CCC read φιλοφιλούς other authorities φιλους) ἐπαινούμεν αιλ s a reason for regarding φιλ a as an ἀρετης: εf. Ε΄. Ν. i. 13, 19 τῶν ἔξεων δί τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς λέγουεν.

On the opposition between ἀνηνούν (that which is materially necessary) and καλόν (the beautiful result) see notes on vui, 12, 7 and ix. 11, 7.

- 1155 a. 31. καὶ ἔτε τοὺς αὐτοὺς οἴοντοι ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ ψίλους] Bekker τeads καὶ ἔνιοι for καὶ ἔτε with M[‡], Γ, Cambr., and NC. Peters ad loc. compares Κερ 334 φέλος μεν δή, ὡς ἔνικε, τοἶτφ τῷ λεγφ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἔσται, ἐχθρος δὲ ὁ πονηρος; ναί.
 - a 22. § 8. διαμφισβητείται κ.τ.λ.] Taken from Plato, Lyris 214 443 see the notes of Zell and Grant. Bo be quotations— δε πότ δρεσε δίγει δεδε δε τόν δρεδεν (Odys, κνί., 218), and κοὶ περαμείτ περομεί συτες καὶ απιδος δεδε δε τον δρεδεν πτωχώ (Hes. έργ, και ήμ., 25) occur in the pusage in the Lyris. In M. M. I. 11. 1208 b. 9 the prove b πολωσε περοκολοιον βίσνει is given. Ramsater is of op nion that Answelle, πλο uses ποτί ποΙ πορό, has in view another and an older proverb than that given by the writer of the M. M. It is to be noted, however that Lb reads παρ, and Ob παρο. In E. E. va. 1. 1235 2. 8 (the parallel passage) παρο is the reading
 - b 2. Δεώτερον και φυσικώτερον] 'φεσεκών ζητών etiam pet se utrunque valet: tum i a disputare ut ad rei veri atem penetretur opp, unpum λογαών, tum i.a ut naturalia in quaestunem vocentur opp e g hθικών' (Ramsauer ad loc.). 'Others go deeper into these questions and into the causes of the phenomena' (Peters).

Φυσικώς επιζητείν, 38 ορρακτά to λογικώς επιζητείν. is to in vestigate a subject in a concrete way with special reference to proximate causes; while hoyade bulgaton is to livesing ate it in the light of general formal principles, see de Gen. et Ceren, a it 9, 335 b. 25 sqq, where durinurepor keyer means to state the officient cause—el de tije elige tie hijases yesear dia tije europe duoienrepor uer de highe tor ours degistar (s.c. than the c who make the eigh causes of yesters and planes to you appropriate and to personate out αλτιώτερου τε του γεννών, καὶ ἐν άπασεν εξοιθαμέν τουτο λέγειν το ποιούν, όμορος En re rois chiace mat en rois and regens, h an il sugrembe. Cf. de Coelo 283 b. 17 duareme de un un antifixou acomorat (see also note on F N 1. 3 4, b 23). But in the passage before us the special of posicial is rather that between to quaities inforeir and to ifficie inforcir, as may be seen from the words with which & 7 opens. The result rethat here rd doomer inforce, bringing in, as Grant sais, the analogies of the whole of nature, is as contrasted with the narre wer ethical enquiry, indistinguishable from to hoyerin on melitare arranwir. Hence the Paraghrast ad loc. To pir our dishes for hipor as nabahirous rivas nai puvikais hayave, nai forew bahin and the rest in the

courter epiero, est ed brow ear ducion, our form ciacion est annocent 1165 b 2 σείνως. επισκιψώμεθα δε όσα μόνης έχεται της άνθρωπίνης φύσεως.

The special mean by which φυσιοπετρον has in the present passage is illustrated by the neighbour of diversor; are Ind. Arist. s.s. δνω—
'in serie potionary δνω dicuntur quie magis sunt un versiles.'

There is no reference by name to Heraclitus or Empedocles in the passage I st. 214, 215 But of Sympos. 187 A vd to yap φησι [Ηρακλειτοκ] διαφερόμενου αυτό αυτώ ξυμφερουθαι, ώππερ άρμουίαν eifor re uni hoper See Bywater, Heruchts Eph. Relig Fr 45 und 16. Perhaps the idea in to directour oundepour is that of things rubbed against each other till they become smooth and fit well ogether, as, for example, the structures of organic beings modified n relation to one another in the course of the struggle for existonce -de tor diaphymetor enklistyr donor ar (juncturum) end warte ear' oper givendar-see Origin of Species, ch. 3 'The structure of every organic being is related in the most essential, yet often hidden manner to that of all the other organic beings with which it comes into compent on for food or residence, or from which it has to escape, or on which it preys. This is obvious in the structure of the teeth and talons of the tiger, and in that of the logs and claws of the parasile which clings to the hair of the tigers body.' Herodotas Lowever, uses to designer, without any suggestion of its derivation from \$60, to mean simply 'opposition.' Heraclitus probably uses it in the same way.

According to Empedocles distorns is the principle of unification and order, muss of disintegration (see Ritter and Preller, Must Phil. § 170)—

οι τουν άλλοσουνα διομπερές ούδαμα λήγει, Τλλονε μέν φιλόνηνε συνερχόμεν είς δε δικουνα, Τλλονε δ' οὐ διχ' ταστα φορούμενα νείκιος ξχθει.

His 'like loves like' principle is illustrated by an ancedote in E. E. vi., 1, 123% a. 11, repeated as follows in M. M. i., 11, 1208 b. 11 havin dl nal noise nots del nadrodovane int the airthe nepapidos, ipomplemen tou 'P produktio, did th note if now int this airthe nepapidos nadrides, eineir des light et the expapido diposor if now, de did to diposor the nova horrisans.

The words quoted from Euripides belong to a fragment preserved by Athenaeus (xi.i. 299), and Stobaeus (Ecl. 1, 9, 1, 208). It appears in Dindon's Poetae Seen in as Fr. 890—dějhou öpáparon.

- 1155 b. 11. § 7. πύτερον εν πώσε γίνεται φιλία ή οὐχ οἶόν τε μοχθηροὺς εντας φίλους εἶναι] Τhis question as Grant coints out, ε stated to the Leves 214 D τοίτα τοίνον αἰνίττονται, ὡς ἐμοί δακοδιτε, ὡ τοίκο οἱ το ῦμοιον τῷ ὁμοίς φιλον λέγοντες, ὡς ὁ ἀμιθές εῷ ἀγαθῷ μόνος μον φίλος, ὁ ἀε κικύς οῦν ἀγαθῷ οῦνε συσφ οἰδίπονε εἰς ἀληθο φιλιεν ἔντενι Λείκτι the's αποινει ἐκ τυπνες cul in via 4. ε δε ἡδοιορ μεν οἰν εὰ διὰ το χρήσερον καὶ φαύλουν ἐκδιχεται φίλουν ἀλληλοις εἰναι εαὶ ἐταιοις φαίλοις κοὶ μηθετερον ὁποιφοιν, ἀι' αὐτονε ἐκ ἀγλον ὅτε μινεις τοις ἀγαθούς οἱ γὰρ κικοις οὐ χαιρουσεν ἐαυτοῦς, εὶ μή τικ ἀφέλεια γένοντε.
 - of per yap to oldperor onueio] Michelet says- 'contendent unum tantim speciem am cicae esse, quai quae quanti ate tallum different (ineligerat to publico cal to heren), quante val general diversa esse non possinti quantitate autem diversas esse amai asquia, ut dicit As rasias, minhou mir farir à roir dyadir. Arror de ? ror nompor. Hoe argumentum refutat Aristoteles optime tre dicens hanc quantitats differentiam alam etum qualitatem e specieta efficere cum nihil impeliat quom rus diversae species ita inter se disinguant ir ut al era sit ampi heat o, a tera dimini-(degerat yap to palkane ent to herene ent ta trepa to eiter). Michele's hane qua itità is differentiam a un etiam qualitatem et speciem efficere' is hardy to the point here. It cannot be said that the three species of Princislep distinguished by Aristotle (xn. 3 t) are constituted by more differences of degree. There are prifound qualitative differences between the ayofile, the 684, and the χρήσιμον (viii, 2. 1) But here are all φιλητά and his general :1tribute may enter in various degrees into the specific ferms, and ough the degree in which it enters into a given form his not. ; todo with the specific differentiation of that form from another from The fron Ish p for cleasure differs and ashely from the for alsingfor the good, because the good differs qualitative y from pleasure, = but nevertieless we can say that the friendship for pleasure is has friendship than that for the good. The specific characteristics make it an inferior form, just as those of the and place him being homen of de nisperen forget that it is pressible and to distriguish species, and to arrange those species so as to exhibit the quantitative variation of a given quality throughout the source of speces taken as a whole. That however to make an berne is not itself eldoronor is shown by Pol. 1, 5, 1259 h 32 machor δή τους έστιν επισκεπτιον περί άρχομικου φυσει και άρχοντος, κάτιρος

φ zirh duerh h śrówu. ch μέν γάρ δεί δμφοτέρους μετέχειν πυλοκαγαθίος, 1188 b 10 διά τό του μεν βρχειν δέοι δυ του δε δρχειθοι καθαστής; ούδε γάρ το μαλλον και ήττον οίδε το μεν γάρ δρχειθοι καὶ δρχειν είδει δικρυρει, τὸ δι μάλλον καὶ hττον ούδεν. The species of Fi endsh p are line the various δρεταί, which are specifically distinct, and yet may be compared with one another in respect of the degree n which they conduce to be Nichle Life: thus δυδρεία is more of a virtue than είτροπελίο, but it is not this more which differentiates them specifically: or, to take the Paraphrast's example — ή γόρ ούσια καὶ τὸ συμβεβηνόν ένερα δυτα τῷ είδει, τὸ μάλλον καὶ τὸ hττον ἐπιδέχοντον οὸ γόρ δροίως εἰσὶν δυτα.

είρηται δ' ύπερ αὐτών Εμπροσθεν] The commentators refer us b. 15. to E. N. u. 8 where the imphaly and Threefie opposed to a virtue are presented as specifically distinct from it although they are only the amplification of diminution of the #idles which is feld in producation by the virtue; see Michelet ad lec. Aspan us not finding any passage in the E. N exactly answering to the present telerence, suggests -loke be elijabat de role ekkenrakous role Namagrise. But the view of Grant and Ramsauer (supported at parently by Sas) that the write epopea. Europoster are spurious seems to be correct for inio niran must be equivalent to repl rol enche geother to malhor and heror and the erepa to elder, while meal airbo In the next line (b. 17) refers to the the holder offer and further, as Ramstact points out imig airds - migh airds is unusual in the Fthics: see Lucker tiver den Sprachgebrauch des Arist, die Praepautiones, p. 47- Im allgemeinen nun ist dies (inip = sepi with gen.) bei Aristoteles richt hat fig. in emigen Schriften und zwar in der Ehk. Katorik und Topik falbt es sich öfter als in den undern.' It is to be noted that in the M. M. and Rhet. ad Alex. Imp = neal with gen, is almost universal; see Ind. Arist. and Eucken, o. c. p. 47.

The six passages in which it does occur in the E.N. (see note on iii, 3, 2 and add iv 2 4 to the passages there quoted, are with the exception of the second, short connecting clauses which might have been fascited by an ethical

CHAPTER II.

ARGUMENT.

But this question as to whether there are reveral spaces of brainly major settled by reference to the objects of Franching a c. the things which a word New these are there—the good, the pleasant, and the useful—the first two sing ends for the take of which the third is shown as means. The good or passes then loved as an end by a particular individual is white thirt good, a wear widual thinks good or pleasant for himself. What he thinks good or pleasant for himself may or may not be really good or pleasant—that is such to go which does not here concern us.

The serm' I viendship' is not applied to the off itson which we very here to displess object. for a lifeless object connect return affection, and not de except seems for all over the person whose good of our friend for his real wife Where, however, the person whose good we thus not have not respondent to feeling towards him is well unshing rather than I recombine for friend for very precal well-wishing—or, more a curricly reciprocal well-wished of what the parties are awares for A might with well to B whom he had never use and B might wish well to B whom he had never use and B might wish very last one of here had never your wishers. In that case A and B would not be friends had onerely our wishers.

1165 b. 17. § 1. mepl adrar | mepl rar rie delias eidar.

b. 18 φιλητόν] The author of M M (i., 11 1208 b 37) distinguished between το φιλητόν which is το δαλώς δγαθόν and το φιλητών και Ε is το δύτῷ δγαθόν. Similarly το βουλητόν is το δαλώς, and το σκαλιών το δούστῷ δγαθόν. Cf. E. N iii, 4° as there the σκαλιών wishes το κατ' δλήθειαν δγαθόν, so in the treatise on φιλίω, he large that which is δαλώς δγαθόν—human nature as a rational system.

The dyaffer and the how are loved as ends while the zeroma is only a means—as the Paraphrast says zeroma polyra for all dyaffe pipes.

The phagrow is always something that is good or pleasant for 1165 b. 21 a man, or which he thinks good or pleasant. For the good man that is good and pleasant which is really so, being absolutely suitable to human nature as a rational system. Such a man comprehends life as a system, and calls things good and pleasant only in virtue of their occupying their fit places in the great whole; the inferior man follows his paragle, which gives him partial and abstracted views. Things are good and pleasant for him because they satisfy a self which is isolated in its own sense and imagination. In the good man the matter of sense and imagination has received that form which is Reason, and there is no longer any discrepancy between to dolline dyadow and th out of dyadie, as particular presents the latter. Pourodia has become the vehicle of Reason, and no longer abstracts to miro syable, but presents it concretely as an aspect of so dadwe wyable ab specie acternitatis. The good man sees clearly that obe fore to active et avec observations oid avec notireles (E. N. vi. 8, 4), and that the sparrieds Bos itself is for the sake of the Graphende Base.

endary be to endary i.e. incorre helyror to incorre dyader

b. 24.

S.o.ion & oddie dorat yap to p.l. hyror patroperor. This will make b. so no difference to our position—it is not altered by the substitution of to paroderor dyolder pelodes for to dyalor pelodes; indeed to dyalor is always given as to patroperor dyalor.

\$ 3 rptor 8' overwell I that I spenged (Acust Stud E N 5 27 p. 215), fellowed by Susembl, is right in reading \$6 here.

8. 8] Kb emits δt, which is accordingly bracketed by Ramsauer But the orms on seems to be a more blurder: of, δt δt τι τών εξημείνων at the end of § 4. The δt d are the dynθών, ήδι, and χρήσιμών.

Lacing Byw, income codd.: income is 'the particular 54 (χον that b 20. happens to interest the man'—Byw. (Contributions, p. 59), who refers to Ind. Arish 166° 61 for the construction—'that, after, verbal substantive βούλησιε.'

ole Fritzsche and Grant compare Lysis 212 D old apa φίλιπτοι είσιν, εύτ αν οί πποι μη αντιφ λάσιν, οὐδε φιλέρτιγει, οὐδ αν φιλόκικε γε και φίλουνε, κ.τ.λ. The writer of the M. M. (il. 10. 1208 b. 27) demes the possibility of friendship between men and τοι. it.

- 1158 b 23 geds—fore γάρ, ώς οίωνται, φιλία και προς θεον και να δίρες, ου δρθώς, τήν γάρ φιλίαν έντιδοθά φαρεν είναι οδ έστε το άντιφιδείνοι ή δέ πρός θεόν φιλία οίτε άντιφιλείσθαι δέχεται, τίθ όλως το φιλια δτοπον γάρ δν είη εί τις φαίη φιλείν τὰν Δία.
 - b 32. τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους . . . λανθάνουσαν;] If A wishes good to 3 for B's sake, but B does not reciprocate A is said to be added a pose 1' to B—not to be B's friend'; for the nation of friend is that of two persons reciprocally well-disposed towards more other. This definition, however, is not complete they make he Anato that they are reciprocally well-disposed towards each other.

According to §§ 3 and 4 piles requires (1) ed two filters φ phony in Boileach i toyoda exclusi éven—i e. \hat{g} évit érrep into e φ phony even (ch. 3, § 2): (2) to diritable (3) to φ la phony even.

1158 a. 5. § 4. 8. Er ti tur elpquérur | 1. e. dià to ayabir, à tà jui, à to ye ourse. This is added somewhat intelevantly, for it is of a case that in the friendships did to how and did to apprend the first requirement of friendship, viz 18 Bookerflas royabli decirou irean, is not 110 1 saturfed as he says in ch. 3 § 2 of m of did to population discovered th abrois dyadle arthyopou, and of his ydonye did to abrois god, and his it φιλούμενδε έντιν, άλλ' ή χρήσιμος ή ήδύς κατά συμβερηκός οι έξει όλα alreal slow. These fine idships for profit and parasite, however satisfy the first requirement after a certain fashion. A person was is merely a means to profit or pleasure may, like merely, come is be regarded after a certain fashion as an end. This seems to be what is meant by the statement made below in via 3 2 d at palaieres oblighous Boulantas toyabis allahame touty of delicient in may perhaps suppose that the "fr endship" of the dog for ha tent satisfies the first requirement of friendship in this way.

CHAPTER III.

Angt MENT

There being three orgets of fremiship, there until be three gaves of from this, such supolving rangement letting histories to both partner.

prients are a good to each other an respect of test in but is the growest a the freeedohip arrane, pleasure, on substity is a tree with each other is the bestween, is pleasure, or as useful as provide. In the first are easy as well

our friend for takes he is in him of; but where use by it the ground of friendit for in ince our friend not as on end in himself but as a means to our own orosmus, aminely where pleasure is the ground of friendship we do not love an area of companion for himself, i.e for what he is, but he awa he grees us pleasure. The freewiships then which are based on pleasure and wie ty over fraudships por accidence men are unvel, not for being themselves what they are but for happening to be pleasant or useful to other people such friend hip a ces its descrived, depending a they do on a schutst relations the friend dep of utility, unit exects cheeft between elderly paper was do not rive to see much of each other or take neach pleasures in the society of each other, erceet in a for as some advantage is hoped for the friendship for piea use, which is thirty between young profit who 'see as feeing eather than arenterest detates, and got the immuniste passure, which they want, by close ompanion-1418, sr, is may be, by faming in love, therefore cannot see soo in h of each other, so long at close companionship is pleasant, but when it ceases to be \$13 and, cease to be founds - ametimes as suddenly as they became friends, tomestrines by a growing out of three friendship.

Perges Francished as that between more who, brive good, are of like . he water. In such friends to A wishes the same good for B us B wishes for A. ce cach resides for the other that he may remain what he is -a good man. rm. A friend rip is triting for goodie i is a losting quality. Moreover, each of the friends or good in him el), and good in relation to the other, i c. unful lie n als pleasent in himself and to the other, for one's oven action, and there the one's own almoss give one pleasure; and the actions of good mengice the come or like. Thus in the similar goodness of the friends, upon which this Friendship is based are employed their counter pleasantness and their complex use ty for each friend verng ready good an good in come comporary relation. is who reas a personal and ready moral who he means that he is present and medial on the same way that the other is Friend his live this then is naturally larreng, but it is rose, for good wen are rare, it takes them a long time to less exist other and your each other's considence and fit their characters together Profit may all at once we k to be fraud . but they do not be one friends all at once. They must have time to know each other's characters.

§ 1. διαφέρει δε ταθτα κ.τ.λ.] έ. c. άγαθον, ήδύ, χρήσιμον.

1150 a. 6.

raing η φιλούσων] 'm relation to that which is the ground of a 10. their frendship '= e, g., those whose frendship is for profit do not I we each other for 'what they are' (Peters), but for what they hope to get out of each other. As Ramsauer notes, dyabór a, 12 = dφίλιμον νι (χρησιμου).

οῦ καθ' αὐτοὺς φιλοῦσιν] Gran. has a good note—"Do not love & L. each other for their very selves." This phrase καθ nöroὺς is rather a legicus formula than an ordinary grammatical combination. It seems to have arisen from καθ σύτος "the absolute" καθ' σύτος ες opposed to κατὰ συμβεβηκός § 2.

- 1186 a. 12 roj notoùs rivas elvas] 'for their qua ity simply'. An aperi (e evrpanekia) is a notorne: see note on v. g. e. b. ao. Hunt g. al (v. dperal. bring grand s. the notione par excellence; see E. N. 4 8 (referred to by Fritzsche) à notional notarior impolation notain vou notoùs nume nat dyadoùs note notions notains nat mpaerieus no nako.
 - 6. 10 § 2. ούχ ἢ ὁ φιλούμενος ἐστιν] = ἐστὶν ῦσπερ ἐστὶν, two l nesters Fritzsche, emitting ὁ with Kt, makes φιλούμενος a pied cate like χρήσιμος and ἦδες !. but the amission in Kb is probably a neter blunder. Susemil l, fo lowing Boantz, inserts δισπερ ἐστιν alter βιλαμενός ἐστιν, line 16. I think that it is unnecessary to do so.

κατά συμβεβηκός τε δή κ.τ.λ.] Fransche (F. N. vii., ix) his in important note here - consociat e parti que re bij ad conclust dam rationem na faciunt, ut cum barbara dictione and and comparari possint . . . Nam utitur auctor particula 86 ad rem anto exploratam aut necessario ex super or bus consequentem in hardam . . . Jam vero ante nane part culam quati, insuper possisri, causa haec videtur esse quod pronunciata voce ri, serentari novam, subjects voce 84, conclusionem aliquam se admuna supericribus declarat auctor.' Zell says to the same effect- 11: on a re pleonastice superaddita est, vel potius par icula mire cod lativa conclusivae conjuncta, quo arctius orationis membra edisrean.. Eucken (de Arrobeteus duemb entione pars frams 3 000 ticularum usu, pp. 21, 22) opposes this view on the green is the meaning and also is expressed by an of and that in about & places in which re by occurs the re is followed by an ther ce, uld ? par icle. In the present passage, Fucken reads & with Mb account of dif after eiddidzeros a. 1 3, und makes this de answer per 2126 st tham to re a. 17. He thinks that two conclusions are this dust from the fact that of er by did to appareum pike weet did to and dyador arrayovar, sai of de glarge dia to avrais hole sai of y & fabrare έστιν, αλλ' ή χρήσιμος ή ήδος 112. (1) κατά συμβελημώς αξ φωλ μι ών eline, and (2) eithe hero, of removes cious these two concluses that coupled, per anacolutham, by re -86. In the parallel asset additioned by Frazzella, viz. Phys. 186 a. 4, de Animal. gen. ; 20 les. and Pol. 1203 b. 7, the re before by is. Fucken points out, times if

So apparently Bywater, Controbutions, p. 59.

by an in the next clause. Cases of re followed, per anacoluthan, 1156 a 18 by & are not rare in the best writers (see Lucken, o. c. p. 17), and Lucken's suggestion that we should read to instead of the after oldinatoria a. 19 is strictly legitimate. But is it necessary? We have the authority of Eucken himself for the remarkable fact that while report followed by another copulative particle is very rarely used in Books 1-vu of the F. V., it occurs h. Books vid, ix, and x much more frequently than in any other work of Arritonic. In E N' i it c'oes not occus , nor in il; I occurs on e in ili; twice in iv; not at all in v; once in vi; and once in vii. On the other hand, m via t occurs eight times; in ix twelve times; and in x serveen times. In these three Books Tucken finds that the style as proacles that of poetry, he subject not being evolved by means of intrade fatoritations, but graphically presented to the mind's Hence the partices by which causes are subordirated to one 25.0 no other are of rare occurrence, while those which samply coordinate clauses are numerous. Thus end, which is so common in the writings of Auscotle and in the seven earlier Books of the F. N., is very rare in time three Books, see Eacker, de Arrat dis, rat. p. 14, 2nd pp. 75, 76. Lucken's inference from this and from other per blances is p. 77)- cum lin ita icter se discrepent, boc videtur clacere, non emnes codem tempore ab Aristotele scriptos, sed postea demum alios cum aliis conjunctos esse."

May we not then repaid he re of 1156 a. 17, notwi betanding the immediately following dift as an instance of the re not followed by another copulative particle (riadjunct vum see Ind Acres) which Fucken finds characteristic of vii, is, and x? I prefer so to regard at—to suppose that re here merely facilitates the transition to a charse which may be viewed either as a conclusion from what has gone before (hence de), or as merely adding (hence re) an all emative phrase work or appreciate to express the notion already expressed by the clause only if diphologous deriv, iddling in philosophic for the clause only if diphologous deriv, iddling in philosophic for the clause only if diphologous deriv, iddling in philosophic for the clause only if diphologous deriv, iddling its philosophic for the clause only if diphologous derivation, iddling its philosophic for the clause only in diphologous derivations are not provided that the first particles are not to be a supplicated to the provided that the first particles are not provided to the provided that the provided tha

§ 3. πρός εκείνα] πρός το χρήσιμου ή το ήδύ.

a. 24.

• 4. πρεσβύτως] Cf. Rhel, ii. 13. 1389 b. 37 καὶ προς τὰ συμφέρου ζώσιν, αλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ καλον, μάλλον ἡ δεί διὰ τὰ ψιλαυτοι είναι' τὰ μεν γεὶρ συμφέρου αὐτῷ ἀγαθάν ἐστε, τὰ δὲ καλον ἀπλώς.

¹ Horo, 1111 o. 9, Bywater restores 36 from Kh.

- 1150 a. 29 της τοιαύτης όμιλίας | the constant and pleasant in executive του συζήν.
 - ele tuotue be aut the ferende tideaux | ferend gebie submitte a. 30. e.g. between an Athenian and a Spartin, does not imply to suffer, and tests merely on mutual convenience. Ramsaner a lm ting the correctness of classing ferring police under & police & die to progress. thicks these words out of place here, and brackets them. "I pronein raines, he tiges, has rething to which it can be grainmatically referred, and the clause is almost a transcript of via 12 1. 1161 b. 15 ele ratrue de rafeies de ret nat ros femens. I thank that values (vni. 3, 4) may easily be taken to relate to the vanus utilitarian diking mendened above. Trose of apposition, of in acut, and son. The writer of the M. M. ii. 11, 1911 a. 12 looks at Eined pila from a different point of view-Bismorory & do de fem-פלאתו דבו לות ביד ון בניונה של זים בסדור של ביד מלים ביד בינים בידור בינים בידור בינים בידור בינים בידור בינים בידור ב incharthren air, alor en coir madienic. granden Inem nece bab abor grydene κατά την ύποροχήν οὐ μένουστο φέλοι δυτου.

 - b. 8. Sidnep filader and raxims majored? Rasson (For h 1 p 3) 34 separated didnep raxims phonos and majored, contraining did raxims property property filader and pirated phonos and pirated property per his well property for the different post on of raxims. Bywater's no e or an raximal b. 3 is fort, raxims and.
 - E 5 την φιλίων, 'their friendship'—is the reading of K', Ob Camb an CCC, B, B', and seems pre-enable to Bekker's φιλιών, the reading of Lb, Mb, NC, Ald.
 - b 7. § 6. releta... b. 11 συμβεβημός] 'The friendsh μ heixers those who are good and abuse in excellence is percet; for in a cach friend, being good in himself [i.e. net merely good for another or useful], wishes alike the good of the other quid good in himself.

and those who il to wish each the good of the other for the other's 1156 b 7. sake are friends in the truest sense, each being the friend of the other for what he is resentially, not for what he is accidentally." This friendship between those who are both good in themselves (end airois) is here shown to be releas because in it each friend loves the Other for what that other is himself (de obroins) i. c. loves him as erepor acres (x. 9 10) - treas Humanity in him as an end not as a me ann' In line b. 10 di airous our un exount means écurepor dideen a Three mois dearspor di decisor-i.e. the expression di airore marks the two friends regarded as each the final object (hence du) of the ther's ove, not regarded as subjects each of whom has the feeling of love for the other - a that case we should have had and abrois. It is to be o served that the Paraphras, reads of abrobe, not of abrobe; his comment is of de produperor ed ayaba eais pilous, aix caurier even. eiddid raw spidaw, obra' riow of madiora spidae. A' airobe yis, rave spidaue Cadobac, and Bobbostin abrois to dyabi, and ob bil dido and anti analegoris.

1 6' dpert udvinor Cf. E. N. i. 10. 10.

b. 19.

of γάρ dyadol nal ánhûş âyadol nal âhhihois ἀφίλιμοι] Here b. 13. âhhihois ἀφελιμοι explains τφ φίλιφ ἀγαθοι of the proceeding clause. These words are quoted by Rassow (Forich p. 83) in support of hin remark 'die Eralärer des achten Buches sind oft za Irrilamern vorleitet durch das Wort ἀγαθοι, das baid im Sinne von καλός bald im 5, inc von χρήσιμοι gelraucht wird.' Cf. the use of ἀγαθοι τε in viil. 3. 8, 8 ≈ χρήσιμου οτ ἀφέλιμου.

those who, he up the rational life, therefore give pleasare by their society to others who live the same life. It is the fact that the rational life is one for all men who live it that makes of bahor your also you so in the life of reason man derives from man true pleasare and true profit—pleasare which can never brong pain afterwards profit what a never results in loss to oneself or to others. The common consciousness of a noble life lived together is pure pleasare, and to live this life together is the lighest good. Accordingly in the life of Reason there is no conflict of pleasares or the new, but all men necessarily agree. As Spinoza says (Ethin, 35) 'quantum squisque ex suae natural legibus id appet t quod bonum et id amovere constur quod malum esse judicat; et quum praeterez il quod ex dictamine rationis bonum aut malum esse

- 1130 b 15. Judi, amus necessar o bonum aut malum sit, erg o hom nes etateus ex due u ration's vivunt eatenus tantum ca necessario agunt quae humanae natame et consequenter unicuique homain necessario bona sait, hoc est quae cum natura tainscujusque heminis conveniunt. Atque adeo homines et am inier se, quatenus ex dueta ration's vivunt, necessario semper conveniunt. Nich I singulare in retiam natura datur quod hom ni sit utilias quan homo quo ex dueta rationis vivit. Nam id nomai utalessa um est quad com sua natura maxime convenit, hoc est homo. At homo ex egibus estate naturae absolute agut quando ex dueta rationis vivit, et estenus tantum cum natura alterius hominis necessario semper convent. Ergo hom ni n hal inter res singulares un lus datar quam homo.
 - b 16. al obeias modes e and ai rosauras] "lais own actions and there there are resemble them."
 - b. 17. al adrai ή δμοιαι] This is the reading of Lb Mb (K' has alreading of Lb Mb (K' has alreading of Γ, Uk Σ, CCC, NC, Cambr., Ald. Thus al adrai corresponds to design to al evadrant.
 - § 7. \$\psi\$ rotain \$\delta \delta \lambda \lam
 - vii. 4. 5 où náro 8 airea ovránvour. Cf. also Cat. 6. 4 b. 36.
 - Paraph., Zell, Frienche, Williams, Peters) to mean that ad trendship on in the ceruma after pilotest and take the plane to mean the afternation of the ceruma after pilotest and take the plane to mean the afternation which is for the sake of a telauve good or pleasure. It extends to pleasure the telauve of pilotest, is a trendship only said discovery the economic of this rendering of said discovery to the relative of discovery the said support of this rendering of said discovery the rise discovery discovery and support of the said species of the said said discovery and support of the said species of the said said discovery and support of the said said support of the said support

Successioner you ripe par' destrict decisioners φιλίοι κ.r.λ., and to vii 4. t 1356 b 20. η δε δια το ήδο δροίωρα τουτης έχει. Grant s interpretation is supported by Aspassus (167, 25 Hey'but); but I have no doubt that the ordinary interpretation is correct. In the 'duplicate' passage (§ 6) the δροίδηγε is the similarity of the friends.

raing be well indexes to depute and airois) but this (sc. b. 21. perfect friendship) has all the specified characteristics (se goodness, I known these, are ulnoss) as essential attributes of the parties."

raing yap opour rai ta horra! The difficulties which this clause b. 82 has raised for the commentators are web set forth by Comes. In transcribing his note, I insert explanations and the views of later editors within square brackets. of pie ifpygoore [Aspasius, Michele., Grata, William s] vướng thị hoặc tẩu vươ vươ được kui từ λοιπά είδη των φελιών, ή αὶ λοιποί φιλίοι, ή το δεα τό χρήσιμου και ή διά to have on de perunmoneree the specture ele to duoise fithe reading of Kh. Combr., knewn to Aspassas accepted by Finascle, Kassow Frs h. p. 24, and Susemill rain, kard to dyadois since dyhady, of ayabis hidas apacoi esas eni év rois domois, roureure ant udeis addinadane ent procum [Aspassus rende ing the abemative reading busion, Lambritis, and Fritzschel. APP fe e, the paraphrase of Argyropylus . hayowan hisse curm's miles sunt et ceterae, voiavene viva ypochne auchomen, τούτη γάρ δμοιαι καί αι λοιπαί, τουτίστι, ταύτη τή φιλια δμοιαί είσε καί of humal delient onep dylai sai if MAP [the Paraphrast Heliodorus] and and δροιότητα ταύτης οι άλλοι φιλίαι δεομάζουται.' «lo) δ' οί [Murells] and (militarirepor linus) neparaprir thus not required its of pomotian ran if heyers [the clause roung . . . homa b. 22] naphyreoan.

Here then we have two allernative interpretations, according as we read human or human; (1) reading human— for the other kinds of friend-lip resemble this, the pelect kind, (2) reading human— for the other heing similar in respect of virtue, they are similar also in the other respects. As for the first interpretation—I think that it introduces an entirely irrelevant remark obviously suggested by a misunderstanding of the preceding sail and apodryrin ring, and must be rejected. The rejection of this interpretation of rainy yap human rid human may seem to raise a presumption in favour of human, for which the MS authority is certainly strong; although, on the other hand, there is a certain awkwardness in laving to take rainy as—mara rid dyadous sing, whereas in the line above (b. 21) it is the

not be interpreted otherwise than as above? Zell suggests to following interpretation.—'Potest autom leads vulgata and tools be quoque explicate: Hinc bonorum vi orum amediate assentate teliqua, il est, reliquit quae ad firmant et veram amediate requirement, il est, absolute bonum et absolute parumeum! I l'est apparently following Zell, translates—'for here there is similar, and the rest, viz. what is good san ply and pleasant sample.' Sundy Spore cannot mean 'similarity, as distinguished from realouse, 'we rest' and is for the test to regard how whom the article as to pre heater of a clause introduced by the 're adjust that is common in floors viu, ix, x? see note on vii 3, 2, and have, de Ariri, die, rat, p. 14, where this case is quoted.

Realing upon I venture to offer the following ten leru g 'exty friendship is for good or Heasare (the good or pleasure being such ether in itself or in relation to the person who has the Lieval feeling) and implies some similarity between the parties, but true friendship possesses all the aforesaid characteristics in virue of the essential nature of the friends-1 say aid for it line friends) processes characteristics also (sai re lours, re, the pleasantness and use u.z. s of the friends to each other, as distinguished from their goodness) are similar (биота), the truly good being also truly pleasant." True friends have a similar, or indeed identical, pleasantness and worldness as well as goodness of below ch. 4. § 1, 1 34 core ware raura giverus nal iman interior masi incresor, imp dei tous fadous image grow—the qualities which the one friend really has the other truly loves, because they are similar to, or identical with, las own real qualities reciprocally loved by his friend. This means that these qualties exist duhies, or that friends between whom this partect dynumys subsists are none and virous, &c. Where all qualities are not bear, the one is not the other's other go, and, if each his 'frienc,' must be so called because loved for some qually ro, inherent essentially in his character, but attaching to the special relation in which the two happen to be placed. The leading idea of my tendering is that where said marra rains yeares sol dieses évaréno man évarenou, there the good pleasant and useful quantice of each friend must be also lute sandar, and airmir, tot relative, for

I have not altered the punctuation of the above quotative, has what I tree to be Zell's meaning would be made clearer by a comma artis engineers.

if they were relative, then a dissimilarity between the friends would 1166 b 22, be implied, whereas good men cannot be dissimilar: I M M is 11. 1210 2. 8 h pile yap sub' buolotyra h two snoodniws sal h tells a billion h dissimilar and an arm to supply out.

udhora be The weight of MS, authority is in favour of by here, b 23, and a I MSS, seem to have be in b. 24; but I think that Bywater's be in b. 23 and by in b. 34 make the passage run better.

§ 8 έτι δε προσδείται χρόνου και συνηθείας) οδ μείνου δε άρκτῆς h. 22 δείται ή τοιαύτη φιλία κεί τροπων άγαθων, άλλα κεί χρόνου και συνηθείας (Pamph.).

τούς λεγομένους όλος] Cf. E.E. H 2, 1238 a, 2 δώ εἰε παροιμίων 6 27 ελήλεθεν ὁ μέδιμοος τών άλών.

ούδ' ἀποδέξασθαι δή πρότερου ούδ' είναι φίλους) ' nor can they b 28. accept one prother as frends, or he friends' (Pe ers). C. viii 5. 3 οἱ δ' ἀποδεχόμετοι αλλήλους: c. also E N ix 8. 7 τοὶς μέν οδυ περε τοι καλος προξε ε διαφερώτων σπουδαζώτας παυτος ἀποδεχουται καὶ ἐπαινούσω.

For 35 Lh, Mh, P, Cambr, read 341,

CHAPTER IV.

ARGUMENT

I has beyond hip then that hiterest good men as percet in duration and in all other respects, the friends always returning each other's offices in the same kind,

The for each hip which is far the sale of pleasure, and that which is brief on ust if are like that from doing between good men for good men, as friends are force and and and as friends are. There imporfed from the peakings are most involved in his in the most friend which is no the friend most to each is so the most to make the pleasure and that derived from the same for both to sees if both is virily, as desire marked from the pleasure of later and beloved. I was and beloved the net three their pleasure from the rame thing the lover a peaking and beloved to not know every the heavily of the happens, the beloved's peaking from the rame and beloved from the bond content of the front top for any the first and the force of the force of the force to force and the first and the force of the force to force and the first and the force of a force to the force while the force of the force of a force of a force of the force of a force of a force of the force of a force of a force of the force of a force of a force of the force of a force of a force of the force of a force of a force of the force of a force of a force of the first mere well by however, is the ground of a constance of the first mere well by however, is the ground of a constance

on one side, lover and beloved can sum the caled forense and the frience In potential potential for the second last some Where notified, as distinguished from purchase to be forense as common in the species course to be useful to each where.

It will be seen then that for the sace of file were and utility had recovered to be freeded of bad men, good men of bad men, and men nee her good not bad observed.

Mether good nor had but for the sale of each other, a ruck, call you were not he friend - for bad men do not ask glit in so he other as ruck, but only in to far at some advantage at desired.

The freedoh photocom good men is the only freed in grade has great a men manner such friends have known rack other to long and too bell to beaute up, of each other.

It must be understeed that we made a sometiment to topicar at deep to me at those who as a step for util ty be corden, in the some a system of people to the deep enters a forestly states — what as the boad of advance between a step for the make a sometiment to popular unity when we call those who a sometime for popular unity when we call those who a sometime for she for forestly for the cold with the forestly in the permany and the tense of the warm of the other forestly are freezed in the generally and the tense of the warm of the other forestly are only methylared as a second because, where they are to a that a boad is post at a second they are been able to the tense of the thirty are forest and the only relatedly good that they are bound for pleasant they are good on that a boad is recution to the main who takes pulsers we then

The two metaphorocally called brandchies, or brandchies per bounders, settlem monet together. There is no law symbolic accordants are compound to furties to a 'friendship' for utility selican happen to be the same as the party to a 'friendship' for picamere,

- 1150 b. 34. § 1. valità) 11 is & Bicker's reading (after Marcus) for the cause of most MSS.
- 1187 π. 10. πολλοί δ΄ αὐ διαμένουσεν] Zell very app is tely compates . Σπεν 183 Ε΄ πονηρος δ΄ έστιν εκείνας δ έραστης α πανδημος, δ τε δ συματος μάλλον ή της ψυχής έρων, καὶ γὰρ οὐδε μαιμός εστιν άτε αἰδε ματρων έρων πράγματος όμα γαρ τῷ τοὶ σωματος ἀνθες ληγοντι σέπειρ ήρας, οξετείς άποπτάμενος, πολλούς λογους καὶ όπου χένεις κοταιτχώνος, δ δε τοὶ ψέλες χρηστοῦ δυτος έραστῆς διὰ βίου μένει δτε μονέμιμ συστακίε.
 - 4. 13. § 2. καὶ εἰσὶν ῆττον φίλοι καὶ διαμένουστε] 6049 ly ἔττον wata
 διαμένουστε,
 - μηδέτερον ὁποιφοῦν] ε, c one who is neitler good nor had man
 be a friend to a man of any sort, good, bad, or in liferent.
 - δι' αύτους δε δήλον δει μόνους τους άγαθους]. Only good men can each love the other for the other's sake, because only good men

are so alke that each finds his frepor nirite in the other. But had 1157 a 18, men differ indefinitely. A had min has no frepor airis. He cannot identify himself with another man; he can only use him as a means to his own pleasure or profit—

έσθλος μέν γάρ άπλως, παντυδαπώς δέ κακοί.

οδ χαίρουσεν δαυτοίς] = δλλήλοιε (Corses).

a. 19.

§ 8. ἀδιάβλητος] 'can defy calumny' (Peters).

a. 21.

de rourois] at a he ween the good men who are friends.

a. 23,

Susen Il reads di with Mb. But the serbe of Mb (or the serbe or corrector of the MS, from all it has entered as I have had occasion to point out before, at dissipational himself is aware (see Eth. No. Profit pivi), is very fond of removing difficulties by conjectural enactations, and I have linke doubt that he has tried to do so here by substituting di for yip. Retaining yip, we may explain the other (in this dripms) friendships; for we tho mass call the persons standing in these rotation ups friends, since they are commonly so called. See the notes of Zell, Fritzsche, and Ramsauer.

Tows he'ven mer bee and hade phones role recourage, etch be the a must so far conform to popular usage as to call such persons phone but we must make it clear hat their friendships are specifically distinct from friendship proper.

rab δμοιότητα) 'in a secondary sense,' r.r. on account of their a. 31 tesemblance to the real from Isa.p - the friendship strictly so called:

of. L. N. vi. 3. 2 where deputoλογείσθαι is apposed to deoλοιθείν το is δμοιότησες.

τη γάρ άγοθόν τι και δροιόν τι] 'n so far as there is involved in a 32 their relaterishing serieshing good and resembling the graid or, if we treat dyadie is and δροιόν τι as a hendradys, 'in so far as there is involved in dient relationship something good in a secondary sense,' ε κ γ leasure—τοί γορ τό ήδυ άγαθον τοίς φιληδέτεν. So the Paradi, από έστι φιλία πρώτων μέν και κυρίων ή των άγαθων, ή άγαθού καθ όροιώττα δέ αι λοιτοί από γορ και τό ήδύ, απόδι άγοθον τι έστιν, ων ήδυ συνάπτει τούν φιληδένουν άγαθων γώρ τι έστι τοῦν φιληδένει το ήδύ και

1167 x 32. όγαθῷ ἔσπεν, ὅτι αἰτοῖς ἀγαθὰν δοπεῖ καὶ τὸ χροταμον ἀγοθων ἀισὶ τῷ χρομονορ ἀιὰ τουτο καθ' ὁμοιότητα τῆς ἐλπθοια ψιλιας αὶ τοιαιται ψιλια λέγονται. So also M cleici, with ὁμοιον τε τε ἀγαθῷ αι d trans. The emerication ἡ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ τινὶ ὁμοιον suggested ty (εικοπαίδοι ψη 1 think, insulta so de as an emericano, gives tin serve correctly. His note is—ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν τι καὶ ὅμοιὸν τε κιτλ γραφὴ ῦποπτος, ὡς ἄηλοῦσε καὶ αὶ μεταφράσειε. ἡ μὰν γῶρ ΑΕΤ [Ατμγτοργίτα] πομαλικε τὸ τελευτα αν ἐγελικι μενον, τι [τ ε πίτετ ὁμοιον so Bek, aι d Sun.]: ἡ δὲ ΑΡ (Ατείπα)ς τοῦτο παμαλιε ψατα καὶ τω συμπλεκτικὰν εἰτ τὰν διαξευκτικὰν ἔτρεψεν, ἢ ὅμοιον, απεί εκπίλε. Το, γρ. ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ τινὶ ὅμοιον εὐ ἡ ὁ υπος, καθ' ὁ γαρ το σεινὰνει αὐτοις εἰς ψιλιαν (ἤδὸ ἡ χρήσεμον) ὑμοιωταί πως τῷ ἀγαθῷ, κατα τιὰτο εἰνε φίλου.

- are not apt to comence (Peters). must de didición and appropriate an indico od návo yberou dore two didico to hávo yberou dore two didico hávo hávo yberou dore two didico hávo hávo didico didico de trendships in which one party supplies pleasure und the other recompenses I in by profit are not very tare. The land of mixed friends are mutually pleasant and useful. This seems to be sufficiently recognised by the editors—Fritze ie, Sadir, Ramsauer, Williams. Ramsauer's note is good 'Quantum differnt i secretal englise la sport aryonism a religión, exponitur ut non possit melas. Que en in per illa is maturam u tro efficient at la boni et uties in the secundanque suaves sad, id in la suaves costa via somel continual: a suites, alit suaves."
- 2.35. τὰ κατά συμβεβηκός] The sense of τα κατά συμβεβενα here is clearly given in a passage (Mel. Δ. 30. 1005 a. 14) quite 1 by Fritzsche and Graut—συμβεβηκου δύ λεγεται δύπη, με μεν τεπ. κυι άληθες είπειν, οδ μέντοι οδιε εξ διάγκης, υδιε έπὶ τὸ πολύ οδον εί τα δρύττων όμπερ βαθρον είρε θποπυρών τωτο νώτων συμβεβιαί τη δύπτωντι τὸν βάθμον τὸ είρειν βησπυρών οδια γάρ εξ διαγκης τουτο κε τούτου ή μετά τούτο εδθ' ὡς είπε το πολύ ἄν τις ψυτείμ θουσικών κίμετα. κεὶ μουσικών γ΄ διν τις είη λενευς αλλ' επει εύτε εξ διαγωρε οδθ' ως επι το πολύ πούτο γίνεται, συμβεβηκός αὐτό λόγομεν.
 - b.2. § 6. ταότη δμοιοι δετες) Here Grant seems to fall in α error from a desire to be perfectly consistent in his rendering of δροιου

BOOK VIII: CHAP. 4: 5 6.

as it occurs in this and the previous chapter. His rendering is 1167 b. 2. 'In this respect (i.e. as affording and seeking pleasure or utility) being like (the good)'. Feters adopis Ginnt's view, translating—"resembling true friends in this respect.' Aspassus gives the correct it terp retation when he says voiry photo spoon space tourises keen route, basic stree role observe having addition of interpretation when he says voiry photo so it is nonlikewise and from the didaglor of doors said of observe keen the sales of the close to the close from the the difference between true friendship and the other kinds turos on the essential similarity of good men, as distinguished from the metely superficul similarity of ball men, but it must be admitted that the words had ropous of the thought to favour Grant's rendering of sairy opons been.

CHAPTER V.

AROUMENT.

full as the may look at the vertuants wan e ther as having a vertice of presents of as "acting vertuantly," so we may look at breads either as having the direction of friendship, or as actively man fitting it. A and fl may have remains apportant is of energing each other's society. C and fl may live at a distance from each other and merely be to must as for foreign when they do need a free of when they do need for reparation united it be very long—doct not is tray the disposition of friendship, only prevents the active manifestation of the disposition.

Suring nim h of each other and tuking pleasurs in each other's society is the prease work of friends. Hence old and moreous people do not make friend high each y he once but a pleasure is to be had from such people, and nobody cares to spend his days with people who are unpleasure.

These who are on good terms, but do not see much of each other, are well-wresses rather than broad. Seeing much of each other, as we sood, is the great mark of fracuss whicher they be those who depend on each other for as a tance, or fortunate persons who love each other i askety for its own case. Put people cannot as much of each other whose companionship is not mutually pleasant.

The tesendship between good men is the true, it freedship. Each is used by each basis for what he is su himself and for what he is to the other what each is to the other heigh in fact, what each is no kinned. The nature of each is the town. Occordingly such finds and loves his own good in the yessness of the

other each give to each and derive from on hithe tame advantage and pleasure. The proverheal equality of fraceds as these vacined most only in the friendship of good men.

- 2157 b. 0. § 1 Sor' temperal Ran sourt and Susemini read Sor' in invite which the set so seen a to require—' they do not perform feedy acts, but their state is such that they would perform them, if tircumstances permitted. L' reads sore an empyon, which perhaps points to all, as Ramsauer suggests.
 - 5. 10. of Sinkiovor the fixing dukas, axid the express of not the friend-hip regarded as such, i.e. as the but its manufaction is despress; of. E. N. v. 1. 20 f de roides the hadde.
 - b 13. πολλάς δή φιλίας άπροσηγορία διέλυσεν] (/ Athense is v j in; where τηλού φίλοι υπαντικ ούα είναι φίλοι is characterised as μσαθρωποτάτη τών παροιμιών πώς γάρ οία άλογον τίπος την φιλιαν το ού τρόπος υρίνισθοι;
 - §§ 2, 3] The passage of policores b, 13...b, 24 from is regarded by Tri zube and Russow (Form b pp 21, 25) as the first of gentine loci, the other passage being ch. 6. § 1 in bit or orpopole 1158 2, 1..., pilonia, 20. See note on ch. 6. § 2.
 - b 18. § 8. ἀποδεχόμενοι ἀλλήλους] 'are on good term.' τα 'knu# each other's see note on viii. 3. 8, b. 28.
 - b 19. obdiv yap ourse fort of her is to out if | Peters has a useful note here. 'To a Greek of course this does not necessarily in 1 ty 1 sing under the same roof, as it does to us with our very different conditions of life.'
 - b 21. καὶ οἱ μακόριοι] 'even the happy.' It seems better to redement and deep, as equivalent to redement and dispose here, with the Paraph and deep, as equivalent to redement and dispose han, with Zeil and Cornes, as meaning 'righ', he the Latin beath. Cornes' note is μακάριοι introi πλοισου india ο ολί ναι ε, Ιριγοντιι δε και οἱ πλούσιοι συσημερείτε τοι φέλαε, κατορ οδ χρήζοντες τῆς πορ' αὐτῶν ἀφελειας, ἄσπιρ οἱ ενδεείς. 'I has a plan who but ren leved improbable by the words immed at by folk with more that μάν γάρ κ.ν.λ. which suggest in, 9, 3 dronor δ' τουν απόριον ποιείν τὸν μακύριον, where the μακάριον is the εὐδαίμων = ὁ κατ' ἀρετήν τελείαν ἐνεργῶν.
 - b 23. of traiping (bilda)] comradesh p' Peters). The friendsh p of

289

one who have been inseparable since boyhood = the Latin 1157 b. 23. falitas: see Fritzsche and Michelet. Ramsmer thinks that the two onep... free s an interpolation like sie rubrae di sai rip majo ribiasis viii. 3. 4.

BOOK VIII: CHAP. 5: 88 3-5.

4 wollders five times according to Ramsauer.

b 28

And στο δε το αυτώ τοιούτον ο δ' αγαθός] These words are omitted b 27.

Κ', which reads . . . ήδύ, τω δ' αγαθώ δρφω ταθεα. Fritzsche opis the text of K', interpreting thus—' That which is good d pleasant in itself is the object of love and choice; and the od man possesses both these qualities (i. e. the good in itself).'

Retaining the text of all other MSS, and authorities (for very the weight ought to be attached to the mere emissions of Kb), we ve to decide between two alternative interpretations of Apple bru-that of the Paraphrast, and that of Aspasius. traphrast says—donei yap didnton pier nai aiperon to andwe nai piwe dynton h hos dudwrop di thedayon and alperdu et abro dynthis δι άγοθος τον άγαθον φελεί δι διφω ταθται το γώρ άγοθον αίτου l during and expluse dyadds down, and to pike dyadds down wore d abbe pilgros dars, cai car' duporépour rous robsouc. This view is lopted by Victorius, Zell, Coraca (δί δμφω τούτα το γάρ συνάπτυν rove ayabar nai andae ayabar inte nat abrain ayabar yiyuran) and Schelet. On the other hand Aspasius says-panton pin yon λώς και αίρετου το άπλως άγαθου, και ήδύ το άπλως ήδυ, έκαστω δέ έτιστοι, τῷ ở ἀγαθφ και ἀγαθών καὶ ἡδύ ὁ ἀγαθισ. Grant alopts is view. I am in favour of the Paraphrast's interpretation. hat of Aspasius seems to make the words écourse de rd norm polyor useless. I understand Aristotle to argue that a friendship high tests on the single ground of the subjective to auro dyadon a of trust be surpassed by one which rests on the double ground of aww wyndor & no in perfect harmony with the objective ander adde f ndú.

56] In this § Rassow (Forsch. p. 32) would transpose the b. 28. atences some 8'... up' seems and sal sayaba Boulovia... and so, on the ground that the sentence some 8'... ap' seems contains explanation of the words of kard nabor alla not seem b. 32.

φάησις] amor or amatio (Victorius), as distinguished from φιλία νου. 11.

- 1187 b 28, amicuta. In E. N. ii. g 2 φιλία is enumerated among the rest.

 But too much must not be made of a merely popular enumeration.

 Aristotle's fully considered theory of φιλία makes it a if a result of the rational formation, or είδοποιρσία, of certain name affections, many of which may be conveniently brough, under the general designation of φίλησες. See the notes of Zell, Introde, Michelet, and Grant.
 - derickoude be merd apodipédeus] This is not a very me or relevant remark if intended merely to bring out the difference between φιλία and φίλησει: ἄψυχα indeed cannot love in return but there are many other objects of mere playous which for for plant in return, drev apompereuse, and even in many police, so called us in many of those of hosein (cf. especially vis. 3. 3), love is mutually given five monopersons. The words derichlord pere specpiones serve to distinguish not so much between didia and different as between a redea pidia and the interior kinds; and may well to intended as another argument in support of mixing his oil out φιλία ή των ιγμθών § 4. The latter half of § 5 is also in facing of making the subject of deriphologic especially of dyadol plan Friends of the inferior kinds never indeed properly acquire a this of friendship at all. This is shown by the fact that ther friendships come to an end as circumstances after. A good ifis that by which a man corresponds with his permanent enviroment—the world as reason apprehends it, which is the same it all men, and has a place for every man. The friendship of the good, as based on the recognition of an orderly system of in is the only friendship which can be properly described as a im-The friendships for pleasure and profit, based as they are on the feelings of the isolated individual irradicially whing his own gratification without regard for others who are as truly persons in a kingdom of ends as himself, may be characterised as friendships mard modue.
 - b. 31. και τάγαθά βούλονται τοὶς φιλουμένοις έκείνων διεκα, οὐ κατά τάθες άλλά καθ 'ξεν'] Βούλησις is of the τέλος (1.. 2 5), as the street from τά πρός τό τέλος. But such a τέλος, being grand, can be apprehended only by reason, not by sense or freeing. See Themistius, vol. ii 208 (cel. Spengel) άγαθού γάρ ἡ αίωθησιε ἡ αἰνθεκε ἀντλαμβίνεσθαι οἰχ οἰο τε οὐδί κυκοί, άλλά μυνον τοῦ τερκαντες ἡ

exerce, ed di dyadin sal to ready roll voll pérou apleur tort. The 1167 b. 31. apprehension of a good end requiring reason, the wish to realise it, or the moral interest in it, requires a lifer or rational disposition of the desires. In the life of mere desire there is no such thing as an end in the true sense of the term.

τη βουλήσει καὶ τῷ ἡδεῖ] Williams brings out the meaning of b. 20. this passage in its context correctly, I think, as follows—' And hence each friend not only loves that which is his own good, but also makes a perfectly equivalent return in the good which he wishes his friend, and in the pleasure which he yields him.' Here βουλήσει — 'the wish for the good' (cf. καὶ τὰναθα βουλουται above) naturally suggests ἡδεῖ ε΄ ε΄ τῷ ἀπλῶς ἡδεῖ, which is always associated with τὸ ἀπλως ἀγαθου. Cf. vii. 3. 7 τὸ το ἀπλώς ἀγαθου και ἡδὸ ἀπλώς ἐστί.

The 121 Tr. and pr. Lh read 330, which Zell, Fritzsche, Stahr, and Rassow (Forsch. p. 32) adopt. Zell writes- Non coint solum amicus amico par omnino pari tefert, ut uterque candem alterum demerendi voluntatem habeat, sed genere et specie quoque parta refert, id est, bona pro bonis, suavia pro suavibus, pro oth bos willa': and Stahr has- Mahin liebt auf beiden Seiten jeder das får ihn selbst Gute und gewährt seinerseits durch seine Walensbestrebung das Gleiche auch in derselben Gattung.' Susem.hl now reads flee after Zeller (see Susem hl, Eth. Eud. append. p. 173). The MSS, perhaps do not help us to come to a decision in the case of two forms so similar in sound and appearance as ibi and elder: but apart from MSS, the weight of probability seems to me to be greatly in favour of ijoin which would naturally occur to the writer as the constant concomitant of dyodds, the object of Bookyess. Grant's point too that Iron eiles would not be a natural expression, as confounding degree with kind, is worth noticing

The Paraph. has inirepose our place indrepor, is dyobor obscior, and Botheror ra dyobd, soi jobs form spoises: and Aspanus has words to the same effect.

All other MSS, apparently read ή before lowing. In E N. ix. 8, 2 the proverb is given as lowing φιλίτης, and in E. E 11, 6, 1240 b. 2. In E. N. vii. 8, 5, however, we have ή δ' lowing κal δμοιώτης φιλότης.

1157 b. 36. As Ramsauer remarks the old proverb was doubless looke down or phorns lookers without the article: but Aristotle a lowed binsel to alter a proverb to suit his purpose; and it would be a timble to suppose that here the sense makes it impossible to take looke to the subject. It is the predicate however, I take it, in the proofe quoted by Fritzsche from Diog. L. vii. 1 B spores size Bubrouse would re two pilous and publish lookers.

CHAPTER VI.

ARGUNENT.

As for stiff tempered and ellerly people—the mark difficult they are to take with, and the less plea use they take on one another's energy, the less it y is friendship to spring up between them. For nathing is to indenteen in elfrant ship and so froductive of it, as taking pleasure in one another is not the what young people do and therefore they be one friends guilty to and it old from not stiff tempered people menertheless with geople may be will possed to one another withing one another good and helping one another in the but they cannot properly be excled friends, since they as not spend their two states or take pleasure in one another—thus failing to reasure the two old characteristic traits of friendship.

To be a friend to many in the roay of Perfect Friend as a income the nation of a surface to be on love with many at the come time ' for Perfect Friend the passant exalted state of feeling, and, as in a him maturally one person as a object, also it is not easy for many to afford the highest introduction to the compensation many in the area food more to there cannot be perfect foreniship unless the friends know on a collection of home come to enter familiarly ento each other's dispositions—a hand though as where only two persons are converned, and much harder warre many are concerned.

Where, however, the chiect of framithely is utility or pleasure, it is for the in basic many friend; for useful and pleasant people are memoring, and se services rendered are quickly rendered.

Of the two inferior friendships that for pleasure resembles Perfect Friendship must when the same services are rendered by both fartie, and they take presume in outh other or in the same things—as young people do to these friend in these fesculd have which distinguished them from the triendship for utility—the friend hip of histories. Further, the lively mood, not useful friends laines their material wants are already otherwise provided for , but pleasure friends is a they and for present with asken to escribed for , but pleasure friends is a they and for a little while, but no

ene recult go on always enduring that which gave him pain—no, not even if it evers the summain busine itself. This is why the Happy seek to have these viscouls fleasant. They ought of overs to seek to have them good as well as Verzant good both adsolutely and relatively; thus their friendship will have all that perfect friendship will have all that perfect friendship requires—the good, the pleasant, and the nieful or telepholygood.

New of wealth and station have their friends an distinct sets they have weful reends and pleasant friends, and it widens happens that the same friends are oth use adapteed pleasant—able subunishates, and amount companions the good han as evoked, as we have said both florant and metril, but the good man don the exists himself to become the friend of one who e, he imperior, enters the opposition of as in wealth and stateon; for if the superior, the opposition is not as an evolution of the superior in wealth and stateon only, the good man rould not compensate for his successive by any proportionate return. High station and goodness, however, eldon go sopether.

The invocepts friendships mentioned are friendships between equals equals remiter to each other the same things or exchange one thing for another, e.g. Measure for proper They are thought to be or not to be 'friendships' or ording to they are viscould as recembeing or a differing from the standard friendship. They are thought to be fermilished, because they are for picasure or proper, i one the i amount friendship that boxed on virtue—has its elements of pleasure and twicks. Let in so far as the friendship based on virtue is proof against slander, and autong, while the friendship based on virtue in many other respects, they are not thought to be "friendship based on virtue in many other respects, they are not thought to be "friendship based on virtue in many other respects, they are not

§ 1.] Friezede brackets this § as being merely a repetition of vii 5 1158 a. 1.

2. 3. Rassow (Forselo. pp. 24, 25), after proviing the genum form a parallel columns, leaves at undecided whether the first or the record ought to be bracketed. Against the claim of the first cassage to stand he notes the point, overlooked by Fritzsche, that tast that part of it which is not repeated here occurs again in unather passage—cli. 6. § 4 and of μακάριοι δέ χρησίμων μεν αὐδεν Κονται, ήδεων δέ συξήν μεν γαρ βούλονταί εισει, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν δλίγον μέν φράνου φέρουστο, συσεχωε δ' οὐδεὶε δν ἐπορείναι, οὐδ' αὐτο τὸ ἀγαθὸν, el υπηρὸν αὐτῷ τῆς. On the other hand he thinks it underiable that he second passage connects uself less naturally with what receives it than the first passage does. Susemith agrees with cassow in leaving it undecided which of the genum locs ought to bracketed.

προσβυτικοίς] Spengel (Aristotelische Studien 1. p. 215) asks a 2. ely προσβύται should not be read as below in this §, and in ch. 5.
12. Victorius contends that προσβυτικοίε is intentionally employed,

- 1158 c. 2. as Aristotle in this passage (as distinguished from 5. § 2) regulative disposition rather than the years of the old men in question—
 ineque calm cuncti hajus actatis sunt difficiles."
 - a. 3. ταῦτα γόρ δοκεῖ μάλιστ' εἶναι φιλικά καὶ κοιητικά φιλίας] Ramsauer regards these words as spurious, finding nothing to which radra can be satisfactorily referred. Frienche refers radra to dipidials by a loose construction not uncommon in Anticks writings. Ramsauer notices the circumstance that the words dipidials elvas domi φιλικά at the end of this § say the same thing is the words which he brackets as spurious. I would call attention to the circumstance (whatever it may in heate) that three passage end with similar expressions—viz. ch. 5. § 3 μηδέ χαίροντας του αὐτοῖες δικορ ή δτοιρική δοκεῖ έχου, ch. 6. § 1. 1158 h. 3 ἡνων τας διμιλίοις χαίρουσιν ταῦτα γάρ δοκεῖ μάλιστ' εἶναι φιλικά καὶ ποιητικό φιλικό, and ch. 6. § 1. 1158 h. 9 μηδε χαίρειν ἀλλήλοις, δ δή μαλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλικά.
 - a B | \$\phi(\lambda \color \cdot \cd
 - 2. Tome γαρ όπερβολή] Γταzsche is wrong, I think, in maint το έρων the subject of τομε. The Paraph, gives the sense of the passage rightly —πολλοίε δὲ φιλον είναι τών σπουδοίων κατα τὴν τολων φιλίων οὐκ ενδέχεται, διαπερ οὐδι τὰ έρων πολλών όμα δυκατών, ἐπερδολιγάρ τὶς ἐστε φιλίας ἡ ειλεία φιλία, τὰ δε τοιοίνον πρὸε ἔνα περωγίνεσδοι. In keeping with this interpretation Aspas us saya λιατών δὶ ἐπερβολην τὴν κατὰ τὸ εδ. Cf. Ε. Ν. τί δ. 17, where διατή τι καλ to be κατὰ τὰ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εδ ἄκρότηκ. As Coracs says, ἡ γὰρ τιλεύ φιλία..., φιλιων ἐστὶν ἡ ἄκροτάτη, καὶ οἰκ ἔστιν αὐτῆς ἐπερπέρα δελη φιλια Perfect friendship is 'an exalted state.' In τ. 10. 5, ἰκ νετο, which resembles this passage closely, τὸ ἐρῶν τε ὑτερβολη τις φιλιων
 - a 14. Tong h' oùt dyaboùs sivat] se, maddoùs findiar
 - 4. 10 § 3. πολλοίς άρθοπειν] Ranisauer conjectures πολλούς, tim corsarily, for πολλοίς άρθοπειν means sumply, as Ασμασίμου καγε, πολλοι είναι φιλούς. His commentary is—διά το χρησιμού ή καὶ το ηθο ενδέχεται πολλοίς είναι φιλούς καὶ γύμ πολύ το τών τοιπότων γενος, πι αιδέ πολλού χρόνου δεί, οὐδ΄ έξετωσεως έν δλίγφ γάμ χρουφ είθεω φανεροί γίνονται αὶ περὶ τῶν χρησίμων παι τῶν ήδεων ὑπηρεσιία, ωι αιταμύθοι δε τις τυχέως τὸν αὐτῷ ήδὺν ή χρησιμού. ὅταν δε μεριτικές τον τοντών όποτεροῦν, λύεται ἡ φιλία' εν όλιγφ γαρ χρόνφ συστών ποὶ τὴν ὑπαρξω ἔχει όλιγοχρόνου.

§ 4. εοικε φιλέφ] The MSS, read φιλια, but Asp. and the Paraph. 1188 a. 18 φιλια, which is adopted by Victorius, Ramsauer, and Bywater.

τὸ ἐλουθέριον] 'a generous spirit' (Peters).

a. Št.

p. 32 'adjungit autem sal—dé see Eucken, de Arist. dic. rat. a 22 p. 32 'adjungit autem sal—dé rem novam, sacpe tam leui modo et idem fere valeat atque re.' It is most frequent in E. N. w. viii, ix, x.

οδδ' αδτό τὸ ἀγαθόν] 'If Anstotle had been capable of a joke, we a 24. must have considered this to be meant as such' (Grant),

Sei & Tows nat dyafods romorrous ovras, nat er: advois] 'The a 88 paradress require their friends to be pleasant: but they ought to require them to be good too, as well as pleasant (resources forus = hois orrae), and also useful (lat. good for themselves), for thus they will have oil that belongs to true friendship. This rendering represents Rassow's (Forsch, p. 83) view of the interpretation of these words. With i've sal abrois he supplies ayodobs, regarding the phrase as equivalent to appointure. Thus to supply dyadnés after for an mirois of the Paraph, role pilous of anoudains adris frouder cives, ayadors over, sai airois ayadors, with whom Ramsauer, Williams and Peters agree) is obviously correct, although I think it would not be right to press (if indeed Rassow does so) the identity of abrois ayallois with apprinous in the more material sense of the latter term. It has just been stated that the mater al wants of the passipion are fully supplied—that they do not need merely useful friends, χρησιμών μιν ούδιν δέυντοι. Sight seems to give the true sense of the passage when he writes- Fredich sollien sie wold auch dazu Menschen nehmen, die nicht nur an sich gute, sondern auch für sie selbst satilich fördernd und. To supply ifder after fre obrois with Frazsche and Grant is. I think, quite inadmissible; ayabove ev dently being the dominating thought of the cause beginn og dii d' lowe, as iddie was of the clause beginning die a. 25 After dyudośc a. 26 Rassew (Forsch p. 84) supplies and lavrośc, which he considers necessary to bring out the opposition to abroir (dyabove), and Susemila introduces rab' savrove into his text.

§ 5. oi 8° de vais isonaiais] highes 8' de isonaiais vois repaireme a 27. (Asp.).

χρησίμους ele τὰ καλά] ol éráperos (Asp.).

- 1158 n. 32 Secrois After denove Rassow (Forsch p. 84) conjectures that de ré has fallen out. Bywater's suggestion however (Coutres, p. 60)—to 'take role di to mean "others,' and understand denois residenté intragélie to be 2 k nd of profitate after (proton'—scems to met the difficulty.
 - a. 34. § 6. άλλ' δικρέχοντα κ.τ.λ.] Aspassus gives the more generally accepted interpretation of this passage—inenixorroe or giveral circle of anoddaios du μή και τη δριτή δικρίχηται ο ύπυρέχων κατά την δυναμεν. δεί δι ούτως άκούεια του δικρικχεσθια του δυνάστην, ώτεν και είδικα, και έχειν πρός τύν συνούδιον ώς προς κρείττους ούτω γάρ δυται ή κατά άναλογίαν Ισότης, δυ υθηται μέν πλούτω και δυνάμει ύπερίχειε, επιπαία δε τών άγαθον ώς κατ' άμετήν αὐτοῦ διοφέρουτα. Τhis view, according to which the subject of ύπεριχηται is ο επερέχων (κατά την δυναμεν, και αυτορέτει by the Paraphtant, Victorius, Lambinas, Zel., Coracy Fritzsche, Michelet, Stahe, Williams, and Peters.

As for ineperations 2, 36—some of these commentators take at the great man or prince, and others the good man, the l'araphe e.g. makes it the good man obre yap ifrançes à ovordine re en iforeme ineperate, dealouse ineperate and ineperations! Corres of the other hand makes ineperates the great man or prince—if the physication of it eforcing and aperty and too moudator, our leader remaindous (où ylyperat photos dylady el ye in language ineperations, rourists tosours objects before the party interesting the production of the production before and iforeside.

According, then, to the view of Aspasius and most other comments ors. Aristotle means to tell us here that the good that will not become the friend of a superior in rank and power unless that superior is his inferior in goodness—or, to use Grant's works a good man would not be a friend to a potentate, if that potentially had superior moral qualities. This cannot be Aristotle's meaning Grant, Rainsauer, and Jackson (Arist Nie 1876 Beek v. p. 91) are undoubtedly right in making a unavading, not a unaprime, the subject of unaproperation, and rendering—"the good man does not become the friend of a superior in rank and power in less be is surpassed in goodness, as well as in rank and power, by the superior." The awkwardness of making the subject of important different from that of vivera is thus avoided, and account is taken of the force of sof before vir operation in general by the other rendering

^{*} So also Fritzsche, reading à vrapt xôperes without MS, authority

As for el de un, obe loufes desiloyon impregoneror-Grant, Ramsauer, 1168 a 84. and Jackson agree that & moudains is still the subject; but Jackson alone seems to me to have got the meaning of the clause clearly:because otherwise the inferior will not feel for the superior that love and regard by which alone he can requite superior services." Cf E N. VI 1. 7. 2 avakuyor d' èv marais rais and unepoxipo obrais pakiaus wai row dakogow dei givendan, alar ran apelem pakkon dakindan ή φελειν, και τον ώφελεμώτερου, και των άλλων εκποτου όμοιως όταν pip cur' afrar à changes ylugras, rore plural mus lobine. & di rise publies eine board. Cf. also val. 8. 1. The equality found in al phia ai rad impositive could not be real and in such a case of inferious y as that of a poor good man to a bad (or not good) rich man, for the poor good man would not be warranted in repaying the great material benefits, which he might receive from the tich man, with an amount of love and esteem equal to them. Between a poor good man and a very good rich man equal recurrence and therefore a friendly relation, is inferd possible, but - seh men are seklom very good - of own d' elodars resource pierrobus (se. of in rais ifonoises, Asp.)

The clause et di pu, où loujes doulogor imperaturos may be rendered— for if this be not so, he (the poor good man) cannot put himself on an equal footing by compensating for his inferiority—ie by making a proportionate return for the benefits which he, in his inferior position, receives. I take doulogor with imperatures: see the Paraph. (directory or directory and imperatures) and Cornes quoted above, and of vil 13 trove d' director (see dei) ed directory eair importair directories.

Peters' content on that & maddior cannot be the subject of interior, because 'the ideally good man cannot be surpassed in virtue,' would have force if it were necessary to assume that Aristotle has here in view the ideally good man,'

§ 7. είσὶ δ΄ οὖν αι εἰρημόναι φιλίαι ἐν Ισότητι] τ.ε. these φιλίαι, ὁ 1 as they have been hitherto described, are ἐν ἰσστητι: but all three ma) be also καθ ὑπεροχήν—κεν τιι. 13 1 τριττών δ΄ οὐσών φιλιών, καθιπερ ἐν ἀρχή εἰρητιι, κοὶ καθ ἐκώστην τῶν μὲν ἐν Ισότητι φίλων ὑντιων των δὲ καθ ὑπεροχήν (καὶ χὴι ὁμαιως ἀγαθαὶ φιλιοι χύνουται καὶ αμείνων χείρονα, ὁμοίως δε καὶ ἡδιές καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμαν, ἰσάζωντες ταῖς ωφελείαις καὶ διαφέροντες), τους ἴσους μὲν κατ ἰσότητα δεὶ τῷ φιλείν καὶ των λυιποὶς ισαζειν, ταὺς δ΄ ἀνίσους τὸ ἀνάλογον ταῖς ὑπεροχοῖς ἀποδιδόναι.

1150 b. 10 dhhois to Scopeper tohhois] e.g. they may subsist between but men, they may include many persons.

CHAPTER VII.

ARGUMENT.

Another class of freencishops is that of the frauditheps between weapulabetween jather and son- and generally between elter and younger, however, husband and suffer and generally between rower and rowd. The express he differ from each other—that of parents for exact on is not the came as that of rules for raised, and further, the friendship of jather for me is not be easiered as that of the surfaced for the goodness and the function of the husband or fa we are not in summer as the goodness and the function of the husband or fa we are not in summer to goodness and the function of the husband or fa we are not in summer to goodness and the function of the husband or and the reason to with heads for free will be a jair and lasting freendship after considering there will be a jair and lasting freendship after another parents, and parents to helders, there is not all those free and the constant temperals ought to be in proportion on as herder to be restored to be and the order of the notion of the angles of free all there is a first one that we restored the north more than he loves for when there is a first, in a way, equally is produced—equality the great and of freendship.

Equality to not the some in Justice and in Freendship. In fusion poportionale equality is of primary, and absolute equality of recordary important in friendship absolute equality comes first, and preporternate equality take, is second place. This is shown by the fact that if the demance, e in goods a weath, between the parties becomes great, they cease to be friends or even to think of each other as friends. The clearest east is the resolven occurrences gods and men; other eases are the resolven between dense and these in ; and that between men who are very good and we y were and there was are em for nothing. It is impossible to define exactly the distance at a lake people not stell be fescule - they may still be freends though the dis on a secondaries of but not if it be that at worth the gods stand from men frem e the question Whether friends really with for their friends the greatest good? Surely my do not with them to become gods, and to cease to be their frames, i.e terr and If we were right in saying that a friend wishes good things for he friend pr hit friend's onto, then his friend must remain what he is; a friend will out the greatest of good things for his friend as a man; but perhaps use ail twice good things ; the very greatest of them he will wish for humself. .

b.12. § 1. τὸ καθ' ἀνεροχήν] 'another kind of friendship in which the persons are unequal'—Peters.

διαφέρουσι δ' αύται καὶ άλλήλων] s c. 28 well as generally from 1158 b 14 al in laderges.

- \$ 2. and the planer. Aspassius notices the sal before diagrae, b. 24. but scarcely helps us to understand its force—in mirais rais doyais καί ταις επθ υπερβαλήν φιλίαις ου μύνου την φιλίαν δεί είναι εινύλογον. adda end the phanous ead oxedin did the phanous ead it public there analogor. I would explain as follows - The loorge realised in these piane and imporge is not merely that of a fair commercial exchanged; it is the loorye of pilia the superior does not give merely assistance in return for the equivalent amount of respect which he receives from the inferior; he gives physical as well since he is the other's piles and expects a proper return of pilyour. The tentant exchange of pilyour between the superior and inferior is indeed more characteristic of their friendship than the exchange of assistance and respect materially necessary though the latter exchange may be to their 'friendslip.' But in this mutual exchange of phagois the difference between superior and inferior must not be lost sight of wler (here = 1, 2 not e.g.) tor speire (sc. bil) pakker pikelabat & pikele.
- § 3.] The essent al thing in Justice is that every man shall \$ 20 get his due whatever that happens to be; the essential thing in Frandship is equality. Justice does not care how unequal the persons are, but gives them their due shares; whereas strict equality between the persons is required by the highest kind of Friendship, and although there are Friendships so-called in a secon lary sense (δουτέρως b. 33), viz. al καθ ύπεροχήν in which the absence of strict equality is compensated for by 'proportionate equality,' yet this compensation is possible only within certain limits. If the real inequality becomes very great φιλίο also becomes impossible. See the Par. ad loc, είν κατ' άξιαν καὶ ἀναλογον γίνηται h διανομή δικαία ἐυτί, κθυ αφοδρα τῷ ποσῷ διαφερεί νόδεν κωλύει τὸν τοῦ δικαίαν σωξεσθαι λόγον, εἰ δέ κιτα τὸ ποσὰν ἔση εῖη καὶ μὴ ὁνολογον οῦ δένειται εἶναι δικαία' ἐπὶ δε τῆς φιλίας δυοπολίν τ.τ.λ. Cf. Grant's good note ad loc.
- § 4. βιάστημα] το εατά ποσόν έσον is primary in Friendship, b 33. otherwise Friendship would not be destroyed by διάστημα.

- 1158 b. 85. Ent vâr Ceûr] Fritzsche compares M. M. i., 21. 1208 b. 30 aronor yêg ar eig, ei rus hain hider vor Lia.
- 1159 a. 4. § 5. of φίλοι] Ramsauer and Susemill bracket of. The former however suspects the words for of φίλοι. Byw suggests φ φίλια for of φίλοι, thus getting a subject for μονεί, see Contest. p. 60.
 - a. 8. § 6. οἱ γὰρ φίλοι ἀγαθά] sc ciou, not as Zeil and Frienche suggest, βούλοιται. See Rassew, Forsch. p. 67. Rassow, followed by Sis. and Byw.) reads οὸ (with Kb, Mb, r) for οἰδά before γὰρ ἔτι a. 7.
 - a. 12. αὐτῷ γὰρ μάλισε βούλεσεα τὰναθα, οἱ περὶ των την πρωτην φιλίαν εἰχόντων εἰμητα, ἀλλά περὶ τῶν ἀμωνύμως λεγομένων φιλών. λεγει ε΄ τέν πετίαν ἀι βν νε πολλοί βούλονται φιλίοθαι μάλλον ἡ φιλίον τ. λ. . . Fritzsche also thinks that the inferior triendships are here referred to. But see L. A. ix. 8, where the conclusion is reached τω μίν δγαθον δεῖ φίλωντον είναι.

CHAPTER VIII.

Argument.

Most men are ambitious of the honour of being lived more than they are this is why the majority of men love flatterers; being loved is very meanly for same therig, in their sizese, as being honoured; and to be esecured is what the majority of niew strice after. But homour is not sought for stiff fee majority of men take pleasure in receiving it from persons who have would in their fower, because they recognise it as the sign of the advantages who he they hope for , white others seek to be honoured by good oven robo are commen some of goodness, in order that they may have confirmation of their man good of wear about themselves. To be level, on the other hand, gives men passines in a 2 A cordingly to be lovest as a better thing it would seem, than to be howevered and freemanh for comething on resulf challemorthy. Line by freemlikes, at mem · loving rather than 'bring land'. The lave of mathers for their your chautren by whom they cannot be topol in return may help us to see that forces ship contests on loving rather than in bring loved . this beaut is, and then was · love their freends' being peneral, it follows that ' loving one another' is be weetne of friends, and those who do this in proportion to desert are lested friends. It is by this loving in proportion to decert that those who are not

vals may be made equals and so freends. Equality and similarity is Freendip—expectantly immigrify in Vertice. Virtuans men are stable in themselves, nor
demain stable friends to one another, neither seeking for themselves, nor
first and another to, anything that is coul—nos, toying to keep one unother
t of exist. But ranked men have no stability. They do not remain long the
nic, they become friends to one another for a short time, piezzed with one
other's residences. Those whose friendship is for utility or pleasure remain
imás longer—that is, as long as advantage or pleasure is forthomoug.

The freedities of utility reems especially to arrive out of contraries—c. g. it has between rich men and poor men, between the man who knows and the in who is ignorant. ("inder this head too may be brought that herowen tower of believed, between one who is beautiful and one who is plain. Hence lowere melimes make themselves rich whom by expecting to be loved as much as they is, at hough they are not equally loveable. But feehops the one contrary does t each the other as such, but only pot accident—the mean being the real wit of device for the main is good; thus the good for the dry "is not to be one" and," but to reach the mean.

1. ἐπερεχόμενος γὰρ φίλος ὁ κόλαξ We see from this that the 1150 a. 14.
ἐλογον ὑπερεχόμενος of vni. 6. 6 effects the equality required in
endship by rendering more love than he receives.

προσποιείται τοιούτος] Bekker's elect after τοιούτος, omitted by a. 15 γw., seems to have no MS. authority. NC reads προσποιείται κουτο.

§ 2.] Grant compares E. N. i. S. S.

4. 17.

16 2-3. To bedelodae be not adre gaipovous n.t.d. See the Par. a. 85. Τος. έστι δή ού μονον το φιλείσθοι δε έσυτο οίρετον, άλλα και το φιλειν, Ιπολλώ μόλλον, δυο βελτιον. To be loved is better than to be moured. Thus pakie, looked at even on its passive side, stands ry high in the scale of human good things. But active love is its to mark -dones d' iv ro dideir paddor h er ro dedeiodot eina (§ 3). he increase of ro dikein, proceeding from the virtuous if it of dikia, lngs the good man, gud pilor into 'the intelligible world' of tive reason, as distinguished from the region of passive feeling. we consider in this connexion the doctrine which Aristotle shares th Plato, that reason in all its flights is moved and sustained by ee, we can see what a high place in the Aristotellan Metaphysic Ethics palia occupies Here, however, its place is merely dicated; in Book ix it is more accumtely determined. Cf. M. M. 11. 1200 b. 6 fore de Bidrios ed dedeir h ed dedeiaden ed mir yap heur irripyera ret ijdovije nul ayadov, and bi rov pekeradas ovdepia ra

- 1150 a. 25 φιλουμένο ένεργεια γέγνεται. Γει δε βέλτιου το γεωρίζευν ή γεωριζεσθαι . .

 ετι το εύποιητικόν είναι βελτιου ή μή: 6 μέν οδυ φιλών εύποιητικος ή φιλεί, 6 βε φιλούμενος ή φιλείται οδ (f. Ακμικίας απ νία. 8. 3 έστι μέν εξν ή φιλεία έν τῷ φιλείν είναι ἡ ἐν φιφιλείν, τὸ δε φιλείνου εὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ ἐνέργεια. ἐεπιτος δε περὶ ἐεείνο ἐστι περὶ ὁ ἔχτι τὴν ἀνέργειαν.
 - a. 39 § 4.] Those who actively love their friends are praised; so, lowing is the true virtue of friends. See E. N. .. 13. 19 var ifear de var anaverde dorde hégopan.
 - b. I. § 6. odru 8' dr e r h.] desson are equalised rop policie declores—
 thus
 - ύπερέχαν: ὑπερεχόμενος :: ἡ τοῦ ὑπερεχομένου φίλησες : ἡ του ὑπερεχοντος φίλησες.
 - b. 3. των κατ' άρετήν] 'ες, φίλων' (Κατακαμόν); but it seems better to understand δμοίων.
 - b. 6. dal' de cimeir mai] 'nay rather, I ought to say
 - b. 20. § 7. άλλά κατά συμβεβηκός] οὐ γύρ, καθό φιλουσω ἄλληλα, όναντία ἐστίν, ἀλλά συμβέβηκεν αὐτοίε ἐναντίοιε είναι καὶ γάρ ὁ πένης έρὰ τοῦ πλουσίου ὅτι ἀφέλιμός ἐστιν κὐτῷ καὶ χρήσιμος (Paraph.).
 - ή 8' δρεξις τοῦ μέσου ἐστίν' τοῦτο γὰρ ἀγαθόν] Cf. E. N. ii. 6. 9 ἡ ἀρετή.... ὅσπερ και ἡ φύσικ, τοι μεσου ἄν εἰη στοχαστικη. *Correspondence with environment' is the law of life.

CHAPTER IX.

ARGUMENT.

The ophers of justice and of frondship as the same. Every association or common undertaking has at a kind of justice, and consequently at a had definentially. Thus men speak of their fellow-sources as their friends. As for as their common undertaking extends, to far does their friendship extend. Thus the proverb Friends have things in common 'is true.

Brothers and compades have aid things in common other friends have more or less in common, for some friends high use greater those where, and as the friendships wary, so does the justice in count case. The parties which a person

over to his could differs from that which brothers over one another—or, again, convender—or fedoverestivens, in using is approvated in proportion as it is done to a mesers friend. This above that justice and friendship have the same ophers.

All area entrons or common undertakings are parts of the great association of the Commonwealth, As the association of the Commonwealth spranging and is maintained in order to scene the common good of its members, we had of these particular associations exists in order to secure some particular good. It is the common good stansies with that which is just which legislates are not then it the armon associations as whath writises associations at whath writises associations at whath writises associations at vectory. There are either associations again which are for pleasure—ritis and gistla and festivals triwhich the worship of the good as combined which relaxation: It is to be noted that the anisome enzymous a transfer were harvest festival; for the time immediately after horsest was the time a took it people had most lessure. These associations then for worship and relaxation are parts of the great association of the Commonwealth which looks not to the advantage of the skey but to that of the whole of life. Each of these associations has the own hould from the distance associations has the own hould from its promiship.

1. dr dexti] viii. 1. 4. according to Asp.

1159 b. 25

*rois abrois] 'between the same persons': see Asp.—ir rois b. 20,
 *strais' οίον φίλια ἐστὰν ἐν τοῖε ⟨σνα⟩στρατιώταιε... ἀλλὰ κοὶ περὶ ⟨τὰ⟩
 *στὰν περὶ τὰ στρατιωτικά γάρ π.τ.λ.

nal pap to binator] se, in resolution does nat door neuroscies b. 80. (Priezeche).

§ 3. τῷ μάλλον πρός φίλους είναι] πρωθυστέρως άντὶ τοῦ τῷ προς 1160 a. 4. φίλους μάλλον είναι (Corses).

αύξεσθαι δε πέφυκεν άμα τη φιλία και το δίκαιον διαφέρει νο έν α. ? τοις είδιλφοις διαφέρει νο έν τοις λυποίς, αθξησεν δε λαμβίνει το δικαιον τῷ μῶλλαν πρὸς φίλους γίνεσθαι βουλομενος δε τοῦτο δείξαι ἐε τοῦ εναντίου επιχειρεί εἰ γὰρ δεινότερον τὸ χρηματων ἀποστερησαι ἐταιρον ἡ πολίτη», καὶ τὸ πρὸς φίλους γινόμενου δίκαιον καὶ ερείττον ἐστιν, εὶ δ' αθξεται ἡ φιλία, αθξεται καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ὡς ἐν τοὶς αὐτοῖς δυτα (Asp.).

§§ 4, 8, 6.] Since, is converige η φιλιο (§ t), the various associations a. 8. (κοινωτια) included in the commonwealth (πολιτική κοινωτία), all of them subscriving its end—the public good, by means of their own special ends (whether these special ends be described as useful or pleasant), involve their corresponding friendships.

§ 4. και ή πολιτική δέ κοινωνία του συμφέροντος χάριν δοκεί και έξ a. 11. άρχης συνελθείν και διαμένειν] Zell and Fritzsche remind us that this 1100 a 11, is not a complete statement of Aristotle's theory of the or gin and maintenance of society, and refer to Pol. in. 4 1278 h. 20 down per έστεν ανθρωπος ζώον πολιτικόν, φις και πάζει ζεσπείοι τως ποθ, σχγάγια Βοηθείος ούς Γλατταν ορέγονται του αυζήν' ού μήν άλλα και το κοινή συμφέρο overyer, ead ones enisables uipor interpret or the eabor. Ramsauer refers to Pol. i. t. 2252 b. 29 γινομένη του (ήν ένεκεν, ούσα δέ του οδ (ήν. Cf also Pol. 1.1. 5. 1280 a. 25 el pir yap rur eraporer yapor écorrirgan καλ συνήλευν, τοσούτου μετέχουσε της πόλεως ύσονπερ το της ετησεως ώσδ o tau aktyapytkau kayas dafeten an languete . . . et de mâre vou fan mino ένεκεν, άλλα μάλλαν του εδ ζήν . . . μητε συμμαχίας ένεκεν, όπως ύπο μηλευής άδικώνται, μήτε διά τὰς άλλαγάς και την χρήσιν την προς άλλφ hous . . . weed d'aperie aut natiae nodermie duomonocour, bre donc visorer chronics and. Comparing the passage before us (E.N v... 9.4) with the passages quoted from the Pehitics we observe (1) that according to Aristotle's complete theory other and more powerful causes than the perception of material advantage brought mea into social un on, and keep them in it, and (2) that to noting our depot is a wide expression including rd solds, and not to be i lentified with the 'useful' as distinguished from the 'noble and good.'

a. 19. ο νομοθέται στοχάζονται) Cf. Ε. N. v. 1. 13.

φασιν] so Aristotle h mself Pol. iii. 4. 1279 8. 17 φωνείν τοίντ διε δσαι μεν πολιτείοι το κοινή πυμφέρον πκοπούσιν, αδται μεν ό, δολ τηγχώνουσα οδσαι κατά το δπλών δίκαιον.

- a. 17. § 5. noleus opeyoperol] as colonists or as exiles Rammaier.
- a. 19. Ενιαι δε των κοινωνιών δι' ήδου ην δοκούσι γίνεσθαι] The P.2 takes pains to show that even those associations which seem to have pleasure as their end, ultimately subserve to many συμφέρου, because άναπαύσειε ρεθ' ήδου ης ανε πορωνιών νοῦ ήδου όφωντω... διαπερ ή των διασωτών κοινωνία καὶ ή τῶν έρανιστών ... καὶ αὐται δε μέπ κολιτικής καὶ γώρ οἱ μονον ὁ τιν ἰστὶ συμφέρου (ητεὶ ἀλλα και ὁ των μερ οῦ συμφέροι, συνοισει δέ, καὶ τοῦτα διωπε ... διὰ τυῦτα θυσίας τε εἰσίγανε καὶ συνόδους καὶ συνουσίας μεθ' ήδου ης και πονων ἀναπαυσίας μετὰ γιρ τας των καρπων συγκομιδής αὶ το σύνοδοι έγίνοντο καὶ αθυσίας ἀποιραι τως αὐσαι μίλιστα γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἐσχύλαζον τοὶς καιραίς διὰ δὴ των εων ποιρωνών τὸ τε θείων έλεων αὐτοίς έγινοτο, δισυνισεων έδωσε, καὶ οἰτω ἀναπαυόμενοι, νεαροί τών ὑπερ τοῦ συρφέροντος πόνων ὅντοντο.

φείνετοι δει πάσα κοινωνια, καὶ ή ήδειε ένεκα γινομένη, καὶ ή τοῦ συμ- 1160 a. 19 φέρωντας, το συμφέρον έσχατον έχει τέλος, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάσαι μέρη εἰαὶ της πολοτικής.

convoir not tearnorist! The members of religious guilds and social clubs, The times was a guild of persons who danced alorg the streets in procession, and joined in sacrificial feasts in honour of a god especially Bacchus. An Iparor was a social club in which each member made his contribution (συμβολη) to the common fund.

Bokker's fail stop after opposed in makes the words of yan a 21 a 23 to flow parenthetical, and refers the participles wooders &c to animated implied in monopole above.

Michelet refers them to pulific and displored, regarding from a 19-2 23 row flow as parentheteal. I am more inclined to acopt Susetnihi's suggestion that something has dropped out between row flow and business a. 2.3; perhaps, as Bywater suggests (see Journ. of Philol. vol. xv.i. p. 69), such do rior convolues do flowing discourt yielded, (ii) Chamaran sal departoriar outes yield business and outerolas a. 19, 20. The point of the passage is excellently brought out by Peters.

But all these associations seem to be subordinate to the association of citizens; for the association of citizens seems to have for its aim, not the interests of our who e life, even when its members celebrate festivals and hold gatherings on such occasions, and render honour to the gods, and provide recreation and amusement for their selves.' And in a note he a life. It is the institution of the State which gives a permanent significance to these amusements of a day.'

CHAPTER X.

ARGUMENT.

(on dirations are of these speece—kingly rule, aristocracy, and temocracy. In much of these the end of processment as the common good—but there is, corresponding to each of these these, a degraded form in which the good of the government process is made the end of government. Thus tyronomy is the degraction of kingay rule—the tyrons as the bud king who rules for his own

VOL. IL

advantage, aligarily, of arrivoracy—the few, who are rich, rule in the ward of their own class—and democracy, of some racy—the moderate property quantition recognised in temocracy is abolished. Of their degraded from your is the worst because it is the contrary of the best bingry rule, and democratis the seat last, for it does not envote a very great de verticen from a moray, time timocracy itself is the rule of the many—i.e. of those who are equal to

virtue of coming up to a moderate property qualification.

Of all these constitutional forms we have analogues in the Family. The relation of the father to his children corresponds to himely rule. Our liver calle Zens, Father; and where as in Previa, a father treats his children aloues we have a relation which corresponds to treating. The relation serves husband and wife corresponds to aristocracy for the his and rule. He was those things in which his superiority entitles him to rule her water helicias fower into his own hands his rule becomes him to rule her water he letters fower into his own hands his rule becomes him to edgarchy sentition where the objective constitute brothers corresponds to time ray to brothers are eigened in the face of makes a difference. The unalogue of democracy is, for the west face from whombers are allowed to do as they please.

- 1160 a. 31. § 1. modercias 8' (oriv elby tpia, loat 8d nai maperstions) in Principal State of the Politics: see their notes ad loc.
 - a. 84. πολιτείαν β' αὐτήν κ.τ.λ.] 'constitutional government' (Peters-'Η ἐκ τιμημάτων is called πλουτοκρατία in Xen. Aem. iv. 6. 22.
 - b. 6. § 2 μή τοιούτος] μή αύτάρεης.

αληρωτός δε τις είη βασιλεύς | Fritzsche supposes the referent to be to the αἰσιμεήτης mentioned in Pol. i.e. 9. 1285 a 31 to αἰρετος τύραντος. But Coraes is enore probably right with αληρωτος δε τις είη βασιλεύς, καθαπερ ὁ πρωτος τῶν ἐνεια κληρωτων ἀιγειαν ᾿λθήνησιν ἐπωνομάζετο βασιλεύς. Pelets and Rathkaler adopt to interpretation, the latter quoting Plato, Polit. 291 A τούτους το τικαν τους αληρωτούς βασιλεία όμο και αρίος, and 290 E καὶ ἐψ καὶ τοῦ ὑμῖν . . . τῷ λαχόντι βασιλεί փασί τῆθο τὰ ανμεύτατα καὶ μάλιστα κατρες τῶν ἀρχαίων θυσιών ἀποδεδόσθας

All recorded sources except Oh and NC read of after in, the reading requires maken to be supplied, see the Paraph. & he me nower than adopted maken ar ree in of Barakein.

b. 8. Rul pareparepor ent raining on xelpionn] According to Ramauer and Peters this means that it is more evident from an inspection of

that it is the worst, than it is evident from an inspection of 1100 b. 8. Baadoia that it is the best form of government. Surely this is not the meaning. Nothing can be more evident, on Aristotle's principles, than that Baadoia is the best form of government. The comparison in Sursparies is between the worst of the optal noduration, viz. reposparia (see above, 1160 a 36 graphing of it reposparia), and the worst of the sapinfluous, viz. reposparie. The latter is quite plainly the worst on his side because it is drawfor to Baadoia which is the best of all forms; whereas it is not so plain that reposparia is the worst on its side, because the difference between it and Baadoia does not amount to bearions.

§ 3. μεταβαίνει] impersonal = ή μεταβολή γίνεται, according to b. 10. Ramsauer; but the Paraph. makes ή πολιτεία the subject—a construction supported by ράστα μεταβοίνουσω at the end of the present section.

καὶ ή τιμοκρατία] ε.ε. είπουταιν, as well as democracy, is a b. 18. government of the many: see Pol. ii. g. 1279 a. 37 όταν δε το πλήθος πρόε το ποινόν πολιτεύηται συμφέρου, καλείται το κοινόν δυομα πασών τών πολιτείων, πολιτεία.

παρεκβοίνει] taken transitively in the Ind. Arist., and by the b. 90. Paraph., Ramsaver, and Fritzsche. The term παρίκβασια scemz to have been derived from the terminelogy of music: see Ε. Ε. 11. 9 1241 b. 28 πολιτίαι . . . καὶ αὶ δρθαὶ καὶ αὶ παρεκβασεις' διτε γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ Σσπερ επὶ τῶν ἀρμονών καὶ τῶν ἐν ταὶς πολιτείαις: and Pol. 9. 7. 1342 a. 22 εἰαὶ δ' δσπερ αὐτῶν αὶ ψυχαὶ παρεστραμμένει τῆς κατὰ ψύνιν τῆς ως, υὖτω καὶ τῶν ἀρμονών παρεκβάσεις εἰαὶ, καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύντων καὶ παρακεχρωσμένα: on which see Susemihl's Arist, Politik, note 1098.

Democracy is the least evil of the debased forms (havin di μαχθηrow in dynosporm), because it arises out of a form in which the
governing tooly is large. In timocracy the governing body, being
the majority of the people, governs for the good not of itself
the majority but for the good of the whole State, the minority
included. In democracy the majority governs for its own good,
and neglects the rights of the minority. But still in democracy
the rights and interests of the minority, at least, are attended to;
whereas in tyranny and objectly, where the governing body is
very small, the majority is oppressed. On the principle there-

- 2100 b. 20. fore of 'the greatest good of the greatest number,' the deflected implied in tyranny or objectely is a much more serious of than that implied in democracy. But extremes meet. There is a form of Democracy in which everything is determined by ψηφοφοτα, and not by νόμος. This form of Democracy, which Arabia (Pol. a. 4. 1202 a. 4 sqq) compares to tyranny, must be excepted from the application of the judgment δίνιστα δί μουθηρών ότα το δημακρατία, and may have been present to the mind of Aspalla when he write—el καθ' αὐτό σκοποσια, χάροι δι εὐγήσεια το δημακρατία τών έτερων' εἶ γάρ ἐν τῷ δημοκρατία πώντεν δηχουσικ, τὸ το νερουσιδε καὶ δλιγαρχία, τῷ μέν δλίγου, τῷ δὲ εἶν' χόμου δὲ όση το πολλοῦς φαύλουν δριγου ἡ καὶ δλίγους ἡ καὶ δια.
 - b. 31. µdhoo' ourses] 'These then are the ways in which the seven constitutions are most apt to change' (Peters); 'most apt' for these are other ways, as Aristotle himself points out in Peters, tyrannics sometimes arise directly out of algarchies of democracies; democracies directly out of tyrannics. See Rinsauer ad loc.
 - b. 22. § 4. ὁμοιώματα 8' αὐτῶν καὶ οίον παραδείγματα] 'analogues sidas it were, patterns.'

The parallels drawn in §§ 4, 5 and 6 differ in value as suggestiveness. Those drawn between the normal control relation and aristocracy, and the abnormal conjugal relation and objectly are perhaps more ingenious than useful; but on he other hand, those drawn between the father and the king, he was the master and the tyrant, between brothers and the members of a timocracy or democracy, rest upon a true new of the raund history of society.

The clan or ullage-community with its Chef (doctors) is the expansion of the house with its Father: see Pol. 1. 1252 b 17 h adapt aromic victor in . 1. 1252 b 17 h adapt aromic victor in . 1. 1252 b 17 h adapt aromic victor in the superior signature of models, and viv det on the superior and all and signature of the superior in the superior in the superior of the superior in the superior of the

marijo dodpilo re Brio re

τύν βαπελέα τυντων απάντων: Φύσει γαρ τον Βαπελέα διαφερειν μέν δεί, 1100 b. 22. to years d' elvos eile autoir l'area nemorde to apenillétepos mois to recetepos eet à president spor re réseau. It is only, however, while a community remains small that the patriarchal kingship is possible; and in the Helleme world, when Aristotle wrote, it had long become a thing of the past. Monarchy now existed chiefly in the form of tyranny, where the morarch was able to ocerce a mixed and divided mass of subjects, as a master coerces his slaves, Greek communities, when they became too large to submit to the rule of the patriarchal chief, naturally became aristocracies and timocracies; that is the customs (vinue) which had grown up under the rule of the patriarchal chief, continued to govern the community after the disappearance of that rule. These customs expressed originally what kinsmen deemed due to one another on their various relations. It is true that on the disappearance, an a large community, of the lively sense of kinship which produced them, the customs underwent many transformations in correspondence with a changing environment; but in all their transformations they communed to give merely new expression to that soem, sense— that community sensus, which, wide as its scope may become, can always be traced back to the feelings of near kinsmer - nembers of the same valage, descended from brothers members of the same family - mides sal maidor maides.

Artstocracy and timocracy represent different stages in the evolution of the primit ve association of brothers. First we have the preponderating influence of the 'elder branches'; then power becomes more equally distributed among all the "kinsmen," as population acreases, and wealth becomes diffused. In other words the arm ocratic families whose local power made the central rule of the patriarchal chief impossible, continued to exercise that power till new families became influential and competed with them. In this evolution however (om aristocracy to timocracy there is no break in continuity. The old customs inherited from the patriarchal period are slowly changed. But either in ansociacy or in timocracy force may break with old customs and introduce disorder. Hence oligarchy or democracy. If anistocracy does not, with increasing population and wealth, pass naturally into timocracy, it is because circumstances have aggrand sed certain aristocratic families, and made them too powerful in a large community the customs of which have ceased

- Timocracy becomes democracy chiefly under stress of population and poverty, when the old customs fall to meet the new oreanstances, and the many poor take it into their own hands to after the old customs more or less rudely. But a temocracy which springs from t mocracy, the development of aristocracy is obviously much better than one which springs from objects, the rapidsanie of anstocracy. The former democracy is there all of the nature of an inevitable development: the latter implies a break in continuity and a revolution, followed soon by the Saviour of Society, in the shape of a tyrant.
 - b. 31. διαφερόντων The slave is φύσει a slave; he differs from to free man ar the body differs from the soul; see Pol. i 2 1254.

 16 δασι μέν οδυ τοσούτου διαστάσιν δασυ ψυχή σώματος και διέμεια βηριου, διακινται τούτου τὸυ τρέπον, όσων ἰστίν ἔργια ή τοῦ σωρού χρήσις, και τοῦτ ἐστιν ὁι χεσθαι ταιτην τὴν ἀρχήν, είπερ και τοἱε εἰμφικαι ἔστι γάρ φυσει δούλος δ δινάμενος ἄλλου εἶναι διά καὶ δλλου επὶ ! he s not a Person) και δ κοινωνιου λόγου τοσούτου δσου οἰσθανοίτε ἀλλά μή ἔχειν τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ζῷα αὐ λύγου αἰσθανόμενα, αλλά καθήμαν τῷ σωρατι βαήθεια γίνεται παρ ἀμφαίν παρά το τῶν διάλων εοὶ τοῦ τρω τῶν ἡμερων ξῷων. βουλεται μεν οὐν ἡ φίσις και τὰ σωματι διάθεικος βουλεται μεν οὐν ἡ φίσις και τὰ σωματι διάθεικος και τῶν δουλων, το μεν ἰσχηρά πρός τοι ὁ πρειου χρήσιν, τὰ δό διθά καὶ ἄχρηστα προς τὰς τοιαίταις ἐργοσίας, ἀλλά χρησιω πρός παλετικών βιον . . . συμβαίνει δὶ πολλάκιας και τοῦναντίου κ. λ.
 - b 32. § B. dropos di nal youands] de nationia.
 - b. 3d. µebiornar sc. who normoving.
 - 1161 a. 1. enichapor] Zell, Fritzsche, and Grant quote Menander in Matration of the Greek feeling about heiresses—

όστις γυνούς άπλεληρου όπιθυμεί λαθείν πλουτούσαν, ήται μήσιο έκτίνει θεών, ή βυίλετ' άτυχείν, μασίριος καλούμενος.

In Pol. ii. 6. 1270 a. 23 the evil consequences arising to the Spanin state from the heiresses are noticed fort of all row years or open the moone xware mount pepas to due, row to intelligent unblood years arch.; see Newman's note on 1270 a. 31.

§ 6. olefocur] 'Dicuntur autem hand mole olefocis (nac non 1161 a. 7 tunt olefo nedum olefo (Ramsauer). The habitations of wild animals are olefocers; see Ind. Artif. s. v.

CHAPTER XI.

ARGUMENT.

In each of the constructional forms we find a forewiship coextensive with the actue amoved in the particular form. The foreid hap of a king for his cubjects is that of one who confers the greater benefits. The long tends his perficient Home calls Assembled in the shepherd of the footbook. The foreids perficient is father is of this kind—an's, a father confers greater benefits than a king he and existence—thought to be the greatest of ail—nucliar and education formathers too are thought of at empering these benefits. The father has a matural right to rule were an foof's, because he experients the footfather.

These friend hops, being between unequals, involve, whi the kinds of justice corresponding to them, "return in proportion to desert" this is tuby parents receive homeur. For only thing runte children can return in an amount pro-

partionate to the boughts which they receive.

The freendship of husuand and realers the same as that between rulers and ruled in an art tore my. The friend hip between brothers recember that between consequent for they are equals and belong to the same generation; and those who are such generally formal in a terms very visit that be sind—its members stand on an equal footing, and take two six deviang office. But in the degraced forms, as justice and and a small extent so done fremishing of hen order and ruled have nothing in common cheer is no primarise platmen them, for their is no just is the relation between them is like that between workness and took roul and body master and clave the slave v. a living tool one cannot make a slave, quit stave, a "friend" any more than one can be "just" to him although qub suits he may be the object of promodules and justice.

in tyranners there is very little freenthing and very little justice in Lemmanian more than in the other digraded forms: for an democratics men are agond, and so have much in commen.

§ 1. φιλία φαίνεται, ἐψ΄ δσον καὶ τὰ δίκαιον] τ. ε. φιλια subates 1101 a 10 between those only whose relations to one another are regulated by νόμος. εf. Ε. Ν. ν. 6. 4 τοῦτο δ΄ (τ. ε. τὸ πολιεικόν δικαιον) έστιν επὶ συνωνων βιου πρός το είναι αὐτάρπεταν, έλευθερων καὶ ἴσων ἡ κατ΄ αναλιεγίαν ἡ κατ' ἀμιθμόν' ώστε δσακε μή ἴστι τοῦτο, οὺκ ἔστι τοῦτοιε πρός

1101 a. 10. άλλήλους τό πολιτικών δίκαιον, άλλά τι δίκαιον καλ καθ όμοιότητο. του you discuss, als and shops apos airoir. (1. below val 11. 7 does you elval те біногом памт, бивраты пріс памта том блюдитом воснатом μίμου και συνδήκης και φιλια δή, καθ' δύου δεθρωπίου. Βη κομοι νο are to understand the social system of laws and customs 210 which individuals are born and in which they as it were more being thus not more individuals-separate centres of force and caprice, but members of a body politic or commonweally have in common (of season § 6) a general rule of the which they are of one mind (Sporoscon ix. 6) to observe in their various pos ions. But as men and beasts belong to different worlds, and cannot agree to live together under one system of general rules, so main and slave, and slave, belong to different worlds between which force is the only intermediary. The slave indeed belongs and his master to ore great social system—the brotherhood of speaking men; and so far, just and friendly relations may subast between a master and his slave; but political fusince and his correspondent friendship cannot. The tyrant, again, as so h, and of grants as such, are external to any social system or body politic regulari by law and custom. They rule by mere force; there is no between them and their subjects. Heme justice and fremally are equally absent from the relation subsisting between 1770 and their subjects. The act on of their rule is, if the metaphic be allowed, mechanical, not physiological; they do violence to the 'social organism' from without, they do not preside with over its natural functions.

a tl. Bookei per apòs role Bookeopérous] As Ramsauer rotes a friendships corresponding to the various noducion are present in this chapter as friendships between the rulers and the ruled lies to be observed however that in a timocracy the distinction between the rulers and the ruled is very different from that in the two other épitai noducion. In a timocracy the came fersion whe and are ruled in rotation. There is therefore a certain and lie as in the use of the term phis in this chapter. It point is not up plantation is between one man—is nord rip discrepances between a few men, on the one hand, and the great body of the proper on the other hand; whereas if phis is nord the temperature has no reference external to the popular body, but is complete with it, uniting its equal members man to man. Indeed, it is not in

a very real sense that we can speak of 'friendship' existing 1161 a 11. between king or aristocrats, and subjects; and probably Aristotle is led to use the expression increly in the interest of the parallels which he is anxious to make out between the king and the father, the anstocrats and the busband. The quan between king, or aristocrats, and subjects is not 'friendship,' but rather willing obedience and loyalty, on the one side, to those who administer laws which represent the fidure of the community; and, on the other aide, moderation and public spirit shown in their powerful position by the here larry administrators of such laws. That there can scarcely be dulia, in the sense of 'friendship,' between a king and his subjects is admitted by Aristotle viii. 7. 4 different descriptions.

e δπεροχή εδεργεσίας] The king guides and protects his people; a. 12 they must honour and obey him in return.

§ 2. § πατρική] so, φιλία. It is to be noticed that in E. N. v. 6. 8 a 16. it is laid down that the relation between a father and his children is not one involving justice (rô discusor) in the proper sense of the term. Justice in the proper sense of the term exists where the telations are those of contract as illustrations in arropy's, and loyalty, rather than friendship.

καὶ τοῦς προγόνοις δὲ ταῦτα προσνέμεται] ' and we at ribute these a. 17 benetus to our ancestors a.so; αλλά καὶ τοῦς προγόνοις ταῦτα ἀποσεριται, ήται συγκεχωρητοι παρ ήμων τὰ ἀγαγιων εἰς τὶ εἶναι ἡμας και τὰ λοιπα, εἰ αιὰ μη ἀμάσως άλλα διὰ μεσων τῶν πατέρων (Asp.). Ramsauer thinks that the words καὶ τοῦς προγόνοις δὲ ταῦτα ἀπονέμεται interrupt the sense and he accordingly bruckets them. Fritzseine, Susemill, and Bywater tead προσνεμεται with Kb, Lb, Ob. Ramsauer reads ἀπονεμεται (Mb, Bek.), remarking that προσνεμω is a ture word in Aristotle.

φύσει τε άρχικον κ.τ.λ.] Fritzsche Michelet, and Susemihl read a 18 γάρ after το with L⁵, M⁵, Γ, Cambr., CCC, NC, Ald. But, as Ramsauer points out, the clause beginning with φύσει adds (not a reason for anything) but a second point viz. τὸ φύσει ἀρχικον

This part of Cambr. (from 1157 a. 18 to 1161 b. 19) is supplied by a later hand.

- resemblance being rd everyrender then, hadrous roll eine and epochia of resemblance being rd everyrender than, hadrous roll eine and epochia od modeller. The sense of the section may be stated as follows. The positions of the father and of the family ancestor are of the same kind. The father benefits his children by giving them existence, sustenance, and education; so also ancestors benefit their descendants. The father has a natural right to rule his children; so also the hereditary king, representing an ancestor, has a natural right to rule his people who represent the descendants of that ancestor. Accordingly, although I agree with Ran sauer that placement to be read before degrade, I cannot agree with him that the clause and row apophous blacked, I cannot agree with him that the clause and row apophous blacked in decompared of apophous in the section similar to that occupied by and apolyous degrade in the first part of the section similar to that occupied by and apolyous degrade in the second part.
 - 8 3. καὶ τεμώνται] Καί emphasizes τιμώνται. Τεμή το the proper due of such superiority as that of parents and gods. Raticave compares iv 3 to έν ύπεροχή γαρ, τό δ' άγαθῷ ὑπερέχου των ἀντιμετέρου: ἐἰτί, 14. 2 τῷ μὰν ὑπερεχοντι τιμής (πλὲον διὰ νέμειν)... τῆς ων γὰρ ἀρετης καὶ τῆς κὐεργεσιως ἡ τιμή γεραν: ε/. also via. 14. 4 τὰ δυναινν γὰρ ἡ ψιλὰι ἐπεξητί, αὐ τὸ κατ' ἄξιαν' οὐδό γαρ ἔστιν ἐν πάσι, κοῦτερ ἐν ταίς πρὰς τοὺς θεοὺς τιμαίς και τους γόνεις' οὐδείς γὰρ τῆν ἀξιων κου ὁν ἀποδοίη, εἰτ δυναμεν δε ὁ δεραπεύων ὁπισικής τῶνα δουτῖ.
 - a. 21. oò ruòró] Wallams brings out the meaning of this expression correctly 'Nestler are the claims of justice in these . . . relations equally balanced on either side, but rather, as is also the friendship proportioned to the benefits received.' The Paragh, least-releté; πάσαι al roudram φιλιαι ἐν ὑπεροχῷ διο καὶ τυμώνται οἱ γενείν καὶ τν δικαιον δὶ ἀκολούδως τῷ φιλία τὰ τὸ πότο, ἀλλὶ ἐν ὑπεροχῷ το γὸρ π νε πατέρα δίκαιον ὑπερεχείν τοῦ προς εἰν τὸ γιρ κατ' ἀξιαν ἀπαδοσκοι δει Cf. Ε. Ε. Β. 9. 1241 b. 37 οὐ γὰρ ταίτον δίκαιον τῷ επερεχείντι καὶ ὑπερεχομένο, ἄλλὰ τὰ ἀνάλογον.
 - 54. ἡ αὐτὴ φιλία κπλ.] Λ comparison more ingenicus than instructive.
 - n. 25. § 5. draspikij ή draspiki φέλω answers most nearly to what in modern times we understand by friendship. It subsists between those who, without being necessarily kinsmen, are of one ago, have

been brought up in close companionsh p, and have common tastes 1181 a. 25. and pursuits.

init, and Bywater reads \$\(\delta_i\). I prefer \$\(\delta_i\), which Ramsauer, Suse \(\bullet \). 27. mill, and Bywater read, following \$K^b\$, \$M^b\$

tron yap of πολίται βούλονται καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς είναι] ε΄ ε, in a c. 26. t mocracy ' the estizens wish to be equal and fair' . Peters), or perhaps better—' in a r mocracy it is characteristic of (βούλονται) the enizens to be equal and fair.'

έν μέρα δή κτ.λ] Cf. Pol. 11. 2. (277 b. 13 δεί δε τον πολίτην του a. 90. άγοθον επισταυθοι από δίνασθοι καὶ δρχευθαι καὶ δρχειν, και αύτη άρετή πολίτου το τήν τών ελευθέρων άρχην έπίσταυθαι δεί άμφάτερα.

§ 6. μηδέν κοινόν] i.e they do not participate in a common a. 22 bount, or belong to the same social organism. In an ophy notirein every member, whether ruler or ruled, acts author the social organism in a manner conducive to the good of the whole. This is to act justly—see Pol. in. 7 1282 b. 16 fore de noderueir dyador to devalor, τούτο δ' έστη το κοινή συμφέρον. But the tyrant's acts are not thus functions of the social organism. They are assaults from without upon that organism. Again, the social organism, like the physical organism, requires for its subsistence many things which are not part of itself: see Pot, II 7. 1328 a. 21 inci & wonep row άλλων των εστή φύσεν συνεστώτων οὐ τουτά έστε μόρεα της όλης συστάστως, ών άνευ το όλον ούα αν είη, δήλαν ώς ούδε πόλεως μέρη θετέον δσο τοίς πόλεσεν αναγκαίου ψπάρχειν, ούδ' άλλης ποινωνίας ούδεμείας . . . πτήσεως μεν бы та с полети, обден в стин й педале перос туг полеме подда в ζωψεχα μορη της κτήσεως έστιν ή δέ πόλις κανωνία τίς έστι των όμοιως, in me de faire the endergreichte aplants. Slaves, who are Industa appeara the deapendor strates from are not parts of the social organism, between the 'parts' or members of which alone just and friendly relations can subsist.

ώφελείται μέν γάρ πάντα ταύτα όπό τῶν χρωμένων] Επιτεκείε and a. 35 Grant compute E' E. H. 10. 1242 n. 13 άλλον γάρ τρόπον συνήλθον πρίων και τέχνη, οἰχ ἔντκα κουνοῦ τινός (οἶον γάρ δργανον και ψυχή) άλλὰ τον χρωμένον ἔντων. συμβαίναι δὲ εοὶ οἰτὰ τὰ δργανον ἐπιμελείας τυγχανικ, ἡε δίκαιον πρὰς τὰ ἔργον ἐκείνου γὰρ ἔντκίν ἐστι. 'The instrument,' says Grant, 'receives just so much care from its master, as will

1101 a. 35. keep it in proper condition for the exercise of its functions. The slave, who is treated not as a person but as a thing, receives the same kind of attention. Friendship and justice imply the recignition of personality; they imply treating men not as instruments, but as ends in themselves."

The benefit received by slaves is thus, as Ramsauer remarks, an ωφίλεια κατά συμβοβηπότ.

- 5 4. ἔμψυχον δργανον] See Pol. i. 2. 1253 b. 32.
- § 7. § 8' arepures Aristotle, writing in a reflective age, attermined. to explain and excuse the historical insitution of slavery by means. of the abstract notion - power dollow: but the political and clinical difficulties encountered in the attempt were so great that he was obliged to admit the distriction if doubles-if dubpunes, a cisameters which the Roman jurists, with their theory of the 'natural equal-v of all men, afterwards brought into prominence: see Upran. quoted by Ze.l ad lec .- Quod attinet ad jus civile servi pro no as habentur, non tamen jure naturah. quia, quod ad jus naturae pertinet, omnes homines sunt aequales: of Justinian Intl. 1 it i § 2 jure naturali ab mitto omnes hommes liberi nascebantar. But this distinction between the slave and the man is presented by Aristotle and the jurisis in too abstract a manner to forms? materal for answering the questions- In what sense then is be a man? What is meant by his capacity (cos dissuperor b 7) ist partic pating in some and outlyan? Can there be a capacity if this kind which is not actualised in some definite way?" Arisco E. mainly concerned to find in the institution of slavery, as it exists, an economic bases for his beliant Helenic life, did not trouve lamself much with the history of the institution. It stated his purpose to represent the slave as a thing. It, left owing his usual method in social enquiries, he had examined the listory of slavers he would have found that the slave is essentially a person are a member of the particular social organism to which the master belongs, not merely a 'human best g'-indportor, as he sagges admits, in much the same way as nowadays we admit that the lower animals are 'fellow-creatures,' Aristotle had little as a recution of the 'dignity of labour', he did not see clearly that in firstry is an essential function of the social organism-semething waker and not merely draysmor-and that the author, the organ of this function, is as much a member of the organism as his master, who,

as pryedomprofit for instance, is the organ of another social function. 1161 b. 8 The truth is that the Greek dooks actually participated in some in a sense not realised by Aristotle at all, when he said that \$\frac{3}{2}\$ Edpunos he 'can participate.' The slave's position, though of course more open to the encroachments of violence than the positions of the other members of society was secured as a tolerable one by guarantees of essentially the same kind as those which secured the free man against the artitrary action of his legit mate rulers. They could not rule without the good-will of their free subjects, nor on other lines than those defined by the history and traditions of the community over which they ruled. Similarly, we may feel sure that 'slavery would not have long continued to sub-ast, in the free and mobile Greek states, as the normal condition of a large part of the working class, if force had been the orly reason for its continuance. The good-will of the slaves was necessary. They acquiesced in a well-defined historical status which was far from being intolerable. To that extent, and thous they actually participated in voque and overling-were, in short, not things, but persons to be reckoned with 'parts' of that social organism which is held together by the aparoid of its members. Arcstotle's theory of colonwoods prevented but from seeing this, and allowed him merely to make the vague, and in the centext, almost numerature admission-done solp sival er binaion nauet andpians upos narra rio duniperur koermijaat ropur kul gurdings kul chin di, kud crow delpares. He left unanswered the questions which touch the root of the whole matter-' In what sense then is the slave a man? What is meant by his capacity for participating in volues and over-Gran? Can there be a capacity of this kind which is not actualised in some definite way?"

The answers to these questions, as the 'llistorical Method' enables us to give them, are indicated by Maine (Ament Law, th. v. pp. 162 sqq) in a manner so conducive to a just estimate of the value of Ansiotics view regarding the personality (or impersonality) of the slave, that I venture to transcribe the passage.—
'The legal rules by which systems of mature jur sprudence regulate the cornexion of master and stage present no very distinct traces of the original condition common to ancient societies. But there are reasons for this exception. There seems to be something in the institution of slavery which has at all times either shocked or perplexed markind, however little habituated to reflection, and

1161 b. 5. however slightly advanced in the cultivation of its moral instructs. The compunction which ancient communities almost unconsciously expenenced appears to have always resulted in the adoption of some imaginary principle upon which a defence, or at leas a rationale, of slavery could be plausibly founded. Very early in their history the Greeks explained the institution as grounded on the intellectual inferiority of certain races and their consequent natural aptitude for the service condition. The Romans, in 1 spirit equally characteristic, derived it from a supposed agreement between the victor and the vanquished, in which the first stipulated for the perpetual services of his foe; and the other gained a consideration the life which he had legitimately forfeited. Such theories were not only unsound but plainly unequal to the case for which they affected to account. Still they exercised a powerful influence in many ways. They satisfied the conscience of the master. They perpetuated and probably increased the debuement of the slave. And they naturally tended to put out of sall the relation in which servitude had originally stood to the rest of the domestic system. This relation though not clearly exhaused is casually indicated in many parts of primitive law, and more particularly in the typical system-that of ancient Rome. It is clear, from the testimony both of ancient law and of their primeval histories, that the slave might under certain conditions be made the heir, or universal successor, of the master, and this significant faculty . . . implies that the government and represcutation of the family might, in a particular state of carcumstances, devolve on the bondman, ... What then is meant by saying that the slave was originally included in the family? . . . When we speak of the slave as anciently included in the family, we intend to assert nothing as to the motives of those who brought him into it or kept him there; we merely imply that the tie which bound him to his master was regarded as one of the same general character with that which united every other member of the group to the chicftain. This consequence is in fact earried in the general assect on already made that the primitive ideas of mankind were unequal to comprehending any basis of the connexion inter it of individuals, apart from the relations of family. The Family coosisted primar ly of those who belonged to it by consanguanty and next of those who had been engrafted on it by adeption; I us there was still a third class of persons who were only joined to it by common subjection to its heal, and these were the slaves. The 1101 b 5, born and adopted subjects of the chief were raised above the slave by the certainty that in the ordinary course of events they would be relieved from bondage and entitled to exercise powers of their own; but that the inferiority of the slave was not such as to place him outside the pale of the family or such as to degrade him to the footing of the amate property, is clearly proved, I think, by the many traces which remain of his ancient capacity for inhentance in the last resort. The Roman law was arrested in its growing tendency to look upon him more and more as an article of property by the theory of the Law of Nature; and hence it is that, wherever servitude is sanctioned by insultations which have been deeply affected by Roman jurisprudence, the service condition is never intolerably wretched."

φιλία] So Ramsauer, Susemili, and Bywater. Bekker reads b. 8. φιλίας with the codd.

§ 8. ἐπὶ πλείον] Κ^b and Asp; the other authorities followed by b. 20. Bekker, read πλείστον Aspasius gives the meaning correctly—ἐν δὲ τοῦς δημοκρατίως ἐπι πλεον ἐστὶν ἡ ψολία καὶ τὸ δίκαιον βπερ ἐν τοῦς Σλλαιο παρεηθοσεσε.

CHAPTER XII.

ARGUMENT.

It is always between those then, who are joined together in some association or other, in which they meet on common ground, that friendship, in whitever form, subsists although perhaps the jerendship of kinemin and comrodes may be distinguished from the other forms, at any rate such friendships at those of extisent, trememen and fedore winners term to have more of the character of associations. In they seem to envolve a sort of agreement entered into to associate, while friendship between kinemen and conscales indicate, without any inch agreement. To the class of few indicates which seem to structure an agreement every be assigned also the quest friendship incomen two men who are extreme of different states.

The freenishing of himmen his many forms, but can always be traced back to that sometimed in the relation between parents and charles Turents and children, as stock and affiguring, are bound together by ties of mutual affaction

parents, however, have a desper commonment than children have of the common nature who he waster also und afterpring a conscioueness too which dres from the birth of the children whereas children do not account to waster, we may the parent rich to hit they arrive at the years of intio gener. The explains read the same love of mothers. Brothers love one another because they if the explains for the same parents. Hence we speak of the same blood "the wave since" (y course, their being of about the same age and being brought up together me and he taken as contributing largely to the fravelish of prevaling a prevalent with these respects recombine the fravelshep of commodes. The grandship also must consider and other himself is to be explained likewise by these considers or in the explained likewise by these considers.

The friendship of children for parents like that of men for the god ----Jesend hep with h has the good at pre ented by a superior for its want for me confer on their children the greatest of all good things - axistence, nurse-This friendship is also more wield, in the ordinary senit of e 144 \$ 1014 term, and more pleasant than that with stranger, in is far as the esminer I , in who has belongs is more entimate. The fraud-hip televen brockers his 14, characteristics of that between commisser wants of the bettern are good in a see radesh p of the best and most lasteny rind. The feverality between burnous and rate as natural, for man as mature in firs a comparat owner and our afterwards a foots as being, since the front y is chemosure in y prior to m state being materially necessary to it, and proceedism is common to man will ail other anima i. Itumun beings however, defer from other animals in as passing merely for the wake of grow reasing, but also for agents which bere to we took the profes content of life Husband and will have there was no functions and their separate vertues, and both outs but by transon of ivons to the common good. Thus the friendship between them is both melal end pieatant, and, if they are niretuous persons, has, as manifested by each, the goodness frombar to the other for its object. But its dren are a great foul of serion, being something common. Children couples are more quickly corrected thun those with children. To ask how a nashand should regulate he i to an a his wife and generally how one friend thea. I be to to worker, is to aid tojustice requires the husband or friend to behave in the currentences.

1101 b. 11. § 1.] 'All friendsh p, as we have already said, implies association; but we may separate from the rest the friendship of kinsmen and that of connacts. The friendships of fellow entrens, of fellow tribesmen of fellow salors, &c., seem, as opposed to these, to have more to do with association; for they appear to be founded on some sort of compact. The friendship of host and guest might also be included in this class' (Peters). All friendship is do converge, or converge, in the generic sense. There are three species under the genus—(1) supposed, (2) impan, (3) summed in the narrower, specific sense, where a more or less express dookeyes exists. Thus in E. E. H. 10, 1242 a. t we have degenerated pixels only several freedom.

κοινωνική, ή λεγομίνη πολιτική. The Paraph. has—πώσα μέν οδε φιλίσ δε 1101 b.11 κοινωνική είστι, καθαπερ είρησαι μόνη δε ή συγγενική καὶ έταιρική φιλία οδ βοσωίσσε έτ κοινωνίς είναι απινωνικοί γύρ είσι φιλία, αί καθ δμολογίαν καὶ συνθήτην τικὰ συντυτάμεσα, εία είχαν αξ φυλετικοί καὶ συμπλοίται σαὶ δοσω τοιούται, είε επόται δε τάξειεν δε τις ποὶ τήν ξενικήν. ή δε συγγενική φιλία καὶ ή έταιρική οδ καθ δμολογίαν ή συνθητην τινά συντυταττικ, άλλά τοὶ ε μέν ή φύσιε συνίδησε, τοῦς δε τὸ τυχείν ήλιαιωτας είναι, καὶ περὶ τὰ σύτὰ έπατηδιύματα σπουδαξείν. Λαρ. has— άφορίσειε δ΄ δε τις, φησί, τήν συγγενικήν καὶ τὴν έταιρικήν φιλίαν, ψτοι χωρίσειεν δε έχούσας τι διαφερου τῶν ποινωνικών λαμβανει δὲ καινωντικὰς τὰς καθ ὁμαλογίαν τικά. Cotacs' bote 15—άφορίσειε δ΄ δε τις κ.τ.λ] ή γλρ συγγενική καὶ ή έταιρική κοτὰ φύσιν μάλλον είσι καὶ οδ κατά συνθήτην, διαπερ αξ απινωντικά.

rife franje] See note on vill. 3. 4, 2. 30.

b 18.

§ 2] Ramsauer notes that we have in this § three separate reasons given for the superior love of parents -viz. (t) μάλλον δ' ίσσσι, (2) μελλον στικρικίωται, (3) καὶ τις πλήθει δι του χρόνου ες, ή των γοινίων φέλλους διαφέρει τῆς τῶν τέκνων. Victorias has a note to the same effect.

ai µnvelocs] Zell, after Muretus, quotes in illustration of this b. 27 remark—

Eurip. Frag. inc.-

μήτηρ φελότοκνος μάλλου όστι τοῦ πατρός!
ἢ μὲν γάρ αυτήσ οίδεν δυθ δ δ' οίττας.

Menander-

αύτου γάρ ούδελε οίδε του ποτ' έγένετο, ΔΑΧ' επουοούμευ πάντες, ή πιστεύομευ.

Hom. Qd. i. 215-

μήτηρ μέν τ' έμε φησε τοῦ ξημεναι, αξταρ έγωγε οὐε αξδ' οὐ γάρ πώ τις όλυ γάναυ αὐτάς ἀνέγνω.

§ 3. Ετιροι αύτοι τῷ κεχωρίσθαι] ' a second self separately existing.' b. 20.

(f E. E. H. 12. 1245 a. 35 Βούλεται ώστερ αὐτὰε διαιρετου είναι ὁ φιλου.

Τό κιχωρίσθαι qualifies advol paradoxically—though indeed the paradox is already contained in the application of έτεροι to αὐτοί. I cannot agree with the interpretations which make τό πεχωρίσθαι give the reason for έτεροι. Thus Lambinus translates—' nam qui ex eis nati sunt, eo ipso quod separati sunt, tanquam alteri ipsi sunt'; and Victorus—' qui en m sunt ex ipsis, veluti alteri ipsi,

VOL: IL

1201 b 38, quia separati sunt. The object of the clause is not to show him chi dren, being abroi, are at the same time drepos, but to statche paradox that, being drepos rai recompanion, they are yet abro. Peters too misses. I think, the exact force of the clause with—'for what proceeds from them is as it were a second self when it is severed.'

Ramsquer ad loc. remarks that, while Justice is mode Trepos, Lore 18 mode Prepos advice.

- b. 81, πρός ἐκεῖνα] 'sunt haec, unde generati sunt, patentes: id quoi neutro genere propter superius ἐκ τῶν οἰσων (quo item neutro parentes indicantur) positium est.' (Fritzsche).
- b. 84. § 4. hhif yap filina] sc. ripnu, see Rhel. 1. 11. 1371 b. 15, L.E. H. s. 1238 a. 33.
- 1162 a. 1. in rourous] 'Verba in rourous intellige: ex his causes, prophe his.

 Nam alian sequents yip languet' (Zed). Peters seems to age
 with Zell in making τούτων neuter. He has—'Cousins and old
 kinsfolk become attached to each other for the same reason h
 mean because they come of the same stock.' But it is better h
 think, to refer τούτων to ἀδιλφοί understood from the present
 åδιλφική. This is the view of Asp., the Paraph., Grant, Sam
 Williams, and Ramsauer.
 - 3. 6. πρὸς θεούς] Zell and Fritzsche quote E. E. H. 10. 1742 + 32 πατρος δέ καὶ νίου ή αὐτή [φιλία έστὶν] ήπερ θεού πρὸς δέθρωσε του εὐ ποιήσαιτος πρὸς τὸν παθοντα καὶ δλως του φύσει ἄρχοντος προτ τον φύσει ἀρχόνενον. Ramsauer brackets the worls και ἀτθρωποι τον θεούς as probably spurious, on account of their meanustemes with Aristotie's doctrine (viii. 7. 4) that friendsh p cannot subsist between gods and men.
 - a. 8. § 8. manhor tor obrecur i. c. manhor the two obries praire.
 - of the friendship of comrades, and has them in a greater income (provided they are good and generally resemble one another).

 Peters. So Stahr ' und in noch höherem Grade.'
 - a. 19.

 φπάρχουσι στέργοντες άλληλους] 'Have an original love for cor another.'
 - a. 15. § 7. dváhoyor n.r.h.] al di ähhai (συγγενικό φιλίω) dváhoyo liest τή κατά γένος οἰοιότητι (Paraph).

бот проткром кай финукатотором обиба тобымя | See Grant's note 1182 в. 18. ad lee. In point of time the family is prior to the state, but in point of idea (hoye) and essentially (poors) the state is prior. C/. Ar. Pol. i. 2. 12 (1. 1. 1253 a. 19) and apperepow of the chair of water και έκαστος ήμων έστιν, το γαρ ύλον πρότερου άναγκαίου είναι του μέρσυς: draspoupirou γάρ του όλου ούς έσται πούς ούδο χείρ, ελ μή όμωνύμως. Aristotle argues that without the idea of the "state," the terms "man" and "family" would lose their meaning. Thus the idea of family presupposes that of the state, which will accordingly be prior. In the same way the family is more necessary as a means, the state as an end,' A thing is draysolor which is a means: cf. Pol. Θ. 2. 1338 a. 12 του μέν μαθησούς έσιτων είναι χάραν, του δέ πρός τήν doxahiar is draysnias sai xupur ahlar. The draysniar is thus opposed to the salds, which is choiceworthy on its own account; el. Pol. 6. 2. 1338 2. 32 ότι μέν τοίνυν έστι παιδεία τις ήν ούχ ώς χρησίμην ποιδευrien rais ulris, oud in curryrams all ins idealipion and makin, comepon laren. Hence drayman is descriptive of Day, as distinguished from eller, or Liyer, which is endow. See Phys. ii. 9. 200 a. 12 dedyen and ordepools είναι, εί πριων έσται καὶ τὸ έργον αὐτοῦ. έξ ὑποθεσεως οδυ τὸ ἀναγnaice, dan' one is renor. In you to they to decynaice, to b' or event in The statement, then, draysoterpar oldin widous means tip hoya. that the family belongs to the matter of which the state is the form.

ent roccoror] se. id bear in reconcident (Paraph.). Zell and a. 20. Priesche compare Occor. i. 3. 2343 b. 13.

§ 6. ταὐτόν αιλ οὐ ταὐτόν φαίνεται είναι δίκοιον φίλφ πρώς φίλου αιλ α. 31. τὸν δόνείου ξ τὸν ἀδελφόν ε.τ.λ. (Paraph.).

συμφοιτητήν] 'consist.pulus' (Victorius). Peters can hardly be a 33. right with 'Travelling companion.'

CHAPTER XIII.

ARGUMENT.

We have seen that there are three species of fixendihep, and that each may rubiful between those who are equal, or those who are unequal—that those who are equally or unequally good, useful, or pleasant may be fixends. Those then who are equally must love each other equally, and render other services equally.

those who are not equal must put themselves on an equality by loving and etc. while communicating each other on proportion to despet.

It is only, or chiefly, in the friendship for profit that friend, bring charge against each other, and find fault with each other. These whose found has build on virtue have no reason to find fault with each other or grared in their object is to benefit each other, and each trues to emide the other nexts nor is fault finding common in the friendship for pleasure. The friend the pleasure in each other's reciety: it would be ride moust to find find neck only friend because his receity does not give one pleasure, when one is at another drop him. But in the friendship for pools fault finding is very common People are not early satisfied unth what it done for them.

As justice is either universities or embodied in moretien law, in friend at for profit rolles either on character or on law. That which remes on law is the cluded on express terms—a certain service is remisced for a community of stated; the return being mustic either at anic or after a time on the additional, although a debt has been contracted about subtich there is no doubt of the clament of premium the fore removed and the clament of premium and the contracted about the permitter of premium and allowed.

In that form of freendship for profit which relies on character metern to mentioned. A makes a present of comething to B as to a friend, but estable (from his general knowled n of B i sharacter) to exercise in return as must, n more for what is really not a gift but a loan, and if he deer not come mid the transaction in the way he expected when he entered unto it, he is so to be failf and with his friend', for all, or most, men have a general with to be hundrome thing, but when it comes to the particular case, three the protesse thing

Accordingly, if one can, one must wountarily make a return equivalent to that which one has received: one must not as through one had made a mustake at first about the service being rendered out of pure friendship and make a return just as if there had been an express burgs no for one must not treat a men as a distinctive friend against her will. Just of course it is advisable so can direct the beginning who is is who confers the cervice and in expectation of what return, and decide whether one will as other in the execute time is or me.

The question users whether the amount of the receive thouse be measured by the benefit actually experienced by the version, or by the treatile, mency it expended by the gener. Where the friendship is for profit the standard is adving to which vector ought to be made use in the absence of an experience ment, it the tracifit actually experienced by the receiver; but where the ground of the friendship is virtue, the intention of the giver is the standard for intention, or deliberate those, is the criterion of virtue and character,

1188 a, 84, § 1. φιλιών] Asp. has τῶν φιλιών which Byw. (Contriễ p. 61) thinks is probably right.

de dρχή] viil 3. t.

b. 1. Spoing 8d and \$8409] 'and a similar remark applies to friendships

based on pleasure and profit. The full expression would be 1182 b 1 busine di eat ôpoins ideis thing planta nat ro idei deuthepowers.

influres rais abolators and diaphportes] 'conferring equal or un-b. 2. equal benefits on each other.' This charac, though at ady applicable, so far as expression goes, to of did to applicable, so far as expression goes, to of did to applicable, must be taken to refer also to or iffice, as if it had been—influence to iffice an true information and disphportes. It ought not to be taken to refer to involve too, the precise distinction required under that head having been already marked by the expressions discovering disphonation arrangement. Peters, I think, is wrong when he translates—'Sometimes two equally good persons make friends, and sometimes a better and a worse (and so with those who are pleasant to one another, and with those who are friends with a view to profit)—effecting equality by the services they exchange, even though they are themselves different.' Does Bywater also, with the comma after pointspoon, refer loafforces and, to the involvity

mar' loornea] 'Those who are equal must effect the equality b. 8. required in Friendship by making exactly equal returns in love and friendly effices.' Aspasius incorrectly takes και' loornea with rows looss. His words are rows loose και' loornea την διά τὸ ἀγαθον καὶ ἡδυ καὶ χρήσιμου δει και κατά τὸ φιλείν ἰσαζείν. Βιὶ ἐσαζείν το φιλείν και' lournea is contrasted with ἐσάζειν τὸ ἀποδιδόνια ἀπίλαγον τοῦς ἐπεροχαίο.

rode δ' άνίσους τό ἀνάλογον ταῖς ὁπεροχαῖς ἀποδεδόναι) τῷ ἀνάλογον b. Δ. is the reading of coir. cod. Far. 1417 accepted by Bek. and Sua., while Kb, Ob, Mb, Hb, Nb, Ald., and pr. Far. 1417 have το ἀνάλογον, accepted by Bywater Bontz (\$ v. ἀνάλογον) decides in favour of the latter reading, but Rassow (Forsch. p. 67) contends that τῷ is indispensable, because not δοι but δεί ἰσιζεω must be supplied after ἀνέσους, and remarks that the variation of the MSS. (which he exaggerates) rather points to τῷ τὸ ἀνάλογον as the original reading Rassow quotes Aleter. ii. 5. 363 a. 11 τὸ ἀνάλογον ἀποδουσε, which he seems to take as an instance of the ordinaty translave use of ἀποδεδονοι, whereas it is given in the Ind. Arist, under the intransitive uses. I think that Rassow's τῷ τὸ ἀνάλογον κι right.

§ 2. xaples] a man of good taste.

b. 10.

ropperor of thereal i.e. the friend who, in the competition b. 11.

- 1103 b. 11. (Δμιλλωμένων b. 8), succeeds in conferring superior benefits, per what he desires, viz. the good of his friend, and has no reason to complain. The other again who is defeated in the compension cannot dislike one who confers such benefits upon him via γω φιλοιωνα και εξ ποιωννα αίδε ε δυσχεροίνει, άλλ'... ήμε ωνται εξ δροφ
 - b. 13. § 3. οὐ πάνυ δ' οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δι' ἡδονήν] τε, γίνεται ἐγελήματα.
 - § 5. το δίκαιον έστι διττόν, το μέν αγραφον το δέ κατα νόμον Ramsauer contends (without stating the reasons for his opana but merely giving certain references to the Rhet.) that this dotineuron is not (as Zell and Pritzsche take for granted) energy that between to overlow dismon and to comes dismos of E N v ; Bonitz however (Ind. Arist. sub v. dismos) makes ed dyporper demos synonymous with re doorah diamer. The following passages in the Rhet (referred to by Ramsauer) will enable us to decide between these two views .- Rhel. i. 14. 1374 a. 18 sqq. enel de rese lemier in των άδικων ήν δυο είδη (τά μεν γυρ γεγραμμένα το δ' άγραφα), τερί ω με of rough dysperiatoric elegral, the d'apphibus dis forte elleg raire d'eriτά μεν καθ' ύπερβολήν άρετης καί κακίας, έφ' οίς άνειθη καί έπαικα κα origins and rigid rol disprol (the moral and social sanctions, as il sting asked from the legal sanct ent, alar to xápar from the real varte el sal dereunische tor el nochaurta auf Bogligtende eleus reie Clau καί όσα όλλα τοισιτα, τά δέ του ίδιον νομου καί γεγραμμένου έλλημα to soip drieines dones dinaire elem, fore de enterels to nopa the sessionation ropor dikasor. Toppulves de roito tà per aktirar tà de ékutta tur вориветия, аконтин рен быть бай дестин в быть рад донично деприя dad' anaproson pin of substance electer, up of de, add' we see to enter nat dan på fiedros diopians di antiplas, olos to towne stange appres ral mily reve buokelmat yop av å nibv dingellpatere. De obe g edicatore, den di supulistivane, diajen andas cineir, ware elle darridice by so incorne τήν χείρα ή πατάξη, κατά μέν τον γεγραμμένον κομών ένοχών έστε εχί ábinci, nará de rá ádades oun ábinci, nat ro énisines rouro éars. C. h.b. 1. 14. 1375 2. 17 tá per obr prypopulira il drivege ed l' dynami ob, and Rhel. s. 15. 1375 B. 3t . . . To per enteree del paret un oideποτε μεταβαλλει, οὐδ' ὁ απινός (επτά φυσω γόρ έστω, οἱ δε γεγραμμιwould deer. Ober charact it is to Lopoulious 'Arreging' analogeitae pay ότι έδοψε πορά τον του Εριοντοι εόμον, άλλ' ού παρά κάν άγραφον

ob you us no ye adubis, all del wore.

These passages seem to me to support the view that the distinction

between the Typapar durant and the early office is not identical with 1102 b 21. that between to devices disagor and to requely disagor. To appropor discove and rd rard vouce are of course mutually exclusive. The diente and about recognised under the first o'dos of ro dypapor dienter -viz. th to of our dy and frame, where the sanctions are merely 'social,' cannot, from their nature, be brought within the scope of the written law. They belong essentially to the unwritten law. They cannot be enforced by 'legal sanctions.' The intunity again included under the second allow of the appropor bismor cannot be embodied in the written law. The particular issues involved in them must be determined independently of, and even in ague of, the written law. But it does not follow from this that to aypador dismor is identical with 46 duoteor diamor. In a good state much of to function distant (to marroxal the adopt dxan dunques E, N V. 7. 1) is embodied in the written law. To dyporpose domine is, in part, that residuars of re grower disease which either cannot be, or has not hitherto been, embodied in the written code; in part, it consists of somfopera-local customs and etiqueties, which, so far from falling under the operator director, may conflict with it.

I take it, then, that we must not identify the distinction before us here with that between to oversor disease and to somewor disease. as described in E. N. v. 7. We have to think simply of 'unwritten' and 'written' regulations. The unwritten regulations may be 'naturally' just, or they may be only 'conventionally' just; they may be such as can, or such as cannot, be embodied in a written code. The distinction before us indeed seems to answer exactly to that between the Lacedaemonian and the Athenian disea unted in the following passage of Justinian's Instit,-i, a § 9 'ex non scripto jus venit quod asus comprobavit, nam diaturni mores consensu uten lum comprobati legem inntantur, et non melegamer in duas species jus civile distributum videtur, nam ongo ejus ab instituis duarum civita ium, Athenarum schicet et Lacedaemonis fluxisse videtur, in his enim civi atībus ita agi sol tum erat, ut Lacedaemonii quidem magis ca quae pro legibus observarent memoriae mandarent: Athenienses vero ea quae in legious scripta reprehe id-secut [comprehendissent?] cus.odirect."

ξ μἐν ἡθικὴ ἢ δὲ νομική] Williams brings out the force of this b. 23
distinction very well with—'the friendship of confidence and the
friendship of covenant.' Cf. E. E. B. 10. 1242 b. 31 ἔστι δὲ τῆς

- 2102 b. 23. χρησιμου φιλίας είδη δύο ή μεν υομική ή δ' ήδική. Ελέπει δ' ή με πολιτική είν το ίσον καί είν το πράγμα, ώσπερ οί πωλεύντες κι ώ ώνούμενοι. διό είμηται μισθος ώνδρί φιλφ. όταν μέν ούν κατ' εροληγικ (ή Spengel, Fritzeche, Susentalil) ή πολιτική αύτη φιλία καί κυματώταν δ' έπιτρέπωσεν αύτοις, ήθική βούλεται είναι φιλία καί έταιρική.
 - b. 24. From ph nard n. r.h.] 'complaints arise when a transaction is not ended in the spirit in which it was begun,' or in which it was begun,' or in which it was begun,' or in which it was begun, e.g. A lend B a sum of money. When B repays it he does so without in etc., thinking that A lent it as a friend; but A, it appears but a as a matter of business and expected the usual interest; see Antiquation of fran ph diahabition for mil our phapital it yap in so think phip to in northward northward northward northward of the output diahabition of the saying that 'understandings are misunders and ogs.'
 - b. 30. § 8. δεόντρ δείος κ.τλ.] In addition to the passage quoted by Finzsche form N.c. Damasc. (p. 314 Tauchn παρ' "telefic due no αποστερηθή δαντίου ή παρακαταθήσης, οδε έστε κρίστε, όλλ' σύτθε αποπαιό στοτιμοσό), see Theophrastus περί συμβολαίων apud S ob Fire tol in p. 168 ed. Meineke, λαρώνδας και Πλάτων (apparently Legg. 915 D and E)... παραχρήμα κελεύουσε διδύνας και λαμβάνειε, έσει δε σες πιστεύση, μή είναι δίτην, σύτον γὰρ αίτιου σίναι τῆς άδικίος. Charactus made laws for Catana and other cities.
 - b. 82. § 7. ή δτεδήποτε άλλο] δωρείται τι, ή άλλην τως ώφιλεων ώφιλεί (Paraph.).

κυμίζευθαι δέ κ.τ.λ.] i e. the motive of this ighai φιλία, no less than of request φιλία, is after all το χρήσιμαν.

b. 35. § 8. βούλεσθαι μέν... τὰ καλά, προπρείσθαι δέ νὰ ἀφίλιμα]
We have here the difference between the unit for semething remote and perhaps unattainable, and the definite choice of something immediately before us. The ideal of a noble life, though present intellectually to most civilized men is practically too weak to regulate their conduct in the midst of objects appearing intendately to their desire for pleasure or profit. Therefore "so choose profit"— προσφάσθαι τὰ ἀφίλιμα—is here tan' amount to actual unique side δρθών λόγου, έ.ε. κατά πάθου.

§ 9. Surapelog by detanoborlos the define we inaber [eal deferte] 1189 a L exorts you of someter] 'A man ought, then, if he can, to return the worth of what he has received, and to do so willingly (i.e. without waiting to be asked); for he ought not to make any one a friend against his will'-e.g. by retaining as a friendly g.ft what was intended (though not stated) to be a loan. There is a certain awkwardness in the proximity of subre and broven, referring, as they do, to different persons, and accordingly the words and devers committed by Kb, Ob, Cambr., Asp.) are bracketed by I'm zsche, Gran., and Bywaler, as an interpolation. They may easily be conceived,' Grant says, 'to have arisen out of the following words howers you. Rassow (Forsch p. 102), however, lets them stand as geniune, and conjectures objector for margineous, making asorra refer to the subject of disequire and issert. I cannot regard this conjecture (which is adopted by Susemild) as at all probable; nor do I fee, that the passage, as trans ated above, presents the difficulty which some of the commentators have found 171 12.ª

διαμαρτόντα . . . παθόντα] The accusatives are to be taken with a. 3. άντωποδοτιον οτ διαλοτίον. Fritzsche quotes E. N. vn. 1. 2, vn. 14. 4, ix. 2. 2, and (for both dat. and acc. with the same verbal adjective) E. N. vni. 14. 3 τῷ ἀφιλουμικος . . . deranodorios deranodolives τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον, and Plato, Κερ. 453 D οὐκουν ἡμία εκυστεον καὶ πειριστέον . . . ελπίζοντας.

aird roūro] 'i.e. δι' airo τὸ εἰ δρῶν μὰ τον ἀντιπώθη' (Ram- a. 4. sauer).

oμολογήσοι 8' &r] I prefer ὁμολόγησε δ' δν in correspondence a. 6. with ἡξιωσεν δν a. 7. The meaning is—If it had been put to the receiver when the benefit was conferred, he nomial have agreed to make repayment, if able; while, on the other hand, the giver record not have expected repayment from one obviously unable to make it—and, in must be supposed, would not have conferred the benefit. Old ἡξίωσεν δν does not mean 'would not have asked him for repayment when he delayed to make it,' as the Paraph, and most of the confidentiators seem to suppose, but 'would not

Bywater (Centred p. 61) thinks that downs yep place to solyteer is an adaptation of Ken. New. il. 6. 9 Groves yep place their bryides.

- 1163 a. 0. have begun by expecting repayment from one obviously unable ever to make it. In short, the fact of a benefit having been conferred raises the presumption that the giver expected, when be conferred it, to be even unly repaid. He believed that the eceiver would be able to repay it; otherwise he would not have conferred it. There is no reference here, it seems to me, to the case of a friend did ro xphother, or creditor, finding out in course of time that the debtor is insolvent, and making him a present of the sum owed.
 - brouding & un se. everywoodneune Rams., who everywoine Corns. Consent to receive the benefit on these terms, or decl ne it.

§ 10. Δμφισβήτησιν κ.τ.λ.] We must repay benefits εαθατερ έτι paroie everyorational when no para exist. How are we then to determine what the pari would have been had they existed? We must put ourselves back into the position we occupied before to benefit was conferred, and suppose ourselves to be making an express bargain for an advantage which we wish to get, but of course should be unwilling to pay too dear for. The price for which we could have got the advantage, supposing the question of price to have been raised, is what at least we ought to pay now a teturn. It is of course very difficult thus to construct free a set an interval of time. The giver will maintain that the circumstances were exceptional and enhanced the value of the bencat, and hat he would not have conferred it if he had known that so small a return would be offered for it. The receiver on the other hand will point out that the benefit has not come to much, and will main ain that he never thought that it would. The standard however which must be found, if an agreement between the panies is to be reached, is. What did the receiver think it worth before be got it? The giver cannot expect more than this: see is. s. 9 ή άμωβή γίνεται πρός τοσούτον έσων αν τάντωσαν οί λαμπίνοντες. 🐉 Τ lows of rosovier siner book knows formers often, whi done was been érina.

From Theeph, mai oundestains (and Stob. Flor, vol u. 160 sec. ed. Meineke) we learn that understandings likely to descap into misunderstandings of the kind indicated in the section before is (viii. 13. 10) were discouraged by many Greek order, which con-Lamed provisions for the payment on the spot of an apparent

portioned to the amount to be afterwards paid in full.

f 11. δναρκά] κ. δ εὐεργέτης. In the friendship of Profit equal 1183 a 18 advantages are exchanged: the question is—What is the amount of the advantage received? for an equal advantage must be given in exchange for it. But the Friendship of Virtue is not a πυνάλλαγμα, but a Life in which the friends stimulate each other to the manifestation of that which proceeds from virtue.

ris deerig... nópior] 'for in choice hies that which is essential a 22 to virtue and character.' It is monificate which converts the divaple rive évarior into the êfet (Met. 0, 2 and 5), and dorrh is defined as a êfet monification (E. N. ii. 6, 15). In E. N. x. 8, 3 we read impropression to nórepou explusivous cheris à nondiperio à ni noulperio. The answer had been given in iii. 2, 1 olandraror elem donei (h novalperio) và dorrà cal màllor và fish noiseau vir noiseau. Taking these passages in connexion, we can see that in the section before us (vii. 13, 11) to explor means that which, being essential to virtue, serves also as a spirâpior, by means of which we may determine whether virtue is present in a given case. Accordingly in the friendship of virtue, the standard by which we measure the worth of a triendly office is the choice or intention of the agent, for this is a true expression of his virtuous character, to manifest which in fellowsh p with a érepos abros is the one of ject of the friendship.

CHAPTER XIV.

ARGUMENT.

Frozie fa'l out in the unequal as well as in the equal friendships: for each of the imageal friends' thinks that he ought to get the larger share? The 'friend who is better or never weeful thinks that, as in a joint stock business the wager entributer gets the larger share of the profits, so in friendship the tester or more useful 'friend' should get a larger share of reministration, unless the 'friendship' is become a hunden or tax. On the other hand the nearly and interior 'friend thinks that the only use of a good and provered the friend ship' a kinger thank Kach remiss to be eight ought to get out of the friend ship' a kinger thare'—but not, of curse, of the same thing the superior friend englet to get his larger share in honour, and the needy friend his larger share in material advantage. The same vuice holds in public life as in friendship. It is me honour that those who spend money for the common good get their reward,

honour being what the community has to give for levels o received. A namicannot get at the same time both money and honour and of the community and as no one cases to be a loser all round, if money is open for the common and, honour is expected in return.

It is proportion, as we have said to be a introduces open by ento innegation freedothers and preserved them the freedother who does were for the more, and material advantage of the other most get homem—this is what she other has to give even honour is not readly equivalent to the greatest benefit such a term conferred by the gods and by parent—but is the freedothers, who is the while in grow and as such meets the room rement of friend hip. We have took that the benefit, conferred by facents have us een equivalent. The is way a fisher homey discount his in of course netwest affection and interest will red work have from doing so unites his own is very tout. But a son may never do van his father by the son is bad he may that the inverset is discount her father, for he can never clear of the debt which he owns to his father.

- 3103 a 34. §§ 1, 2.] These sections are best illustrated by the parallel p
 - \$1. λειτουργίαν] properly a public service defrayed by a piwale citizen—a τριηραρχία, χορηγία, οτ άρχιθνωρία.
 - b. 7. § 3. h tigh be konde Fritzsche quotes i. 5. 4 tigh toi redunent Bion nyedde ridos.

traced as follows—6 to soude everywher gets a reward from the 1163 b. c. courds. This must be run, not money, for, gud everywher to courds (e.g. as incidianos) and not laures, he spends money—and that such a everywher must get sun, since he does not get money, is plain, for no one is willing to sacrifice himself all round.

ΘΦελουμένψ . . . ἀνταποδοτέον, ἀποδιδόντα] For the change of case b. 13 see note on διαμαρτόντα γίιλ. 13. 9, 2. 3.


§ 4. deciracear] According to the Athenian law a father might 6.19 desolve the legal connexion between himself and his son by the process of inoripolic -of Plato, Legg. 928 E ilioni achieve, in Βούλωνται, του υίδο έπο κήρυκου εναστιού απάστων απειπείν υίδυ πατά του roper prair' circu. He had to prove to the satisfaction of the court h 8 800's deficiency in filial attention, riotous living, and profliguey generally. If the droshpofes were not avoided by the father's subsequent pardon of his son, the latter was disinhented at his father's death. Apparently his privileges as to the tribe and state however were not affected by anunipoles (cf. Plato, Legg. Le in per our alkan πολιτεία παις άποιεκηρυγμένος ουκ δυ έξ άναγκης άπολις εξη, ταύτης δέ, ής ander of solune Economic, drayanime byes els addays xingars examileration who endropal. See Smal's Dut. of Antiquities article, Apokeruxis, (summarised above), and Lucian's (1) arosporrourres, which opens as follows-A son disinherited by his father studies Physick, an t by a specified remedy cures his father who was become distracted, and was given over by all other physicians. Thereupon the father cancels the will, and again declares him his heir. But afterwards upon the son's refusal of curing his mother-in-law that was falen into the sam distemper, he is disinherited a second time, against which the son makes the following oration."

άμα δ' ίσως κτλ.] ίσως δ' οὐδείς πατήρ άφίσταται τοῦ νίοῦ εἰ μή ο 22 ὑπεριβαλλύντως εἶη μοχθηρός (έ.ε. the son)—Paraph. οὐδείς δέ ποτο ἀποστήσεται τοῦ νίοῦ εἰ μή μοχθηρόν Βοι εὐτόν δυτα—Αερ.

Sudelodas] of the father.

ъ. 25.

rệ 84] the son.



Introductory Note] The Ninth Book may be described as a not very systematic collection of dropous regarding Friendship, which are discussed and answered on the general principles laid down in the Fighth Book. Michelet (pp. 281 sqq) thinks that this collection did not originally belong to the Editor, and he identifies a with the brown policed B, in the list of Diog. Lacrt. (No. 72, Row. the sept pixture of the same list (No. 24) being the Fighth Book. But although the Ninth Book undoubtedly consists, in main path of amopia, there are cor.am chapters (4-6, 1166 a. 1-1167 b. 16) of an expository character which seem out of place in a coder con of anopus. Spengel (Arish Stud. t. pp. 215 sqq.) calls attended to the fact that the Eudemian equivalent of these chapters, and of chapter 7-E.E. H 6-8, 1240 a. 8-1241 b. 12 (= E. N. ix 4-5. 1166 a. 1-1168 a. 27) -is inserted at a point which correspon is in the E. E. to that between chapter 8 and chapter 9 of E. N. vm -Whether the writer of the E. F. found E. N ix 4-7 in E. N visi between chapter 8 and chapter 9, or merely altered the arrangement in his own version, is a question which, in Spengel's opinion, cannot be answered.

The writer of the M.M., without following exactly the order observed by the writer of the E.E., does not, in Spengel's view, deviate senously from it. Susemit! however (Nr. Eth. p. 203) is of opinion that the writer of the M.M. must have read ix 4-6 where we find them, and not in via, because the order of his discussion (M.M. 1210 b. 32-1212 b. 33) is partly that of the

E. E. and partly that of our E. N.

Why and how ix. 4-6 stand where we find them, whether the writer or editor of the Book intentionally placed them there, or they came there by some accident, are questions which, I think, cannot now be answered, and therefore need not be asked. As a whole however Book ix has a distinctive character of its own, and I see no reason for doubting that it was written to follow Book via. As Spengel (Arist Stud. i. pp. 215 sqq.) says, 'Das neutre Buch besteht aus Aponen. es sind Zweifel und Bedenken, die, nachdem die Erklärung von der phis im vorausgehenden Buche gegeben ist, entstehen kennen und ge öst werden mitssen, wie etwa bei der dagworfen.'

CHAPTER I.

ARGUMENT

The proportion which equalizes persons who are dissimilar and maintains frientish p between them is the same as that which regulates the each anges by which she shownaker, weaver and other members of the community receive due veturns for their products. In commerce, however, the dissimilar products as changed are all referred to a common measure—money whereas the dissimilar services rendered by with 'friends' as lover and beloved have no common weature, home resiminations, and descolution of 'friendship.' The biking of reach other as persons, but for the side of pleasure or profit wasch each has at his disposal; and if this comes to an end, or turns out to be different from what it was inffered to be as when the maintain found out that his prison had already faid him with the pleasure of expected payment—their friendship comes to an end.

It is suffix to decide what is the worth of a service remirred, where no bargain has been made hejorehand? The person who confers the service, or the person who receives at? The reserver surely, for the person who confers a service, mithout making a hargain, lowes the remimeration to the pleasure of the receiver. This is what Protagoras did, he let the pupil fix the amount of the fee but in such matters some people like better the principle of fixed fees. As for the tencher who begins by receiving the fee, and them fast to fulfil the extravariant promises by which he indused his frights to fay an advance—he maturally becomes the object of complaints this is what the softwar have to do, for under no other system would people pay them anything for their broadcing. But these who confer benefits for the sake of the persons benefited, this is what they do in the friendishy based on vertue, are, a see have said, were corrects of complaint, and ought to get a veturn equivalent to their good intention, for

intention is the mea are of true friendship and of virtue. The termine condered by a true teacher of philosophy must be estimated in the cost war as teal centered by a true friend. It cannot be measured by the surfaced of mency, homour count to weighed in the towns a against it - but prekape enough . A me of the discripe gives in return what he can, as to the gods and to parents

If here the service as rendered, not for the sake of the person to when it is rendered, but in view of some return which, however has not been agreed nown beforehand it is of course, bed that the return wait should be one we & both parties think adequate failing unanimity on this foint, of would seem to be not only necessary but fave that the secence chould be the amount of the return, he being the only judge of how much beneat he has derived from the acressed and this rule does not apply only in "friendlikef," for the processor of a thing that is lought is what the buyer will give for it and in some not. there is no legal resonery of debti-in the principle that if you begin by trusting a man you ought not to end by maing hom.

If hen a service, then, is contered restrictions arrangement as to the return, at is for the receiver to fix the amount of the return the gover connect to all and to do so, for people put too high a vaine on the things which they give that en fixing the amount the exceiver must go, not by what he thinks the seem a warte now that he has received it, but by what he thought it worth before he received 11. for people generally do not put the same value on a thing when they have t

as they did when they wished to get it.

- 1168 b. 32. § 1. dropolocistor These theterogeneous friendships, as Ramsauer points out, have not been previously referred to under the name. They are not the same as al and inepoxie, but exist where the object of the association is not the same on both sales one party seeking for instance pleasure, and the other energy in return for pleasure provided. Cf. vili. 4. 1 maximum de sal és rouves οί φιλίοι μενουσεν, όταν το αυτό γενηται παρ' άλληλων, αίον ήδονή, και μη mores ourse dida nat and row airou, olor rois streamfaces, and po es spriery sal spouring or yap sai rois abrois floorer alres, all & mer in Image & be departeudueves into roll spectral. It is obvious that persons whom it would be impossible to distinguish as bropigue out berpexoperor may be arapacondeis pilos.
 - Raddnep eipyras] It has been sauf before (eg vil 14 3) that proportion equalises the difference between the superior and inferior, and so preserves friendship between them; but it has not been said (expressly at least) that it preserves friendship between those whose difference is not quantitative, but qualitative (disputeesdrie). See Ramsauer ad loc. Grant's reference to visi. \$3. 2 is thus hardly relevant.

The Paragh, simply iden lifes at amparondice dubing with at and 1169 5 32. une, og nv (in per our rais kar labrara dudines rà lea deranadarion allyhore rove phove, is de rais insponeration philass, native elypten, to analogos), but the writer of the commentary on this Book a yled Lustratius by Aldus (but identified with Mich. Eph. by Rose, Commentere zur Ethik des Aristoteles, Hermes, vol. v) sees he difficulty, and takes great pains to show hore at deopomentics are not ύπερηχής. ἀνομεμεήσκει τών έν τώ πρό τούτου βιθλίω εξμημένων καλ δελειγμένων έδειξε γάρ ότι το άναλογου σήζει του άνομοειδείο φελίος. opposities de thediae elver, . . . al run dyadur, al d'addae mavae despuse deis (the reading of L. Mh, Ald., CCC, Caml r., B1, B1), spotes yap sal ίσοι όριθμος και δυναμες οί άγοθα ... ή δε του ποτρος πρός υίον φελότης, ή rod viol upoe naring, ody smale odd len ander e.r.h. It is seaseely processary to point out that this identification of al demonstrates pixias will al and imposing on the ground that al raw dyadow, being immidris, are to a sad burpostiv, ignores Aristotle's plain statement that in all the three kinds of pilie we have import and looings VI 13. 1 spireme d' adiran filiain . . . un une denarge san per de latirge. φλων όντων των δέ καθ ύπεροχήν (και γάρ όμαιως άγαθαι φίλοι γινονται eal apriror gelpore, spoise de eal fideix nat did to griffe por, louisortes rais achedeines uni denchépouree) u.r.d.

notiving] so account Mich. Eph., Par., Fritz., Stahr. Poters. b. 34
Ramsmer however supplies φιλίη, which is probably right, as it has
certainly to be supplied in the next δ with έρωνική: ef E. E. H. 10.
1242 b. 32 βλίπει δ' ή μεν πολιτική είς το ίσου καὶ είς το πράγμο, δοπερ
αλ υπλούντες καὶ εἰ δυσύμενου. Θιὰ εῖρητου

" murbie arbeit thing."

These words occur in a context extensively drawn from $E(N, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x})$.

- § 2. & δε τη έρωτική κ τ.λ] ε ε. here there are misunderstandings 1106 a. 2. because there is no common measure.
- § 3. ταῦτα δὲ μὴ δμφοῖν ὁπάρχη] Peters with 'they do not both a o get what they want,' masses the force of ὑπίρχη here, which (as may be seen from the use of ὑπίρχοντα below, a. ττ) masks the subsistence of a quality—τὸ ἡδὺν εἶναι οτ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι in A, not the satisfaction derived by B from that quality in A. The Paraph

VOL. II.

- 1104 a. a. is right with συμβαίνοι δε τά ναιαύτα, όταν ά μεν δε ήδανην έρωτ, ό δε δεά το χράσιμον, είτα μήτε ούτος πώνν ήδύς ή, μήτε δεεώνος χρήσιμος.
 - 2.10 άλλὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα] Mich. Γρίν. has συμβαινει . . τῆς φέκας διαλνυτε . . διὰ τὰ ὑπολιπεῖν τὰν μὰν ἔμαστῆν τὰ χρήματα, ἐνίστε δε και τν ἀκμίν, τὰν δ' ἐρωμενον τὰ καλλος οἱ γὰρ αὐτινές φησιν ἐφιλονν ὡς κι σπακδοίοι ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτοῖς ταῦτα δ' ἦσαν τὸ κύλλος οοἱ κι χρήματα οἱ μύνιμα ὅντα.
 - a. 19 A St Tur 100r] Mich. Eph., the Paraph., Stahr., Rams, and Grant take this as equivalent to if any aperily diding or tyrice friendship. Victori is however refers to viii. 4. 1, where, speaking of the instability of the friendship between spacetie and spaces Aristotle says nound of an diaminovous, far in the supplicion of in ortificans, hunidate bures. The worls of Victorias are total sequitur apud auctorem i bi rav ison nos unife acon pien ... acc pio ut pertineat ad candem amici iam declarandam qua juici sunt inter se amator deliciaeque ipsius : usa emm verit aliqui. ut ipsa quoque maneat, cum pura atque integra est: ne que conpropter explendam lib dinem, aut fructum inde au juem commedanque auferendum - sed propter moram ingernique surs I tud out nam quod addidit nune hoe a se antea dictum fuisse, inte st locum eum in quo primium superiore in libro de ipai pracej usus en m quoque illie est in alus usclem qui us l'ir verbs 🕬 sunt hace mobbol & at s.r.h. viii, 4. 2. Zell takes the same view as Victorius, referring the words of de row office end, to the good pikin of the immediate cortext and quoting vii. 4. 1. "Kamei (as (as Victorius and Zell un lerstand the present passage) is pecular unstable unless it happen that similarity of character (184 whether good or indifferen.) establishes a more lasting bond between 🔀 overs.

Against this interpretation are the works not ning of all white can scarcely be anything but an abbreviated expression be of (1.6. in the note and about dyadan) de about φίλοι ein; see E. N 12. 3 6—the passage, I ake it, referred to here (1x. 1. 3) in the not subunop express. Of course ή των ήθων φιλία has, in any case nothing to do with the ήθως φιλία of E. N. via. 23. 5, which has under the head of η διά το χρήσιμου.

a. 18. § 4. கவேஷ்கீழ்] See the notes of Zell, Michelet, and Grant of the story.

ndection ye xdow rating Educated interiors in the 1 as to offer in return: to yip interior distant rotins intered diducts A regione exemptions of the (Paraph.). The reading of the (Ob, and an authority known to Mich. Figh.) is accopted by Michelet with the sense — he will be ready to give of his own an amount equal to that which he receives. Corner reads of observe the conjecture of Murcius. The change of number (to encious) hard your for home in a writer like Aristotle: at any rate I cannot think that Fratzsche's explanation adopted by Grant is satisfactory. Pronomen encious singulari a intere ad priorem multitudius in increm (the deducers royalism) refertur proptered quod una res, singulari desi levata occasione, exprimitur. The passage via. 3. 3 referred to by Fritzsche in illustration seems to me rather to be a good example of a change of number careless y made without any reason.

66 8-9. την άξιαν κ.τ.λ.] When a service has been rendered a 22. without any previous dispolosion, or understanding between the parties respecting its value and the remuneration to be given in return for it, διοφοροί and eyeligeness naturally arise. With whom, in such a case, does it rest to put an end to them by fixing the value or remuneration? With the recipient: for the other party cannot force a service (or whatever else), at his own price, on an unwilling recipient, and if (without an express diopologia) he performs it, he evidently does so leaving the remuneration to be sent ed by the recipient. This is what Protagoras did; but what ordinary sophists do not venture to do. They even collect their fees in advance. It is to be carefully noted that, in these sections, Aristotle is speaking only of those cases in which no previous diopologia exists. The abeyyeo'la does diopologius of these sections may be compared with the issue of vin. 13. 7. When, in vin. 13, 11, Aristotle says generally that the standard of value in § &a to xphotipor didde is it too notheres dependent, he states the basis indeed on which the question of price must be discussed by empying and notice, but does not of course mean it to be unlerstood that the latter can (except in the absence of a δωμολογώ) fix the price of the apileo. The unw llingness, due to various causes, of the prospective elepying to perform the service has the effect of making the (prospective) nationate the advition more highly. The unwillingness of the one to perform the service below a certain price, has as much to do with the result of the diopologia, as

- or otherwise.—The diplication of the buyer is the ultimate standard of value, but the application of this standard to a particular case resulting in the naming of a price, is not left to the buyer alone. If it were possible for him to fix the price as low as he liked, t would be possible for the seller to go on always selling at a loss. It is therefore only of an hore disputably for empty of in form full, g under the head of home disputably that Aristo le's answer to the question asked here at the beginning of § g applies.
 - 6. 23 § δ. προϊεμένου . . . προλαβόντος] Zell thinks that προλαβοίντας 3 simply equivalent to λαβόντος: but Corace in right, I think into του προκτού λαβώντος, δυτιδιασταλτικώς προς του δυτιλημβώνουτα τοι δεν πομεξόμενας το Επηρετηθέν.
 - 24. Πρωτογόρου] Comes, M chelet, and S altr quote Flato, Proceed 328 Β επειδών γορ τις πορί δρού μαθη δών μέν βούληται, ἀποδίδωκο δ ον πρώττομοι ἀργύριου, όλον δε μή, ελθών είς Ιερίν, δησόσος, δσού δε φή δου είναι τὰ μαθήματα, τοσούτου κατεθητέν. But perhaps the pressure exercised by means of his method was more considerable dut Protagoras wished it to be thought.
 - a. 28. In tois receives δ' in in the place. The context in which the place is these words as out of place. The context in which the quotation occurs in the Eth. Fud (H. 10. 1242 b. 34) was when moderns) φιλια, i.e. ή των πωλούντων παι ώνουμενων, is discussed of considers more natural. But if we remember what the line (Hernod Ipy, σ. ήμ. 368) is in full, and what its context is, it all as pear, I think, that Ramsauer is wrong in bracketing the week before us.

μισθός δ' άνδρί ψέλφ είρημένος πρειος έστω, καί το κασιγνήτω γελόσας έπὶ μάρτυρα θεσθαν πίστεις δ' άρα δμώς καὶ όπιστίαι άλεσον δυδρας—

to even with a friend, pay even with a brother, let there be no 'mere understandings'; let every contract be entered in the process. This is the advice of Hesiod. After mentioning unit Protagorus allowed his pupils to fix the fee, Aristotle process to say that in the matter of fees to be paid for philosophical instruction (in rois raisorus), some teachers (inim) are of the opinion of Hesiod, that there should be a stated fee (to be paid after the instruction has been received), all hough the relation of teacher and pupil is one of friendship rather than of business.

s all eyalipure are avorted. Those Soph sts however who, 1164 a 26. sa refied with having a fair arrangement before and as to emuneration to be paid afterwards, go to the extreme of ring that fees proportioned to their extravagant pretenmons ad in advance, naturally become objects of complaint when pupils find out that they have been swindled. We have thus relations between teacher and pupus- (1) where the pupuls e fee: (2) where the fee is fixed beforehand in a fair neumer, ding to the standard of remuneration commonly recognised uch instruction: (3) where the pupils are swindled by an The expression of apadamater to day open is to be retood in close connexion with the rot appliableror of line Where there is no dispologie, the woodapier, not the woode-2. 23 (or directables b. 11), fixes the return; but if the apolyphic money received for services yet to be rendered, the transaction lisgraceful one in which the rule laid down at the beginning of oes not at ply. Of apphagateverre to develor (as distinguished these apolapplarance the everyeolar) cannot be allowed to hix ence.' Their services would be dear at the lowest price. I am right in supposing that Ar stotle has Hesiod's whole at in his mind here—viz. moder & ... Shrow dropus—the

t. ev sie δε μή γίνεται διομολογία τής όπουργίας] The subject a. 33. dero διεμολογίας όπουργία is now resumed after the digression the teachers who act on the maxim μισθέε δ' deδρί, and insist διομολογία.

i ir appositeness of the quotation in the Fudernian connexton

ot be admitted.

pèr 86° atrous mpoisperot] those whose friendly services are a. 24. red to and for the sake of the personality of their friends, ith a view to some advantage (ini run § 8, b. 6) to be received um: at improvement role of those 86° aircoe nal apoisperot ra dancin older of one of the personal apoisperot ra dancin older of one of the personal apoisperot of did flowly (Paraph.).

iyulayros] In Perfect Friendship a δωμολογία is unnecessary. a 35 pisunderstanding is possible, because the value of a service sts in its being the true expression of a virtuous character, as such at a immediately recognised by the agent's irroper

- 1184 b. 1 την δμοιβήν το ποιητέρε κατά την προαίρεστε (αύτη γάρ του φθον και της δρετης)] 'The return made must be for what the gree intended; for it is the intention which is the significant thing a striend and in virue.'
 - b 2 some 8 some und] so respects the passage. As we shall so later, the highest friendship is of the nature of philosophical nurcourse—a kind of Dialectic.
 - b. 8. § 8. μη τοιαύτης | έ, ε, μη δι' αὐτούκ.

tal rived for some return's i.e. not de sérvie, for the friends' sake. The expression on tou does not necessary imply that the transaction is in pyrois, or founded on a detaile dispologia, as Mich. Eth. seems to take for granted-all' a ren, roveicre di avridacio nai dirennoccar non dia Hogicario, enco you form if di sandoyung. An adequate seturn is expected by the giver, but no definite bargain has been made in the exwhich the section has in view-a case answering to the description of ifted piles given in viii. 13. 7 h & isted no or ρητοιε, αλλ' ώε φιλω δωρείται ή ότιδήποτο άλλο πυμίζεστοι δε και to war h nking, we of deducat akka appeare. There being no premius agreement, or διομολογία, the recipient, as an honest man, and try, if possible, to meet the expectations of the gace-palion in lows now, b. 7. but if this be not possible, he has the matter in his own power, and must make what payment he duras equivalent to the benefit received.

- b. θ. προέχοντα =πρυλαβόντος of § 5.
- b. 12 and γhρ dv τοῦς ἀνίοις οὖτω φαίνεται γινόμενον] 'for even word a thing is effected for sale, this rule holds good'—i.e. the laves fixes the price: a fortieri, then, in the cases just mentioned, when a more or less friendly gift or lean has been made in ran, but των διομολογίας, the receiver fixes the amount of the return. It is not necessary to think, with Ramsaler, of a thing being bought των διομολογία this would surely be an unusual lase—bu. many of the 'higgling of the market,' by which a διομολογία as to prove is arrived at. Where things are not offered for sale 'at fixed prices,' the buyer rather than the seller seems to 'fix the pube,' when he beats down the seller. Again, at an auction the highest bidder seems to fix the price. The Paraph, an! Mich Eph, tack seem to understand the reference to be to the 'higgling of the

tnarket': the Pamphrast has and do role ώνίσες σύσω φαίνεται γινόμενου 2184 b. 12. δ γάρ ώνούμενου τάττοι τήν τιμήν καθ μετικό τή δαυτού ώφελο'ς ή τή ηδουή. εαλ τοσούτου άξεον είναι λογει τό ξητεύμενου ώνεον: and Mich Eph. has δ γάρ πεπρέσκων πλέος δεί ζητεί τής άξίσε, δ δε ώνούμενος τοσούτου δεδωσω ώσου δο σέπται γενέσθαι την όπο τοῦ ώνεον ώφελεων.

§ 9. ένιαχοῦ τ' sioù νόμοι τῶν ἀκουσίων συμβολαίων δίκος μὴ εἶναι ὁ 13. «τ.λ.) Having instanced the 'higgling of the market' to show how much power rests with the 'receiver' even as prospective logics, Aristotle now adds that in some states the law declines to interfere with him as debtor—it may be even as frau lident debtor.

The expression isolona συμβόλαια (cf. Plato, Ref. 556 A) seems to be equivalent to the lastona συναλληματα of E. N. v. z. 13, viz. πράσει, δινή, διωτισμός, κ. v.λ., with this difference perhaps that it calls special attention to crefit given in these transactions. In Athenian law συμβάλαια (plur.) is a bond or corenant—more particularly with regard to money lent. Where credit was given, even only force, it would appear from this and the parallel passage viz. 13. 6 (where see note), that in some states there was no legal termedy against one who declined to futil the contract. See Newman's notes on Pol. 1263 b. 21 and 1267 b. 37, where he quotes Strabo 702—δίσην δί μ) είναι (among certain Indians) κλην φονών και θέρεως οὐκ ἐπ΄ αὐτῷ γὰρ τὸ μἡ παθείν τουτα, τὰ δ΄ ω τοίς συμβάλαιως επ' αὐτῷ Ιωστῷ, ώστο ἀνέχεσθαι δεὶ ἐῶν τιε παραθή τἡν πίστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσέχειν ὅτῷ πιστευτού, καὶ μὴ δικῶν πληρούν τὴν πόλος.

φ γάρ...b. 20 λομβάνοντες] Ramsauer regards these words as b. 15 out of place here, and in themselves confused, and brackets them:
νόμος, οτ νομοθετης (suggested by Mich Eph.), is scarcely satisfactory, he thinks, as subject of olera: and the comparison begun by δικαιδτέρον is not completed—i.e. the reason for the failure of the giver to make a just estimate of the value of the benefaction is indeed stated, but eviden by the writer intended to go on to point out that the receivers estimate is also prejudiced, though not to the same extent as the giver's, for he adds άλλ' δρών κ.τ.λ. In a like ion to these points noted by Ramsauer, I would call attention to the point that of ξχοντές in the suspected passage is used of of προύμενοι, whereas in § 8 προέχωντα is the receiver, and

1104 b. 15. Expers and Exer at the end of the present & also refer to an receiver.

If the passage suspected by Ramsauer be allowed to said as it is, dhh' 5,000 will mean, I suppose, 'notwithstanding be extravagant value attached by the giver to his gift it is the receiver's estimate that he has after all to accept as final'

ъ 20. bel 8' lows u.v.h.] The statement that the receiver, in commun. the value of a service, must keep in view the distinction better from and note from shows that the case here contemplated a set in which the service has already been rendered without present διομολογία, and it devolves upon the receiver alone to decimara as an honest man what return he will make. suggestion to read the sentence to solda you of tol low raises ol ixorres nal ol Boukóperos kapteir af et étipa b. 21 seems 10 m an excellent one, and enables us to give of Theorie its proje meaning, which, as I have pointed out, we cannot give twhen it now stands. I offer the following rearrangement when to only allows us consistently to refer igner, ignor, and of ignore to the receiver, but meets Ramsauer's difficulty about disserve and places all some where its force is felt :- 4 yap introof. τιώτου ούσται δικαιώτερου τυξαι τού έπιτροψαυτος τα γαρ ούσια 🕫 🖟 didonare francis duieras anyon uçus, qui que or ensuiron ben boon exoure paineral aften, all soon whin exem evina to work her où toi brou rembour al l'agrees nal al Bandinesse dadeir dad insi a άμοιβη γίνεται πρόε τοσούτον δσον άν ταττωσιν οι λαμβάνοντις. Τα difficulty of finding a subject for dirent points, I think, to a seem between ekonomyore and of you b. 15.

CHAPTER II.

Акаликит.

The following also are difficult questions.—Cught a man always to grave preference to his father, and over him on ad things? (r anget he, when it, to over his doctor rather than his father, and, in electing a screensi, well write consider who has me way experience? And again should one up a normal to a fewerd rather than to a good man? Should one recompense a lawfalle.

rather than bestow a gift on a consense, when one cannot do both? Well, it is not every to give exact onswers to such questions. Cases differ indefinitely, and what is right or necessary in one east is perhaps not so in another case. Link this is place—that one ought not to give the same person the preference in all things. Also, as a raise one ought to terat services remited as debts and repay them before one makes presents to one's associates—as a rule for there are exception:- A has been veniented from brigands by B: should A vanion or vepay E, evidently he ransom his own father? There can be only one answer He cought to ransom his father. Another case in which the general rule that persones emple to be expand take delt. is perhaps inapplicable, is where it does a serve to 5 whom he knows to be a good man, and B is thus put in the position of owing a return to A subom he suffores so be a bad man. Thus, if A lends money to St knowing that S is no honest man and will pay book the iven, S is not bound in turn to land money to A whom he looks upon as a dirhome I man and not likely to repay it. It's return does not stand on the same forming in A consensal service, if B is right in his opinion of A's character. and if his ofinion is mistuken, yet it is his opinion, and we need not be rurfortsed at his acting on it. Lowever, where circumstance, vary indefinitely if 21 surpressed to give definite annears , only this much is come that the same returns are not to be rendered to all persons, and that ad things are not to be rendered even to a father, any more than all things are officed to Zens. There are things which are properly and fittingly rendered to farents, brothers, companions, and benefactors respectively this es indeed commonly recognised: thus et is treer kinemen whom people invite to weddings and junerals, on the ground that these are emportant family events.

To prevent as to the authors of their being, chiedren ought to render support, and also honour, as to gods. but not every kind of honour, for withe first place the honour size to a justice differs from that due to a mother; and again the honour size to a justice differs from that due to a philosophic seather or to a general Indied, to all these who are easier honour is saw an ordering to age

in respect of scats and other such matters.

To coverally and brothers our bearing ought to be frank and open. To kinsmen, fenow byshesmen, festow-cetezens, and all others we must try to give what is severally due to them according as they stand on different degrees of relationwho to overseives, and differ on virtue or in metaliness. Where people are of the come hand it is must very difficult to assign to each his due, but where they differ it is a harder task; still, we must not shrink from it, but do our best to assign rightly.

Introductory Note] In this chapter, Michelet remarks, we have the beginnings of Casuistry. 'Casuistry' has got a bad reputation because it has manufactured, in in tation of bend fide cases of moral perplexity, cases which no honest man would find perplexing—and this, with the concealed object of resolving them in a sense favourable to some dishonest inclination. The perplexing cases given in this chapter are all, however, bond fide ones, though

the form in which some of them are presented remands one of the Debating Society. They are cases with waich an honest man might find himself confronted cases in which he has to choose between two courses of conduct, each of which alternately 'common sense' presents as a 'duty' if it seems right to choose the

one, it then seems wrong not to choose the other.

Common sense takes out of their real contest certain points of view presented by imagination, and recommended to the attent on by feeling, and makes them into absolute and selfsubsistent 'enuties,' incapable, naturally, of reconciliat on as parts of a rationally consistent system. To attempt to solve for himself the problems of casuistry from the level of 'common sense' can accordingly only weaken the moral nature of the man who attempts it. He has to believe in 'two duties' in the same crcumstances, to one of which he must needs be unfai hful. Hausteby the thought of unfaithfulness to a 'duty,' every time he is forced to make a choice in circumstances of moral perplority he does volunce to an honestly entertraced moral sent ment and brings himself gradually nearer a point at which it is no longer doubtful that his decisions have become dishonest.

'The problems of Casuistry' are only for the man who has tiven above 'common sense' to the height of reason; who can see life clearly as a single organic whole. Of course the peace of difficulties of distinguishing between the right and the wierz, and of choosing the right, remain for such a man, but the fallict of the 'two duties in the same circumstances' -of the moral region on in imperio-no longer imposes upon him. He now pen e we that there can be only the one duty, however hard to find, in the case set of circumstances. His attitude towards the perplexities of L: is a resolute and objective one. He is not paralysed by the thought that when he does what is right, he is allo doing what a wrong. His philosophy has not made life less perplexing in detail but it has given him the great idea of the organic units of ite world an idea which inspires him with formude and resignator It is the clearness with which Aristotle preserts life as a rot sal whole that makes the discussion of the problems of Casu say 's satisfactory in his system. Corravio and nador break Daty in a multitude of cases of conscience - Lafe into a chaos of separate and repugnant i cms, making it 'a series of episodes, like a tol play. The perplexities of 'Casustry' represent the work of rparronia and malue. The resolution of these perplexities is the work of Reason. On the relation of Philosophy to Casustry, see Green's Prolegomena, §§ 314-328.

42. τψ καλψ καλ drayκαίψ] τψ καλψ marks the claims of the 1164 b 20 Form or Ideal which the good man strives to realize; τψ drayκαίψ, the limitations imposed upon limit by the matter of his circumstances. For the different cases differ in all sorts of ways, according to the importance or unimportance, the nobility or necessity of the act (Peters).

§ 4. απαιτούντι δέ] τά λυτρα (Corses).

1108 B. L.

§ 5. προϋπαρχήν] ' the primary obligation ' (Grant).

a. 5.

8 μέν . . τῷ 8έ] Both refer to the same person, viewed first as a σ προτέμενος, and then as dστιλημβόνων.

οὐκ ἴσον τὸ ἀξίωμα] ' .he claim is not equal' (Grant): η. Mich. a. 10. Fph.—οὐθε γὰρ ἴτον τὸ ἀξίωμα, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν ποιηρόν ἀσκεζειν ἐπικετὰ ἄξεον, τὸν δ' ἐπικεῆ τὰ ἴσα καὶ τὰ πὰτα πρὸς τὸν μοχθηρόν ποιεῖν οὐδεὶς ἄν περώσου. Victorius has—Non est par postulatum.

cloren) Cornes reads oferm, which the Paraph, seems to sapport z. 11 with after roleur dhylly περί του μοχθηρού καμίζαι ὁ dyaldis, ως καὶ τούτο μοχθηρώς έσται καὶ οἰα ἀποδώσει, εἰασα ποιεῖ μὴ δανείζων είτε μὰ σύτως έχει, εἰεται δέ, καὶ διὰ τούτο οἰκ dμειβεται τοῖε ἐνακ, καὶ οῦτως οὐ πόρρω τοιεὶ τοὶ δικαίου. Cornes also reads δόξεων with Γ, Mh, Oh, Ald, at stead of δαξεων given by Kh, Lh, Cambri, the subject of σίτσι and δοξεων being the υπουδαίου. There can be no doubt, however, that if we read σύσσει and δόξοων, their real subject is still the σπουδαίου, not both parties. Ramsauer sees this, for on the words οἰκ δυ δοξοων στοπο ποιείν he has—' se, οἱ ἐνίστε τὴν προυπορχήν οἰκ ἀμειδόμενοι.' The change from the angular ελπίζω to the plural σίωνται need not surprise us în Aristotle.

§ 6. woldeng] i. 3. 1, ii. a. 3.

6, 12,

τῷ Διί] Grant refers to v. γ. 1.

a. 15.

§ 7. κηδη] 'funerals.' Mich. Fph. is certainly wrong with κήδη a. 20 δ' club τὰ πρό του γάμου συπλλάγματα. Why, as Michelet asks, if this is the meaning, are τὰ κήδη mentioned separately from and after

- 1185 a. 20, the yapur? According to the Ind. Arms, the word occurs only lere in Ar stotle.
 - e. 22. § 8. τροφής ... γονείσε ... ἐπαριείν] The gent we is partive—' to supply one's parents with their due share of sustenance Zell and Coraes, following the Paraph., conjecture τροφήν. The regular construction of ἐπαριείν is dat of the person and acc of the thing. The dat, of the thing however occurs. Perhaps we should read τροφή.
 - a. 24. τιμήν] sc. άπουτμητέον.
 - 40.] Fritziche, Grant, an i Ramsauer quote Plato, Rep. 425 A σιγάς το των νεωτορων παρα πρεσεθυτοροίε, διο πρόπες, απι κατακλίτεις αι Ιπαναστάσεις.
 - a. 33. συγκρίνειν τὰ ἐκάστοις ὁπάρχοντα] 'to assign to each what is properly due on the ground of relationship, goodness, or usefulness
 - A 35, χρήσιν] W.lliams very plausibly translates this by 'intimacy'
 of. Latin usus; but the commentators are probably right with
 'usefulness' χρήσιι is not quoted in the Ind Arit, in the sets

 of 'intimacy.'
 - a 34. § 10. § objective] So Bywater after Ruelle (Ret de Pad 1).
 p. 175), for the spices of the MSS. 'The question,' says Bywar (Contributions p. 62), 'here is not of "julgment" or 'distribution' or any thing of that sort, but rather of combining the persons and their respective dues'—and he quotes de Gen. et Corr. 329 b. for the usage, and compares objection here with objective in E. 3.
 v. 3. 12.

CHAPTER III.

ARGUMENT.

Another difficult question is about the dissolution of friending in) bushe do not remain the same

It here from his re for projet or pleasure of course of require masura the reformal de broken off whom has projet or premiere course no fault can be trent with the from who then ordake it of, unless be harbeen presenting to use in

other for his feremal character, while all the time he was ready in love with his use nine is in that case the other would have a right to complain of exercepted friendship a wined worse thing than counterfact coin. But of man make another has friend on account of that other's youther and that other become had, can be continue to have him as a friend! Sure'y not. He cannot have that which is east, or be like it; for, as the home seen, like town like. It at then to write off the friendens at once? Not unless the other has exemic en unally buil. If the other's character on still be reformed, he could not no anything more worthy of frankdup than trying to reform it. Again, if one of the two friends remain the same, and the other become a new h bester own, is the latter sted to been up has prended prout the former? He can havely do so at any rate not if his friend be a friend of boykood who has remained a boy on understanding, where he has himself became a man of distinguished excellence; for abot waid the laster of two such persons have incommon? How would two .u. a percent see much of each other? Is the distinguished man then to make no difference between his old friend and a dranger! Our answer is who englis to remember the old intimacy. Something is due to by your friendship where the expansion has not been eccasioned by the old friend turning out a very bad Austri.

1. Sid ro foos) di diserio nal ro filos (Mich. Liph.).

1165 6, 5,

de dexed No remark exactly corresponding to this has been b. e. made. Zell, Cornes, Fritzsche, and Michelet however refer to ix.

1. 4 and Michelet regards the expression is dexed as showing that this collection of θέσεις φιλικοί constituting the Ninth Book was published separately. Ramsauer finds the dexed in vii 13. 3 giverns our to dyahhara addioff bray an area the arther ourablushed and discussion of διαφοραί begins.

§ 2. κιβδηλεύουσιν | The commentators quote Theognis-

ъ, 12

χρυσού κιβόήλοιο καὶ ἀργύρου ἄναχετος ἄτη
Κύρνε, καὶ ἐξευρεῖν βάδιον ἀνδρὶ συφφ΄


εὶ δὶ φίλου νόος ἀνδρὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι λέληθε
ψυδρος ἀῶν, δόλιον δ΄ ἐν φρεσὶν ἤτορ ἔχει,
τοῦτο θιὸς κιβὸηλότατον ποίησε βροτοίσε,
καὶ γνῶνοι πάντων τοῦτ ἀνιηρότατον.

§ 3. ἀποδέχηται] 'receive into his friendship.'

b. 18.

obre δε φιλητάν (τό) πονηρόν] This is Bywater's reading, b. 16. after Stahr, for Bekker's οδτε δε φιλητεον πονηρόν. Ramsauer and Susembl, however, rightly (I think) bracket the words (omitted by C), reading οδδε (Ramsauer's conjecture) before δεί b. 15. Kb omits οδτε δείν φιλοπονηρόν. We may suppose that the scribe of Kh,

- 1165 b. 15. with a text before bith the Bekker's, accidentally omit ed ober to φιλοπόνημον, because of the similarity of these words to ober he φιλητέον πονημον which he had already transcribed. They are unsimilar; and a reason for their similarity may be given as followed the original text being δρ' δει φιλητέον; h ού δενικόν, είνει μη το φιλητόν διλλά τάγαθόν, ουδό δει; φιλοπονημον γωμ ε.τ.λ., in each blunder repeated the words old δεί φιλοπόνημον. The blunder was then rationalised by the alteration of the first member of the divergraph into obte δδ φιλ[ητε]ο[ν] πονημόν and of oide in the second into obte. The scribe of Kh, with this rationalised dit ograph between of το φιλητέον πονημον and of το διε φιλοπονημον αστί το to omit the later. Fritzsche om to ofte δι φιλητείον πονημον αδεί διε κυρροφίας that these words represent two glosses on φιλοπονίτη γάρ οῦ χρη είναι, vix, οἱ φιλητείον πονημον and οῦ δεὶ φιλείν πονημον
 - b 16 φιλοπόνηρον] Zell and Cotaes quote Theophrastus, Char. 14 :: περί φιλοπονηρίας. καὶ τὰ δλον φιλοπονηρία άδελφη έστι τὰ τῆς παροιμίας τὰ ῦμοιον πρὸς το ὅμοιον παρινεσθαι.
 - b. 31. τῷ τοιούτῳ j τοιούτῳ is the reading adopted by C τ.ν., Fritzsche and Susembl, and found in Pat. 1417, cont. k Cambr, and γρ. Ob Toiro ἢ τοιοίτᾳ is the reading of Kb. 15 B², B², Γ, Ald. Bekker's and Bywater's τῷ τεωίτᾳ is the realize of Lb, Ob, CCC, and B¹. See Bywater's Contribute ns, p. 63.
 - b 20. § 4. σόδὸ γὰρ περὶ ἀλλήλους ταῦθ' ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς] τι κ ἀριακοθαι τοῖε αὐτοῖε, &c. 'for τ ot even in regard to each othercharacter will their tastes agree' (Peters).
 - ь 31. «Гряты] Cf. viil. 5. 3. and viii. 7. 4.
 - § 5. ap' our odder addoctroor m.r.h.] 'ought he then to j'ac' hunself in no other relation towards him than towards one who had never been his friend?'



CHAPTER IV.

ARGUMENT.

The characteristic marks of our friendship for others seem to be copies of these which belong to the feelings with which the regard ourselves. The reserve segminary recognised as characteristic of our friendship for others are that we we hand try to effect the good of our friends, or what we think to be their pord—that we word them to exist for these own wher this is suboit mothers work for their inchiers, and friends were have had a difference with for each other) -that we speed our time with them and choose the same things as they do, sympashe ing with their joys and sorrows 'a again mothers especially do as regards their children. Now there are the marks which characterise the feel. ings of the good man towards him ilf, and the feelings of other men towards thems'tes, in is far as they suppose themselves to be good for the good man, or his vietue, as we have seen, is always the standard. The good man is in conconducité homself, und code after the came thongs with all furto of his soul Pe trockes and tries to effect his own good for his own sake—that is, for the rake of the raciona, part of his nature he also unshes to exist, and continue in exextence, for to him excitence is a good thing that is his own existence watern the family of human nature, for he does not week to leave his out self behind, and to cous mother being -not even God with all the good which God as God persesses. Such a man pushes to spend his life ies h hunself for what could he were pleasant I has life is full of hisppy memories and good hoper. his wind to rack'y stored with things worth thinking about. Morrover, he sympathises so the fail with his own pains and pleasures. The same things always give him pera, and he same things already give him pleasure without exception for he meter, toe may say, feelt regret.

Such, them, being the good man's relation to h mielf, his relation to his ferend has other self cost to isruitar. Whether his relation to himself is friend this each is a quartan which need not be discussed at present thus much however may be seed, that it seems to be friend-hip in to far at this two or more of the however transfer marks of friend-hip just mentioned. Also, the expression, the way to be friend at homself - necessary that his friendship for h m is very great

-seems to imply that a man can be his own ! friend?

The characteristic marks of freendrusp which have her mentioned seem to telong coun to the fectories with which have who are but regard themselves only, however, in so far as such men are pleased with themselves and think themselves good. The feelings with which those who are so utterly bad as not to be able to think themselves good regard themselves have certainly more of the characteristics of friendship; and, perhaps we ought to say, even the feelings of those who are had without being uterly bad are destricted of these characteristics? In it, men are at invidue with themselves; there desires and touches

could take these of the incontinent i instead of that would they recognise a good, they choose that which is pleasant and overly harm or through our distance and sinh they hold also from doing what they tamb right, and concerns his thanght of the roll deal they have some and the acceptance in take he they are heat for their role, wishe them flee who and decay there since. And the roll seed seed attended, thereing from themselves. When they are by themains they remember and look forward to much that is assessmented which it is at the he had they do not think about when they are took others. There is with it without in the he had so they have no freendly feelings tunarde themselves. They was not refer in a franchy way com into their sum joys and soveres. There we are healthy one factions: they are soon very that they have for every they have for every they are for it is gial therent. This is the state of the we had everyly a wound laste of before us therefore to fice we helpers, and toy worth all our might be good, and to become freedock to ourselves and others.

[See Introductory Note to Book ix for the relation of Chapters 4-6 to the rest of the Book.]

merated in § 1 all of which are to be found in the good must relations to himself, § 2. These are—

τὰ βούλεσθαι καὶ πρώττειν τὰγαθα ή τὰ φυικώμενα ἐκτίνου ἔνντα.

3. To Boundardar elem and fine the place wires adper-

3. To our distribute.

4. τὸ τὰ αὐτὰ οἰρείσθαι,

5. το συναλγείν καὶ συγχαίρεω τῷ φίλφ.

The good man (§§ 3-5) (1) wishes good to himself for his our sake—i.e for the sake of his Reason which is himself. (2) he wishes his own continued existence; (3) he dwells with himself of the pleasant memories of the past, and the good hopes of the future; (4) he is of one mind, always seeking the same things with all parts of his soul; and (5) the same things are always distincted to him, and the same things pleasant; he does not now fail to sympathise with feelings which he entertained then, he has to cause for repenting. Bad men on the other hand (§§ 8 to) the from themselves, even to the length of suicide. Their sours are full of disorder and regrets. As Eudenius says (E. E. 11, 6, 1240 b. 16, a chapter to be read in connexion with the chapter before the year porthyle of a six didd moddel, and the night had are frequently (unstable).

These feelings, then, with which the good man regards himself

are said (\$ 1) to be the source of the feelings with which a friend is 1100 a L regarded; or-the chief characteristics by which friendship is defined, find their explanation in the good man's atdande to himself; as hademus says (E. E. H. 6, 1240 b. 2) - anarra raira (t. c. và pilias) înavapepera spòs riv îva, and (1240 b. 17) și abrov spòs niede φαλία deayers προς τήν του dyaθού. The good man realises perfectly in himself that oneness of soul and life which characterises the relationship of those who are erepor obror to each other. But this derivation of the feelings of friends from the feelings of the good man towards himself must not be taken too literally. The logical order may be that stated by Aristotle in ix 4.1; but the chronological order is different. The good man hanse f is the result in time of that development of society from Family to City which phile or social feeling has ren lered possible; or, to put the same truth otherwise that Reason which gives the good man lis unity of life, and in virtue of which he is his own constant 'friend,' is real sed not in an isolated indvidual but in a citizen; it is the form under which, at last, after ages of incessant struggle with disintegrating forces, the good of men, as members of a society held together by utility and natural affection, has presented itself to the most gifted minds; or again -the 'self' which the good man loves so constantly is not the isolated self of sense which seeks its own good at the cost of others, but the rational self which consists in the happy consciousness of being joined together with others in a beautiful social order.

The 'good man' therefore cannot be abstracted from the society in which he has his being, in order that the feelings with which he regards 'himself' may be represented as the source of those with which he regards his friends, for we can define 'timself' only as 'a being whose very essence is regard for others—denot on to Justice an I Friendship.' Fudentes indeed (E.E. H. 6 sub tent), before beginning the remarks parallel to those in this chapter, points out that palia upds wirds can be spoken of only in the sense in which ddma upds wirds is spoken of (see E.N. v. 11.9). Friendship, like justice, is properly between man and man. Those whom it unites most perfectly are indeed similar in character and interests; but it is only by a figure of speech that those who are similar can be represented as one person.

We must suppose therefore that Anstotle is describing the logical as distinguished from the chronological order, when be

1188 a. 1. Writer (ix 4. 1) en milital le en reche esta reliar col als at hillian freform. Tours de tor mode douter shiphedieus. Just as the Sate is said in the Politics to be logically or metaphysically prior to the indicates though chronologically subsequent, so here Reason is representate prior to the State itself the harmony of the rational soul within use f is represented as the source of those friendly relations which hand men together in the Sate. This is the logical or metaphywil. not the chronological order; and Coraes is, I think, much misture when, on the strength of this passage, he asenbes to Aristote the view which derives the altruistic feelings in time from egoista felings -ύλον δε τουτο το αεφαλαιον των άριστα πεφιλοσοφημένου έπ περιέχει γὰρ ἐν συντόμος τὰ τοις νεωτεροις των φιλοσοφων δια μακρώ το apayunteupéra nepi tijs deyopième nods n és spointe athunisteire. ès est mept faveur yap dedicing diallionar & didaurius, de and unine, of proces Loyer the train the allows pilian. Here, as I have said Cora- s much mistaken. Aristotle is not concerned in this charter, with the Natural History of \$100. This is one of the most meanly said contexts in the whole of his writings. He it sists ex lower on the metaplysical prior ty of rd more develor to rd delical rd rps role milas, because he wishes us to regard the Friends.p. Good Men towards each other as the mire on schoe of Reson. To know oneself, to be able to contemplate will the eve of Reason the System of Human Nature, and, in contemplating a to maintain it as rolds in the midst of the ily of our process and necessaties, is Happiness or the Cluef Good. But her shall a man 'know himself'? Only by seeing himself in his friends-i e by having friends towards whom he can are and so realise himself; for he is what he is to as friends. As Fallmus puts it (E. E H. 12. 124% b. 18) hair pie ed et end erepor, emerg !-(f e Bea) autos airau to en earin. It is in strict conformity therefore with the metaphysical basis of his ethical philosophy and in he interest of the development of his ethical philosophy on that their that Aristotle here derives to thiking the spot took dikare from the spot dantés.

§ 1. το προς τους πέλος] Bywater's reading for τὰ προς τους φλους. These words are omitted by Spengel (Arrel, Stad. 1, 217), after Muretus and Scalger, as superfluous. It seems to me that the antidices to in τῶν προς δαυτών τεquires us to retain them. I do not agree with Ramsauer, whose note on in τῶν προς δαυτών is—' ne addas

cog tatione φιλικών. Rei prima sedes το πρότ δαυτόν dicuntur esse: 1166 a. 1 nomina a duorum societate petita sunt. Surely we ought to supply φιλικών here—cf. 1x. 4. 10 ούνω γάρ καὶ πρότ δαυτον φιλικώς δυ δχοι καὶ δτέρφ φίλος γένοιτα.

wal ols] Spengel (Arist. Studien i. 217) suggests ole eal.

oi mpourempoundres] 'friends who have had a difference' (Peters), a. o. but still are well disposed to each other at a distance. Mich. Eph. ίτες άλλα και των φίλων, φησί, οι προσκεκρουκότες, επίπερ μηθε συζώντες, μηδε συνδιημερεύοντες, μηδέ άλλήλοις συνόντες διά την γεγονοίαν διαφοράν καὶ πρόσκρουσεν, καὶ οὐτοι τοιούτως έχοντες Βι ύλονται ελλήλους καὶ ζην καὶ endor duryew. Ramsauer regards the words ent row pilous of uponresponsives as spurious, on the ground that of speckesponsives, who have omitted that which is most characteristic of friendship, viz. m oven, can hardly be addiced in support of a definition of friendsh p- vercor ne absurdum sit, ad probandam aliquam amici definitionem eas landare qui tà padiora didicio (tà actio) sanc parum amanter omiserint et «ovos, potius quam amici, appellandi sint.' To this it may be replied that Aristotle is here immediately concerned with only one aspect of frendship, viz. vo pookeaden shore sal for the pilor giroù yapir, and of mousekpoukures are specially fitted to illustrate this one aspect, which they, as it were, isolate from the other aspects for separate examination. It is not implied that of spoonerpounders are perfect friends, any more than that the relation of a mother to her young child (to which Ramsauer does not object as an illustration) is, in the absence of derupingous, perfect friendship.

και την φιλίαν] από τούτων δε και ό της φιλίας δρισμός, από του α. Β άρισμοί των έχύντων και ό άρισμές του σώφρανος τον της σωφρασύνης όρισμου παρεχει (Paraph.). Cf. E. N vi g. 1 περί δε φρονήσεως ούτως δυ λάβοιμες, δεωρήσωντες τένας λέγορευ τούς φρουίμους.

§ 2. η τοιούτοι δπολαμβάνουσεν είναι] The effect of this false a. 11. υπόληψει is explained below in § 7; they think that they are good, and so are pleased with themselves—φαίνετοι δί τὰ εἰρημένα (ε. ε. τὰ φελικά) καὶ τοις πολλοιε ἐπάρχειν, εαίπερ εὐσε φαιλοιε. ἄρ' εὐν ἡ τ' ἀρέσκουσεν ἐαυτοῖε καὶ ὑπολαμβανουσεν ἐπεικεῖε εἶναι, τσύτη μετεχουσεν σύνῶν; it is only by deceiving himself into the belief that his life has the unity of the good man's, that a bad man can feel on 'friendly terms' with himself. I think that Bywwei's δί, line 12, for γάρ is an improvement's see Contrib. p. 63.

1100 a. 12. наванер еїрути] e.g. iii, 4. §§ 4, 5.

Indorew] Bywater's reading after Kb for Bekker's isnory. The is easier than Spengel's conjecture dearrow neut., for which to quotes Arist. Stud. 1, 217) in. 4. 5 & unoudains of although is instant opin, done another an inferior although the student of the stude

* 14. § 3. κατά πάσαν την ψυχήν] των αὐτών όρεγενωι εστά τε λέγων ψυχην καὶ αυτά τὴν ἄλογων' καὶ οὐ κυθάπερ ὁ ἀεροτής το εσινά ξετι, ευτε παθητικὰν αὐτῷ τῷ λογιστικῷ πολεμεί (Paraph.). Cf. R. V.. 13 § 6. 17 καὶ ἐν τῷ ψυχὴ ναμιστέον εἶναί τι παρά τὸν λόγων, ἐνουνεν ὑμενν τεν καὶ ἀντιβαίνων ..., λόγου δὲ καὶ τούτω φαίντσε μετέχει» ... πιθερεί γοῦν τῷ λόγῳ τὰ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς—ἔτι ὁ ἄνως εἰηκοώτερών εστι τὸ τω σώφρονου καὶ ἀνδρείου' κτώντα γὰρ ὁμοφωνά τῷ λόγῳ.

Τό των αυτών δρεγεσθαι κατά πάσον την ψιχήν is αποιδεία προκρατικο f. E. N. vi. 2. 2 ώστ' έπειδη ή ήθικη ώρετη έξει προκρατικη η δι προκρατικ όρεξις βουλευτική, δεί διά ταυτα τόν το λαγων άληθη εὐτα το την δρεξιν όρθην, εξπερ ή προκίρεστε σπουδοία, και τά αὐτά τον μεν μεν την δι διώκειν, αὐτη μέν οὐν ή διάνοια καὶ ή άλήθεια πρακτική.

ψυχήν και βούλεται δή Rams, and Sesembl put a full see after ψυχήν instead of Bekker's comma, and write δέ for δή. The seems right Having implied that the good man's προώρουν ε απουδαία, Aristotle proceeds (καὶ - δέ) to describe his βούλησε. His δρεξει being κατά τὸν ἀρθόν λογον, the λόγος will be δρέξε η reliant to a rationally apprehended end which he wishes for (Δείλεται). This rationally apprehended end which the good man wishes for is to the pe fection of his own nature as an organic whede—or as a rational system (τὸ διακογτικόν), ε.ε. 28 a system of harmon so telanors not liable to be disturbed by passion. The good man, as the Parisph, expresses it, τὴν διακρίαν ἔχοι τοῦ τόλους τῶν ἐσιντοῦ προξειν, whereas the bad man has only φούλη ἡδονή.

2.15. τάγαθά καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα] Explained by via 2. 2 φλεί δ' έκεντα οὐ τὰ δν πὰνῷ ἀγαθὰν ἀλλα το φαινόμενον - δισίσει δ' σεδινό έντει γας το φιλητάν φαινόμενου. In the case of the good man, however tar difference between τὸ ογαθών and τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθών is na τὰς à formal one; for ἐν ἐκαστοιε τὰληθὲς πὰνῷ φαίνεται (Ε. Ν. 11 4 4)

(τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τὰγαθὸν διαπονεῖν.) added to explain κοὶ πράττα. The good man does not stop at βούλησιο, but goes on to πραξιε.

τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριε κ.τ.λ.] We must not suppose Aristotle 1160 a 10 to mean that the good man devotes himself entirely to his 'intellect' strictly so called; that he gives himself up to the cult vation of his 'scientific faculties.' If he did, his life would be as ones ded in its own way as that of the politician who sacrifices the good of his nature as a whole to his amilition, or as that of the tradesman who sacrifices it to his desure for gain. To rook or rob bias manifely is the whole nature of man qual conscious for itself of the harmonious action of all its parts. These 'parts' are feelings, self-regarding and altruistic, as well as faculties and acts of knowledge. Reason realises itself in the discovery of truth, and in the regulation of the feelings.

The 'personality,' or self-identity, of a 17. man is not given in any separate impression of sense or feeling, or separate outgoing of desire; it exists only so far as impressions are related to one another, and desires are regulated. Reason (rd 2000—rd discontinuous), as the source of all relations and rules, in the sphere of conduct as well as in that of science, is therefore the true man. To Bodhtoda... all apartice... roll discontinuous xapie is a life sord history, in which both knowledge and conduct have due place, as det ngu shed from a life sord walls, whether the malor be an erroneous or prejudiced notion in the sphere of science, or the undue influence of a pleasure or pain in that of conduct. The order of Human Nature as a whole is, in short, here opposed to the disorder. To discontinuous is co-extensive with Human Nature as an orderly system.

§ 4. syabàr yap vệ amubaiệ và cleai] C/. Spinoza, E/h. i.i. 6 a 19 and 7 'Unaquacque res, quantum in se est, in suo esse perseverare constur. Constus, quo unaquacque res in suo esse perseverare constur, nihil est practer ipsius rel actualem essentiam.'

inacros 8 tauro pouleran rayaba, peroperos 6 allos alpeiran obbite nort tren [trein to peroperon] (tren yap nal run a dede rayaba) dll or 8 th nort tother bifere 8 ar to room inacros elean publicera 23), and Ramsaner brankets these words (inacros a. 23). In ordinary a. 23. The passage may be a 'duplicate' of the preceding section: it is certainly obscure, and interrupts somewhat the otherwise straightforward account of the trains distinguishing the good

1100 n. 10. man's 'relations to himself.' I transcribe Stahr's transactive tarby representing the interpretation given by those commentation (the majority) who do not make the words the your sate with the right for particular to the first transaction of the particular transaction to the first transaction of the particular transaction

Grant and Bywater (see Bywater's text as quoted at the made this note) differ from other commentators in making the noise exceeping and one of being relyador parenthenest, and referring all in its nor dorw, not to 6 being but to exceed. See Grant's note. Sugnal prints the passage thus "exceed d'have poulet aparent four decon el prediction dipertu more lyen decon el prediction. Les per en ente bois rilyador, all' de 6 et not forte. defene d'an en mois frances tons el prediction de contrata de c

ή μάλιστα,

If we are to assume, with Susembl and Ramsauer, that the passage is an interpolation, we must, at the same time, recognize it (punctuated as in Susemild's text) as the work of an ear polator' who understood well the metaphysical dust of the context which he thus ventured to interrupt in its even flow. We cannot help see bg that the present context, with its row re pap memorane encrepneie al propunt, na vor meddorous chardes combal, al ranton ? horas (§ 5), and its bewonquirou & ednopsi to desvely (§ 5), remitels the "interpolator" of other descriptions of man's apiers diagram, in which its shortness, and yet immeasurable worth, are pressed on our notice by the comparison with it of the life of God: perhaps we may surpose that Met. A. 7 (1072 b. 14-18), with its daywest ? easth out & abined hinden Abines whim, easter did use exerce fair bee γαρ αθύνατων), έπει και ήθουή ή ένέργεια τούτου και δεά τούτο έγ, ήγεροιε atabyous vigous photoes, thatdee of and unique did rains - was specially in his mind, and that his 'interpolation' means that 'every man withis good things for himself; for himself, as I e is, not as having become another being; tousher God, indeed, now and for ever posseries the good, but possesses it as being what He is." The two points which the comparison of man's estate with God's brings out elsewhere (e.g. in Mol. A. 7) would it us at pear to be

brought out in this 'interpolation':-(1) Man touches the good 1188 a 19 in so far as he is a self-identical being, i.e. rational; and God This also touches the good as a self-identical rational being. is the point in which God and Man are alike: (2) Man, however, differs from God in the manner in which he touches the good. Man's good hes in the future, and he touches it after reaching forward to it in Bothnois. God's good is always present with Him in His continuous perally were rod sogrood. The time which intervenes between Man's Bookhous and its realisation may change him (for he is immersed in \$\text{\$\text{\$\gamma_0}\$}), and may make his Bookygos vain. He may not be present in his old person to welcome the good wished for, when at last it comes. God impye-Exer (Met. A. 7 1072 b. 22); time does not clapse during which He possesses a capacity which is not yet actualised (on the expression drayer from see Rosmini, Opera vol. vill. p. 525, Tonno. 1857, and Schweger, Met. vol iv. p. 267). He has not an ideal, held up by Hochman, of future good never fully realised. Capacity and actuality, the ideal and its realisation are one in Him: see Mel. A. 7. 1072 b. 20 έμετον δέ νοεί ό νούς κατά μετάληψιν του νοητού νουτός γώρ γίγνεται βιγγάνων καί κούν, ώστε τούτος κούς καί νουτόν. τό γόρ δικτικών του νοητού και της ούσίας νους. ένεργει δε έχων. Η ετε vote a explained by Alexander ad for, as & nparos vote-God.) Cf. Plotinus, Eine. 3. 7 4 (vol. ii. p. 286, ed. Kirchhoff) - ruis de aparois eni manufune orgi chea e care tor merrance, iga sub care to oyen suf amen mirrais vion adjeiteras (que expuns man dante (grounde aiden, dutes to pelitar abraic adder farer, add apa terira to protest petitar.

I have tried, then to show that the section before us (punctuated as in Susemili's text), if an interpolation, is in perfect keeping with the philosophical associations of the context. The only reason, I venture to think, which can be fairly alleged for regarding it as an interpolation, and not as written by Aristotle to stand where it does, is that it interrup a somewhat (perhaps as a 'duplicate of § 3) the even flow of the passage in which it occurs. But I do not think that it interrupts the series senously, and I should be unwilling to regard it as an interpolation, even if I could suggest no other excuse for its appearance here than that it contains a character stically Aristotchan remark, which is not unnatural—though perhaps not strictly necessary in the present context, I go further however than this. I think that it is not an interpolation, because I understand it to say about the good man's wish

1100 a. 10, for his own good what has already been said elsewhere about his wish for his friend's good, and the purport of the present chapter is precisely to show how closely the good man's feelings owns himself resemble his feelings towards his friend. The posses with which I compare the section before us is E. N. viii. 7 6 800 ποι απορείται, μή ποτ' ου Βούλονται οί φιλοι τοίε φίλοιε τα μυγιστα τω άγαθών, οδον θεούς είναι οἱ γάρ ξτι φίλοι ξσονται αὐτοίς, ονδέ δη έγκος οί γύρ φίλοι άγαθά. «ὶ δή καλώς εξρηται δει ό φίλος τῷ φίλο βπίπα rayaba desirou évera, péver au bion alor mor daris desiror auditore de όντι βουλήσεται τὰ μέγιστα άγαθά. Ισως δ' οὐ κώντα αύτῷ γὰν μιλοδ exactor Souterns riyabi. In the light of the above passage I would explain the section before us as follows- Every man westers and things for himself, that is, for himself as remaining the same person; no man desires to become another being, and let that other being possess all good things—thus, no man design to become God, in order to possess the absolute good which field possesses now and for ever in virtue of being what He is," Gods possession of the good depends on His self-identity; the god man's west for his own good cannot overpass the limits of his self-identity—he cannot wish good for himself as having become God; nor (as we have seen vii. 7. 6) can be wish good for he friend-his second-self -as having become God. My exparature may be shortly described as consisting in the insertion after yesnever d' allor a. 20 of olor bide as a mentally supplied glass; meet, although on the whole I prefer Susemili's punctuation to Grand and Bywater's, I cannot help thinking that it is just possible that the words the you not viv & beds rayadar were or ginally a marginal note explanatory of olive Order, and that olive Order once stood in the text after yeogueros o' addoe, and afterwards fell out. On that I spothesis, of course, all so & is not forth would refer to inseres. Viewed as an original part of the text, however, the wards fare you rol viv à diàe râyador, I confess, appear to me pointless, unless all' by o re nor deriv be referred to o bede, and taken charely with them.

The Paraphrast's explanation is peculiar. He thinks that the transformation marked by yerduros whose takes place when one identifies one's good with to whose paper. He words are "O to amoudains powered large for dyodan you to amoudains to come tour is you to rove i duiorou orden autotum, his route makera. Os de to didoup powers to even autotum, his route makera. Os de to didoup powers to even an autotum, his

ίαυτφ βούλεται τὰ ύγαθὰ τοῦ οἰκείου είναι παρατραπίστι, οὐχ έαυτφ βούλεται 1100 a. 19. τα άγαθα, ἀλλ΄ ἐπεικφ, εἰε ὁ μιτεβλήθη καὶ ἐκαστοε δὶ ἐσιτφ βούλεται γενεσθαι τὰ ἀγαθά, οἰόμενος μένειν ὅπερ ἐστίν εὶ δὶ συκίδοι ἐαυτὰν ἄλλαν γενόμενος, οἰκ ἀν ἐλοιτο πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἔχειν ἐκείνα τὰ γενεμενον οὐδὲν γαρ ἐιαφέρει ἄλλη τωι βούλειθαι τὰ ἀγαθά, ἡ ἐπικφ μεταθληθέντι. Đù ἀιὰ ἀναθὰ ἐκ ἀγαθὰ, ἀλ ἐπικ αλλη τωὶ γένηται τὰ ἀγαθα καὶ γὰρ τῷ θεῷ παντα πρόσεστε το σγαθά, ἀλλ ἔστιν οὐτοι ὁ, τὶ κυτέ ἐστι. Mich. I.ph. explains in the same way.

In line a. 22, Kb and CCC margin have did dies oner force for did is a nor force, which may perhaps be thought to point to did is often nor entire; if, the pieces is dies often nor days draws of will, 7. 6.

As regards the bracketing of the words torus of profuses—the clause reads more easily without them: the subject of their is naturally that of alpeiron.

Boffere & dr . . . udhiora | This has been said before in § 3 rol & 22. γάρ διανοφτικού χάριν, όπερ έωιστοι είναι δοκει. Reason is the Form or ellor of man. This Form the good man preserves pure amid the Day of circumstances, as plants and animals preserve their various sien from generation to generation, realising to brine mi ro dei in the permanence of the race-type. It is as corresponding with his whole environment, and not merely as exercising his 'intellectual faculties,' that man is identified with Reason in this and similar passages, e.g. in x. 7. 9 . . . 6 and the voice film, alrep rvivo palarra ardpares. The qualification palarre is added because man is not, like God, pure elder, but a giveney, or an Juckey elder, See Mich. Figh. on ix. 4 4-elmor de écourar ed moor durir, inhywyer, ή μιλιστο τοίτο, ότι συντελεί και μέγα συμβιάλλεται και τό άλογου ήμων είε σύστασιν του ίδιως παρά τοις περιπατητικοίς λογωμένου ποιού deposon de obron of dedpes idiar moide the ef literature overattenta δεομον οίων των Σωκρώτην, του Πλατωνα, δεν ίδιστήτων, του Σωκρώτους το άθροισμο εύε δυ έπ' άλλος ποτέ γένοιτο, ποινως δέ ποιον λέγουσε του кавинов Ледринов.

§ 5. 17 Stavoio) Bekker has a comma after Stavoio. There a 27 should be a full stop, the cause belonging to what has gone before, not to what follows (see Ramsauer). 'Hs mind is stored with objects of contemplation'; his rich experience supplies him with Geophyara, 'views of life,' pure from admixture with that merely

- 2108 a. 27, personal element which makes the experience of the bad min a sounce, not of pure 'views,' but of unhappy recollections and miserable forebodings. The good man's life is the frequences store
 - a 39 ως είπειν] "in one word" see Fritzsche, E Λ vi i 8 5, on he use of the expression.
 - § 8. Boffeie 8' . . . Suocouvar Tuese words are bracketed by Ransauer as the inerpoletion of a sorbe who had in his trad E. E. H. 6, 1240 a, 8 sqq. and M. M. is, 11, 1211 a, 33, 43 t ή προς αίτον φιλια is said to exist in so far as, there Leang different μέρη της ψυχής, these agree-incl σου έστι της ψυχής πλειω με τότ' έσται μια ψυχή δεαν συμφανώσε προς ώλληλα ό το λόγες κα 😘 ποίλη, ούτω γαρ μία έσται. ώστε μιας γενομένης, έσται πρός αίπου φιοι (M. M.). If the words & few , . . Spondres are an interp land suggested by these passages in the E. E. and M. M., as Ramero thinks, then it will be right to accept the explanation given by Mich. Eph., the Taraph., and others (e.g. Stahr and Let m. according to which if fore die if alone means in so far as mator the soul, consists of two or more parts," as your element butter 'in accordance with what has been said' !- e.g in E. N. L. 13. 4. The clause being an interpolation, the occurrence of my algument in a different sense immediately afterwards (§ 7 1166 to 2) need cause no surprise. If, however, the clause is not an interpolation, no other interpretation seems possible than that of Victoria-, Michelet, Grant, and Williams - But whether friendship towards oneself is or is not possible, we may leave undouded for he present. It would seem to be possible in so far as two or it is of the above-mentioned conditions (1 / ro Buckendu ra dynas --Budaeadus to fir - to oudsiger to outakyin and oughnisms) cand and because the extreme of friendship resembles one's feelers towards oneself' (Gran.). Against Ransaucr's view (that he passage is an interpolation) is the fact (noticed by Micheles, as i apparently observed by Ramsauer himself) that the writer of the M.M. gives both interpretations, beginning with that adopted by Grant: see M. M. u. 11, 1210 b. 33 norepor & forte elie an mpie auton chilia fi aŭ vin pin dependo, ĉerapor d' apresir mora de βουλόμεθα ήμεν αλτώς, και γάρ συζήν μεθ' ήμων αυτών βουλαμεθα «,τ λ

I lywater, placing a comma after show, adopts this interpretation, and suggests the insertion of we after due see Control, p. 63.

After dismissing the question thus (viv piv dipolodis) the writer 1166 a 34 almost immediately resumes it (1211 a, 16) with dispersor d' dipological viver root sinsie, notespoe fore upoe airon pikia \(\gamma\) of, and answers it, as Eulemus had cone, by reference to the parts of the soul. We seem to have the compilation of one who had before him the text of the Air. Eth as we have \(\tau\), is such defined... is denoted and the text of the Eud. Eth. I therefore see no reason for bracketing the clause in question with Ramsater and Susemble.

- § 7. ἢ τ ἀρέσκουσεν ἐαυτοῖς] see note on § 2. 8. ετ, above. Mielt. b.8 Fph bus the following continent here—δ δὲ λογει τοιουτον ἐν εἶη. εἰμεν ελλων ἐπιθυμών ελλα δὲ βουλάμενος δηλώς ἐπτιν ὡς οἰκ ἀμάσκται ἐπυτῷ, ὁ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀρεγώμενος καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ εἰπτιν ὡς οἰκ ἀράσκται ἐπυτῷ, ὁ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀρεγώμενος καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ εἰπτιν ἐνα αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμών καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ βούλειτθαι. καὶ γαρ ταῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὑρῶμεν γινόμενον, δσοι μεν γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν ὁρεγωνται καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ βαὐλονται καὶ θελειντιν ἀμάσκυσαν ἀλληλαις, ἀπαρεσκοιται ὁς καὶ ἐιαθφέρονται ἔντιν ὁ μὸν τῶνὰο ἐπιθυμή καὶ ταὰς βαῦλητοι, ὁ δὶ ἄλλων καὶ ἀλλα καὶ μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν μπὰἐ τὰ αὐτὰ, ἐποὶ οὐν οἱ απουδαίοι ἱαυτοίς ἀρέσκουσαν, ὑπαλαμβιδούσων οἱ πολλοὶ απουδαίοι εἰναι ἐνε ἀμέσκονται ὑπταις, ἔιχως ἀμαρτανοντες, πρώτον μὶν γὰμ αἰχ ἐαυτοίς ἀρέσκονται, οἱ γὰμ ἔστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸ ἄλογον ἡ τὰ ἀρεστὰ πραττούσις, ἀλλὶ ὁ λογος, ἔπειτα ότι μὴ ἀληθῶς ἀντιστρεφόνου ὁ μὸν γαρ σπουδείοι ἀρεσκεῖν ἐκυτῷ, ὅτι τὰ ἀρέσκονται τῷ λιεγῷ φυρέτεις, οἱ μὴν ακὶ ὁ δοκῶν ἀρεσκεῖν ἐκυτῷ, ὅτι τὰ ἀρέσκονται τῷ λιεγῷ πρώτεις.
- § 6. Indow who incorporate that he positioned of the wicked as being of the particular, and subject to the domination of the senses (Eth. vn. 3. 9), is at variance with their "wish," which is of the universal and implies a conception of the good' (Grant).
- clor of departies] The description of the φαίλοι (as distinguished b 8 from the κομιδή φωίλοι § 7) given in §§ 8 and 9, corresponds with sufficient accuracy to that of the departie, as distinguished from the dechargo, in Book vii. Cf. v.i. 8, 5 fort δί τις διά πάθος έκατατικός παρά τὸν ἀρθάν λόγων δυ ώστε μὲν μὴ πράττειν αυτό τὸν δρθον λόγων πρατεί το πίθος, ώστε δ' είναι τοιουτου οἰου πεπείσθηι διωκιιν ἀνέδην δείν τὸς τοιαύτας ἡδωλε οἱ κρατεί οἶτύς ἐστιν ὁ ἀκροτής, βελτιων (ων) τοῦ ἀκολύστων, οὐδὰ φαίλος ἀκλῶς σώξεται γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἡ ἀρχή. Similarly the φαίλος here αίρουνται ἀντι των δοκούντων ευντώς ἀγιθών είναι τὰ ἡδια βλαβερὰ

- ties to a form, and in § 10 are said to be a prey to permuthene; so in val. 8 the departer is described as permuthyration. The declaration on the other hand is of permuthyration, in this respect resembling for extremes meet) the omorotoios who is decraphlyror as election (i.e. 4.5).
 - b. 10. § 8. στασιάζει] 'This picture,' says Grant, 'of the mental struggles of the bad does not recall either the phrascology of the doctrines of Book vii, where μοχθηρία is contrabed with and opposed to departs (i.f. vii. 8. 1).' Grant here, I think, overlooks the fact that Aristotle is speaking of of φαίλω = of departs (b. δ olos of departs, where of = relited) as distinguished from of equity φαίλω = of σκόλωστοι or μοχθηροί of Book vii. The word μοχθηρων occurring in this § is evidently used loosely and not in the more technical sense in which it is used in Book vii; for το μον δι μοχθηρίαν α.τ.λ. is opposed to νδ δί ήδεται which is the λόρω έχων μέρος, as the Paraph. explains καί τὸ μέν άλογων άλχεί τω μοχθηρών dπεχόμουον, τηνικαυτά δε οὐ συναλγοι το ληγισνέτες, αλτ χαίμει. Thus, notwithstanding the use of the term μοχθηρών, the ακρωτής (in whom a struggle between λόγων and καίων goes onnot the μοχθηρός of Book vii, is here described.

For the express on armonates in this connexion compare Phys. Rep. 352 A. quoted by Fritzsche and Grant—h idima is it is is east apparate diversors entries aparate animal armonate animal object aparate animal diversors above airsh, instra explose ani davrip and role disclose. Cf. E. A. ... 13 15 powers & de airole ani dade to mapa the dopon reducte, a payera and determines to dopon.

b. 26. § 10. el δή s.τ λ] Aristotle seldom addresses h s reader, as here, in the language of direct exhortation.

CHAPTER V.

ARGUMENT.

Well-wishing must be elistinguished from friendship, which it resembles. We wish well to people whom we do not know, and who are not aware that we mush them well; but in friendship the gardee must know each other, and ce aware of each other's feelings. This however has been founded out telere, he as well wishing affection, for it has not the intensity and desire a link the

ratterns affection. Again, affection grows up with intimacy, while we may with well to a stranger, e.g. an athiete, all at once, taking his xide, so fee as feeling it conserned retthout carring to do anything actively to help him. Beislwashing is thus a superficial liking for a man. It seems therefore to be the becomment of friends hip, as the picariere of the eye is the beginning of love. no one fulls in love without first being charmed by the right of beauty, but, though charmed, is not necessarily in love - is in love only if he longs in above o for the beautiful one" so men who have not first been wed withers connec be friend, for, as well-nushers merely they would not go out of their way to help on hother, but confine themselves to good wishes. So we may transfer the name of 'freendship' to woll unshing, and call it 'mactive friendship.' As time, bragger, goes on, and entenincy proper, it becomes freendship in a sense no longer metapherual—and true friendship, not that far profit or pleasure; for wellassumption no place in the friendship for propt or pleasure, sohere it is oneself at the respect of profit or plearure, and not one's friend, to whom one wishes well. The object of genuine will wishing is always another regarded as having some beautiful or good quality.

§ 1. ἡ 8' εὐνοια κ.τ.λ.] Susemihl thinks that chapters 5, 6, and more so 7, 1166 b. 30 1168 a. 27 ought to be inserted after chapter 8, at 1169 b. a.

nal mpórepor be raur elparas VIII. 2. 55 3, 4.

b. 32.

- φίλησις Mich. Eph. has—φίλησιε ήτοι όδος είς φιλίαν ἀνίλογον γάρ έστιν ή φιλησιε τη θερμάνστι καὶ λευκάνσει ός γόρ έχει ή θέρμανστις καὶ ή λεύκανστις πρὸς θερμάνστι καὶ λευκότητα καὶ ή ὑγιανστις πρὸς ἐγρίκαν, υὖται ή φιλησιη πρὸς φιλίαν. καὶ ἔστιν ὡς ή λεύκανστις μεταξὰ τοῦ μελανος καὶ τοῦ λευκοῦ, οὖταις ή φίλησις μέσου εὐνοίας καὶ φιλίας.
- § 2. δπερ γάρ εξπομεν] τ. r at the end of the first and beginning 1167 a 2 of the second section; επιπολαίως referring to οὐ γὰρ έχει διατιστε αυδ΄ δρεξεκ.
- § 3 του δράν] Cf. 1x. 1x. 1 τους ερώσει το όρων αγασητότατον έστι » 4. τοι μάλλον οιμούντοι τούτην τήν οξαθησεν ή τός λοιπάς ώς κατά τούτην μάλιστο του δρωτος δυτος καὶ γινομένου. Staht, Fritzsche and Grant teier to Plato. Cral. 420 A Τρων ότο είσρει Τέωθεν καὶ ούα σικεία έστιν ή ρόη αύτη τῷ Τχοντι, ἀλλ' ἐπείσακτος διά τῶν όμματων, διά ταὐτα ἀπό τοῦ είσρειν ἔσροι το γε παλαιάν ἐπαλείτο. Cf. Com. incest, apad bleineke Frag. 1v. 645

έκ του γάρ ἐσοράν γίγνος ἀνθρώποις ἐράν

and Plotinus (vol ii. p. 379, ed. Kirclihoff) Those . . . ore the deficient the incorrance their Also Plot. (i. 341) and of theres de identities

1107 a. 4. sal uple alder avendures. Of Merch. of Vin. 11. 2, quo el 'x Grant-

'It is engendered in the eyes, By gasing fed.'

• 10. διὰ μεταφέρων φαίη τις ἀν αὐτὴν ἀργὴν εἶναι φιλίαν] Μ.ε.Ι. Γρα. (CC marg. γρ., and Argyropylus rest ἀρχὴν εἶναι φιλίαι. but what μεταφορά (defined Poel. 21. 1457 h 6 μεταφορά ἐσταν ἀσύματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ γίνουν ἐπὶ εἶδοι, ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδοιε ἐπὶ εἶδοι, ἡ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον) τε πικ l cd τη πετε γ εταφορά of the term φιλία when it is taken over from its proper place where it denotes a relation characterised by the φιλια enumerated in ch. 4 § 1, and app rel το an choice state like εἶνοια. There is a μεταφορά of the term φιλία, when it is qual hed as ἀρχή, just as there is of ἀκροσία when it is qualified by δυμουπεί Ε. Ν. νίξ. 5. 9.

Victorius has a good note here, in support of degrie against degrie "qui dient benevolentiam esse principium non transfert verbum è sua in allemam sedem, quod manifesto facut que concedit ipsam amicinam esse, sed inchoatam et ignavam; iros catque quod non sunit eam absolutam perfectamque esse: caret enim eo quod requiriur in plena amicina: id auteu, est quod

non studet prodesse et opitulari benevolo?

8. 12. οὐ τὴν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον οὐδὲ τὴν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ] C/. Ε. Ε. 1. 7. 1241
2. 10 δήλον ότι περὶ τὴν ἡθικὴν φιλίαν (to be d st ngu shed from the ἡθικὴ φιλία of Ε. Ν. νιι. 13. 5) ἡ εῦνοια ἐστιν ἀλλὰ τοῦ μέν εὐνενίντος βούλεσθαι μόνον ἐστί, τοῦ δὲ φίλου πράττειν ἄ βούλεται, ἔττι γὸρ ἡ εῦνοια ἀρχή φιλίας ὁ μεν γὰρ φίλος πὰς εῦνοια, ὁ δὶ εῶνοια οἱ επε φίλος ἀρχομένος γὰρ ξοικεν ὁ εὐνοια μόνον, δεὶ ἀρχή φελίας ἀλλὶ οὺ φελια,

Ramsuver points out the seeming variance between the doctribe laid down here (ix 5 3) and that of viii 2 4 moldor you close close of objective tradappearons of interests close of apparations: either he argues, if we may speak of piles for the apparation, we may speak of closes for the same; or both terms—piles and close—should be reserved for relations of aperity.

trent mond of the loss of tentions of apriles

a 14. & pile yap everything u + A.] This gives the reasons for refusing to recognise eleman in the 'friendship' of Profit. (1) The man who has been benefited outes eleman. But eleman thus exceed, and not

arising spontaneous y is not preparly eleman. (2) The man who 1167 a 14 expects to be benefited, though he may seem to wish well to his prospective benefactor, really does not wish well to him but to himself, and this is not eleman. Much. Each describes At stotle, in the words & per yap elegyeryfels... & down, as gupleas the eleman and the interesting and the our by fifth a differ all dopp, discour difference yap to the first and dopp, discour difference yap to the first and dopp.

§ 4. Der ganze Schlass, says Stahr (note ad loc.), 'd eses a. as. schonen Kapitels zeigt, dass Aristoteles unter dem Wohlwollen, welches der Ursprung (ἀρχή) der wahren Freundschaft ist, jenes tein menschliche uneigennttlzige, nur durch das Schöne und Gute in der menschlichen Lrust erweckte Empfinden versteht. Das Woalwollen, das eines Anderen Clück und Erfolg wünscht, well es davon zu prefitien hefit, ist gemeiner Egoismus, Gest nung gemeiner Menschen.'

CHAPTER VI.

ARGI MENT.

I manumity also seems to be allied to Friendship. Accordingly it is not more wentity of opinion for that may whent between those who are not know one worker, and between students of astronomy and other subjects in which agree went of crows has nothing to do with the persons who agree being 'ferends.' I manimity imbrists between elisions who are of one mind about important points al questions who he retiled in a way pleasing to those who are said to be 'of one wind' about them. Thus, there was unanimity between the Mitsucaneans who wished Fritanius to rails over them and Fatianit, when he was a raing to do to there is unanimity between the Mitsucaneans who wished Fritanius to rails over them and Fatianit, when he was a raing to do to there is unanimity like this in the tout as the friendship of streets men should hold office, so unanimity like this in the toul of the good man, and between good men. The resches of good men stand fast; they do not fluctuate like the Euripus. Ent but men cannot be of one mind, any more than they can be forenis, except for a little way, insummed as they are always seeking to get for themselves the larger share of udvantages, and to put the barden of their duties on other people.

[On sporous see E. E. H. 7 and M. M. ii. 12.]

§ 1. mepl brovour] Cf. E. E. H 7. 1241 3. 16 fort 8 où mepl maera 1187 a 94.

- 1167 s 34. ή δμόνοια ή φιλική, αλλά περί το πρακτά τοίς όμονοούσε, καί έσα els τό συξήν συττείνες.
 - n. 28. τὸς πόλεις] Fri zsche and Ramsauer point out that we are not to think here of the concord of several cities, but of the unananal between the πολίται of one city.
 - § 2.] There are three character stics of δμάννια then, oned here.
 (1) it is πορί τὰ πρακτά, (2) πορί τὰ ἐν μογεθεί, (3) πορί τὰ ἐκλετωνι ἀμφοῦν ὑπάρχουν ἡ πόσω.

Οπ τὸ ἐν μεγεθει the Patat h. has —τοῦς ἀξιολόγοις . . . περί γὸ το ἐν τῷ βίφ μερών οὐ λεγονται όμουσεν ἀλλήλοις οῦτε πόλες (πέλεις) οἰπ φίλει, οἰου οίκει μένειν, ἡ βιοξίζειν εἰς ἀγοραν, ἡ τόδε κὰτεὰν ἡ δοῦσει, δί ἐν οῦτε ἀφάλεια τις μεγαλη οῦτε βλάβη ἀκολουθεί.

The meaning of indexquere appoin inappear & name is explained below by the words own yap nam yiveras of externa b 1. Usanimity is concerned with important practical questions which admit of a solution agreeable to the wishes of both parties, if there are only two, or of all the citizens where public interests are involved. Cf. E. E. H. 7 1241 A. 27 ours de die rue atrus aperenda διστ' ένδιχεσθοι άμφυτέροις υπάρχειν οῦ άριγονται δε γάρ τοιούτου έ, έγωντικ δ μή ένδεχεται άμφοϊν, μαχούνται οι δμονοούντες δ' σύ μαχούντοι In this and the Nicomachean passage the word images is somewhat misleading as suggesting that both or all parties actually ge. the same thing, and that therefore the objects of budson are things which both or all can share in alike. But the examples given show that opinion may exist with regard to the possession by one of the parties of an office which the other or others cannot held. What is meant is that opione is concerned with things about reduct both or all parties, having the same wishes, may have these wastes satisfied. The People and Pittacus agree in wishing Putacus to rule; Pittacus rules, and everybody, Pittacus included, gets what he wishes. Peters therefore is hardly right with 'people are said to be of one mind, especially with regard to matters of importance and things that may be given to both persons or to all the persons concerned,'

Dictator by the Mitylenaeans. He ruled for ten years, and, having restored order into the affairs of the city, voluntarily hid them his office, although the Mitylenaeans wished him to retain it: see

Valerius Max. vi. 5 'Postquam autem pax victorià parta est, 1167 a. 32. continuo, reclamantibus Mitylenaers, (imperium) deposuit 'Hence the words ore sai obrès flucter. The Mitylenaeans wished him to tule, and so long as he consented there was dedicois: but when, at the end of the ten years, the people still wished him to rule while he wished to resign, the dedicois was at an end. On Pittacus see Sisemihl's note to Pol. in. 9. 1285 a. 35, and Grote's Hist. Part ii. ch. 14 end.

oi de rais doutionais] of Europides, 588 sqq.—Etcorles and a 33. Polynices.

τό ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ] ι ε τὸ αὐτὰ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τῷ αὐτῷ ἱς probably mase \$ 33. 'Unanimity does not mean merely thinking of the same thing whatever it may be, but thinking of the same thing in connexion with the same person' Cf. M.M. ii. 12. 1212 2. 21 τὶ γὰρ ἐντουύσιν ἀρφύτεροι ἄρχειν, ἄλλ' ὁ μὲν αὐτόν, ὁ δ' αὐτον, ἀρά γε τὸ γὰρ ἐντουύσιν ἢ οῦ; ἀλλ' εἰ κάγὰ ἐμαντόν Βούλομαι ὅρχειν, κῆκεῦνοι ἀμέ οῦνωι ἢλῆ ὁμονοούμιν . . . περὶ ἄρχοντοι ἄρα κατάστασιν ἐν τοἱτ πρακτικοῖε τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀστὶν ἢ ὁμόνοια ἡ κυρίως λεγομένη.

oi inversis] 'The upper classes,' of Pol. Z. 2 1318 h. 35, where b. 1. of inversis an γρώριμοι are apposed to the δήμος, and Pol. Z. 2 1319 a. 3, where of inversis are apposed to the πλήθως.

wahrenh δή] The codd, have de: so Bekker. I prefer de with b. 2. Ramsauer, Susemihl, and Bywsier. This sentence draws out what is in piled in the remark made above - περί το πρωτά δή όμονουδου, καί τούτων περί το δεν μεγεθει καί ένδεχόρων όμφοῦν ὑπάρχεω ή πόσι.

παθόπερ και λέγεται] 'we see then (φαίνεται δη) that όμουσιο το πο is πολιτική φολιο, and indeed it is actually spoken of under this trame -' or, 'and undeed the word όμουσια is commonly used in this sense'—as e.g. by Arist. Litrself Pol. E. 5. 1306 a. 9 όμουσιουσα δι όλιγαρχία συν εὐδιαφθορος εξ αὐτῆς. Thue. v.i. 75 ώρεησαν πάντας τοὺς στρατιώτας τοὺς μεγίστους όμους, και αὐτούς τους du της όλιγαρχίας μάλιστη, ή μήν δημοκρατήσεσθαι τε και όμουσήσεω Ευνώμνευσι δε και Σημίων πάντυς τον αὐτου όμουν οί ἐν τῷ ἡλικίφ: Thue, vin. 93 ξινιχώρησαν τε ώστ' ἐς ἡμέραν βητην ἐκκλησίαν ποιησαι εν τῷ Διανσίας περί δμονοίας.

naorra] Cambr. agrees with Mb in giving horra.

b. 4.

§ 3. dr rois dimension the 'good' generally as opposed to of b 8.

- 1107 b. 5. pailor of the next §; slibough the narrower sense of enseme to fairness causing its possessor to jut himself on an equality will others, seems also to be present to Aristotle's mind; for the describes the chancele as chi von whoe force, e. e. as 'standing on the same footing,' and in § 4 contrasts them with rove changes changing. Cf. viii. 11. 5 foot yop of notion Boilderin and countries.
 - b. 6. ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες] This phrase seems strictly parallel to in the law μίνεια of Pol. E. 3. 1304 6. 38 . . . στάσεια αυσώσεια ἡ γω α τούτοιε φθονούντες τιμωμένοια ἄρχουσε τῆς στάσειως ἡ οδικα διά την ίνω οχήν οδ θελουσε μενοφι ἐκὸ τῶν ἔσων.

Lambinus however gives a different meaning to end run are deres, which he translates—"Cum in fissem (packe down consults et factis versentur ne perseverent": and Stahr takes to same view, with "da sie, so zu sapen, immer bei und in t detselve Dingen beschäftigt and": and Fritzsche follows, quoting less Phil in p. 66. 15 for acobinari for Oliverton aparents raises ich he im pos, i.e. "on which he is now intent."

Grant (followed by Will ams) adopts an entirely different was this note is "Being on the same moonings as it were" a opposed to the ebungs and flowings of a Facipus. Of Deade Cor. p. 319, § 181 were into a single oppositions would be a deader to use this natural, metapore in would have employed he proverbal expression, what seems to have been a very definite one.

- 5.10. § 4. καθάπερ καὶ φίλους είναι] καθάπερ σύχ κάν τε φίλοις ένα πλήν έπὶ μικρόν.
- b. 13. ἐξετάζει] του έττρου εὐθύνει, περί τῶν λειτουργιών ἀεριβαλογείωνι (Paraph.).

CHAPTER VII.

ARGUMENT.

Why do benefactors love those whom they benefit more than the latter love them? The answer generally sitten is that benefactors are like lenders, and the demented take horsomers, and that lenders are auxious about the secifare of berrowers, whereast berresours do not care what becomes of lenders. Equ. harmen secured ferhan, say that this is to look at the matter from a bad point of view and yet, it or ght be replied the explanation scenes to be true enough to human nature, for the majority of men are ungrateful, and more anxious to receive benefits than to confer them? The cause, however, but deeper. The analyzy of senders and borrowers as marseading I anders do not feel any offe teen for berrowers only with them to live, and flourish, and repay, shereas beneficite a love those whom they have benefited, even when the laster can be of no we to them. The analogy to help m here is that of the arms and the thing which he makes, not that of the lender and hornmur. The artist broot the thing which he himself eachts more than the thing, if it were custowed with life, would tone him - parts are perhaps the best instancer—they are excessively pleased with their own works, loving them as parents love their chistren. Semplarly, the object of his benefit ence, qua benefited is the search of the benefactor, and he lanes this object more than this object loves him. The course of this is that a work is its maker actualised. A maker loves his work because he loves his own actual existence. Again what the benefactor days is beautien in his own eye., and therefore he rejones in it but in the eyes of the person renefited it is at best, only wreful, not something brantiful for which he takes pure ure en the beneforter and leves him Hir mock therefore shutes for the aser the beautiful as lasting; but the profit of the recrever is soon a thing of the past. Further a benefit is received without labour, but to confer it effort es needed, and men advays love those things more who he have cost them labour - e g. wency made, more than namey inkersed. For the same reason mathers are funder of their children than fathers.

1. λε ποιηρού θεωμένους] 'Looking at the matter from a bad 1167 b. 20. point of view'—as from a bud seat in the theatre. This expression doubless used by Epicharmus occurs only here, and it is impossible to determine with certainty its exact force; but Cornes' suggestion that it refers to a bad place at the play is very plausible. This note is—où βιβών dκριβώς γρώνων τὶ λέγεω βιβούλετο 'Επέχαρμος, μουν τοῦ φιλοσόφου, και ἐν μουφ τῷ χωριφ τῷδό χρησαμένου τῷ βησειδίω

1107 b. 30. ή ήμωτιχίφ τοῦ *Επιχάρμου, ἐκ πονηφοῦ θεωμένους* «ἐκὸς δε ἀπό τὰ στηνής μετενεγκείν τὴν Φράσιν τὸν Ἐπιχαρμον (εἶ γε ἐπὶ τῶν ηθων εχρημοπη) ἐλλειπτικός τοῦ τόπου ἄσπερ γαρ ἐν τοἱς θεάτροις, οἱ μὴ εκτολαβύνεες χώραν ἐπιτήδειον, οὕτε το δρύμο οὕτε τοὺς ὑποκρικομένους κοικολ ἀρθως ἔχουσιν, ὡς ἐκ ποιηροῦ τόπου Θεώμενος, τὰν αυτὰν δή τρόπον και εν τή τοῦ βιου σεηνή, εἶ τις ὑπὸ ποκηρᾶς περὶ ἀνθρωπιων διέξης πρακατικός μένος ερίνειν ἐπιχειροῦ τὰς ἀνθρωπίνας πραξεις, οῦκ ἔσται κριτήκ ἀδεκωτικ, ὡς ἀκ πονηροῦ θεώμενος.

5 29. § 2. финики́теро»] ⁴a deeper reason,⁴

nal ούδ' δμοιον τό περί τοὺς δανείσαντας] Byw. for liekkei's α οίχ δμοιον τῷ περί κ.τ.λ. For οὐδ' (Kh) he computes 1105 2 20 see Control. p. 64.

b. 80. al yap dort hilmers meel encirous] i.e. al yap dort hilmers encourage meel rais dependence. Much high has al yap dort hilmer rais dependence. This seems better than, as \$2.1 apparently does, to take decleves of both developers and dependence member ansicht nach durfte... die Ursache... keineswess den Verhähmesse zwischen Gaubgern und Schaldnern entspresche denn zwischen desen letztern findet überhaupt gar kein Verhaltus der Liebe statt, sondern nur auf der Seite des Gaubgers der Wunsch, &c.

1168 s. 1. § 8. wointde] Cf. iv. 1. 20.

- α. 6. § 4. δαμόν δ΄ ἐνεργεία] Cf. 1 7 13, 14 διττως δέ καὶ σαιτες (ε τῆς πρακτικῆς ζωῆς) λεγομένης τὴν κατ' ἐνέργιαν θετίων κυριωτερών γω αὐτη δυκεί λέγεσθαι . . . ἀνθρώπου δέ τιθεμεν ἔργον ζωῆν τικε, ταίτης δε ψυχῆς δυέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου.
- a.7. Prepyriq & d morfron ed epyor ever mos Mich. Eph gives the true interpretation of these words—fore & physical claims, to red Empires Approvides & Ado & inequity advide & Zonnains, the subject being Topos, and the predicate & nomess. 'The work is in a sense the realisation of the workman.' Bekker's fore (retained by Bywater) declared accordingly be corrected (as by Susemill) to fore Fer other renderings (which agree in making of Topos acc after nations) we the notes of Victorius, Zell, Grant, and Fritzsche. Ramsaur, Susemill, and Bywater read & for Bekker's &, rightly I thank there is no inference.

δ γάρ όστι δυτάμει, τοῦτο ότεργεία τὸ ἔργον μητύει] These words 1166 a. 6. are to be taken closely with τοῦτο δό φυσικόν which they explain. The 'desper reason' (φυσικωτερον § 2 above) is found in that law of nature by which δύνομει rises up into δύργοια. A man is really what he does: of Afel. Θ. 8. 1050 2. 7 ἄπαν ἐπ' ἀρχήν βαδίζει τὸ γιγνώμενον κοὶ τέλου ἀρχή γάρ τὸ οἱ ἔνινοι, τοῦ τέλους δ' ἔνεκα ἡ γινεσιε τέλου δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια, κοὶ τοῦτου χάριν ἡ δύνιμες λαμβανεται . . . ἔτι ἡ ὕλη ἐστὶ ἀνκημει, ὅτι ἔλθοι ἀν εἰς το εἰδος' ὅταν δέ γ' ἐνεργεία ἢ, τοτε ἐν τφ εἰδοι ἀντίν . . . τὸ γὰρ ἔργον τέλου, ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια τὰ ἔργον. διὰ κοὶ τοῦνομα ἀνέργεια λύγετοι κατὰ τὸ ἔργον.

The Form of Reason is realised perfectly and purely—as designed deep designed—in One Fternal Being; is immersed—as an devotor hope—in many mortal beings, in the best of whom it strives resolutely to free uself from its condition of passivity by creative acts—by embodying itself in external works, which may last for the use and joy of future generations, and especially by reproducing uself in Persons whom it reverences as Ends because they realise itself; see E.E. H. 12. 1245 b. 14 & deas od readfree direct definition of the pair definition of the pair of definition of the pair of the pair of definition of the pair of th

§ 5. nakon The sakon is the orderly work of role, or the active a. 10. Reason. Being vogedo it can be apprehended for what it is only by roor, or the active Reason. An act which, for the rational agent who has performed it, takes its due place as molder in an orderly system of life, appears as an isolated and transitory occurrence to the person who is merely affected by it (τψ παθουτι) -the person whose mere rates or airthous has been called forth by it. This state of mere passivity is the mental attitude of the great mass of the uneducated, and of the self-seeking among the educated, towards the social good which the leaders of human progress have placed at their disposal, and towards the conveniences of daily life devised for them by science. Nothing to them is andie or davparrie. They have an eye only for the narrow field of the personally evapipor. Their life is one of passive reception and feeling, as distinguished from the life of active Reason, which thinks and organises C/. Alex. on Mel. 1. 6. 1071 b. (p. 660, 26 ed. Βοπίτε) το καλών έν τῷ εἴδεε μάλλον ή έν τῆ ύλη, 🕹ν γὸρ τῷ ποιούντι

1188 a. 10. μακλου ή όν τιρ ποσχουτι' καὶ έστι πάσχου το δυναμει δε, ποσών δε το ένεργεία δε.

- 6 θ ήδεία κτλ | Frety difpyera las its own pleasure see : 6 0 8 13. and emigrape dispyrane obsem island street, or pleasure and isopying are identical see vit. 12. 3. Hence their and proper are pleasant gul suggesting dipyna. See Mel. A. 7, 1072 b. 13 de romine (i.e. deapenion obras, bre here alred obe fore of thex.) Spa oppies format ούρανος και ή φύσες. δεαγωγή δ' εστίν οξα ή αμεστη μεκτον χροπον τρα οδτω γάρ del έκεινό έστιν ημίν μέν γίμ αδυνατην έπει επί πόσε η ένεργεια τούτου και διά τούτο έγμηγορσια αισθησια νόησια βλετω. elember de oil jurgin did raves; on which Alex has the following commertary. Level our det out forth à defort hair durwy des most upávou toù yôp ách, álli drav éseppeia pérntat à huitepor soir tà regul Thermy the fails der their to about auton . . . east hat it inches aits מינולים ולאלם למדוני ון דם שוובני במעדוני, ון לפו ביינוסים עלדים וולדים עלדים בייני. ênî rovre dipa ravrep dil (ji rêp (wep, deye dê rêp roriv davris . . . ani de τοίτη, φησε, και τήν αισθησεν και την έγρηγορουν και τον ναρουν έλετο paper, bu lespecal river obtain lebulquest tien and train for the supple per irepreias nai fir Coper Cope, orar & frierros rove yermai mue tà rope τος δε ελαιδίες πάλεν και μνήμας φ λούμεν διά τός ένεργείος μεμνημικά γω τινας ενεργείας ή έλπεζαντες ένεργήσαι φιλούμεν την έλπέδα καὶ του μετιστ
- a. 18 ἡ προσδοκία δ' ἀνάπαλω] επιπέστε, των μεν χρησάμων ηλεια, των λε ταλών αὐ πάνυ (Coracs). If παλά as well as χρήσιμα are referred to here, the inferiority of the pleasure attending the ai tempation of the former will be due to the fact that they are χαλεπα: but perhaps only τὰ χρήσιμα are referred to.
- α 20. τοίς ύπερέχουσε δέ περί την πράξεν] ε ε τοίς είνργετοις
- a 21. Iverac] 'are attributes of,' see note on via 9. 6, b 34, and Bonitz on Mel. A. 2, 982 2, 27.
- 25. § 7. φιλοτεκνότεραι] ε., των πατέρων: εf. Ε. Ε. Β. ε εξε b η και (μάλλον φιλοίσω) αι μητέρες των πατερων. Hence the Pataph B weeing with al μητέρες φιλοτεκνότεραι μάλλον... η οι παίδει φελομήτημε.
- a. 20 Ral palkor loader for advar Ramsauer brackets these words as out of place here, where Aristotle is concerned to such way benefactors love more. Surely, he argues, those who rece we know as well what they receive as those who give know what they give,

while the connexion in which the similar words occur in vii. 12. 2 1188 a 20 is quite different. The parallel passage, however, E. E. It. 8, 1241 b. 7, which Ramsauer does not regard as making against his view, seems to me to indicate that the writer had the text of the E. N toolh wit patter for airon before him. His words are and al proper row miripur bet matter airon airon sinai layor rd riwa. ed 3dp lypur rift galong dioplown, whise de timelinai mept my yivenur mirrop. See note on al proper viii, 12. 2, b. 27.

CHAPTER VIII.

ARGUMENT.

Another question is swhether a more angle to love hintself or some other me? As himself, some argue, for "self lone" is bad bad men are noted for three "neif-love"; good men for these lone of what we beautiful and right, which moves them freed ut of "solf," and devoted to their friends. But facts, it may be night are against this view, Self-love is not bad a man is his own time three is, if a true friend the one who wishes the coul of the object of his friend-hip visionerescelly, or for that object is own rade and if it is his truest friend whom a man sught to one more whom ought he to love more than himself, his even truest most directered friend? Our disconnect that a man's love for his friend is necessary an extension of his love for his self may he taken as favouring that commons, and all the proverbs about friendship accord with it—has are some —'things in common'—'aquality'—'three nearer than thin'—these are at most teny applicable to a man't friend hip for himself. Which of their two opposite views then must we follow? Both are planishle.

In densing with such were, we must dear distinctions, and try to see how fix and in what cense, each is true. Let us see then is what sense outh view universated it in a bad sense takes it to even the hauts of assigning to one elf the larger share, where money however, and boos y pleasure are concerned. There are the thinger which the major ty of men think best, and compete keen'y for—in their selfish pursued of them living for the east to tron of their decrees and the serational part of their nature. The self love of such men then is justly held up to contempt, and it is it which those who say that a man ought not to love himself most, have in view.

But if a man were seen to be always bent on airing virtuously and identilywee knowless with air that is knowlessed and good, no one would beam kent for this kind of 'suffece' 'self love' too, in the troops sense, manusch as it is the true 'stif' the governme peturple in him—which such a man obeys and leave pre
That Reason is the Time Self as shown by the use of the terms 'continues' and
'facontment'—t c able and unable to 'contain him off, or govern his pairon
all a by the fact that the was vatanni acts are thought to be the most winning,
and by the fact that the good man form his Reason med.

There would seem, then, to be two kinds of self live, which as for as was in a the life we coising to Reason and the life according to Impulie 7 br god min therefore night to love himself for to come he will tempte both himself and others; but the self-love" of the worked man as hungle book is homself and to het unighbour, for et conteste en jossening et el par son. The valled an does what he ought not to do; the good man does what he ought to do for housen always chooses that which is best for street, and the good man obeys the rule of Keason for his friends toe the good man well, do much and for his country - even laying down has life, if need be. He was good of wealth, and station, and ail the good things take a men compete for a that he may make the glary of well doing his own. He well overter the great in of a short time to feeble rate factions continued throughout a song time in an perfer one glorious year to a long lifetime of ordinary doings-one great see glarsous deed to many small performances - dying it may be for he. ander and resuming what he chooses for himse f-to be the does of a g'orise deed or he was toet his chance of making money slip, that is his friend may come in a e larger thane for that he secures for himself what is better than more the glory of performing a virtuous action. Seminarly, he will be known and offices go past him in favour of his friend; may is over to that he amsometimes lowe even good actions to be performed by his friend, where this so more virtue in being the cause of his friend's performing them than in fer forming them himself. In short, where vertuous actions are concerned the god man will always take to himself the larger share. This is the sense in what he loves himself most-rightly, test have sten, not as the wing been teen seiver"

Cf. M. M. i. 13, 14, where δ phavros is discussed in much the same way as here; but there is no corresponding discussion in the E, E_0 , H. δ replicable obtains phave obtains δ and given gover the same ground as E, N, x, 4. Indeed the term phavros does not occur in the E, E_0 . It is pretty evident that Eulermus had not E, N_0 in in exactly its present shape before him.]

- 2108 a. 32. § 1. olor] introduced into the text by Susemill and Ryunter, is given by Cambr. and CCC, as well as by Kb and r.
 - a. 39. do tauroù] πορρω levroi (Mich. Eph); 'wi hout thu king of self.'
 - b. 2. § 2. δ βουλόμενος ο βούλεται] For φ Kb and Cambr have ξ & Bywater's conjecture ξυ φ is very likely. The ξυ would refer to 1855 b. 3rt see Conirib. p. 64.

καὶ αὶ παροιμίαι δέ κ.τ.λ.] τούτοιε δέ καὶ αὶ παροιμίαι πάσαι μαρ. 1198 δ 6.
τυρούσε. Τούς γὰρ σφάλρα φίλους δηλούντες, μία ψυχή φασε δτι δὲ καὶ τὸ και τὸ τῶν φίλων εἰς τοῦτο φέρει, καὶ ἐνότης φιλοτης, και γόνυ κνήμης Τγγιον. Ει γὰρ τὸ κοινόν, και ἡ ἰσάτης, καὶ τὸ ἔγγιστα, φιλία, τὶ γενοιτ' δν ἐκαστφ φιλικοτερον ἐαυτοῦ, (Paraph.). These proverbs all go to show that Friendship is a very close relation, and to whom can a man stand in a closer relation than to kimself ἐ

γόνο πνήμης δγγιον) Stahr and Fritzsche refer to Theor. xvi. 18 b 8. where dποτέρω ή γόνο πνήμα is put into the mouth of one who excuses himself for keeping his money to himself.

86] So Bywater for &:—"to indicate that the statement is a b. 11 conclusion drawn from what precedes it in the text—" Contrib. p. 64.

§ 3. Sampeir What is the precise force of dauprir here? Does to 12. it mean that we are to 'analyse' each view by itself? or that we are to 'distinguish between' the two views? Peters, adopting the first alternative, translates- Perhaps the best method of dealing with conflicting statements of this kind is to analyse them, and then clearly desinguish how far and in what sense each is right.' Stalar adopts the other alternative and translates- Allem ich denke, man muss dergle chen Raisonnements scharf von einander halten und genus bestimmen, we wert and in welcher Art sie wahr sin l.' I am inclined to Stahr's opinion, on account of what follows. It turns out that each of the two hopes is concerned with a different phavrov. Instead of being contrary theories on the same subject, they are theories relating to entirely different subjects. This being clearly seen, the two theories are properly 'distinguished,' cf. Ramsauer's note- Dirimentur autem certantes (hospin) atque utrique rem non male gessisse videbuntur, si apparuent, diversa cos censulsse de nomine quidem vel título uno, sed de re vel hominum genere diverso."

ci δη λάβουμεν τό φίλαυτον πώς έκάτεροι λέγουσων π.τ λ.] Both Mich, b. 13. Fph. an 1 the Paraph in their commentaries on these words seem to take διαφών in the sense of 'analysing' first the one and then the other of the two theories. While, I think, on this particular point they are hardly right, their remarks are useful for the general understanding of the present passage. Mich. Eph. has—δεί διαφ

1188 b. 13, peix radines, roverore del dampeix en ens planmar boma brep ductions προίσχυνται είς τὰ σημαισόμενα πράγματα, ος γος έστες φυγοίο ή φιλαιτίο άλλ' δρωντρον, δε δ κίων, καὶ διαιρούντας, λεγιιν ότι άμφοτεροι επλωι λέγουση οξ τε φιλιών Ιαυτούς λέγουτες καλ οί μή φιλεί(ν), χρή οδυ διαιρυέντες λέγειο ότι το φίλουτου διστόν έστιν ώς εξηγιαι άγοπαν και δεριπείνω τω σ ημιο δημον την άλογίου... , έν μεν ούν τοιτο των τής φελαυτίας σφουregions ones forth publics and alexages and a resource photocare de orde empline thikaurde fore editoras en our une alazhoraros, og den fatte e διθρωπος ή σίσθησες ήν αίτθε φιλεί άλλ' ο μούς δυ πίπλε δεττείβλου . . . δίλλο δε φιλουτίας σημαινόμενου το φιλείν του δυτως ανθρωτου έπες earl of en him promoun a recourse pilantes our alexpos form alle subdictor. The Paraph, has over course dispersions has layer Delas elvai donoberwe, electus anopeirai nortepa dins dichundele expiritous de biehorres mi diopiciquevas ech ovon mi mus eniropas adqueen (ubie) Heinsius translates, doubtless correctly, Nos igitur si di genier dividamus rem ipsam et distinguamus &c.) a.r h .- to the same effect as M.ch. Eph. above.

b. 15. §§ 4, 5.] The two kinds of pilaren contrasted in these sections may be compared with those who act from ideae inadaequatar or an passionibus obnovii, and those who live ex ducte ratem, as distinguished by Spinoza. The former are dominated by the abstract and onesided views presented by passion and imag nut a which hold up the same thit g in different lights to different persons between whom accordingly dissensions and conflicts arise. Bit those who live ex ductu rationis see nothing paranly; they unlive stand everything truly as its nature is determined by the place it occupies in the universal system. Between men who look at thirgin this way there can be no disagreement. Acistote's aid on miles έσωτῷ περιποιείσθοι (§ 5) is Spinoza's 'Acting in a martner su take to that rationally constituted and apprehended Human Nature a oneself which is common to oneself with all men. In seeking his own lighest good a man seeks toso facto the lightest good of it other men; the distinction between 'his own' highest good and that 'of other men' being merely a formul one. See Spinozi L'à iv. 18, Schol - Quum ratio ribil contra naturam postu et, postelat ergo ipsa, ut unusquisque se ipsum amet, suum utile, quod terra utile est, quaerat, et id omne, quod hominem ad majorem perfectionem revera ducit, appetat, et absolute ut unusquisque suum esse quantum in se est, conservare conetur . . . Deinde quand una i-m

virtus minil alaud est quam ex legibus proprine naturae agere, et 1108 b 10 nemo suum esse (enservare conetur, tasi ex proptae state naturae legibus; hine sequitur . . . virtutis fundamentum esse ipaum conatum, program esse conservands, et felicitatem in eo consistere, quod homo suum esse conservare potest.' . . . iv. 35 *Quaterus homines affectibus, qui passiones sunt, conflictantur, possunt esse natura diversi et invicem contrard . . sed quia unusquisque ex sure naturae legibus id appetit, quod bonam, et id amovere conatur quod malum ease judicat, et quum praeterea id, quod ex dictamme ranoms bonum aut mainm esse judicamus, necessano Lunum aut malum sit, esso hemines quatenus ex ductu futionis vivunt, calenus tantum ca necessario aguit, quae humanae naturae, et consequenter union que homini necessario bona sunt, hou est, quae cum natura unuscujusque hominis convenunt: atque adeo homines cham inter se, quatenus ex ductu rationis vivunt, necessario semper conveniunt.

§ Β τῷ κυριωτάτῳ] ε.ε. τῷ νῷ. Cf. κ. 7 9 δοξειε δ' δυ καὶ είναι ο 80 έεσστος τοῦτο, εἔπερ τὸ κύριου καὶ δμεινου.

ώς τούτου έκάστου δυτος] ώστε του μέν νου κρατούντος αυτός τις λέγεται ο 35 ερατείν, τών δε παθών πρατούντων, αυκαύτος πρατείν αλλά μάλλον πρατείσθαι (Paraph.).

The sets of the rational agent represent a consistent and single personality to which we always refer them; whereas the acts of the assent merely the prevalence for the time of certain tendomon, and are regretted and as it were discound, by the man when he comes to himself again. On this ground the acts of the rational agent are spoken of here as voluntary in a higher sense

- 1168 b. 95. than those of the deposits. But it must be remembered that the doctrine of the Third Book (and we have no reason to say pose that Aristotle wishes to mod by it here) makes no practical difference between acts done sord loops, and those done distribution between acts done sord loops, and those done distribution between acts done sord loops, and those done distribution between acts country. If our good acts are voluntary so are also our bad acts: see in 1, 20 to isolates distribute distribution applies as well to acts caused by mere nable as to those due to Southern distribution. Horepos (ii. 1, 23) addit desardes a pairtour the let indicate all builds, if the analy pir isolates that while the is the practical view as it recommends itself to the sociologist, the statement nempayanus doseions alm had devotive in para loops palatore is made in the spirit of the melaphysic of Ethics.
 - 1109 s. b. Rai defyeodas & roll raisol & roll decourres supplement Control following the Paraph, is doubtless right with order discharge relative house for roll raisons, said from easily define the decourres has betrayed some MSS. (Kh, Mb, Cambr., CCC, Ald. followed by Bywater) into the insertion of 4 before roll solve.
 - e. 6. § 7.] With this § c. again Spinoza Eth. iv. Prop. 36—Summun bonum corum qui virtutem sectantur, omnibus commune est, corre omnes acque gaudere possini. Demonstr. ex virute agere est es ductu rationis agere, et quicquid ex ratione conamur agere est intelligere. Atque adeo summum bonum corum qui virturem sectantur est Deum cognoscere, hoc est, bonum, quod omnibes hominibus commune est, et ab omnibus hominibus, quateres ejusdem sunt naturae, possideri acque potest.
 - 11. είπερ ή άρετή τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν] ι. ε. cach man individually will have the greatest of good things, ⁴ for such is virtue.³
 - n. 17 § 8. πῶς γὰρ νοῦς αἰρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἐαυτῷ] Nοῦε in its perfect purity, as God, contemplates and eternally realises that which is best and highest—itself: see Met. λ. 9. 1074 b. 25 δηλον... . ὅτι τὸ θιώτατον καὶ τιμιώτατον νοῦ, καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλεις εἰτ χειρον γὰρ ἡ μεταβολή... . αὐτὸν ἄρα νοῦ ὁπερ ἐστὶ το κράτιστον. In man νοῦς τα the principle which maintains the ἄνολον είδος of his nature, to maintain which is his chief good, while in the organisms of animals and

plants the same formative principle appears as an effort, cha- 1100 a 17 racter sed as 8000, to preserve and perpetuate the type of the race. A draine Reason thus penetrates Nature, producing dby out of \$\times_{\eta_0}\$έκ τοιούτης (ε. ε αναγκοίον ούτως ότι άνει αύτου ούκ έστι το ευ. Αλι Χ. ad lee) has dayge (i.e the divine irrayria how dividuent, or roquie νοήσεως) ή, πηται ο οδρανός εαλ ή φύσις. (Met. A. 7. 1072 b. 13); τά εστά φυσιν, ώς οδόν τε καλλιστα έχειν, ούτω πέφυκεν (E, N, i, g, 5): επειδή ώμιστος τὰ είδος έκάστου των φύσεως γινομίνων, υξον άνθμοπου έππου κ.τ.λ., καὶ ή ταῦτα δημιουργοίσα ἀρχή μίχρε τοσούτου προεισε κινούσα τήν έλην μέχριε οδ το είδος τούτο καὶ την μορφην τελειως έναρμόσαι τη έλη (Thernist in Phys. vol. i. p 171, ed. Spengel) of. Rhit. i 6. 1362 a. 24, quoted by Ramsauer (dyaba d' dori) bou b voir av duárro úmodoly, nal bra ú mepl Ennovou unis ánodídumos énúrros. Fph. remarks on one yap sove alpira, to Bikriator fauro as follows κάς γάρ νυθς αξτοφυώς μή πειραθείς υφ' ήδανής ή νοσου αίρείτας και διώτες τό βελτιστον και συμφερον έσυτώ δήλον δι τούτο και από των αλύγων (φων' έστι γύρ τις δασαι τούτοις έλλαμψις νού' ώσαύτως ό 'Αριστοτελής althogor keye (Aristotle does not seem to use this expression anywhere) τοις μίν μάλλον τοις δέ ήττον, δέ ήν Τλλαμψω αύτοφυώς ζητεί καί sipioses ed apelouers . . . (Mich. I ph. then gives several examples of the 'instinct' of animals; and proceeds-) ri bri modda yprident Angers romiran al mepl ¿apor Aprovoridous apoyunteine un éf inciran de Βουλομινός λαμβανέτω τὰς πίστεις τοῦ παντά νοῦν αξρείσθαι τὰ βέλτιστον emery' Gove and & enterales exercia nerdapper ro vo, imourieren de rus άλόγους όριξεις, τά βελτιστα και δαυτή καί τοις πελας αίρήσεται καί Epiléet.

§ 9 aiρούνται δη μέγα καλόν έαυτοίς. We see how far removed a 20 the φιλαντία of the good man is from ordinary self-seeking. For the sake of the καλόν the φίλαντοι will lay down his life. He will not east it carelessly away as inferior men, falsely called courageous, do under the influence of anger or other excitement, but will lay it down rationally for the sake of his ideal of Human Perfection. He knows hat Human Perfect on, unlike the Divine Perfection which is realised in One eternal Being, is realised in a succession of mortal beings. The mere prolongation, as such, of a mortal life he seek to be a matter of little moment, because Human Perfection is secured by the succession of lives. He cares only for Human Perfection, and if he finds that he can further it by doing something that can be done only at the cost of his own bodily life, he gladly

- 1169 a 26. lays down his life. Here all the ordinary motives operating within the region of the sensibility are left behind, and the agent ries into the sphere where action is determined by 'reverence for his universal.' Thus the doctrine of phinoria, which in its highestern amounts to 'self-sacrifice,' belongs to what nay well be called 'the Metaphysic of Ethics.' That there is such a 'Metaphysic' a surely a great practical truth, attested by the fact that nan are found thus ready to lay down their lives.
 - 6.82 § 10. δεδέχεται δέ καὶ πράξεις τῷ φίλφ προϊσσαι] If the μεγείνουχος—the form under which the highest excellence is presented the Fourth Book—be compared with the form under when a is presented here, certain, perhaps not unnatural, misun lessantes will be avoided in connexion with the earlier account.
 - n. 34. § 11. de māri di trais évaletrois à avoidaise dairetal lauri vi nadoù nhior répur] not at the expense of others, but for the sale it our common Humanity. By évaletra we are to understant de virtues: see E. A. i. 12. 6 à pèr yop évaletra virtues à see E. A. i. 12. 6 à pèr yop évaletra virtues à daire raites. The larger share, then, which the good man takes to humself is a larger share of sales and blood. The good man takes to humself a larger share of sales and blood. The good man takes to humself a larger share of sales and blood. The good man takes to humself a larger share of sales and blood. The good man takes to humself a larger share of the pitanter like elevation of the self-sacrifice of the larger han in Eta is a 4-5.

CHAPTER IX.

ARGUMENT.

Another question is whether the Happy Man will need from a or no. As so y some he is self sufficient he has the good way, then shows he med a second or supplementary self to help him to attain a good which he arrively be "When Henrich is hand, what need of breends?" To the 18 is reported to we is seems absent to assigns all good things to the Happy Man with the one conspicuo of friends, the greatest of external good things, Also, same the good wan a essentially a benefactor, and is or teller to broast friends, them i manger, the good man will read friends to be the objects of his benefacion. Hence a man we question arross—If hether the or prosperity or advants that freends are need recided? In advanty a man will need broafactors, in prosperity, or next to

his benchiouse. Again, are not to make the Hoppy man a Solitary? Murity this would be abound. Man is naturally social. No one would encoue to have all by houself the wasse list of good things. The Happy Man, then much have covery, and, founly, the society of good friends for that is better than the society of changes.

W hat, then, as the tench contained in the first a con- that the Higgy Man is mit sufficient, and does not need friends? The trees is true so far as friending for pront, and fesculohist for pleasure are concerned. The Happy Man does not need to make the for mer hind of friend hip, because his material necessities are othersame sufficiently provided for , nor does he need to make f sends for the take of piecewire, for her life is in itself p'emant, and has no need of imported Ent it is not true to say, wishord quidencation, that he does not need sita, NIC friends for he must have good friends, muse Happiness is a Life-a function performed, not a posternien treasured and this function is good and pleasant in welf for the good man who performs it, and pleasant too, busines it is his own function but he can contemplate the like function in his friend better than he can emiteral are his own function. The Benty Man thus needs the mirror of friend-Asp to who hen see clear y that which is her you - the lafe of good a tion - his e m lafe I writer at heing annealised that the cife of the Manty Man ought to be preasant, it could hardly be their were he a Solidary, for by himself he could not earny ferform his function cont numery. With others and en reaction to others, he ever, he soul be able to do so more cost'y. A free usen pleasant in river free i thus be west continuously performed; and that ar end we home weren of Liaperment Again, a man gate praises on worthe by as occurring on emotely made good onen, as Theogram seils me.

But there it a still deeper reason in the nature of things, from which we inter that a good frame is maturaly too object of the good near tehoter. He have recon these that which is macurally good is good and pleasant in itself for the good man Now, Life were a si the power of perceiving and thinking or more druly, the exercise of the power, actual perception and thought is good and preasons in uself, for it is definite; it is therefore good and preasons for the good man all men indeed strive after it, but the good man especially strongs after et, insimuch is it is best and most theired as realised by him. Further, he sind ser or hears or walks percentien that he tier or hears or walks there is a foculty an him which perceives that he exercises the isocious functions of sense perception, and of thought but to perceive that he perceives or thinks is to perceive that be exist for existence or left, we saw is perceiving or thinking; were, to percents that he exists or times as pleasant in stielf, and expectally to the good man where life is especially characteristy more them, the resultance in which the great man stands to he, friend is the same as that in which he stands to homself, the good man who, percentage homself as good, makes his once exprisms for anyes of his chance will now sarry make the existence of his friend a so the copied of he tchoice descerting het friend's existence and commercia per cereing his own for a friend is a second self. The common perception of & s experience and of his friends the good man we becalise in that common months of speech and thought who a constitutes the social lefe of man, as distinguished from the gregorious age of cottic gracing together in the same pictures

Our conclusion, then, is that the Happy Man much have good friends.

(The subject of this chapter (excellently summarised by Grant ad line) is abscussed in E. E. H. 12 (a chapter the interpretation if which labours under great textual difficulties), and in M. M is tall

- 1169 b 6. § 1 vor 8è pilor, êrepor autor dura, mapifeir à 81° autor d'écration of the êrepos autor or supplementary se f, who supplies what the autor by I inself cannot obtain, is incomment a priori) with the notion of the autopreia of the autor.
 - 5. 7. Star & Saiper u.t. A.] Eurip, Orestes 667.
 - § 2. 6 Bonel rur entog dyadur peylotton elval I cannot reiglige passage in which Aristotle explicitly pledges himself to the ver that friends are the greatest of external good that gs. The value of the eregon airos as he is characterised in the present book scarce y that of an external good, while in E. N. i. 8. 15 at Rhet. 1. 5, friends are simply enumerated among other extensi good things, without being placed in a position of mared superiority. Thus in E. N. i. S. 15, 16, we have powered & in na two enter dyallow spouldequiry, natures entoper idinator yes in ρύδιου τὰ καλά πράττειν άχορήγητου όντα. πολλά μεν γαρ προτευικ καθάτερ δι' δργάτων, διά φίλων καὶ πλούτου καὶ παλιτικής δυκίωσως στος de ensurevat functionate to passibus, alor elyment entervies mellout a πώνο γάρ εύδαιμονικός ό την ίδεαν παναισχης ή δυσγενής ή μετώτης και ένavos, era & lows hrrow, el ro máyenens maides eleu h dilina. H águstal dens ridraow, and Rhet. i. 5. 1360 b. 18 sqq el bij dorw i ebbomorie r ... τον, ανόγεη αυτής είναι μερη ευγένους πολυφιλίας χρηστοφιλιώς πλοιτο ebreavior moduranties etyppion, fre rue rot misparos aperies of an execus subles Ισχύν μεγεθος δύναμεν άγωνεστικήν δεξαν τιμην εθτυχιαν . . . υστω γες abrupceararse ely, el braignes abraj rá el év abraj nal rá vierbe apadia a भूविक रेजराम बीधेक सामने पारंपता रेजरा है रेम कोएक मारे पर मानी क्रिक्रिक करी रव स σωματι, έξω δι ελγίνεια απι φιλοι καὶ χρηματα τοὶ τιμή. Ετι δέ προσφαι υλόμεθα δυνάμεις υπάρχειν και τύχην ούτω γαρ δυ παφαλέστατος 🛦 🕬
 - 5 10 § 8. μονώτην] C/. Ε. Ν. ί γ. 6 τό δ' αὐταρκες λίγομεν σία μότῷ μονη τῷ ζώντι βίυν μονοτην, όλλη καὶ γυνεύσε καὶ τεκνοιε και γυνεικί και όλως τοῦς φίλοις καὶ πυλιταις, ἐπειθὴ φύσει πολιτικόν ὁ ἀνθρωπος.
 - b. 88. § d. of mouros oir donei mi dein dilan rois manapines (Parag b.).
 - 6 94. του τοιούτων μεν οῦν οὐδεν δεήσεται ὁ μακάριος] C/. Meman ker (apud Plut. de Aud. Poel. 13)—

panapios bares obelan ant robe tron.

η έπὶ μιαρόν) κῶν ἱσων ποτὰ διὰ κόσην ή τοιοῦτά τι διήσεται, ἐπὶ μιαρόν 1100 5 20. διήσεται (Mich. Eph.).

ἐπεισάκτου] C/. L. N. i. 8. 12 ούδεν δή προσδείται της ήδονης & Βιος τέντων δοπερ περιώπτου τενός, άλλι έχει την ήδανην όν έαυτώ.

§ 8. dr dρxĝ] E. N. .. 7 15, where εὐδοιμονία is defined as ψυχής 6 28 dripped a.t.λ.

ή δ΄ ἐνέργεια δήλον ὅτι γίνεται κ.τ.λ.) The Paraph. Liss— ἡ ἐνέρ- ὁ. 30 γεια φανερών ὅτι γίγνεται, καὶ ἐν εῷ γίγνεσθοι τὸ εἶναι ἔχει, καὶ τὸ γίγονε καὶ ἐντίς ἔχει, καὶ τὸ γίγονε καὶ ἐντίς χει βὸη καθάπερ τι κτήμα συνίσταται μὲν οἶν ὁ ἐνδαμανείο ἐν τῷ ἔξον καὶ πρώττειν. Mich. Eph. has—el δὲ ἐνέργεια. δήλον ὡς οἶκ ἔττιν ἔλον τι καὶ ἰφεστηκός, ὡς οἶκία ἡ ἰμάτιων ἡ ἐγὼ ἡ σίς αλλὰ γίνεται ῶσπερ ἡ εινησις οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ κίνησίς εστιν όμοῖ ξίμπασα, ἀλλὰ τὶ μὲν αῦτῆς γέγονε το δὲ ἔστι, τὸ δὲ μέλλει γενέσθαι οὐκ ἔστιν οῦν ἡ εὐδιιμονία ὅλον τι, ἀνέργεια οὐσα, ἄλλὶ οἶον ἡ κίνησερ καὶ ἔρασις.

Happiness is a function performed, not a thing possessed. This function, as performed by the good man, is pleasant on two grounds-as good, and as 'his own and invites contemplation. But the good man stands, as it were, too near himself to see properly 'his own' as realised in himself. He sees 'his own' better at the distance of his 'second self.' Imageala nat horia and abrie b. 32 I understand to mean 'good and consequently pleasant in itself, the good being one source of true pleasure (of via. 3. 7 to te dahwe dyalor rai 380 anker fath), while in the next line b. 33 re alution is stated to be the other source. Actions which are oncobaine and obsine, to be experienced as pleasant, must be contemplated (Gropers), i.e. must be clearly realised in consciousness (if, for the use of beopsis, in the sense of being fully conscious," E. N. vii. 3. 5 diolore to Exorra per un Bempourra de a.t.h.). This cor sciousness of one's own actions- of the alerian markens bropia becomes explicit in the contemplation of the actions of a good friend. The actions of such a friend are good, and, although not circles in the narrow personal sense in which actions often stand too near the observer to be objects of clear vision, they are in the sense of being amount, and realising the one law of rectitude common to all good men: of viii. 3 6 and yap andihe of dyadal fileic sal additions decomp you not hourie clow at alectae apilicie and at majorie. Tur dyndûr bi al airal f opena.

In God 'subject and object' are one. He realises and sees votant.

- 1109 b.29. Hinself in Hanself. But man realises and sees hanself in me through others E E. H. 12, 1245 b. 18 fpie per ro et col impe éceive de (se. Buj) airès ro et cores. For man, as immene ! a in 'sul ject and object' are two. Hence, to fulf I the in junctical year occurrie, he must place himself at a certain distance from bruself at it were. He must by an effort make himself an object to himself This he dies by universalising his own conduct, by regarding a not as the conduct of himself only, but also of others. Thus the idea or ideal of 'conduct' is abstracted from the Day of the wilvidual's sensibility, and made an object of concerplation. It are longer his conduct, but the conduct of all good men. Houses jetformed by the individual with the consciousness that they are such as all good men perform are pleasant par excellence; true pleasar either being (bock vii), or attending (book x), the constitutes (disput) of good actions and this consciousness being sail's heightened in each individual, when he sees of fer raidinal agents obeying the same Law of Rectitude with himself, as Springs says E.h. iv. 37 Bonum, quod homo sibi appe it et amat, osstantius amabit, si vi lerit, an is idem amare. Atque aden combitur, ut religai idem ament. Et quia hoc bonum (i.e. bonum quod unusquisque qui secta ur virtatem sibi appetiti comi us commune est, coque omnes guadere possant, consbitu, e pe sa omnes eodem gaudeant, et eo magis quo hoc bono magis fructur.
 - b. 35. al των σπουδαίων δε] I prefer δη, beginning the apod as a lett. Zell and Michelet, however (and apparently also Susemi h) and Bywater who read δε with CCC, Cambr. A d.) make it begin we δ μακοριος δη 1170 a. 2. It seems to ne necessary to state as a conclusion from (1) τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ενέργεω σπουδοία κω ἡδεῖα, (2) τὸ οἰκίως τῶν ἡδείων, and (3) θεωρεῖν δε μάλλον τοὺς πέλια δυνώμεθα ἡ ἐπιτνικ και το ἰκείνων πραξεικ ἡ τὰι οἰκείος, that 'a good friend's actions are pleasant to the good man': then, from the premises είπερ ειτλ. a. a, felture the different conclusion that 'the μακαριος will trend good friends.
- 1170 a. 1. διφω] τ. ε τό έπτεικές (Or rd σπουδοιον) and τό σέστον. (f. believe είπερ διωρείν προσυρείται πραξεις έπτεικές και αλεύες. Zell and Fritzsche are evidently wrong in making δρφω nominative, i.e. δ σπουδείων και δ φίλος αύτοῦ σπουδαίος δυ.
 - Β. 6. συνεχώς] Cf. x. 4. 9 πώε οθν οθδείε συνεχώς ήθεται; ή εξμινε; πωνα γάρ τὰ άνθρωπεια άδυνατει συνεχώς ένεργειν. Cf. Met Δ. 7. 1072 b.

14 διαγωγή δι έστιν οδι ή άματη μικρών χρόνον ήμω. οδτω γάρ ἀὰ ἰκεῖνό 1170 a. 6. εστιν. ήμων μεν γάρ ἀδύνντον . . . φαρεν δε ταν θεον είναι ξήσιν αίδιον ἄριαταν. ὅπτε ζωή επὶ αίδιν συνεχής καὶ ἀίδιος ἐπάρχει τῷ θεῷ΄ τοῦτο γάρ δ δεός.

med' érépoir be aut mode andous poor The form of God is real-seil n one Eternal Being: the form of man in a mulatude of contemporary and successive examples. Each individual man realises tomself only by looking away from his own mere particularity, and assimilating into his consciousness the form of man's reason as other examples—his fliends and fellow-citizens—by their cumulative influence impress it more purely upon him. The great embo brent of human reason the social order into which he has been born, exists independently of himself. It is there already as an object for lam to contemplate and identify lamself with. It has not to be held up, as it were, in actual existence by his own una ded reason as the aboractions of Philosophy have to be maintained (and cannot long be maintained at a stretch) by the thir ker h.mself: see E. L. H. 12. 1245 b. 16 ov yap ovens & dids ev Fxee, alka Bekrew & ware bako re voeix ourse map auron, aires & bee quis pir ro el and' erepor, excura de abres miros ra ed evre. To contemplate, and in contemplating to identify himself with, the social life is a thing which a man can co almost continuously, because his moio or dione is to be a person who sees himself in others and lives in others. l ut to identify himself with sogra which involve no social reference is a gov' ke act, which he can only at rare intervals and for a short time, perform. Cf Alex in Met. p. 67 (cd. Bontz) - b pricepos rous. Surapes liv to vonta, brow de the lapae interipos nat the ligar eifwice ένερχειο γενηται τὰ νοητά, τύτο (ώμεν την άριστην και μακαριωτοτην και πάσης ήδουης επέκτικα ζωήν, ήτις λύγφ μέν έστιν αυτρμήνευτου, γινώσκεται bi rous to parapier toute national nation. . . . p. 687 our eaten ininover πύτῷ (ε ε. τῷ πρώτὸ νῷ) τὰ συνεχές τῆς κοήσεως εἰ νούς έστὶ καὶ νόησις. addad nieg rip squerdpip vip vi stamping is rip voir einat intravir iart ra orneges the uniquems; if nin eater à hueropus unit duspyriq vous sai duspyeig is decisor, dand devidues: As Alex, quantly says, it is not difficult for a man to be always a man, ore in the circu indownes obviourue: Let it is difficult for han always to walk, did to up it to Budifeer obridados (p. 687). So it is difficult for man to think continuously, as God doca, because man's whose stands to his work as his walking does to Lis physical power-it is something which tends to suck

- 1170 a. 8. back into the potentiality (diseque) from which it springs; where God's rights is an evipying does designed Cf. Themselve to be p. 211 (ed Spengel) if eligibrative of if it is a fill the friend role of its property of its property of its property and seed of its property of its property of its property of the included is aided by the stength of the fact in the law of rectitude is embodied in the good men of the fact, in the law of rectitude is embodied in the good men of the fact, in the law of rectitude is embodied in the good men of the fact, in the law of rectitude is embodied in the good men of the fact, in the law of rectitude is embodied in the good men of the fact, in the law of rectitude is embodied in the good men of the fact, in the law it is actually on the effects of any single meridual. The efforts of the individual are rendered cavity and serve which they have not themselves, with pain and westerness, to have up in actuality.
 - 6 6. συνεχεστέρα, ήδεία ούσα καθ' αθτήν | These words are to x taken in connexion with oformi re driv holing (i) vor eidamore 2 4 The popularie cannot well be eddingue on account of the differ. (as explained in the foregoing note) of an approach in his case to vò ovrexue erepyere. But, susta ned by society, the in lividual at make an approach to it. The worls movery . . Pipor a 5.6 h. .. thus nothing directly to do with the statement oform or deir files Gir rdr cidaipora, being rather an assertion of the general tru a test ebbaquovia an a grovene evipyeta requires (in man's case) from is and society. But having thus almost parenthetically but upon rd owner as distinctive of ridamovia, Aristotle then proceeds in regular crurse to point out that the requirement alored to dely \$5600 (or the entire move is justified by the law that 'his function, decenter pleasurt r tiself, will be more continuous "- avantifes são vip infosesar à cimic hoosy (x. 5. 2); and we are to understand that the pleasure of friendship contributes a good frien I making the good man take increased pleasure in his own spifere. I understand the rais or aperns apilera a. 9 to be not only those of the good man homself but also those of his friend; and, although the passage (like other passages in this chapter) is somewhat confused (whether Ly the fault of Aristotle or his editors it is impossible to say). I do not think it necessary, with Ramsauer, to bracket the words a. 8 \$ 744 onordaios f onordaios . . . a. 11 Aprilia. They seem to be farly eneugh suggested by ideia offer and attribut The function of the eidaines is truly pleasant—he rejoices or takes pleasure in the truly

actions, his own and his friends'. Susemill places \$169 b. 33 1170 a 7 for be ma . . . 1170 a, 8 pasapion elien after \$170 a 11 homeira.

§ 7. donnois ris rigs doarns.] This consideration seems to one a it at least the form in which it is presented to the words rain ear' doern's moission in the passage a. 8 6 yeap... a. 13 homism, bracketed by Ramsauer.

Stoyms] i.e. as quoted at the end of this book— λαθλών μέν γαρ a. 12. 12 λαθλά (διδάξεσι, ήν δέ κακοίνε - Συμμίσγης, ἀπολείς καὶ τον εύντα νόον).

4. Μεπαπάσει & φθείρουστο ήθη χρησο φιλίσε κακαί.

φουνώτερον] It is difficult to see in what respect the enquiry a 13 comained in this section and the subsequent sections of the chapter is more 'concrete' (see note on vii. 3, 9, 2, 24) than that in §§ 5 and 6. Both are concerned with the manipulation of abstract formulae; unless it he said that the second enquiry, by i s use of the psychological terms alothous and whose, is rendered more concrete. It must be admitted, however, that these terms are used in a very abstract way.

τὸ δὰ ζῆν . . . δυνάμει αἰσθήσους) Cf. de An. ii. 2. 413 b. 2 rò be a. lu (ψον διά τὴν αἴσθησω πρώτωσ t cf. Ε.N. i. 7. 12 and 13.

alσθήσεως ή νοήσεως] Zell reads uniwhich gives the sense which a. 17 f must bear if retained; and there seems to be no grown for rejecting η; of de Am. ii. 3 414 b. 14 νῦν δ' dul τοσούτον διωμίσθω ότι των ζώων τοις έχουσιν οφην καλ δρεξις ύπορχει περλ δε φιντασίας άδηλον θστερον δ' όπωπεπτίαν. ένδιας δε πρός τυύτας ύπάρχει καλ τὰ κατὰ τύπον κινημικόν ἐτέροις δε καλ τὸ διανοητικον καλ νοῦς, αἶον ἀνθρώποις καλ εί τι τοκούτον ἐστιν ότορος, ἡ καλ τιμιώτερον.

η δε δύναμις είς την Ινέργειαν ανάγεται) 'a faculty results in a function.' Fritzsche und Grant compare Mel. 0. 9. 1051 a. 29 τά δυνάμει δντα είε ενέργειαν άναγόμενα εύμισσεται.

το δο κύριον εν τη ενεργείο] 'The reality is in the function; if e, a. 18. then, in the real sense (κυριως), is perceiving or thinking' Cf Met.

Θ. 5. 1048 a. 10, where it is said that the δύνομες must be realised by a determining cause external to itself – άναγκη δρα ένερον είναι νό κύριον, and Met. Θ. 8, in which it is laid down that ένεργεια is μισι to

- 1170 a. 18. δίναμε both λόγφ and τη ούσερ. The printly ούσερ 13 set fait's that 10,00 a. 7 άπαν όπ άρχην βαδείει το γενομενον και τελος. αρχή γορ το πίνεκα το τελος δί ή έκργε σ, και τοιτια χαν ή δύναμες λαμβάνεται, ού γλρ ένα δήνεν έχωσεν δρώσε τὰ ίφα, άλλ έπει δρωσεν δήνει έχωσεν δρώσε τὰ ίφα, άλλ έπει δρωσεν δήνει έχουσεν.
 - To be ffir ... § 8, 3. 23 havepwrepor The 19 a very amined passage, which Ramsauer proposes to mend by omating the bill of it -viz from descrip a, 22 to have porreson a, 25 . Indeed by practically recommends the omission of the whole of it, for te suspects the clause approprior yap 2, 20 . . . process 2, 21 lening only to de (no two ead abto dyndor (ear adense), to de to diversitate not vý drusení. Of course the argument which proceeds from the beginning of § 9 would not suffer if the whole passage, +6 h ?" a. 19 . . 2. 25 deseporepor, were out tied for the parenthers for bl cas a. 26 . . . 8. 29 (wir concairs all of material importance had would be thus lost; and indeed, by making to reares only of a see. and priditive rate inservice and parapions a enquelor of the class also in seayador sol hos, pais the matter much more crearly than it is paid § 7, where the corresponding to de the phote ayador and the reserve hiérep voice noon fibb elvas apprais as a demetion from et de form and oùth dyador and his . Notwithstanding all this, I cannot beig myself to think that the passage, with its references to to discourse and to him, ought to be omitted. These references are but of material importance to the argument, but are just such as may naturally be made in passing without interrupting it.
 - 2. 20. Sproperor Cf. E. N. i. 6. 14. Life is unthankable except to the realisation of definite forms and functions.
 - 2. \$2 § 8. oò ba bè . . . lówais] When we say that life is na tra'h gord, because 'definite,' and na urally pleasant, we must retarribet that vice and pain make it 'indefinite' and lad, and that they connect a with bad pleasures—for all men, not only good men, find life pleasant—with the pleasures of excessive incluigence and of relief from pain.
 - a. 24. In role decidence by meeting himse force pareparence of the says.—'This must be after all (see vol. 1, p. 49), undenticed y an interpolation. The editor probably had in his mind a combined

reference to x, 3, z. Ramsauer urges that there is nothing in 1170 a. 24. x about pain being depictor. It may be replied that there are frequent references to pain in x; and that indeed the promise made here does not pledge Aristotle to speak more fully of pain being depictors: moreover the epithet depictor used here applies to the paxelopia and despelapaien (wh as well as to that is himses. Vice with its pleasures desirous the doth or horse of mans nature, and makes it chaotic—adoptors: similarly, pain distorts it; although here we do not attach blame; of E. W. id.

§§ 9. 10.] The apodosis of the sentence et δ' αὐτό κ.τ.λ. begins a. 25 with οὐτω b. 8. See the notes of Friezische, Michelet, and Grant:

of also § 10 b. 14 et δή τφ μοπορίφ... b. 17 etq. a sentence which epitemises the sense, and reproduces in skeleton the grammatical construction of the more diffuse reasoning which precedes. The apodosis of this sentence begins with κόν ὁ φίλος b. 16.

§ 9. 6 8' opor or opa aloddrerai] Cf. de An. in. 2. 425 b. 12 a. 29. έπει δ' αίσθανόμεθα ότι όρωμεν και άκούομεν, άνογες ή τη όψει αίσθάνεσθαι ότε όμα, ή έτέρα. άλλ' ή αὐτή έσται της ύψεως καί του υπακειμένου χρώματος. Εστε ή δύο του αυτού έσονται ή αυτή αυτής, έτι δ' el gai έτέρα εξη ή της όψεως αξυθήσις, η εξς Επτιρού εξοιύ η αύτη τις ξοται αύτης Sur' int ris noures roure nomeion. See also de Samne 2. 455 a. 15 έστι δί τις και κοινη δύνομις άκολουθούσα ποσαις, ή και ώτι δρά και άνούει airelaurtae où yòp độ từ ye byet ôpệ ắτι ôpệ: see Filwit Wallace's Aristotle's Psychology, note on de An. iii. 2, 425 b. 12, and Introduction § 12, 'common or central sense' - especially his excellent remarks on pp lxxxi-ii, where he reconciles the passage in de Somno 2. 445 a. 15 with de An. in. 2. 425 b. 12: 'unless,' he says 'we are prepared to credit Aristotle with a wonderful amount of inconsistency we must regard the one passage as illustrative of the other. So taking them we cannot but allow that if Aristotle asserts in the one passage "it is not by sight mind sees that it sees," and in the other passa writes "sight perceives that it perceives," he is using sight in the former passage as the more particular organ, whereas in the other it is identified with that original faculty of sense which serves as basis to the whole system of the senses. The consciousness of sense perception is then, we may conclude, an attribute of that same central sense

1170 a. 20, which enabled us to compare and distinguish the different reports transmitted by our isolated senses. The two functions are a fact but different aspects of one and the same process, for the comparison of the reports of sense involves as its presupposited the conscious recognition of them as our own, the faculty, in other words, of holding them before the mind."

In seeing, bearing, walking, etc., a man is conscious of himself. of his own existence: 'be perceived that he need, hears, etc. This perception of self, however, would hardly be possible to man if his only objects of experience were his own sensal as In that case the sensation and the perception of the sensation as his sensation would coalesce, as they practically do, we may suppose, in the experience of the lower animals, or of most of the lower an mals. Even his experience of his own actions would be accompanied by only a dim consciousness of a self distinguibet from them. But man is not confined to his own actions. He has a 'sympathetic consciousness' of the actions of his friend-st actions which are still in a sense 'his own' (for his fe end is a errors acros), and yet are not in such a way 'his own' as to mile it difficult for him to distinguish 'himself' from them. The discinction between 'himself' and 'his friend' (for his friend is a Erepos oferis) helps him to the distinction between "hanned" and hs own sensations and actions.' In other words-it is in the consciousness of the existence of another that a man becomes tall conscious of hunself. To airbareadai airov ayades irree 5. 9 cannot be realised apart from to auxonofaseaflor onl too of Les on force b. 10. Man is distinguished from the brutes by the mental distance, as a were, at which he places his sensations and actions. He stands behind them and observes them; but this he does because he is a social being; because he can recognise, and takes pleasure in the recognition of, acis, thoughts, and feelings, not 'bis own' but Like his own."

There can be no doubt that the term conserving that, as employed in §§ 9 and 10, is intended to be accurately distinguished from ciaboneabu. The term ciaboneabus marks a mark's consciousness of his own life, consciousness of his trend's

¹ The two terms are carefully distinguished in E. S. 1.2. 1.24 b. 23 below to Anthonor the to figure and the dependent and the three game of the to also becomes an et your few and the object to also be the transfer and the property of the actual and the actual and the actual actual and the actual a

life - his 'sympathetic consciousness' of his friend's existence, 1170 a. 29. as Grant well puts it. Where the term avourdancedan occurs in § 10, b. 10, this is clearly its meaning: but announdarigation at the end of § 9, b. 4, in its present context seems to describe merely the consciousness which the individual has of his own life, and to be equivalent to the simple of obsequence: hence Ramsauer is of opinion that it is employed after the analogy of lawry wwenders, and stands for farrois avenuadardures roi und airò dyadoù-e.e. being conscious of . . . Consistently with this view he remarks that own adam of a in the next \$ is used in a different sense. But is it likely that overendarifures b. 4 has a different sense from overeddirection b. 10? Perhaps something has dropped out before avvoid barópavos b 4 which served to make the transition from the individual's simple wie beserbin of himself to his overarbinebar of his alter ego. The words aforton de b. 3 . . . b. 4 and foi (which Ramsauer brackets) certainly do not serve to make the necessary transition, but may perhaps be a fragment of the lost passage, rois dyadois being the good friends required as the subjects of avvacabavouevas. I am more inclined, however, to think that avvoir bardpers yap roi kad abre όγαθού is an interpolation; for the words ώς δέ πρός b. 5 . . . b. 7 giver for a seem to be written as if nothing had been said before to justify the transition from alabireabia to aumardareaba, a circumstance which makes it difficult to suppose that the dyndoi, regarded not as separate individuals, but as on correct are the subjects of puraugharourou b. 4.

By water (Control. p. 65) explains his reading 2. 31 wore do alabaraµet, for alabarapeta, starrager, freezonizer (Bekker has ware alabarapeta &r for alabarapeta, sal majore for rootper) by saying 'it would be strange indeed it, with alabarabar for rootper in the immediate context, be lapsed into different language in 1. 32 and said, what the vulgate makes him say, root for rootper.

§ 10. Το τῷ συζήν καὶ κοινονεῖν λόγων καὶ διανοίας] Cf. Pel. iii. 5. b. 11.
1280 b. 29 φανερόν τοίνυν, ότι ἡ κόλιε οἰα έστι κοινωνια τόπου καὶ τοῦ
μὴ άδικειν πφας αιτοίς καὶ της μεταλόσεως χάριν, άλλὰ τουτα μεν δυαγεαίου
ἐπάρχειν, είπερ ἔστια πιλιν, οὸ μὴν οἰδ' ὑπαρχύντων τοίτων ἀπάντων ήδη

Cf. 1145 b. 21 ένδεχαμένου γαρ απλλοίς συζήν όμα καὶ συνεισθανάσθαι άς αλείστοιε αίγετωτατον ενεί δὲ χαλεπωτατον ἐν έλάτεσσιν ἀνάγκη τὴν ἐνέργεων τῆς συναισθησωμε είναι

1270 b. 11 πόλις, άλλ' ή τοῦ εδ ζῆν ποιεωνία καὶ ταῖς αλώσις καὶ τοῖς γένεσε ζωίς τελείας χάριν επὶ αὐτάρεσους. αὐκ ἔστου μέντοι τοντο μή του σύτων και δυσ απταιεούντων τόπον καὶ χρωμένων έπεχαμίσιε διὰ κηθείως τ' έγειοντι καιὰ τὰκ πύλεις καὶ ψματμιας καὶ θυστια κοὶ διαγωγεί τοῦ σε ζῆν τὰ ὁι τοιούτον ψιλίας ἔργον' ή γάρ του συζην προμεσιε ψελ α. τελος μεν κίπόλεις τὰ ἐθοίς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους χάμιν, ποδιος δὲ ἡ γενών καὶ κωμικο κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους χάμιν, τοῦτο δ' ἐστέν, ὡς ψιμέν, τι ζῆν εὐδαιμονως καὶ πολως των παλου ᾶρα πραξεων χαριν θετεσω είναι τρι πολιτικής ποινωνίαν, άλλ' οδ τοῦ συζήν.

CHAPTER X.

ARGUMENT.

Should a man by to have an emachalitily great number of fr emas or must he strate the line somewhere in the number of his friend, as in the name or of his guests. As region's weeful ferends he must ceeining draw the less as he number which he finds usigul to have more as to burden have of with the day of recompanions informameenings and hundres the left of more acres Acre friends for picamire a feer well be enough, like a lettle revolutioner in fore Find what shall we say about the number of freeness the en susance they are part men! Here again every are limits. The errole of true friend k.p. the incertify, must not be too large or too small. Its extent common be accurately axis. any more than the rate of a city of varies occurring to cer umstances, we to definite limits. This is the sense in which its extent is definite. Perhaps we may say that it ought to enclude as many as it is forsible so time on interests terms with; but, plainly, a man cannot like on intermete terms with and distribute himself among many further one i friends would be friend aiso to one another, if all are to meet together constantly in one's company. and it is a difficult matter to get many people to be thus all fix and of our another. Again, it is hard to make the joys and socrotes of make fasta on's own for one would often have to sympathise with the pleasure of this friend and the distress of that friend at the same time. So perhaps it is bed not to ter to have a great many fracult, but to until oneself to the number influent to make up a critical of submate friends, for it is on-possible to be on terms of internal freewithip with many, as it is impossible to be in love week many. If hierarch friend hip is strong it is for few take for example the frend hip of emrades -it does not extend to many; and the forecour cases of it are between twe Those who have many friends and trial everylossy they meet as "My diar friend, are recognised to be notody's freenes I beer friends lift of it is friend

ship at all some people call it foreness complanemes is friend-hip in the some in which we people of a man's friend-hip for his follows is eas. A man may include have many entrem "friends," without being chargedore with overcomplanemes may, a trilly good man may have many "friends" of this sort; but it is interested to have many friends of the sort who are chosen for these good.

Must, that is, for themselves, We must be satisfied if we have been able to find over a very few friends of this wort.

§ 1. μήτε πολύξεινος π.τ.λ.] Hesiod. έργ. κ. ήμ. 660.

1170 b. 91

- § 2] This section may be said to retract upon further con- b. 23. sideration what was admitted Eth. viii. 6. 3—did to applying de said to had nothing objection bedagates nother paper of touries, said in dripp apply al impresion (Genus).
- δ βίος] may be 'their means,' which seems to be the view of 5 25 Mich. Eph., who has βίοι γύρ και περιουσία ένδε σύχ Ικανή σύτω πολλοίς έπηρενείο: but the more ordinary sense of the word is, I think, preferable.
- § 3. Games molecus] Cf. Pol. H. 4 1326 8. 9 segg oforme pir our b. 80. αί πλείστοι προσήτειν μεγάλην είναι την είδαιμονα πόλιν' εί δε τουτ' άληθες, άγνους σε ποία μεγάλη και ποια μικρά πόλις κατ' άριθμου γάρ πλήθος των έντικούντων κρινουσε την μεγείλην δεί δε μάλλον μη είς το πλήθος, είς δε δύναμιν άποβλέπειν, έστι γάρ τι καλ πάλεως έργον δατε τήν δυναμένην rains paktor daoreket, rainge olynios eivat prylange . . . if he di Βάνωσου μεν εξέρχονται παλλοί του εξαθμάν, δαλέται δε υλίγοι, ταύτην αδύνατον είναι μεγάλην' οὐ γάρ ταὐτον μεγάλη τε πάλις κολ πολυύνθρωπος" dada uhr nai rourd ye én rou épyou dauspou ore nadende, idou d' άδύνατον εύνομείσθαι την λίων πολυάνθρωπον . . . όμοιως δε καλ πόλις ή per if oliver liar our airipegs of di in mollier ayar in his rois arayσοιοιε αίταρσης, διαπορ έθνος, άλλ' ού πολις' πολιτείαν γάρ ου ράδιον έπάρχειν . . . δεδ πρωτην μέν είναι πόλω άναγκείων την έκ τοσούτου πληθους δ πρώτον πλήθης οθτυρεις πρός το εδ ζηυ έστε κατά τήν moderneju zowanian ... dndon rowur ús obróz šore mideme úpos ápiaros, j μεγίστη του πλήθους υπεμβολή πρός αυτώρατων ζωής ευσύνοπτας. The State is an organism, and like all other organisms must observe definite I mits. As real sing to solow, however, it must be on as great a scale as is consistent with order -see Poet. 7, 2450 b. 36 το γάρ mahao in μεγιθεί και τυξει iori: Pol. 11. 4. 1326 2. 29 & γάρ rópine rufue vie eura not viju europlan avayenion euraflan elvau ó de λιαν ύπερβυλλων αριθρός ού δυνισαι μετέχειν τάξεως. Θεικε γάρ δη τούτο

1170 b. 30. δυνέμεως έμγον, ήτος καὶ τόδε στοίχει το τέν έπεὶ τό γε καλίω έν αλήθει καὶ μεγέθει είωθε γεωσθαί δω καὶ πάλιε, ήτ μετὰ μεγέθους δ λεχθεὶς δρος Επάρχει ταίτην είναι καλλίστην ἀναγκαίου, ἀλλὶ ἔστε τε ειὰ πόλιστ μεγέθους μέτρον, διαπερ καὶ τών άλλων πάντων, ζομιν, Φυνών, άργανων, καὶ γὰρ ταίτων έναστου αίτε λιαν μερόν αίτε κατὰ μέγεθει ὑπερβαλλων έξει την αίτοῦ δίναμε κ.τ.λ. Similarly, the friendly c tele is of the nature of an organism, and cannot include an indefinite number of persons.

b. 31. σῶτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων κ.τ.λ.] Plato, in a passage in which he is concerned with the legical analysis of the present conditions of society, rather than with the natural history of the origin and growth of society, says, «ἔη δ' ἄν ἢ γε ἀναγεωιστάτη πολιε ἐκ τεντώρων (πέντε ἀνθρών Rep. 369 D.

out in disa population] Cf. Pol in x. 1276 a. 28 the have first five reprypactive pathons idease if roless s.r.h. This currency limited idea of the size of a state, says Grant, is based on se Greek notion that each citizen must personally take part in the administration of affairs. On this hypothesis, a state consisting of a hundred thousand citizens might easily appear unwield;

According to the allegation of the 400 in Thic vii 72, the actual attendance at the Asheman Assembly always fell short of 5000. Grote (Hist. of Greece, Part 2, ch. 2, vol. v. p. 392 note ed. 1862) remarks on this— That no Assembly had ever been attended by so many as 5000 (videnánore) I certainly am far from behaving. It is not improbable, however, that 5000 was an unusually large number of citizens to attend. Nenophen (Min. iii. 6. 14) tells us that the city of Athens consisted of more than 10,000 houses— h pier moles de mondone h popular obsider arisingua. Bocck (Staatshaush. d. Ath. i. p. 43, quoted by Küliner on Xen Mon. iii. 6. 14) estimates the population of Athens (including the Piraeus) at 180,000—citizens, women, children, and slaves.

- b 32 rd be worder] d.c. the size of the city.
- 1171 a. 2. Bones] viii. 5. 3 older yep ourne dort diden de ed enfig.
 - § 4. \$71] Pritzsche reads & dr. with Kh; but &- is to be explained as a dittograph of the preceding -a.
 - 2. 3. oly olde to rollois outhe aut Biurepeir tautor] Cf. i. 7. 14 6, 7

το δ΄ αθταρκες λέγομεν οὺκ αὐτῷ μονῷ, τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονωτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ 1171 a. 3.
γυνώσει καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ δίλως τυὶς φίλοις καὶ πυλιτικε, ἐπειδή
φύσει παλιτικόν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τούτων δέ ληπτέος ὅρου τις ἐπεκτείνυντο
γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς γανιίς καὶ τοὺς ἀπογουους καὶ των φίλων τοὺς φίλους εἰς
δπειρον πρόεισω. ἄλλὰ τοῦτο μέν εἰσαὐθες ἐπισκεπτέων.

j 6. ούδε γλρ ενδέχεσθαι ... a. 13 δλίγους] 'For it would a 10 appear that it is not even possible to be a great friend of many persons; and this for the same reason that (διδαφ.—'candem ob causam ob quam,' Ramsauer) it is impossible to be in love with several persons; for, as love, which may be described as an excessive friendsh p, is for one person, so (δη a. 13) great friendship (τὸ σφόδρα φίλου είνοι) is entertained towards a fru.' As the ὑπερβολή φιλίας limits itself to one, τὸ σφοδρα limits itself to a few.

§ 8 αι δ΄ ύμνούμενα.] Mich, Eph. has 4 τοῦ 'Αχιλλούς καὶ Ποτρό- α. 18 κλου, ή τοῦ Παλάθοι καὶ 'Ορίστοι, ή τοῦ Θησίως καὶ Πειρίδου. Cf.
l'Intarch de ame orum multitudine 2 τὸ προσαγορείναι έταῦρον, ως έττρον,
αὐδίο έστιν Ελλο πλήν μέτρφ φιλίας τῷ δυάδι χρωμένων.

white moderations of except in the sense in which fellow-etizens are a. 17. "friends." Mich. Eph. cautions us against referring obs solt malourar approach to moderation, the words which moderation being a parentheses, the subject of which is taken up in the next sentence—moderation μέν οδε π.π.λ. a. 17. On πολιτική φιλία see ix. 6. §§ 2 and 3. On the approach see iv. 6. 9.

δι' dperfy δι και δι' αδτούς] αυτούς is By water's reading for the α. 10. αυτούς of the codd. I think that δι' αυτούς is right here, while δι' αυτούς is right in vif 4 2. 2 18: see note on that passage

romurous] worthy of being loved & abrove.

6. 20.

CHAPTER XI.

ARGUMENT.

We come now to the question, Whether frounds are more moded in prospects or in miserity for they are rought on both in advert by, to render at a taux and on prosperity, as associates and receptions of tenchion e. Hell, our answer to that in adversity it is more necessary to have friend on reserve in asserting men look out for weeful friends, but better to have friends in friends. perety fence men are auxious to have good friends in pre-ferry, for time armore worthy as a water, and resignants of bearfacture most but that the torpresence of and's friends is exact in advante, as we'll as in prosperity, for the twho are in sorrow are lightened by their friends greeting us, A there who let they are lightened became taker fromts take a vacre of the number, at it were or whether it is because the sorrow as reads issety the receives of front presence and by the thought of sympathete, greef need not be linear as here we fact at any rate, is that the presence of friends to brens sorrow. And yet the smeethers of these presence is a neited river new 7 to very a chi of one a formal. especially token one is in district is indeed room, and kelps one to restrain servore for the sight and word of a friend give one courage of the friend have tast: he knows one's disposition to well, and the things which give one present or pusse. On the other hamil, to see another on pain for one; weefer and a painful. Energlody avoids being the cause of from to his friends. Hime thout hearted natures through from making their fromds those from week throunless some great veises be treeredy gained undeed such natures cannot ensure companions in laministion, because they are not thomse'ces given to is men's tion. Lamentation they leave to weak women, and men as weak, who dearest on it and love as friends those who form with them in their desire s. It is their stout-hearted matures that we ought to copy for me ought to copy, in a stone. the better example.

In prospecify however, the presence of fescule gives speakness to the employ ment of lexinee and at a sweet to thank that they are now to take planness on one's will-leing wherefare at awaid seem right to be forward in calcing in one's friends to those one's prospecity, but backnown in rating them in to take part in one's adversity. One for irrow is enough, but of they are to be usual as in adversity, let it be when, with a little trouble, they are likely to be great good. On the other hand, a friend aughs to come uncalled where where if may be asked; but, unless to help in currying out some mole more, onesi to be some in coming where there is prosperity and good things are to be on each of but here again he must be conful not to seem chartish on rejecting advances.

Our conclusion then 12, that the presence of friends is always desirable

- § 1. drays a struggles with matter which opposes itself to the form of his elderstruggles with matter which opposes itself to the form of his eldermaria: n prosperity he real set it e beaut ful form without his drance.

 In the former case friends are means—instruments by means of
 which he grapples with his difficulties; in the latter case they are
 ends—persons in whom the object of his contemplation, human
 mature as a rational system, is adequately represented.
- § 2. ήδεία καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις] Bekker a. 28. comits the words καὶ εν ταῖε εὐτυχίαιε. The authorities for their comission are K^b and CCC (CCC omits it can in the text, and a later hand supplies them on the margin). They ought to be restored to the text; see Rassow, Forsch. pp. 67, 68. For δυστυχίαιε L¹, O^b, and Ald, give druχίαιε.

βάρους] Victorius, followed by other editors, quotes Nen. Alem a. 31.
i. 7. 1 Σωκρώτης Αμίστορχών ποτε όμων σκυθρωπώς έχουτα τοικας, έψη,
Βοριως φιριεν τι' χρή δε του βάρους μεταδιδύναι τούς φίλους ίσως γάρ διν
τί σε ήμεις κουφίσαιμεν Fruzsche quotes N T Gal vi 2 άλληλων
τά βάρη βαστάζετε.

† τοῦτο μὲν οῦ, κ.τ.λ. Perhaps one's friend does not relieve one of any part of the birden of one's serrow, but encourages one (παραμοθητικόν γὰρ ὁ φίλος § 3) in bear the whole weight manfully.

§ 3. παραμυθητικόν γάρ δ φίλος και τή δψει και τῷ λόγω] Coraes, b a Michelet, and Fritzsche quote Eurip. Ion 732

εί τι τυγχάνοι κακόν,
εἰε διματ' εθνου φωτὸε ἐμβλέψαι γλικύ.

Cf. Menander (apud Stob. Ε'εν. ίν. 65, od. Meineke)—
ήδύ γε φίλου λόγος έστι τοῦς λυπουμένοις.

6 4. nds μη brepretey τη druntes in there be a great b 7 balance of relief' otherwise expressed at the end of the next section, b. 19 δταν μέλλωση δλίγα δχληθεντίς μεγαλ' ουτόν ωφελήσαν. I cannot agree with the in expretation offered by Grant and most of the editors 'unless he (s.s. δ ωνδρωδης) be excessively impassive.' The charge from the plural είλαβονιστα b, 7 to the singular ίπο μίνει b. 8 is awkwaid, but need not surprise us. Bywater suggests that the clause b. 6 διόπερ . . . b. 7 αὐτοῖε should be placed after θρησητικόε b. το.

§ 5. едерустиков] вогругтичног given only by Ob is accepted by в. 16.

- 1171 b.16. Bekker. The word is a same signation. All other MSS recorded give suppression, which is rightly restored to the text by Rassow (Forsch. p. 68).
 - b. 16. Ake tyè doorvae? The Paraph. says—d roopphir come. The words, however, ho not occur in any extant play; and Ramsaure is perhaps right in thinking that too nuch has been made of the Paraphrast's remark, and that we have here a common phrase, which it is not necessary to ascribe to a particular port. Mich. Eph. refers the words to Furipides, whose does for the continue (Orest 240) is quoted by the editors.
 - b. 22. § 6. καὶ [τὰ] μὰ ἀξιώσαντος] Rassow (Fornet, pp. 68, 6,) advocates ἀξιωσαντος the reading of Kb (and CCC). This realing makes the τδ (which is difficult with ἀξιωσαντος, and is onu tool to Mb, and bracketed by Bywater, and gives place in Ald. to τοῦ) quite natural. Bywaters suggestion, τὸ before τὸ πονῶ bit, ought, I think, to be accepted.
 - b 20. Subtiobal 20. The similator.

CHAPTER XII.

ARGUMENT.

As sight is the tense dearest to lovers, being, above all other senses, the est and origin of their lave; so to spend these times together is that which for fromthe is communion. Near one a maintand related to his ferend. The processor of his own existence is chosecularly therefore the perception of his fraudic existence. This latter perception he receives an expending he late parts he friend. It is matural, then, that he should seek to spend his lipe with he friend. It follows that in whethere a man makes his as seem to court he friend. It follows that in whatever a man makes his as seem to court to that he carries to spend his time with his friend. Wherefore when to come to that he carries to spend his time with his friend. Wherefore when fearly their times as the interval or hunt, or study philosophy together—all, according to their speces, spending their days together in the pursuits with which they idensify their speces,

Thus the friendship of but men is an evolutiony for they are auctorie, and there in their that are bad, becoming stal and like to one another—the friend thip of the good is a good thing, and grows with intercourse, they become better by practice and musual correction being moulated to one another's taster,

BOOK IX: CHAP. 12: \$\$ 1-3.

40I

§ 1. 4 8' despress reverse adries do rie outher] i.e. if suppress it rie 1171 b 38.

andiparus replirate dillor des force. For airies, restored to the text by

Suscend I and Bywaler, Bekker reads adrois: airies is given by NC,

and by corr. CCC.


§ 2. ois oiorras συξήν] hace faciunt haceque inter se communi-1172 a. s. cant, quibus se arbitrantur communi vitae societate inter se coputari (Lambinus). I shink that the words are corrupt. I suggest is ois oiorras elem và (γ̄ν. NC and Paris. 1853 have ois oiorras (γ̄ν. The Paraph., with ούτω γὰρ συζήν δυνατόν, seems to have had before him the blunder & olds re which appears in Kb.

6 8. ABiBasos Beres] See vill. 8. 5.

B. G.

Aristoph. Range 1040 öder ή 'ωή φρήν ἀπομαξαμένη πολλαε ἀρετὰε ἐτοιησε Ποτρόκλων Τεύκρων, and Akciphro Ε΄ρ. τι. 64 ὁ ποις ἐε τὰ ἀκριβέστατον εξεμάξατο τὰν διδιασκόλου. Mich. Fph. has ἀπομάττοντοι χὰρ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων καὶ ἐπωπώνται πρὸς ἀπντώς τὰ ἀλλήλων ἔργα. These examples of the use of ἀπομάττεσθαι, or ἐκραττεσθαι, seem to me to support Ramsauer's remark—' ἀπομάττεσθαι παρά τενός τι τηιι us est "formum exprimere ex aliquo ut epistola obsignatur anulo," quam "ea quae placent imitando (quasi dighis) apud se effingere" —
' For they copy from each other those traits which please them.' Grant's rendering—' For they take the stamp of one another in those things which they like '—scarcely gives the exact force of ἀποματτοντοι, or brings out the construction, which is ἀπομάττοντοι (middle) παρ' ἀλλήλων ταῦτα οἶς ἀρέσκονται.

ioθλών μέν γάρ ἄπ' loθλά] Theogais: see above ix. 9. 7 a. 12: a. 18. quoted by Plato, Μοιο 95 D.



CHAPTER I.

ARGUMENT

Our next subject is France—admittedly a most emportant one—for Floring is inhered in our nature; pleasure and pain are the rudder hand, of education, there is nothing to important for morality, and consequently for the attainment of the Happy Life, as learning to lake and distals might.

The subject then must by no means be omitted expectably as it is one on a both there is great difference of opinion. for some maintain that Fleature is the thing Good while others—whether from conviction, or by may of from fraud given frauds, it may be remarked, are generally found out, and do have in the mid-there is nothing so useful as the plane tenth, maintain that it is uttery bad,

1173 c. 10. § L. wepl fiborns] See Introductory Note to vii. 11.

- α. 30. συνφκειώσθαι] 'to have an intimate connexion with our exture'
 (Peters). Mich. Eph. has—σίετα τῆ φύσει ῆρῶν ἐστὶ και ὡς κίντων
 διαντικ αἰρούμεθα καὶ διώκομεν.
- A 31 πρός την τοῦ ήθους άρετήν] Kb, Mb, Nt, and Cambr. sead άρχην Mich. Eph., however, seems to have had derrive before him. It is note is—μέγιστον δή φησε και πρός την τοῦ ήθους άρτην τὸ χεωριν οἰν διι' ήθους άρτην είπων οὐτην την αρετήν his el l'arya, δοκει δὶ καὶ πρός την τῆς ήθιεῆς άρετῆς ετῆσιν μέγιστα συντελείν τὸ γαίρειν οἰς hi n.t.λ. Cf. Plato, Legg. 6.33, and E.N. ii. 3. §§ 1-4, also Pol. O. 3. 1340 2. 14 8qq, where the principle ἡ δὶ αρετή περά τὸ χαιρικο ἐρόως

sel piles rel proces is applied to determine the place of Music in 1179 a 91 education, and the kinds of music that are to be taught.

§ 2. Owip be the recourse For imp-repl with gen, in the Ethus, a 26 see notes on l. 5. 7, i. 6. 13, iii. 3. 2, iv. 2. 4.

of μέν . . . of δέ] Fudoxus . . . Speusippos. 'In all probability,' a. 27. says Grant ad loc., 'Aristotle here alludes immediately to two sections of the Platonists, (1) the party represented by Fudoxus, whose arguments are quoted; (2) that headed by Spensoppus, whose an ihedonistic arguments were contained in two books mentioned by Diogenes Lacrius, under the tiles sept idonie a 'Aptortunos o', and which are now passed under review. Under the class of those who "call pleasure the chief good," Aristotle less directly refers to Aristippus, who, though he belonged to a tygone era still lived in the pages of Plato's Philebur, and in the book of Speusippus bearing his name.'

Ramsauer has a persinent observation that in the parallel passage vii tt. 3 of rayodan adanju kiyarres are not mentioned. Mich. Eth. has a very interesting note here. E6dofor piv the odarge ratrae dero rayadi eidinie yap donge mit altine mieres rue inalin irdero, is of the line aperteinure to abrufyou tou fow επί το αύτοδο τών δυτων καί του αυτούνθρωπου τών δυθρώπων και τύ σύτοκάλλος τῶν καλλῶν!. According to this account the doctrire of Fudexus concerning pleasure was a development of, or perhaps only another way of stating, Plato's doc rine of the like rayabol. If it was this, Anstotle is unfair to it when he insinuates (as he does below ch. 2 § 1) that it was a doctrine of mere bedomen (in the Cyrenae sense) - a doctr ne which was not supposed to be so immoral in tendency as it really was, only on account of the temperate character of its author. Aristotle is too much inclined to criticise Plato and the Platonists au pied de la lettre. Is his criticism of Eudoxus a case in point?

of per lows memeropieros . . . of be Two classes of of if evarior a, 20 σομιδή φουλον λέγοντος. So the Paraph.

Sed Selv . . . pérov] Cf. ii. 9. 5 'Aristotle does not approve of a 32 this being done by means of a sacrifice of truth? (Grant),

^{2 (} f the marginale in Lb on t. 12, 5 (where see note) They grap (8 16666601) την ήδουην όποσεινα είναι πάντων των άγαθων



404 BOOK X: CHAP, 1: §§ 3, 4.

1172 a. 38. § 3. reig nata the alongow] 'palpable facts' (Peters).

- rolaury) e.c. cherje understood from ideaprese. Mel. Eth. has — déporter the house chaides, elsa deschairestes dyades és est dudween alrip. The Paraph, has -6 yip pigur vie plusie ifthe ποτε έφιέμενος αίτης, αποκλινές δοκει προς αυτήν και αγοδών ήγεισδα. eat out a differ for that role domein of the house dynder circle all. and die and an entire of the special and services and to his interspinen, entigeabar de allas paidas eine, and east the wallow like άμα το είδον του υπών έχουτα ήδους του χαιροντα, και κάσαν ήδουτο άχυδου cal alperde géféquese cient, en corner ob passes à éfficientes ada fantese. dala not the adifferent approximation - t. e. they say without qualification, by way of 1 ious fraud, that all pleasure is had; but when they are seen to seek some pleasures, they are thought to inhante that all pleasure is good. They thus not only fail to get people to enter into their pious fraud-to believe the general proposation 'all pleasure is bad' - but they also discredit the participate proposition 'some pleasures are bad,' which, as their own actions show, is what they really believe to be true, and wish people to act upon. It would have been wiser to say at first that some pleasures are bad to distinguish for the benefit of those who, unable to distinguish for themselves generalise hastily from topa. For he receives Ald, NC, Paris, 1853, and B' read he of receives $(=\psi_{\alpha\alpha\gamma\dot{\gamma}\nu}).$
- b 3 § 4.] But a distinction which is consonant with fore is of great practical use to those who understand it (reis ownered); of course, only those can understand moral definctions placed before them, who have had the preliminary moral train ug naised on in E. N 1: of. i. 4. 6 and del role lbeam fallen andie rie ment endar en dienum ent adus ror nodirent innunfusion lemme Without such moral training no one can display the owners which comerts έν τῷ χρήσθαι τῆ δοξη επί τὸ κρίνειν περι τοίτων κτρί ών ἡ φροκροίς form, Whom heyevers, and spiners nakus (E.N. vi. 10 3). It is in connexion with the doctrine of oursess thus laid down that we must understand the expression role owners in the present passage. For the practical value of hopos, or you our, to those who have received good moral training, see note on 1. 3. 7rois de nord hispor rds opefees notouperous and mpartours makingules de elly to meal routur eidings.

CHAPTER II.

ARGUNENT.

Emisens thought that Picarure was the Chief Good, (1) because all creatures, rational and vrational pursue it his doctrine was accepted actrue, not so resuch in a steeper to take an evipartial vero of Florance (1), (2) because all creatures would be controlly. Pain. I wither, he argued that up one acts why Piersure v describe, and that added to any good thing very the performance of putties, it makes their good thing better. This last argument we may say in fating present that Planure is a good thing, but not that it is the good sinced it is the soft argument that Planure is not the chief Good, he organic, cannot be enhanced by the advance of any other good, and Pleasure with Windom is better than Pleasure without Windom.

There who meet Endorus with the objection—that what oil pursue is not good, commet themselves to an antenable position. What all pursue must be good manufactly what all rational beings pursue; and even the irrational creatures are discovery impelled to seek after their sum good.

Nor to there any force on the objection varied against the argument which Eudones draws from the universal avoidance of Fiam, the contrary of Pleasure The objection is "that it does not follow from Fain being earl, that Pleasure is good, for each may be opposed to earl, and both earls to that which is neutral" This formula of appositions, als very well as a formula, but it is not apposable to Harmer and Fain for if both were earl, we should find both avoided, if he both were the first were neutral one should find menther avoided, or both avoided airly, whereas we see plainly that men avoid the one as earl, and took the other as good.

§ 1. Ευδοφος] of Cnidus, one of Plato's disciples, a celebrated 1172 b. 9 astronomer, mentioned in Met. A. 8 as the author of a theory of the notions of the heavenly bodies, which is described, and in Met. A. 9, 991 a. 15, as holding the view that the ideas are mixed in sensible things, like the δροιφορή of Anaxagoras—cf. Alex. ad loc. (p. 72. 4) sal Εθδοφοι τον Πλάτωνοι γνωρίμων μιξει τον Ιδάτων δι νοίε προς αυτάς το είναι έχουσιν ήγειτο έκαστον είναι: cf which view he proceeds to give the refuta ion contained in the second Book of Armothe's περί ideas, but omitted in the Metaphysius: see Alex. Met. 73. 11 (cd. Bomtz). Eudoxus' theory of pleasure,

1172 b. 0. discussed here, has already been mentioned E N : 12. 5, on which see note.

Spengel (Arist. Stud i. Nic. Eth. pp 218, 219) and Ramsuc complain, unnecessarily I think, of the confused manner in which the argument of Eudoxus is here presented.

- b 15 διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἦθους ἀρετἦν] Grant sees in this 'a pleasing reference to the personal character of Eudoxus': Lut see note on x. 1. 2, a. 27.
- b. 20. § 2. Spoise] f. t. not aird warm (Ramsauer).

δ μη δι' δτερον μηδ' δτέρου χάρεν] The latter of these expressions seems to be added merely as an alternative for the former. They seem to have exactly the same meaning.

- auteobar de] Bekker reads kal auferbar die. Kh and Lh omit w ъ. 25. Ramsauer, Susemili, and Bywater read offeodu &c, the &c being Ramsauer's conjecture for the bij of the cold. Spengel (Artic Sand, 218) asks with some force—How could Endexus, who wished to prove that hoosy is edyador, have used this argument as At stotle here (§ 3) understands it? What Footowas real) meant, Spengel thinks, was something very different -viz. When idour is added to any good thing however small, that good thing surpasses all other good things however great to which floor is ted That which can thus enhance the smallest good abese the greatest, must itself stand higher than the greatest must be, in short, rayodir. This view of the relation of idory to dyads, attributed to Eudoxus by Spengel, agrees substantialy with the account of his theory given by Mich. Eph. (see note on E.N. x 1. 2), and with the marginal commentary on 1, 12, 5 in Lt (see note ad loc.) Theye gap the hoosing the trent cival matter the analog.
- b. 38. § 3. Πλάτων] See Philebus 60 D. E. where it is shown that the best life for man is δ μωτός βιος ήδουής να ααλ φρασφασια.
- b. 81. οὐδινὸς γὰρ προστεθέντος αὐτῷ κ.π.λ.] 'For the highest good is not made better by the addition of anything' For αἰτῷ Kh ṭakara it would seem) gives αἰτὸ preferred by Bekker and Susemild.
- b. 24. § 4. rf our cori rotoure a.r. A] 'What good is there, then, which is thus incapable of addition, and at the same time such as men can participate in it?' (Peters.)

oi & lescrapevos m.r.d.] Those who bring against the first 1172 b 35 argument of Eudoxus the objection, or feoreasts (An. Prior. ii. 26, 69 a. 37 secreasts & sort separatest separatest securia), that 'what all seek is not good,' commit themse ves to an untenable position in Aristotle's opinion; & ydp naos donsi, radr' sland paper—securus judical orbis terrarum. Their securous is supodofos, and, as such, is dialectically inadmissible, dialectic admitting only sudofa, save when the paradoxes are those of great philosophers (disess); as for the paradoxes of ordinary men, it would be silly to pay attention to them—Top i. 11. 104 b. 22 rd yop row recovers securia rule diffuse interparation possible softers.

opiγera.] Bekker's δρίγετο is the reading of Lb, Paris, 1853, 1175 a. 8. and apparently of Mich. Eph. and the Paraph. All other authorities (including CCC, Cambr., B', B*, B*) have δρίγεται, adopted by Bywater. For d in this line and in the next, we perhaps ought to follow Michelet in reading β.

adray Cambr. has airie.

8.8

ην δι τι λεγόμενον] Bekker's νό before λεγόμενον 18 omitted by Kb, Lb, Mb, Ob, Cambr, NC, Paris, 1853, Bb.

φαύλοις] the 'inferior,' or irrational animals—τά ἀνόφτα.

a. A

ton τι φυσικόν ἀγαθόν] Susemill, following Thurot, brackets ἀγαθόν, and Bywater's note is—' ψυσικόν ἀγαθόν fort, secludenda.' I think that it is likely that both words come from the margin.

they seem to be indulging merely their own caprices, as individuals, they seem to be indulging merely their own caprices, as individuals, they are really maintaining the elder of their race—striving after το δεί και το δείον. At the end of the Philebus (67 B) Socrates says that to go to the lower animals for arguments in favour of pleasure is to trust 'the augury of binds,' instead of 'the Muse of Philosophy IO. Οὐκοῦν πέμπτον κατά τὴν κρίσω, ἡν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἀπτφήτατο γιγναι' ἀν ἡ τῆς ἡδονης δύνομις. ΠΡΩ Τέωκον. ΣΩ. Πρώτον δί γε οὐδ' ἀν οἱ πάντες βότε τε καὶ ἱπκος καὶ τάλλα ξύμπαντα δηρία φώσε τὰ τὸ χαίρεω διώκουν, οἶς πιστεύοντες, ώσπερ μάντεςς δρείσων, οἱ πολλοὶ κρίνουσε τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰε τὸ ζην ἡμιν εὖ κρατίστας εἰναι, επὶ τονε θηριων ἔρονας οἰονται τυρίους εἰναι μάρτιμας μάλλον ἡ τοὺς τῶν ἐν Μούση φιλοσόφφ μεμιντινμένων ἐκάστοτε λόγων. Aristotle may have had this passage in his mind here.

- 1178 a. 6. § 6. oda šouce be obbe mept rou évarriou nahus héperbal 'nor a what the opponents of Eudoxus say about "the contrary" (re about his argument from the contrary—viz. pain—cea here if fer elem parepar de rou évarriou § 2 above) satisfactory enther?
 - of yap dane, a.r.h.] See notes on vi. 13. 1. Mich. Epa. ha the following commentary here—d de rod describe occarios my ήδουήν άγοθου λόγος τοιούτος ήν εί ή λύπη ένωτια αίστα τη έδουή καιο έστω, αγαθόν άρα ή ήδωή. πόθεν δέ; - ότι ή λίπη αμόν, έκ του κώνι φεύγεω αύτης, πρός τουτος του λόγος του δε του έκαπίος συσερτώτε the floorly dyador, delocated & Incidenties higher, our deaper, incide and έστεν ή λύπη άγαθον είναι την άντικειμένην αίτη ήδονήν ού γυρ το то антисирског пасф ауавых сотиг антисках уда ту враситуль вых bere, of bridia, and our force dyadir of bridia, didd analy ... arricemus our digit Incompres nat nacos nach sui deche ve processe. τουτεστε και αμφώτερα τὰ κυκά τῷι άγαθῷ μηλετερού γορ τὸ άγαθω είχο. al yap aperal perdentes abrat abberepur rur arpur eine f 30/3 aberes obre deshia oure oparity early, and lives rains suline, almost you रेजनाथ बोक्सिय हैन्द्र सेथनीसारास सामध्ये सामध्ये, साथै वैद्यापीरेनन्यूय गर्व स्वाच्ये ग्रम् केंग्रुकीन τούτο μέν οθν λίγουσε καλώς το δ΄ ότι ή ήδουή ώς κακαν κακή είντακτα τη λίπη λέγουσαν οἱ καλώς. οἱ γὰρ ἀντικισται ἡ ἡδονή τῆ λυπη ὡς κικο enem art, we adopt a wall of did the maje of figured for any character and μισηγόν ώς ή λύπη του δό την μέν λύπην φιύγος παντα . . . ώς εκείν. dianes de rep hamin de ayaban.
 - a. 8. ἄμφω τῷ μηδετέρφ] τῷ μηδετέρφ seems to be the reading ony of Γ, Mich. Eph., and Ar. All other authorities apparently reading μηδέτερα (80 Kh, Lh, Oh, Bl, Bl, CCC, NC, Cambr. Ald.) or τῷ μηδέτερον (Mh, Bl). The reading τῷ μηδέτερα το ετοπος supported by Plato, Rep. 583 E ἢ καὶ δυνατόν τὸ μηδέτερα δυ διμότερα γίγνεσθαι words which occur in a context which, I think, Ar. stolic has in his mind here.
 - a. 10. δμφοῖν γὰρ δετοιε (τῶν) κακῶν] Bywater adds των—a di uner improvement to the clause. The δετων κακῶν οἱ Κὸ (Δεεὶ Κὰ accepted by Bekker and Susemikh, shows us how the or ginal των dropped out.
 - a. 11 The particular bi undirector h ducing. The construction apparently is run undirector di direct (if both pleasure and pain belong to the class of neutral states), undirector (neither of them) the provide elea, h ducing factories deserted to a Course puts it —ei form

διμφω κακό, ή το ήδονη και ή λύπη, έχρην και διμφω φεύγειν εί δ' ήσου 1178 a. 11.
μηδέτερα, μήτο κακό, δηλονότε, μήτ' όγαθά, έχρην ή μηδετερου φευγείν,
ή όμοιως διώτορου. Μ.ch. Eph gives what seems to me a less
satisfactory explanation of μηδέτερου—τουτεστών οθτε φεύγομων οθτε
δεώτομων: while ή όμοιως he explains— ήτοι όπίσης ή διωκημού ή
φευγομών.

As directed against Speusippus the words before us are pointless. Speus ppus did not regard pleasure and pain as pyderipa, but ax some- Speusippus vetusque omnis Academia voluptatem et dolorem duo mala esse dixerunt opposita inter se, bonum autem esse quod utrausque medium foret -Aul. Gell. ix. 5. In fact, only the words authors yap durous (this) saude are referable to Speas ppus. As regards the words the underspow de underspow h duction, one would be tempted to accept the latter of the alternatives offered by Ramsauer-' aut corrigenda, aut secludenda'- were it not possible to point to the discussion in Rep. 583 sq. (mentioned above), where howis, or to perage is spoken of as sometimes 'painful,' sometimes 'pleasant.' It will be seen that Plato's attaude to the supposition run underspow de is practically the same 28 Aristotle's - had in addous ye, ofman, moddous minimus aladdres yeproμενούε τούε ανθρωπούε, έν οίε, όταν λυπώνται, το μή λυπείσθαι και τήν ήσυχίαν του τοιούτου έγκωμιάζουσαν ώς βδιστων, ού το χαίρειν. Τούτο γάρ, ion, rore ijdi lows sul dyamprov piqueras, houxia. Kal Grav movogras άρα, είπαν, χαίρων τις, ή της ήδωνης ήσυχία λυπημών έσται. "Ισως, έφη, *Ο μεταξά δρα νύν δη άμφοτερων έφαμεν είναι, την ήσυχιαν, τούτό ποτε άμφότερα έσται, λύπη τε και ήδανή. *Εσικεν. *Η καὶ δυνατόν τό μηδίτερα δυ δμφότερα γιγνεσθαι; Οθ μοι δοκεί. Καὶ μὴν τό γε ήδυ ἐν ψυχή γεγνόμενον καὶ τὰ λυπηρών κίνησίς τις άμφοτέρω έστάν ή οδ , Ναί. Τὸ λε μήτε λυπηρόν μήτε ήδυ ούχλ ήσυχία μύντοι καλ έν μεσφ τούτουν έφανη άρτε; Κφανη γάρ. Πώτ αυν άρθως έντε τα μή άλγειν ήδυ ήγεισθαι ή το μή χαίρειν άναιρον; Βόδαμως. Οδα έσταν άρα τούτο, άλλα φαίνεται, ξυ δ' έγω, παρά το άλγεινου ήδυ και παρά το ήδυ άλγεινου τώτε ή ήσυχία, και ούδεν ύγεις τούτων των φαντασμάτων πρός ήδυνής άληθειαν, άλλά γοητεία τις. 'Δε γούν ὁ λόγος, έφη, σημαίνει, 'Ιδέ τοίνου, έφην έχώ, ήδονώς, οἱ οὐε ἐκ λυπών εἰσών, ἵνα μή πολλάκιε οἰηθητ ἐν τῷ παμάντε ούνω νουνο πεφιιείναι, ήδοιην μέν πουλου λύπης είναι, λύπην δε ήδουής. Nou di, Thy, sat notae hoyers, Hahhai per, einov, sai ühhau, paheuru d'el Olheis involptus rès repl rès éques ifovés, abrai yèp où apahuπηθεντι εξαίφνης άμηχανοι το μέγεθος γίγνονται, παυσαμεναί το λύπην οίδεμίων παταλείπουσιν. 'Δληθέστατα, έφη, Μή έρα πειθωμεθα παθαράν

1173 a. 11. ήδουής είναι την λύπης ἀπαλλαγήν, μηδί λύπης την ήδουής. Μέ τον ΄Αλλά μεντοι, είπον, οί γε διά του σωματος έπι την ψυχην τνικασα καλ λεγάμενας ήδαναί, σχεδον οί πλείσται το καὶ μέγεσται, τυίσον τὸ είδους είνε, λυπών τικές ἀπαλλαγοί.

It remains only to note that, for undiregone, Kb, r, CCC, Caralt.

B1, B2, B1 read & frepor.

n. 13. οδτω δή καὶ ἀντίκειται] ώς τὸ μὸν σίμετον τὸ ἐἰ φενετίο ὅν (Ransauer). I think that λόνη îs the subject of ἀντίκεται: see the Paraph.—δθεν φανερόν ὅτο ὡς κακὸν ἀγαθῷ ἡ λύνη ἡλοη ἀντικτον. Μὸ gives the caster reading ἀντίκευται.

CHAPTER III.

ARGUMENT.

The argument that ' Pleasure is not good, because it is not a Quality' provites much -vertuous actions are not qualities, nor is Mappiness a quality.

To those who argue that 'Pleasure is not good, because it is independe, and sudepende be auto it admits of degrees' my animar— n, Ferhaps your common relies on the corrumatance that people are pleasure of neurons degrees but you cannot infer that there are degrees in Pleasure stief because people are pleasure various admits of comparative and infer degrees in disascrops, because of the neuros admits of comparative and inferious degrees businesses, because the services of the new orders of the population of degrees then, see animar it is not then next of framers you took they ended admit of degrees, but it is not to the next of the pure pleasures that you ought to be for embence. In I was to the you maintain that even the pure pleasures admit of degrees, we may grant that they do, without allowing your inferiors that therefore they are indefinite and bad a thing may aimset of degrees within definite mate. Acade, a warren, without coaring to be the diposite thing that it is. so may pleasure too.

The argument that the good is perfet, or has realized the end, whereast Processers is only a Motion or a Frances which is imperfect, we must by founding out that it is immensing to speak of Plassiers, which is marker quick new slaw, as a Motion; or as a Process of generation—for what, it may be asked as generated out of what by the so-varied process, and what is resolved back two what by the veverse process, from I To say that Poin is the dissolved meaning. It sees, it may be asked, are the generation of the so-varied by the so-varied generation; and teporated by the so-varied identificant.

Apain, to describe Fleature at Kepletion is to confound Pleasure stuff and a indip process with which cortain pleasures are associated. Those lower pressures which are felt when want is being satisfied, for the higher pleasures - those of thinking and some of the boiltly pleasures—are not associated with the repletion

of want and the rejust of passe.

to those who bring forward the disgraceful pleasures as evidence against Preasure in general, we have to point out that it is only to ill-conditioned natures that the objects of these pleasures are 'pleasant', in short that there are good pleasures and bad pleasures those being good which attend good functions, or are easted by good objects, bad, which attend bad functions, or are raised by bad obje to

I had passeres deffer specifically as their objects differ is, in thort, our final ammoor to those whose arguments we have been examining. It is unmeaning to nay ' l'isames is good,' or ' Pleasure es bad.' Pleasure in what Objects ' we disk. There are objects in which we ought not to take pleasure, and there are objects which we should pursue even of no pleasure were connected with them.

We see, then, on the one hand that Pleasure es meither the Chief Good nor ail desirable, and on the other hand that some pleasures are desirable.

§ 1.] See Cat. 8. 8 b. 27, where ifens are given as the first and 1170 a. 18 most important kind of noisygres. The aperal, or virtuous effers, are, it is true, nodrapre- and, as possessing such nodrapre, we are now! vives and dyafol (E N i. 9. 8), but there are things which are not notingers, and yet are good. The trippens which spring from doern 200 Hol motorgree: ef. Poel. 6. 1450 2. 18 kai yap & evdatuovia ev epufes dari, kal ra redor apafie rie forth od noubrys' elot de kard per ra 4θη ποιοί τενες, εατά δε τὰν προξεις εὐδαίμονει ή τολναντίον. Το be good a thing need not be a permanent state (igis), like virtue of health. The act of vision, e.g., is good and perfect within the limits of a moment. So a so is the experience of pleasure (see x. 4. 1). The argument which Anstotle here opposes is founded on a very natural feeling-viz, that to be good, and worth having, a thing must endure permanently; especially the conscious life of the individual to be worth having at all, must endure permanently. But Arasto le does not share this feeling. Consciousness, he would tell us, is fully good within the limits of an indivisible moment; is essential goodness is independent of time - let those who maintain that if the individual consciousness is ever to be extinguished, then it is not worth having at all, look at Nature. Why does Nature produce the individual organisms of plants and animals, and allow them to perish without possibility of revival? Is it not 'good' for these individuals to live while they live, and are their lives less perfect and good, because they are not permanent?

1179 a. 18. 'Αλλά μήν οὐδε τῷ ἀίδιον εἶνοι μάλλον ἀγαθὸν ἔστοι, εἶκερ μεδέ λεικότερο τὸ πολυχρόνου τοῦ ἐφημέρου.

It will be observed that the position combated in the present of (x, 3, 1) is really that which the writer of vii. 12, 2 attacks—the simple identification of the and dyador; see note there on managed to plu despute to d'after 1152 b 33.

- a. 15. § 3. λέγουσε... ή του] See Plato, Philipus 24 Ε. ΣΩ. Νέο μισε εθρει τής του ἀπείρου φύστας εὶ τυῦτο διξόμαδα σημείου, Îνα μὰ ταντ ἐπεξιόντες μηκύνωμεν. ΠΡΩ. Τὰ ποίου δὴ λέγεις; ΣΩ. 'Οπόσ' ἐν ἰμω φαίνηται μαλλόν το καὶ ἡττον γιγνόμενα καὶ τὸ σφόλρα και ἡρεμιο δεχομικε καὶ τὸ λίαν καὶ δσα τοιαίτα πάντα, εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου γένος ὡς εἰς ἐν δεὶ κάνει ταύτα ειθίναι; και αίνα δόμελους 31 Α νοῦς μεν αίτιας ἤν ξεγγενής και τούτου σχείδον του γένους, ἡδονή δὲ ἄπειρος το αὐτή καὶ τοῦ μισο ἀρχὴν μήτο μένο μήτα τέλος ἀν ἱαυτώ ἀφ' ἐμυτοῦ ἔχοντος μηδὲ ἔξοντος ποτε γένους.
- el ple ofe de tol foedbar touto apleaudi . If it is from absert is people pleased that they come to the conclusion that pleasure admisof degrees at d is therefore not good, they will have, by punty of reasoning, to conclude that justice admits of degrees and is derefore not good, because people are just in various degrees.' (/. Cat. 8, 10 b. 33 discionomy più yap discionime al mare pari des diverbles midden see heren, oude bytesen byteses. Heren mines Exer Trepor tripov tyletar, kai discamorune trepor tripov . . . Biraibrepos yas tripor irepon kiyeras. Thus vo ilkerthas, 'the being pleased'-for which we may substitute o hooursos, the man who is pleased answers to the adjective dismor in the passage quoted from the Calgorier; and as discuss may become discussivepor, so & fide person may be ' serve pleased', but as we do not infer from bumbrepor that bemoving itself is indefinite and bad, so we must not infer from foreign μάλλου that ήδουή is indefinite and bad. The Paraph. has i extraore mil å ureate en ro ådeadar generat det åbouenor pudden mil årren bederem. Toute de nal en rais aperais auppainon hairerai dinaise yan eles pallos καὶ ἥττον ἀνδρεῖοι . . . ἀλλ' οὐ δια τοῦτο αόριστοί είπιν αι αρετας τον αντο δή τρύπον καὶ ή ήδονή αὐτή μέν καθ' ἐσυτήν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀύριστος, ἐν δὲ τιὰ independes of entractive and of decour inidexeras. Similarly Marte byth. speaks of the elder of the elvar of distinction, supposing, or how, as being roof onep forest, and as avenirards to an assurros. The detinction drawn here and in Cal 8, 10 b. 33, between drawne and Simmoring is new familiar as that between an sujective which a lines of 'degrees of companson,' and an abstract noun which does not

But this and other distinctions of the kind did not present them- 1173 a 17. selves to Austotle and his contemporance as 'grammatical' distinctions. Grammar, as a separate spoymeno, did not as yet exist. Much that seems on, of place, and even involous, in Austotle's discussions of physical and other questions, and especially in his refutations of the views of opponens, is to be explained by this circumstance. Distinctions not clearly recognised as grammatical were thought to be germane to subjects with which we should say at once that they have nothing to do. But although the scientific subjects immedia ely in hand often derived little benefit from such verbal de-custions, language, the instrument of all science was being perfected by them for future use. One of the most interesting acl ievements of the Greeks was the abstraction of the Form from the Matter of Speech, as we find it made by Apodomias and his brith regrammar ans; and not the least important aspect in which Greek philosophical activity (and notably Aristotle's philosophy) may be regarded is as the process by which the abstraction was gracually effected, and language made an instrument of fine thinking. The services of the schoolmen, too, in this respect must not be ignored.

el 82 rais 480vais . . . marail I agree with Rassow (Fors. A. a. 23 p 69) that the correct reading is that of Kb, if he rose flowers so votre spiroves. With spiror either is or the dat, may be used in cases like this, but not in, which Bekker reads be one rais formais. But if they come to the conclusion that pleasure is lad from looking not at people pleased, but at the nature of the various pleasures then selves. I fear that they have not got hold of the right premisses for their purpose, if there he any truth in their own distinction between pure and trixed pleasures'-r. e. although the mixed pleasures may be indefinite, the pure pleasures certainly are not and it is to them, rather than to the it ked pleasures, that we have a right to ask of rair ifdora's appropries to go for the r premisses. Cf. Philebus 52 C, where ouerpla is assigned as the characteristic of the mixed, and lupurple of the pure pleasures. 'Speusippus,' says Grant, ii. p. 319, 'forgetful of this distinction appears to have made imercia a universal predicate of pleasure." The guern ijdoval of Plato are the bodily pleasures which involve pain and want, the ourger or molopoi the intellectual pleasures and those bod ly pleasures which involve neither pain nor want-the

- 1178 a. 92. pleasures of smell, night, and hearing. Mich. Eph. is, therefore, entirely wrong when he says keyet de duryet per ficous airò aid air yap's rivos inose peron rò eldos rife fidories nooiperor... perpenna d'ai ir épol nal ool de dimedose nal divious lorsonas.
 - a. 23. § 3. Kal rl Kwhden, R.T.A.] Bekker's rl ydo kwhóm is the reading of Mh alone. Oh has ri yan nohorron, but yan is not given by ar y other MS. Kb hat sai re audirem, I'vi de audire, and Lb, CCC, Cambr, B', B', NC, Pa all have ri subbit of. The authority therefore for Bekker's you is of the sightest. This seems to have been substituted for sai or de to make the clause explain the erroneous meaning attached to meral, which were taken (as by Mich, Eth. quoted at the end of last note) to be al is inol sai on, while al dangers were thought to stand for en elder ene flowers. But if we read el de cale. (see Rassow, Forsch. pp. 69, 70), the clause is seen to contain not an explanation of a. 22 el di . . . 2, 23 meral, but a new argument against the vew the honder dopioton client. The first part of § 2 argued that the fact that people are pleased more and less does not imply that pleasure itself admits of more and less or is indefinite the second part of § 2 argued that even though the mixed or lower bodily pleasures may themselves admit of more and less and be indefinite, yet the pure pleasures are not indefinite; while the clause beginning to de makin goes further, and questions the value of the inference adjustes elem our digital to make and [14] free, and suggests that the closs of even a pure pleasure may display degrees without ceasing to be the eidee that it is, or becoming deputer
 - a. 25. of ydp is adrif our perpia. These words seem to me to prove that Aristotle is not thinking of the mixed pleasures in this section, as most of the commentators suppose, but of the pure pleasures which invoive imperpia or proportion (Phil. 52 C). Aristotle, using for the occasion Platonic language, points out that the definite proportion which constitutes a pure pleasure may be realised and maintained in different ways, just as the balance of health or write may be effected by many different arrangements of the elements which are organised. Grant seems to me to be wrong when he says in his note here "even the mixed pleasures, says Aristotle, admit the idea of proportion (our perpia)."
 - a 29. § 4. τέλειόν τε τάγαθὸν τιθέντες] Plato, Philibm 53 C-54 C: see notes on vii. 12. 3. Aristolle's argument against the new that

pleasure is a singue 18—If pleasure is a 'motion,' it must be quick 1178 a 20 or slow. Can we speak of pleasure as quick or slow? We may pass into a pleasurable state quickly or slowly; but the pleasure actually felt is not quick or slow; see Phys. E. 1. 225 b. 8 for the three kinds of εἰνησιε—(1) ἡ τοῦ ποιοῦ—ἀλλοίωστε; (2) ἡ τοῦ ποιοῦ—αξέρους ποὶ φθέσιες (3) ἡ ποιὰ τόποι—φορά.

καὶ εί μη καθ' αύτην, οδον τη του κόσμου, πρός άλλο] The κύσμος a. 32. is here the universe, as one whole, moving with the aparor obpanic, or andards opage, the rechopopia of which is uniform, and therefore cannot be called either quick or slow, when regarded per se-mos σίνην, although προς δίλο-compared with the proper motions of the inner planetary spheres—it is quick. With olior vy voo soo pou we must understand our fore right sal spediers and airin. On the motion of the newros of pards see de Coelo ii. 6, 288 a. 13 mept be rise εινήσεως αύτοθ ότι όμαλής έστι καί συκ άνωμαλος, έφεξης τών εξημένων διελθείν' λέγω δέ τούτο περί του πρώτου ούρανού και της πρώτης φοράς; see notes on ni. 3 3 The comment of Mich Eph. on the present passage is-8 di diyet forin el ph nava augore adri auf aurin es θάττον επιδέχεται, αίου ή του κόσμου, λέγων εύν κύσμου αὐτήν τήν άπλανή opripar direcidence pip fore rigore eal spaduryroe did to opadur πωνίσθαι τήν τοιτότην σφαίραν, ώς έν τῷ περί ούρανοῦ δίδεικτας άλλ' οὐν προς τὰς τῶν πλανωμένων κινήσεις εξ τις αύτην παμαβάλλοι, εὐρήσει θάττονο páro poddě tur america islima.

τούτων ούδότερου] L'heasure has ταχος καὶ βραδύτης neither καθ α 39 αύτήκ, ποι πράτ άλλο.

ήσθηναι] 'το become pleased' = μεταβάλλεω εία την ήδουη» α. 34

fileofae] 'to have the feeling of pleasure'= ἐνιργών κατ' αὐτην b. 1. b. 3.

§ 8] In this section Aristotle deals with the view that ήδωνή is υ. 4. a γίνεσες, in the same way as he has dealt with the view that it is a πίνησες. If it is a γένεσες, he argues, there must be certain definite elements which this particular γένεσες called ήδωνή organises; and the disorganising process, or φθωρά, contrary to this γένεσες—which is λώση αccording to the Platonists, for they say οδ γένεσε ή ήδωνή, τούτου ή λύση φθωρά—will leave these same elements in separation for our inspection. Where are the elements in question?

- 1173 b. 6. They are not to be found. The term γίνοσε is used with as Lie regard for its real meaning as the term γίνοσε is when applied to that which is neither quick not slow. It is to be careful y noted, that kal ob γίνοσε ή ήδονη, τούτου ή λυπη ψθορά is the statement of the Platonisis. See Grant's note ad loc, to which I am much invelted. Much, Eph. has the following comment on this section—I wis am ή ήδονή γυνεσιε ήν, ήν διν όδόν τις και μεταθολή δε τωνο εξε τι, ώς ή μέλωσες ία λενκού είς μέλαν..., οὐα έντι δί ἐπὶ τῆς ήδονῆς οθτε τὸ ἀρ' οἱ εἶτι τὸ εἰς δ, οὐε ἔπη γάρο οῦτε τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον και μεταθολλον και γεγισμένο το διὰ ήδονῆς οθτε τίλος τι εἰς δ τελευτή ή ήδονῆ, δαπερ ή θγίανσιε εξε την ύγιειαν καὶ ή δύρμανσιε εἰς τὸ θερμόν καὶ τοῦτο εἰκότων ανιμβαίνει, οἱ γαρ ἐστι γένεσιε ἀλλ' ενέργεια, ὡς δαξει, εοὶ αὶ ἐπέργειαν τέλη εἰοὶτ ἀλλ' κὸς ὁδοὶ πρὸς τελη ... οὐε ἔστι γάρ μάριον τε τοῦ χρόνον καί δν ήδεται ἐπ ῷ οὐ τέλος ἦν ἐν τῷ ήδομένω ἡ ήδονή, τὸ δ' ἐν δεκοι τοῖε μέρεσι τοῖ χρόνον τέλειον τι καὶ δλόκληρον δν οὐ γένεσίε ἐπτιν ἄλλ' εὐεργεια. See x 4 4.
 - b. 7. § 6] The following passage in the Philippet (31 E-32 B) presents the doctrine criticized in this section, as well as that disposed of in § 5. 20. Helog μέν που λύνες καὶ λύπη; ΠΡΩ. Ναί. 20. Helog δέ, πλήρωσες γεγνημένη παλιν, ήδονή; ΠΡΩ. Ναί. 1Ω. Δίθτε δ΄ αδ φθορά καὶ λίπη [καὶ λύπες], ή δε τοῦ ύγρον παλιν το ξορανθέν πληκεσα δύντιμε ήδονή. διακρισε δέ γ' αὖ καὶ διαλυσες ή παμά φύσεν, τοῦ πτιρενε παθη, λυπη; κατά φύσεν δ' ή πάλεν ἀπόδοσίς το καὶ ψέξος ήδοκή. ΠΡΩ. Πανι μέν οὖν. ΕΩ. Καὶ βίγονο ή μεν παρά φύσεν του (ωνα της υγρανικα πήξεν λίπη' πάλιν δ' εἰς ταὐτάν ἀπείντων καὶ διακρινομένων ή κατα φίσεν δόδος ήδονή. και ένὶ λύγος σκώτει εἶ σοι μέτρισε δ λύγος, δε δε φῆ τὸ ἐι καὶ ἀπείρου και πίρατος κατά φύσεν ἔμφυχον γογανός εἶξος όπορ ίλεγον ἐν τὴ πρόσθον, όταν μέν τούτα ψθείρηται, τὴν μέν φθαμάν λύπην εἶνω, την δ εις τὴν αὐτών οὐσίαν όδον, ταύτην δ' εἰς παλεν τὴν ἀναχώρησεν πάντων ήδοκήν.
 - b.11. od Somi Self but nobody thinks so.' Aristotle speaks here as if Plato differed. Plato is entirely at one with Aristotle in hosting 21 pleasure to be psychical.
 - b. 13. άλλά γινομένης μέν ἀναπληρώστως ήδοιτ ἄν τις]—And the was what Plato meant after all. Any one but a very captions cental can see that when Plato says εδωδή δί πλήρωσες γιγνομένη ήδως, he merely uses an abbreviated expression, as when we say 'work is a pleasure to him,' meaning that work gives him pleasure. Again, when Aristotle says b. 13 ή δόξα δ΄ αύτη δοκεί γεγνεφικένε δε τών ακρί την προφήν λυνών καὶ ήδονῶν, he merely states what Plato himsenf

consistently man tains—that the pleasures which are deanly dense or 1178 b. 12. doublayed hims are those of eating and drinking; but that they are not the only pleasures—there are pure pleasures which are not associated with pair, and want:—a statement which Aristotle makes in § 7 as if it were an original correction of his own necessitated by the onesidedness of the Platonic theory, which he allows his realers to infer took its idea of all pleasure from the deanly poors of eating and drinking. All this strikes one as being very disinger tious; unless indeed it be that, not Plato, but Speusippus is critic sed, and that Speusippus entirely ignored the 'pure pleasures' of his master—which is unlikely.

reproperos] Spengel conjectures acrosperos. Zellet deducers, Bywater (irdelje) yordneroe. I hardly think that any alteration is recessary. The parallel—' pleasure goes with filling, just as pain goes, e.g. with cutting' seems to me to be satisfactory enough.

§ 7. at re padmarieal the pleasures of knowledge. That b. 10. Plato recognised as fully as Aristotle the existence of pleasures which do not ar se out of pain is shown by the passage in the Rep. (583 sq.) quoted above in note on x, 2, 5, a, 1t q.u. The passage in the Philibus (51 B) in which the sudupol howel are described is as explicit as that in the Rep. in its doctrace that they ατο άλυποι-τός περι το το εολά λεγόμενα χρωματα καί περί το σχήματα not the doubt the adelottes, and the time oddyyou, and one the ledelos evaladyrous experie and idinates was adappeared aladyrds and officers napebibaor. It will be naticed that Plato still speaks here of certain pure pleasures as adaptioner: so also in Rep. 585 B obtain adaptin as o re τροφης μεταλομβανών και ο νους ίσχων-although the terms in which the pleasures of smell are described in 684 B, isaudings dufgaros to migrifus yeprortus, seem to be inconsistent with the view that they are gradual adaptorie. The truth is that we must not press the word adaption as applied to 'pure pleasures'; the essential part of Plato's theory of the 'pure pleasures' is not affected by the retention of the word.

§ 8.] C/. vii. 11, 5.

b. 20.

§ 9. η οῦτω λέγοι τις ἄν] This is Bywater's correction for b. 25. Bekker's η οῦτω λέγοιτ' ἄν.

ai mèr horai aiperal ciour, où màr dud ye rourar]. The pleasures b. 20. vol. n.

- 1173 b. 20. in question are in themselves choiceworthr, although not when viewed with reference to the source from which they are dented. Williams i.e. as pleasures they are desirable, but not as higher-ful or, as he puts it more clearly in the next section, there are good and bad pleasures.
 - § 10. I ry elber biapépouver at florai | pleasures d'fler spec fcally. This is the best expression of Aristotle's answer to my προφέροντας τος έπονειδίστους τών ήδονών: and in support of he doctrine thus expressed he points out (§ 10) that different cases of persons have their own pleasures which others cannot enter into . that (§ 11) the pleasure which the Flatterer arms at giving to his Patron is a very different sort from that which sweetens the intercourse of virtuous Friends; and (§ 12) that when we become men we put away childish pleasures as unworthy of us. To thee considerations is added the remark (§ 12) that in-lead there are many pleasures which we consider it to be our dity to avoid, and do avoid, for, after all, we are more independent of pleasure day might, on a superficial view, he surposed there are many actions and functions performed by us independently of the pleasure attending them. This last remark I do not regard as made with the special object (as some commentators suppose) of showing that pleasure is not the Summum Ronum, but as flowing naturally from what the writer has just said about the power we have of detaching ourselves from certain pleasures. Our power of detaching ourselves from these particular pleasures is, of course a special case of the law of our nature, that function is primary and pleasure only attendant.
 - b. 32. § 11. δ φίλος] as described in viii, 3. §§ 6, 7.
- 1174 a. 8. § 12. δε οίδε τεμάλιστα] CCC, NC, and Cambr. read δε σότερ μάλιστα, an Obvious blander (although Zell trees to make sense or of it: 'significat opinari quidem pueros maximis se gaudus performed decipi in hoe') which occurs elsewhere—e.g in Ε. Ν. i. 9. g No reads οίδεται, in iii. 3. 13 Mb reads οίδεται, in iii. 5. 17 Kb and CCC read οίδεται, and in iv. 2. 11 Kb, CCC, and Cambr. read οίδετα.
 - a. 8. § 13. See plu cour. . a. 27 or] bracketed by Ramsauer, who thinks that bitherto Aris offe has argued rather in favour of, than against, the view of Eudoxus which makes pleasure the Sam-

mum Bonum, and that if, in §§ 11 and 12, he seems to argue 1174 s # against the view, he merely goes the length of pointing out that not only are some pleasures not good, but some good things are not pleasures. Susemily fo lows Ramsauer in bracketing the words before us. I see no sufficient reason for suspecting them. The distinction drawn at the end of § 12 between vital functions and their attendant pleasures is exactly that of which so much is made later on (see x. 5, 7), and which enables Aristotle to distinguish between cocamorla, or the Chief Good, and even the highest experience of howh. Accordingly the abrupt are air our variable if ijdarij seems to me to be in favour of the genuineness of the clause. The remark § 12, 2. 4 mepl modda re omovôgo 2, 8 an' airov idovi, though, as I believe, directly suggested by the terms in which the reasons for supposing on aller dispersons of illowe have been stated, is, as soon as made, recognised by the writer as having a bearing on the other question (only incidentally, and as yet insufficiently answered in x. 2. 3), whether flowing in the Summum Bonum. Hence obre royabbe à idani escapes him, akhoagh certainly no sufficent proof of it has as yet been brought forward. In a. 9 rayable which the sense demands is given by Lb and I, other authorities (including the Paraph.) read aya86v.

CHAPTER 1V.

ARGUMENT.

Now let us start again from the beginning, and try thus to make the true nature of Pleasure planner.

Pleasure is the Science—something individuo, and perfectly realised at any moment you take it therefore it is not Motion, for Motion (e.g. that of building) is always in time, and towards an end, and perfect, not in its parts of g not in the processes of fitting the brocks, and fluting the columns—three parts' prouries different ground, and thus aiffer specifically from our another and from the whole Motion to which they belong, or at any moment, but—if to be entired perfect at all—only in respect of its whole duration, the only conceived as a prices which has at last come to its end; in attaining the object of the completed temple, for which it started. Of Pleasure, on the conteary, the

sp. So from 30 mateurs, is perfect at any occurred you take at 4 for his till it will be to be a for his till parts of wish have cannot say "to manual the analytic of grown up to, the perfection of its nature."

precy family of conse and understanding pair lists its function in excise to an object; prefectly when, its consistent being perfect at meet write a functional; and, if feele lighthen with the funct pleasure. Every for of once and under tanding has its some fine are. This parameters in function—not however, as organ and meed by their excellence, 'perfect it —they 'perfect' it as the doctor 'comes' the patient's hoolth; but pleasure 'perfect' function, as the primaple of hear 'comes' the patient's hoolth; but pleasure 'perfect' function, as the primaple of hear kind, and fee, its interprine 'k kase if organization's and family we perfect of their kind, and fee, its interprine 'perfect' is function, not us the function on the function, the personness 'perfect of supercoming end, like the bloom of youthful prime.

At long as pertect family so pertectly related to pertect of set there are no pleasure in the function. Put man's nature is week. He cannot be pup berfect volution continuously: function fluxs, and with it bleasure is a set of the function fluxs.

perfect volution continuously: function flags, and with it picature is a selflt may be thought, that the reason why self-cree up or flew use is that the self-class of function, some heaves can reperfected by sexual times and present to enterthe question whether stay for the self-compatible was that we seek I go or for the rake of I go that we seek Pleasure: enough he was tast to show that the two are so wound up together that they arrest to of exact working function there is no picature, and every function is perfectly pleasure.

- 1174 a. 13 § 1. vi & loviv & wolder v.] not the same as vi love nal notion of see note on 1. 7. 19, 2. 31.
 - Cough yap i uer opacie . . . 3. 19 elbos Opacie is an despres 15 a 14. distinguished from a kirgois; see Met. O. 6, 1048 b. 18 ang and Borata's important trote, p. 306 'Prégren, stru'ly so culed, a action or function which contains in itself the end for the sake of which it is performed, and does not, like somete, cease to be when its end has been attained. In the case of a anyone such as olonopayors, which has an external end, era, oldia, and ceases when that end is attained we cannot say due obsolouse only indopress, as no can say opp rol copues due in the case of opion, which is an imposs strictly so called A suggest is delipped per to, deckes pertured A de it 5, 417 a 16), whereas in an impyria strictly so called costa pre To Tikor (Met. 8. 6. 1048 b. 22). Such an delpyna is per cel interes. of realises its end (relief) at every moment of its duration and arrivois xplivou redela évri (F. N x 4 1): of Sigh. El. 22, 173 2 9 % ένδέχεται το αυτό θμα ποιείν τε αιί πεποιητέναι, οδ. αλλά μην δράν γε τι dien and communicated above and nard radio indigeral. The passage (Mit

Θ 6. 1043 b) referred to at the beginning of this note runs in part 1176 a 16 as follows, according to the emended version given by Be nitz, p. 307... δρό άμα καὶ ἐώρακε, καὶ φρονεί καὶ πεφρόνηκε, καὶ νυεί καὶ κενόηκεν, ἀλλ' οὐ μανθανει καὶ μεμαθηκεν οἰδ' ὑγιάζεται καὶ ὑγίασται. εὐ ζη τοὶ εὐ ἔζηκεν θμα (i e. εὐ ζῆν is pethett in itself its 'present tense' is a 'perfect tense') καὶ εἰδαιμονεί καὶ εὐδαιμόνηκεν εἰ δὰ μῆ, ἐδει ἄν πονε παύσιθαι, Εσπερ όταν ἰσχναίνη, νων δ' οδ, ἀλλα ζη και ἔζηκεν εσύτων δὴ δεῖ τὰν μὶν κινήσειε λέγειν τὰν δ' ἐνεμγείας. πάσα γορ κίνησει ἀπελείς γε' οἱ γιρ ἡμα βαλίζει καὶ βεβαδικεν, οὐδ' οἰκοδαμεί καὶ ψεκοδάμησεν, οὐδὶ γίγνεται καὶ γέγωνεν ἡ κινεί το καὶ εικίνηκεν, ἀλλ' ἔτερον καὶ κινεί καὶ κεκίνηκεν ἱώρακε δὲ και δρὰ δμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ νοεί καὶ νενόηκεν. τὴν μεν οὖν τοιαύτην ἐνόργειαν λέγω, ἐκεινην δὲ εινησεν. Cf 2150 Afel. Θ 8 1059 2. 23—1050 b. 2.

TOLOUTY & forme and of floorf | i.e. hours is like impress as described a. 16 in Met. 0. 6. That he does not identify it, however, with evipying is plain from the explicit statement in ch. 5, § 7. Mich. Loh. has the following comment here—in indutto you viv to opar teleside does not not ένθργειαν έφθεστώς εί γάρ έν χρινώ τινί τόδε τι δρώμεν, αλλ' έν έκάστω τών τοῦ χρόνου μερών και ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀτόμφ νῦν παντελώς βλέπομεν, καὶ οῦ δέχεται τι ή δρασικ δ ούκ είχεν έν τφ προτέρφ νυν έν τφ μετά ταύτα νύν όλη γέρο όμα πάρεστι, καί το είναι ούτης ουκ ατελές ως ούν ή δρασιε ούτω παλ ή ήδονή, ούδε γώρ ή ήδονή οίον σωρεία τίς έστε καλ έπλ σύνθεσεν παλλων ήδουδος οίδε μενούτης της προτέρος ή δευτέρα έκιγένεται, καλ μετ' αίτην ή έφεξης, και τά το προγγούμενα και δπόμενα μέρη παρέσταν αίτη Que, Comes int vis infabbauerns eilleine, performe von morrisme produ, εφισταται τὰ δεύτερα, καὶ ούτω τελειουται ή γραμμή τίλλ εν άπασε τοίς υθν παντέλειος έστι, καλ οδα δυ έν τῷ προτέρφ τοιαύτη επί έν τῷ ἐψυξής, καλ έν τῷ μετ' αὐτὸ καὶ έν τῷ μετὰ τούτο, καὶ ἡ μύτὴ καὶ μία έυτλν ἐν ἄπασε τοις vův.

§ 2. mai rikous ruiss] ' for the sake of some end,' 11. external to a. 20 itself

olov ή οίκοδομική, και τελεία όταν ποιήση οδ έφίεται] This is Bywater is correction of Bekker's olov ή οίκοδομική τελεία, όταν ποιήση οδ έφίσται, and, I think, a great improvement. The ear before τελεία seems to exist only in Kb. For αλεοδομική Ramsaver conjectures οίκοδομησικ. This is plausible; ef. Met θ. 6, que te l in note on x. 4. I a. 14, where we find δοχνασία μαθησικ βαδίσει οίκοδόμησικ.

- 1174 a. 20. Mb has olaodamia a late form meaning the same thing as acadimor or olaodomia. The Paraph, in explaining the present passage, uses olaodomia and olaodomous but not olaodomous. I think that olaodomous (= the art of building) is not quite in place here, where we are to think of the present of building. Pechaps the classiques relate of the MSS, is a corruption of olaodomia, and relate.
 - η έν αποντι δή τώ χρόνω η τούτω] So Bekker, Susem hl, and Bywater, he meaning being-'it (i.e. motion) is perfect, then siewed either in the whole time of its duration, or at the memoria when it reaches its end. This meaning is quite satisfactory; but I am not at all sure that the text on which it relies is sound. 12. Mb, and B' have he in James by the apolicy training Instead of the second of of Bekker's text, Ob and Paris, 1417 have an which they omit after amore. This misplaced by was perhaps the or are of the second # This supposition seems to be supported by ht. Cambr, and Bt, which, omitting by with Ob and Pirs 1417 after annex, read if not by before rules. Of recorded MSS, orle CCC, NC, and B' bave both by (after drawn) and Bekker's second & The MS authority for \$ is denote by to xpoing \$ rains is thus decidedly weak. The reading of Lb, Mb, and B'-4 is some 2013 xpore rooms accepted by Michelet, requires us to explain & as = ifroit 'motion is perfect when I has effected is end-that it it is perfect in respect of the whole time needed for effecting its end." -τῷ χρότῳ τούτῳ being, as Michelet explains, equivalent to τῷ χρότῳ τού ποιήσαι Ος ολευδομήσου.
 - nstead of the rod χρόνου of the other DISS. It seems to me that we must cill er relain rod χρόνου, or accept Bywater's 'kert τῷ μους seeh.dendum'. I hardly think that one can go the neight of saying with Bywater (Central p. 67)—'The subject teating de 22 role μέρεσι του χρόνου may be dismissed at once as implying an erroneous view as to the sense of μέρεσι, which stands (or the various parts of the work, as is shown by the explanation which follows, ἡ γῶρ τῶν λιθων σύνθεσιε... Notwithstanding the 'explanation,' I think that the context, with its context between in τη disarro χρόνου and in ότημοῦν χρόνου, allows us to retain (if or trained desirable) the vulgate in role μέρεσι τοῦ χρόνου.

wasen] et. al unform.

† γλρ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσες the fitting together of the stones 1174 a. 23. after they have been hewn; not, as Grant says, the collection of the stones. I believe that here ἡ τῶν λίθων σῶνθεσες means the fitting together of the separate drums composing one column.

paβδώσεως) Coracs' note here is ' βάβδωσιε πίονθε ίστιν ή τή των a. 24 Γάλλων φωνή conneture (i.e. fluting) λεγομίνη, καὶ βαβδωτοε πίων ή ενίσημε cannelée. What does Mich. Eph. mean by saying here-βαβδωσιν δέ κίσνος λέγει τὴν κατὰ μῆκος νοῦ κίσνος πῆξιν ή γιγνεται ὅταν πρὰς δράδε γωνίας ἵσταται? See Facciolati and Forcelini s. ν είται = πτίξ = βάβδωσις. Hesych, has πτίξει = the act of making a πτίξ or fold. Is the πῆξιν of Mich. Eph. a corruption of πτυξω?

της τοῦ τοοῦ ποιήσεως] I think that Stahr is wrong in translating— dee Herstellung der Tempelcella.' Noör is indeed sometimes used technically for the cella, or inner part of the lepón—as perhaps by the Schol. (cod. II) on Thuc. iv. 90 lepòn ναοῦ διαφερει ερὸν μέν πότος ὁ προστερωμένος τόπος τῷ θεῷ νοῶς δε ἐνθα ἔδρυται αὐτὸ τὸ ἄγαλμα τον θεοῦ. Βαι lette ance the ποίησες τοῦ ναοῦ is contrasted, as τελεία, with the ποίησες τοῦ μέρους, οἰων τῆς κρηπίδος, which is ἀτελής, it is necessary to understand by νοος the technic temple: so the Paraph. τῆς γὰρ δλης ποιήσεως, φίρε εἰπεῖν, τοῦ ναοῦ ἐτέρα ἡ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσες κ.τ.λ.

φ μέν τοῦ ναοῦ τελεία] At the last moment of the whole ποίητιε a sa there exists a perfect product, which has just burst into existence as a perfect product; the last touch has been given which makes the ποίητιε if e «αχάτη τλη of the resultant μορφή—and, except as logically distinguished, identical with that μορφή, or είδος—see Mel.

H. 6 1045 b. 18. The words sol ή μέν τοι ναου ποίητιε τελείο are thus equivalent to sal ή μέν δλη ποίητιε τελεία—τουτίστιο όταν ποίητη τον νέον; 'when the temple is made, the process of building has realised its end; the plan requires nothing more: but the processes of constructing the foundations, and carving the triglyphs, do not realise the end of the work.'

κρηπίδος] ' the foundation '-lit. ' the boot.'

8, 96,

τριγλύφου] 'the triglyphs' (a the Doric temple)—tablets divided into vertica flat bands by grooves—were placed above the architrave at equal intervals (one over every column, and one between) along the frieze. They probably represent the ends of beams in the old wooden temples. The spaces between them were originally open

1174 s. 26. (Snal, hence the term persons), but afterwards filled in and oran mented with sculptures.

- 4. 27. de ôreous xpóres al any moment' (Peters).
- a. 28. Δλλ' «ἔπερ, ἐν τῷ ἄπωντι] 'In the whole time of its duration.' I agree with Grant that these words are against reading § reity and a. 21.
- a. 80. § 3. ή φορά) See Phys. vii. 2. 243 a. 6 èneì δὲ τρεῖε εἰκὶ πεήσει ἡ τε πετά τίπου καὶ κατά τὸ ποιον και κατα τὸ ποσόυ, ἀνάγεις καὶ τα κινειρείε τρια εἴναι: ἡ μέν οὖν κατά τόπον φορά, ἡ δὲ κατά τὸ ποιῶν ἀλλαίωτες, ἡ δὲ από τὸ ποσὸν αθξησες καὶ φθέσες.
- n. 82. τὸ γὰρ πόθεν ποὶ οὐ τὸ αὐτό] 'the whence whither,' ε. ε. 'space traversed,' is not the same: and sometimes, of course, superess and differ as taking place in or posi e directions over the same space.
- - b. S. &r allows in the Physics.

EDINE & OUR LA GRANTE XDONG TENERA CENAL, AND AL MANDAL ATCHES motion is not perfect at any time you take it (in amount in brace) but the many motions into which a given motion may be resolved (eg. the whole motion from starting-point to goal in the coarse may be readyed into the motion over the first hundred yards, be motion over the second hundred yards, and so on) are imperfect. and differ specifically, since different spaces traversed, or different directions over the same space, make the motions traversing then, or it, specifically different ' So the Paraphi-rove pir our deposes περί εινήσεως λύγους εν δλλοις εποιησομεθο. Τούνο δι μενον εντικέυ είνεν άναγκαίου, ότι ούκ όν παντί χράνφ τελεία έστιν ή κίνησια, έλλ' έν τφ ελφ. Al de en rois miprot tou odou xpusou empores, arthre eloi, au bompenerous άλλήλων το sides. This interpretation seems to me to be that required by the context, in which 'a whole motion' and the 'paris' into which it may be resolved have been distagaished. I take it that the clause b. 5 simp to notes not sidemone can be explained only in connexion with a, 32 rd yds mides see of re seri

s.τλ., where the specifically distinct motions are the 'parts' of 1174 b. 3. a 'whole motion.' Another interpretation is given by Mich. Liphi, who takes al nobbai to mean "most motions," i.e. all motions except ci cular motion, which alone is 'perfect.' He says-to nobbot πρόσμετεπι διά του κυκλυφορίος αύτου γάρ αλ κανήσειε dei en τέλει, καὶ eligital nue en to spuro ege sept abpavol spaymerine Railbauet, adopting this interpretation, conjectures b. 3 oid is ro annur your (NC and Pans. 1853 support this conjecture so far as old' is concerned), and explains by reference to Phys. 48, 264 b. 27-'hoc quiclem ότε ai πολλαί των κινήστων 5. φορών συδ' έν τῷ ἄπαντι χρόνφ rehem per Physicorum auctoritatem stat (" lome"): v. 0.8 6 8i rob rindov avvantes un fort purp riderer 264 b 27 s.; et jus tet causa est quod rel quae, quum in infinitum abne requeant, necessario al quando sistantur et interposata quiete de novo incapitatur (iovarrae, iracaparocour).' I think it is very unlikely that, if Aristotle had wished to say that all motions, except auxhopople, are drehale, he would have begun with the general statement that 'motion (alongus -not Ramsauer's al noldai run aurjosur) is not perfect even (old') in the whole time of its continuance." Of course if Aristode had written the al nobbal raw aurioran and in to drawe sping redem of Ramsauer's note, I should have had nothing to say.

6 4. Trepai] ideso and congres.

b 6.

and in του μη δυδέχεσθαι πινείσθαι μη δυ χρόνω] The is another to sargument to show that ήδουή is όλου τι, and therefore not πίνησιε.

τό γόρ έν τῷ νὖν δλον τι] Mich. Et h. has χρόνου τὸ δτομου είπε ο 0. νὖν δεδευνεω δ' ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ ἀκριοστει ἐν τῷ ἐκτφ βαβλιῷ ότι ἐν τῷ ἀμερεῖ καὶ ἀτύμφ τὰν υὕτε κανείσθαλ τι υὕτε ἡμεμεῖν δύνατωι, ἀλλ' υσδὶ γίνεσθαι ἡ φθείρεσθαι. See Phys. vi. 3. 233 b. 33 sq.

τον ήδονήν] so Bekker and Bywater with the codd. Susemal, b 10 fellowing Ramsauer's conjecture, reads της ήδονής. This teading, I think, has much in its favour. The nai (b. 9) before ότι seems to introduce a new point (the words b. 6 δήλου ούν ῶν ἔνοραί τ' Αν είνν αλληλών mean ουκ ἐστιν ή ήδουλ κίνησα: the new adds ηδουλε οὐκ ἔστι κίνησα), and the words b. 13 οὐδὶ δὴ ήδουλς seem to give the conclusion of the argument establishing the new point.

In b. 13 the reading oideois (cod. Turnebi) for sold a planty a

1174 b. 10. blunder; vidé ratrus videsir elegan vidé pésente mou la motely topes! what has just been said.

ού γάρ πάντων ταύτα λέγεται] τούτα 2το εύποιο 2013 γένους

§ 5. Alothocus 82 manys n.r.h.] The apodoms of this sentence begins b. 18 with and decorrate by (Bekker and Sasemill real and senorus de; Lywaler resteres sedorus from Mo and Alex - see Br water's Contrib., p. 68, and reads by with Lambaus and Racca -see Fors h p. 102). After aladyan b 16 v, L!, Ob, AM, B'. B', CCC, NC, and Cambr, read requires. Of receeded authorizes only Kb, Mb, and apparently Alexander Aphrod. (who quotes this passage anopus mi huma w 14 p. 258 sq Spenge') om t acquires

The doctrine of this section is shortly, that planting a ten is functions which are in correspondence with environment; as dibit functions which maintain the most perfect correspondence with the best environment open to the organism are the nost perfectly pleasant. For J. S. Mill's estimate of this coeffine (Examination) of Sir W Hamilton's Philosophy; ch. 25), see note on vi

12. 3. 3. 15.

\$ de of dorn to Chor (Mich. Eph.).

§ 6] Pleasure perfects function, but not as the object and faculty of sense (rd alabyrón re mit à madyon), if good, 'per ect' !! The difference between these two modes of 'perfecting' fundaments like that between the ways in which health is 'caused'-by a healthy constitution, and the doctor respectively. A healtreestitution (t e the principe of health within a man) sihe ' ferral cause,' and the doctor is the 'efficient cause' of health. It as by operating as a formal principle, then, that pleasure *pertrects function; whereas the object and faculty of sensation 'perfect' it by their efficient operation. According to the dectrine of de .la. III. 2. 425 b. 25 the sensible object, as actually perceived, is identical with the actual perception exerted by the faculty of sease. -the two are only different aspects of the same thing. if he rei airontor eripyera nai the airongrows in airn per irre eal pia, to d'eire e enirds airais. The alabyrds per se is broaps by, and the offere on alabhreadu) per se is l'hemise buidant du : they are two reless which have no actual existence, or impyets, apart from each cor-'environment' has no meaning except in relation to 'organ,' and 'organ' has no meaning except in relation to 'environment.' The 1174 b. 23 reality of the two is 'correspondence' or 'function.' To aladyrous to sense if aladyrous, then, 'perfect' despute in the sense of 'effecting' it. It is the outcome of the joint efficiency of these two designer. But pleasure does not 'perfect' enjoyee in the sense of 'effecting,' or producing it. Pleasure is that without which the form of despute produced, would not be perfect. It is the 'formal perfection' of designer a perfection, however, which in § 8 is described as supervening (incorporation to relate b. 33): which means that it is not the immanent relate, or ultimate raison delice of the designer—that her deeper—but a sort of beauty (opa b. 33) which reveals designer to sense, and may indeed easily be mistaken for the reality of designeratively (§§ 10, 11, and ch. 5, §§ 6, γ), for the illusion of sense—'Beauty is its own excuse for being—is always powerful within

Mich. Egh. has an instructive comment on this section, which he understands as I have explained it above—except that he falls into the error (I think) of making the construction-of row of rde of de The man restation the emphasis of though not the alabater to alabate and the alabass; after comuck ng that to alabasos perfects' the alabasis (or airthyricin) we dyen obrijn and the duniquese ele to incresion, and notour airis dripyeur, and referring to de An. iii. 2. 425 b. 25, he goes on to draw the paralle s alodgede inspos (both external to ed desprove). and ήδουή - έγων (both in το ενεργούν) - και έστι το αίσθητου έκτας αύτου ros aladamyalou mit despyoieras, sal aporepue rije mar despyesae aladijaeme ή δ΄ ηδονή σίχ ούτως έχτε πρός τήν ενέργειαν' ού γαρ έστιν αίτης έκτύς, φύδε poirepou raings, all' dia rééare sal ous fort sal ympachquae ris éveryeins do n do tiv no diverse, redemir de deperus the everyment h now in our miforas . . . De yap à larpor phas est à vyels ultion rol dynamic ed ζώου, άλλ' ό μεν Ιατρύς έκτός έστι του υγιαίναντος και πρότερος ό Ιατρός are yap indres & in airoi bytarbele, largue pir he à larqueros che corriere, 6 de l'yeardele byege out fu' à de byein out extre éare voi bymirerror, άλλ' έν αθτώ έστλυ ώς μέρος ή έξις. έν γάρ τή συμμετριο τών έν αθτω χυμών ý bycia sai tá bycairece čatí, sai obrestu abrij ázaplotos ý bycia, čas de equality out and it ifdown automapped the emptain of it yested . . . ed his σίπθητου τελειοί την αξοθησιν ώς έκταλούμενου και άγου αύτην όπο τοῦ dunines els despresar, extre de nat aportepor the despresas . . . A de hand rederai the important we over found to an overgon on eal pieces alove!

The Paraphrast falls into the strange error of making the doctor,

1174 b. 23. or efficient cause (6 6), answer to pleasure in the companie n, thus ignoring the point on which Anstotle's whole theory hir gesthat pleasure is a sort of immanent final (or formal) cause—some thing, at any rate, which can only with difficulty be detinguished from the final cause of the bippers, and indeed was identified with the evipping at its best by the writer of Book via The Puras hrust's words are unbinep oids if tylers not b larges because and είσε του ύγιαύσευ" ή μεν γάρ αύτη παεί μή οδσαν τήν του ύγιαίνευν ένε, γενεν & de avergee and polaries, and once napopoling free. Fre de ord direct જે લોક્રિયુરોમ જરોરામાં જેવુંમ લોક્સિયુરામ, ફે જે ઉતાવ્યાયુરોમ જોમ દેવસમ્લામ, બ્રેજન નાતે ફે રૂ જેમણ τελειοί την ένέργεων αίτων. ΄Η μέν γαρ έξα, και το άντικείμενον, από του dunique els vo luenyela apodyovan van évenyelan à de étanh và despresa γενομένη σε μπιφυκεία συντηρές και φυλατιε. Πείθει γώρ ένεργεία η έπ aired flowh According to this, flown a called in, List a doctor, by Isipyene. Peters seems to understand the relation between filling and drapping in the same way, for in a note on p. 329 he says - the only analogy between pleasure and the doctor is that both "complete the activity " from ou.side,"-but see E. N. i. 8. 12 oiler di sprodefra της ήθονης ο βίος αυτών ώσπερ περιώπτου τινός, άλλ έχει την ήδους εν enura-a statement which the theories of Book x and Book x merely expand and develop. The reason why the Paragh, falls into the error noticed is that he does not see that the words b. 25 Comp . . . b. 26 bytaken are merely parenthetical, giving byten and larges as familiar instances of a formal and an effect to case respective y. It so happens that bying is a ifie; and, as in \$ 3 holding is said not to 'perfect' beginnings ifte does, the conclusion is drawn by the Paraph here that it must do so as the larger dies' But it is to alochror we sal is alochrose (paralle, to the impos) of § 6 to which the ten of § 8 corresponds; while hours, which in § 6 is parallel to bytesa, is deser bed in § 8 as impuripment to reloc, sion test depaiose & Spa.

b 20. § 7.] This section (Susemill is wrong in saying that it is orn test by the Paraph.—see his rai μάλιστα p. 216-34 Heylbur) is bracketed by Zell, Ramsauer, and Susemill, breader it repeats what has already been said in § 5. It may be noted that there is another repetition of the same in the latter part of § 8, is 33 for five... 1175 a. 3 γίνεσθαι. Are the passages § 6, b. 23 οδ τέν αυτα § 7, b. 31 πεισυμένου and § 8, b. 31 τέλου ... 2, 3 γονοθαι doplicates?

§ 8. oùx úg à this trumapyorda] ' Pleasure perfects its function, 1174 b 32 not as a habit does by subsisting in the agent, but as a superventing end.' Rassow (Forsch. p 70) and Susemild omit h with Lb, Mb. I think that if a necessary. We are to think of a given empyora in cornexion with its own paren, ign, as we are to think of it in cornexion with its own (obern) is buris. A formed habit, subsisting permanently in the agent, 'perfects' the injoyon which proceeds from it, in the sense of easly 'eff a ing' it (see note on x. 4 6), or constantly realising itself in it : of at. 7. 6 redor de mings in sycias eve to sava the ifer. Thus, the ifee of the addresse realises itself in certain érépyent-rà sorà tập dubpron-which it tends to produce as perfect (rilea) as may be, i. e. as well fitted as may be to take their the in the permanent system of things in relation to which all virtue us if are formed. Empyion externally indistinguishable from ra sarà riv deductar but not proceeding from the ifes, are drekit in the sense of failing to fit it to that permanent system of solai epager in relation to which all virtuous igns are formed. "Egic, then, is the organic source from which evipyon springs; and the perfect on 'which it confers on iripyrus is that of permanence and fitness for a permanent system. But flowing a not the organic source of evipyria; it is rather a sort of end the beauty of dispyria uself, when once it has 'risen up into the borders of light'. As such, it stata as and strengthens drippen (see x. 5, 2) - in some such way as the mparor mover moves the universe—not mechanically, but by the attract on of beauty (Met. A. 7 1072 b. 3 mini de de époperon) As was remarked on vii. 12. 3, a. 15, Aristode's theory does not profess to tell us what idon't is as a psychological or physiological phenomenon, but what it does. It is a theory with a directly practical aim.

olov tole anualous & wpo] sc. incherou.

b. 33

τὰ κρίνον ή θεωρούν] το κρίνον απνωστε το το αλαθητόν (αλαθοσιε τε b. 84. κριτική: see note on ii. 9. 8 ἐν τῷ αλαθήσει ἡ κρίσει), and θεωρούν το νοητόν.

δμοίων γάρ δετων] see note on vi. 1. 5 3. 8 προς γόρ τὰ τῷ γινει 1178 n. 1 έτερα κ.τ.λ.

καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐχόντων] This means that, if the relation between such corresponding (δροια) faculties and of jeets

- 1175 m. 2, experienced as pleasant, remains unchanged, it will continue to be experienced as pleasant.
 - a 3 § 9. πῶς οὖν οὐδεὶς συνεχῶς ἥδεται;] Why then does the relation not remain unchanged? Why is a that no man experiences pleasure continually?
 - A. 4. 4 κάμνει [] 'Is it not that man grews weary?' Grant quotes appositely Mel. O. 8. 1050 h. 22 διο αίτι όπεργεί ήλιος καὶ διστρα και δίλος ὁ οἰρανός, καὶ οὐ φοβέρον μη πεσε στῆ, ὁ φοβουντια κὶ κεια φεσνος οὐδὶ κάμνει τοῦτο δρῶντια οὐ γὰρ περὶ τὴν δύναμα τῆν ἀντεψάσεως αὐτοὶι, οἴον τοῖε φθαρτοῖε ἡ κίνησες, διστε ἐκίπονον είναι τὴν συνέχειων τῆς αυησκώς ἡ γὰρ πίσια Τλη καὶ δυναμιε οὐσα, οὐκ ἐνεργεια, κὶτια τούτοι. Το ποίος οπ νιὶ 24. 8.
 - a. b. οὐ γίνεται οὖν οὖδ' ἡδονή] Ramsauer reads in the text after ἡἀνοἡ the συνεχής required by the sense. The l'araph, has bere ἀπορίσνα δ' ἀν τις εἰ τοῦνο οῦνως ἔχει, πῶν οὐδείε οῦνως ενεργών συνεχως ἡδετα. Πρὸτ ὁ ἡητέων ὅτι καμνει πάντα τὰ ἀνθρωπεια καὶ οὖ δύνιται συνεχώς ενεργών. Διὰ τοῦνο οὐδὶ ἡδεσθαι δύνιται συνεχώς, ἐπει ἡ ἡδανή τῷ ἐνεργεία ἀπολουδεί as if he read in the text: πῶν οὖν οὐδείε συνεχώς ἐνεργεία, ἢ κάμνει πάντα τὰ ἀνθρωπεια καὶ ἀδυνατεί (οτ οὐ δύνιται) συνεχώς ἐνεργεία, οὖ γίνεται οὖν οὐδ' ἡ ἡδονή συνεχής ἔπεται γάρ τῆ ἐνεργεία. Ν΄ επτεκ γάρ αίτει πώντα α, 4, and reade κοὶ οῦ δυνατεί (sec). Paris. 1853 has καὶ ἀδυνατεί. I think that some such reconstruc inti ωί τὰνε τεχί αν that suggested by the Paraphrast's version is necessary.

iveral] see notes on vii. 9. 6, b. 34 and ix. 7. 6, a. 22.

7. διὰ ταθτό] K^b, O^b— i.e. διὰ τὸ ἡμῶς ἀδυκατέν συνεχῶς ἀνεργέν.
 Other authorities have διὰ τουτα or (NC and Paris, 1853) τωτα alone.

παρακάκληται] V. L. παρακάκλυται.

- a. 0. μετέπειτα δ' οδ] After οδ CCC, NC, Cambr., and other authorties (see Susemihl and Bywater) read yieras.
- a. 10. § 10 uai τὸ ξῆν δή] Bekker, following the codd, has δε Susemihl and Bywater, following Aretinus, read δή.

eddoyus our nat ris hooris efferract All seck after pleasure - this is only what we might expect from the intimate association of

pleasure with life; it does not prove the position of hudoxus that 1175 a 10. 'pleasure is the chief good.'

§ 11 άφείσθω de τῷ wapóere] Of course there can be no doubt a 19. about the answer. As a biologist, Aristotle would tell us that function is the end, not the pleasure of function. At the bottom of the series of Tayoxa we see plants performing function without the anducement of pleasure; and at the top of the series we see the despense doing a last act of duty which involves the renunciation of all that is dear to sense. Mich. Eph. has an interesting comment here et pir fr f foren rikor the everyties de f viete the οίποδομήσεως πολ ή υγιεια της ύγιάνσεως . . . ήν άν ή ένέργεια πολ το ζην adout the house. . incl d'our fort telor, all' alor telos, we esporat, ούε δυ εξημεν σερούμενοι το ζεν διό την ήδουήν, άλλα μύλλον ταύτην διά το for. He goes on to argue that idory is not the end, but brown, because there are virtuous actions which we choose to perform, although they are not pleasant, but painful-on de makker rips ήδονήν δια τὰς ένεργείας καὶ τὸ ζήν διωκομεν εκ τώνδε μαλλον άν τες morebacie kal nower de sur ear doirfu dripycour el yap eal bri paliara ήδιταί είσιν αύται, είλλ' οὐ τῆς ήδονῆς ένεκα απουδείζονται παλλάς γώρ τῶν επτ' άρετην έντργειών αφούμεθα καιτοι λύκης και πουων olrios ούσας, ώς έπλ τών αυτά την ανδρείου ένεργειών ασίτοι έδει τουτος μισείν και Φείγειν εί ται ένεργείας χάραν της ήθονης υξουμεθα, και έκ του έναντίου πάσαν ένέργειαν μετα σπουδης ένεργειν ή έπεται ήδονη, άλλα τίς αν εί μή μαίνοιτο, πράττειν όν και ένεργείν ανώσχοιτο, οίς επονται των ήδουών οι αίσχρότητες; ware danor or. rae adamie alpor peda did rae mar aperar everyeins.

CHAPTER V.

ARGUMENT.

Since each function has ess onen pleasure which perfects and augmentait, and since functions differ specifically o g, thinking, seeing, hearing, differ, as functions, specifically—of follows that Pleasures also differ specifically

That this is to ix plain, not only from the fact that its sum pieusure perfects and augments a function—c g. pleasure in working out geometrical proviews makes one work them out better—but also from the fact that one function is impedial by the fresence of the fleasure which belongs to another function—e.g.

a genion tolo is foul of music cannot attend to a philosophical decention of be overhear some one glaying the finter under an alien give not understood as he had as all attended an alien give a weatherform as he function almost as much as its attended above of the source as the performance of the source will alternate the performance of the source will be a first or a first of the source of

hunctions, then, different as good and bid Pleasures will I fee at road out had. The Pressures which belong to good functions are good, those a brokeron;

to had functions are had.

Its own Pleasure belongs more instructely to a function than desirbs appears who a attack the function the affects is distinct in time and in majure from the function, but the pleasure is so destly bound up with the function, that one would consist them—erromeously, of course, for propers is not include a presence but naturally enough, be our they change or logither

The somes differ in purity o g. re, ht as purer toon town to also do there

fleatures and the furest preatures are there of thought,

Animals have different preasures, a they have different functions as well of these races as expressed have a gold or Hero liture save. Were in the transverse, however individual differ much so the flavoures they free or Hero me standard must always be the Good Main. The pleasures which he prefers those which perfect the performance of the good functions in which Hugemes consists—are good. They are real—as two twelf II manufactures these free ferred by disordered matures are not really producers.

1175 a. 23. § 1. érépur] ac. so elde.

- α 23. οδτα γάρ φαίνεται] π. τελειούμετα.
- n. 24. καὶ γραφή καὶ ἄγαλμα] Bekket lux ἀγάλματα. Bywater restores the singular from K^h. Cambr. has καὶ ἄγαλμα καὶ γραφή.
- 8. § 8. airai] airai, the reading of Kb, is accepted by Bekker and Bywater. All other authorates (except Γ which has airai airai, give airai (=ai κατὰ τὰς airainμακε), accepted by Swemith. Kez ing airai, we are to understand that there is a generic difference between al τῆς διανοίας διάργειας and al surà τὰς alσθησεια, and that under each genus there are specific differences.
- 20. φανείη δ' dr τοῦτο καὶ dκ τοῦ συνφκειῶνθαι κ.τ.λ.] τοῦτο is τὸ τὸς ήδονὰς τῷ είδει διαφέρευν, and another reason (καὶ) for accept ng this statement is that pleasures are 'akin' to (συνφενιῶνθαι) thuse υπογεια (and dείργεια differ τῷ είδει) which they 'perfect.' That there are 'akin' to them (οἰκεῖαι) is shown by the fact that they 'augment' them (συναῦξουσι κ. 36)—the conclusion being a. 36 τοις στεροις δι τῷ είδει καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἔτερα τῷ είδει. The destriction between εδοιή as τολοιοῦτα τὴν ἐνίργειαν and as συνανξουσι τὴν ἀνίργειαν τα evalently.

a very subtle one; perhaps it may be sufficiently explained, if we 1175 a. 20. say that the term συνούβουσα seems to express, more distinctly than the term redenouse, what ήδονή does a egain the case of the φιλομούσου μάλλον γάρ έποστα κρίνουσα καὶ έξακριβούσων (§ 2): ή μέν οίκεια ήδουή έξακριβού του ένεργείου καὶ χρονιωτέρου και βελτίους καιεί (§ 5).

έπιδιδόασεν είς το οξεείον έργον] 'improve in their work.'	a. 35.
ovrastovou bi al hBorai] Susemilil reads bis. I prefer di.	a. 36
§ 3. नवरेंगे] नवे नवेंड नृतिवार्थंड म्क्रे रविंख देवकांकृतम्	ъ, я.
navanośowowe overhear.	b, 4.

- § 4. deconomeron, olor nat! Bekker after Kb and Mb omits olor; b 11 but olor, the reading of Lb, Ob, CCC, Cambr., NC, Bl, *, *, accepted by Susemial and Bywater, is probably right.
- § 5. δηλου ώς πολύ διεστάστυ] i.e. ή οίκεια ήδουή and ή αλλοτρία. b. 15. They differ (se. in reaction to a given διέργεια) almost as much as ήδουή and λύπη.

σχεδόν γάρ α.τ.λ.] Mich. Eph. explains—το σχεδόν πρόσκεται b. 10 στι πί οίντιοι λύποι οίελ καί παντως είολ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν φθαρτικαι, al δ' ήδοναι οία ἀεί ε ε πλήν οίχ όμοιως at the end of this section, b. 24. Οίκεια λύπα, as a rule, puts a stop to the ἐνέργεια: ἀλλοτρία ήδονή only retards it.

oiseins & eigiv at the right representation and authorized with control tracks as distinguished from that which is associated with consequences which may eventually result each συμβεβηκός from the function.

recorded authorities, gives this reading. All other authorities apparently have apparent; so Cambr., CCC, NC.

f. 6.] 'Engryous differ as good and bad (some perhaps are in-b. 24 different); hence there are good and had home. If we confine ourselves to the subjective point of view—if we look only at the pleasures themselves, as felt, we shall be unable to distinguish them as good and had—as higher and lower. We shall be able to distinguish them merely as more or less pleasant—as differing you. II.

- functions which put us in relation to the objective order, or environment, that we can distinguish pleasures as differing qualitatively (rip eidel), and say with MI, 'It's better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied' (Utelaurem m. p. 14). It is sometimes urged that M.I has no right 'on the own principles' to say the to prograise, as he loes, a qualitative difference between pleasures. I venture to maintain that has moralists have a better right. His coiles seem to forget that his sandard of conduct a the public poed. His standard of conduct is emphatically not pleasurable feeling. Only an ensure treatment of isolated phrases (phrases which need not surprise any one who lacks at Mill's system in its place in the History of English Ethics) could represent it as such. Mill's 'hedomam' is presty much on a par with that of the writer of E.A. vii. 11-14
 - the pleasure avolved in (i) a function is more akin to the furction than is the appetite which prompts the function (he gentive now ôpificar) depends on the comparative observerse; of pir h 31 are the ôpificar and of ôt h, 32 the hômes), for the appetite is separated from the function both in time and in nature, whereas the pleasure is close to the function, and it is so deficit to draw the line between the two (idiamores obvious h, 32) that the question may be argued whether the function is not invited with the preasure. Opific precedes imports in time (now ximous), and differs from it in nature (the possess), being a nodes.
 - b.14. § 7. bidroio, regarded here as an éroppes harogers, se Ramsaner ad loc.

(drower yap), dhad did to phy applicates pointral transferred that the tiew set forth in the rest was likely when x. 1-5 was written; also, if we assume that the 11-14 was written by one who had x. 1-5 before him, it would appear that he was not deterred by the drower yap here. The conficulties suggested by these considerations will not escape the student.

- b. 80. Scapiper] here means 'surpasses.'
- 1178 a. 1. sadaption of so Bywater for the sadaption of other texts. The codd for the most part seem to give subspictors. CCC, so far as I know, is the only cod, which gives and apriory of the code which gives and approximate the code which gives an approximate the code which gives an approximate the code which gives an approximate the code which gives a code which gives

Mich. Fph has the following comment herr—ή μίν δψες τών 1176 a.1. είδων έστιν ἀνειληπτική διχα τῆς δλης ώς ἐν τῷ δειπέρφ τῆς περὶ ψυχής πραγματείας δίδεωναι (ἐ ε. de Anima h. 12. 424 3. 17) ώσπερ γὰρ ο αηρος τὴν σφιμιγίδα μόνην τὴν ἐν τῷ χρυσίφ δακτυλίφ ἀποματτετοι χωρίς τῆς ὑποκειμένης ἐλης: χρυσός γὰρ ἀν ἐγίνετο ὁ αηρὸς εἰ σὰν τῷ ὑποκειμένρ ὡς ὑλη τῷ χρυσός τὴν σφιμιγίδα ἐλεχετο, τῶτω και ἡ δψες των ηλογων ἐστὶν ἀντιληπτική χωρίς τῆς ὑποκειμένης πύταἰς হλης: ἡ δί ἀκοη καὶ ἡ δυφιματε σωματοειδείς οἶσαι καὶ παθητικώτεραι μεθ ῦλης εἰαδέχωνται τὰ αλοθητά, μετὰ γαρ τοῦ ἀερος καὶ σὰν τῷ ἀἰρι οδ παθος ἐστὶν ὁ ψόψος καὶ ἡ ἀσμη, ἀντιλημελόνονται τὰν οἰκειων αλοθητών . . . καθαρωτερα ἄρα ἡ δψες, ὡς ἀιλων ἀντιληπτική, ἀκοῆς καὶ δαφρήσεως. Τhe least pure is γευσες, because its ῦλη or material vehicle, is the crass ὑλατωδες ὑγρόν, which it takes in along with the sensible firm: see also notes on τῶ. το.

καλ τούτων αλ περί την διάνοιαν] έ.ε. κοί τών κατά τός πίσθήσεις a. 2 διαφέρονσεν οί περί την διάνοιαν.

ral deárspat άλλήλων] The meaning is that 'within each of the a 3 two classes (pleasures of sense, and intellectual pleasures) the pleasures differ from one another in purity' e.g. in the class of intellectual pleasures, the pleasures of vò intermedia are purer than those of vò λογίζεσθαι, and among the pleasures of sense, those of sight are purer than those of taste. In all cases the less άλη, the greater επθορμότης.

- § 8 καθάπερ 'Ηράκλειτός φησιν όνους σύρματ' αν έλέσθαι μάλλον ή α 6. χρυσόν | zee Bywater, Heraclik Reinquiae, Fi. 51, who gives the fragment as δυα σύρματ' αν έλουτο μαλλον ή χρισόν. This seems to be the only place where the saying is quoted. Bekker and Susemild read δ-ον Bywater reads δυους, which is given by Kh, All, Mich Eph. (?) B¹, B', CCC, Cambr, NC. M chael Ephesius has an interesting remark he e—τὸ δὶ λεγόμονον ὑπὸ τῆς λέξεως 'Ηρωκλείτου τοῦ 'Εφισίου καὶ ἐμοῦ πολίτου, τὸ δνους συρματ' ἀν ελέπθαι μαλλον ή χρυσόν, σύρματα του χορτον 'Πράκλειτας λεγεί, δε κοτὰ φύσιν ἡδὺς ἐστι τῷ ὅτφ. Σ΄ρματα means 'sweepings', hence later, or fodder.
- § 9. επί γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων] 'in particult ye latet vast im illud a 10 discrimen naturae inter homines et inter bestias' (Ramsauer). All the animals of the same species, we may suppose (εδλογον 2, 9),

- 1170 a. 10. find pleasure in the same things; but men do not present such a uniformity of taste. Good men and bad men find pleasure in different things. The distinction of good and bad is not found among the lower animals—old? Oppion for socia oil open va. 1. 2.
 - a. 12. répres The mass of text beginning here with repres 1175 2 11 and ending with femor 1177 2, 30 is musted by Kh. For the quantitative relation between this mass of text and (1) v. 10. 1137 2, 31-1138 2, 3, (2) v. 11. 1138 2, 4-b. 12, (3) v. 9. 1135 2 9-1137 2, 30, see Introductory Note to v. 10.
 - 6. 15. § 10.] See notes on i, 8. 22, iii. 4. 4, and vi. 12. 6.
 - 22. τούτοις] For Bywater's explanation of his conjecture 'fort τοῦ vel τοιούτοις' see Contrib. p. 68.
 - a. 27. § 11. al τοῦ τελείου καὶ μακαρίου ἀνδρός] 'Transit ad discostitionem de bestitudine" (Michelet).
 - a. 28. suples ... a. 29 wollowing Peters brings out the force of these terms very well "... will be called "pleasures of man" in the full meaning of the word and the others in a secondary serve, and with a fraction of that meaning."

CHAPTER VI.

ARGUMENT.

The Vertices Friendship, and Plessure housing been demossed we shall now

end our Treatise with a shotch of Happiness.

It well save time, if we receptivilate what we have already and what Happiness. We said that it is not a Habit, but a Familian—and one of the functions who have "necessary as means" but one decreable for its consiste we according y cleantified it suit the Function of the Cool Man—with his wirthous and beautiful actions, which are desirable in themselves.

But why, it may be asked, identify Happiness with virtueus actions! Is not Amusiment choice often at the cost of health and memory for it, can user-timply for its own pleasure not for the sake of any thing beyond. To the in an anticor-bes, by tyrants, for initiance and this is one of the id-of resion why at as identified with Happiness in people's name, but tyrants, and take uses

them, are no evidence in this matter—men unthant vertue or intelligence, who have never tasted pure pleasure. It is to the Good Man as we have often each that we must refer, and he prefers the life of vertuence action. Therefore Regimes does not consist on Amusement. The life of vertuens action of Russemens or the Chief End, and the proper place of Amusement is as means to this. Play that you may work, as Anacharsis said, should be our rule Amusement is relaxation; and relaxation is not an end in each fut—since we cannot also so, be working—a means to the better performance of serious duty.

It is in the performance, than, of the highest functions of Main that elappiness annote if it consisted in bodity employment and amusement, any tensiolist—care a state, to whom no one thinks of accreting bioppines, any more than

cutiventhip - would have to be called " Jappy!

§ 1. εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονός, 1176 a 30. Ramsauer compates x. 9, t εἰ περὶ τε τουτων κοὶ των ἀρετων, ἐτι δἱ καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονός, ἐκατῶν εἴρηται τοὶς τύποις: and says 'agnosci his verbus videtur dispatatio quaedam de amicat ae generibus, posita illa inter τὰ περὶ τοι ἀρετὰς et inter τὰ περὶ τοι ἡδωνος: negligi quae τὰ, 11–14 περὶ ἡδονός acta sunt.' Connecting-passages i ke ti ese must be interpreted with great caution. They are evidence only for the or let which existed when they wase written, and, to many cases, are demonstrably late interpolations. The two passages before us may well belong to the time when the N connachean Corpus, as we have it, with the two Treatises on ἡδονή, was made up, for the editor, having just left the sulject of ἡδονή (as treated in x. 15), would naturally put it last in his act of suljects hisherto discussed.

NC and CCC have elequieum di ribe mepi vis desvis (vis devras first hand CCC, vis devige corr) ve sal publas sal illavie.

§ 2. elmoper] c.g. E.N. 1 8. 9.

a. 30.

tur d' dreppetur al udr ciour drappalat n.t h.] See note on i 1, 2, 5, 2, and Mol. 9, 8, 1050 a. 23 sqq. quoted there.

δήλον ότι την εὐδαιμονίαν . . . b. 5 αὐτάρκης] See i. 7. 7. b. 3.

§ 3. na. row mathior be at fibrian or. donotion since and where b. 0 alperal. This, of course, is not Anstode's own opinion. He answer to the arguments for regarding annusciment as an end in itself begins with wider d fows appears of receives there § 4, b. 17; and in § 6 he states his own view of the place of annusciment in life, that it is relaxation, a means, to the better performance of carnest work—naifer d'oner anordaign b. 33.

- 1178 b. 10. βλάπτονται γάρ ἀπ' αὐτών κ τ λ.] καὶ τῶν καθεῶν δὲ αὶ ἀἰνῶν κὰ δι ἀλλα (ητούντω: αὶ γὰρ αἰρούμενοι αὐτὰν αὐδιν ἐξ αὐτῶν ὡξελείντω: βλόπτοντοι μὸν οἶν μᾶλλον (Paraph.),
 - b. 17. dwoxoldfew] dmaxoldfew ('to be entirely engaged with' 'to make one's business in afe', is the reading of He, Lb Mh, N'— a dmat εξημένον αρφαίστης, although dmaxolder occurs!. Kh a defective here (size note on x, 5, 9, a. 11), but dreaxidates a the reading of Cambr which has much in common with Kh a Book x (see Ans. Ox val. 1 par. i. Lucleik MSS. of the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. 74-83); also of B', B', B'.
 - b. 20. § 4. §80rgs eiluspiroùs] Mich. Eph. has légel de libespirit elors als ob pipustes § perd \$paxb éverus limit aut perdina.
 - b. 94. § 5. каватер обт поддане вортац с. д. х. д. 10.
 - b. 27 παὶ τῷ σπουδαίφ δή] So Ramsauer, Sasemilal, and Bywater for Bekker's δέ.
 - § 6. οὐκ ἐν παιδιῷ ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία κτλ.] S→ P / € 2. 1997 b. 22 sqq. al per oir naraboshquirae ror pubjeres, naturas emens протерои, впарифотерівовано в тех до честара пустав в поделен віндась γράμματα και γυμναστικήν και μουσικήν και νίταρτον ένων γραφικίν, το μέν γραμματικήν κελ γραφικήν ώς χρησίμους πρός του Βίου οδοιις κο πολυχρήστους, την δε γεμναστικήν ώς συντείνουσαν προς ανδικών τη δέ μουσικήν ήδη διυπομήσειεν αν τις. νών μέν γάμ ώς ήδοσης χώριο α ndeioros parezovor ovirie of & if upzie trafan en naideig din ed ere Φυσιν σίτην ζητείν, όπερ πολλάκιο είρηται, μή μονών ασχαλειο έκδικ άλλά καὶ σχολάζεω δύνοσθαι καλώς, σύτη γάρ ύρχη κάντως, ire as militer einwher mehl airige. A & auchas pier dei, pathan de aiperin es angehilfele the angohiae art tehne (protion & te dei amoierne angohiles. où yap dij naiforme" rekus yap airayeafur edra toù Hor tije naulent init el de rotro adovaror, cat maddar in rais angoliais gogorean rais noideas (6 yap nover being the dramatures, if he made now dramature early το δ' ἀσχολείν συμβαίνει μετα πόνου καλ συντονίας), διά τούτο δεί παι ίπι είσαγεσθαι κοιροφυλικούντα την χρήσεν, ώς προσαγοντά φαρμασίας χορις άνεστε γάρ ή τοικότη κινηστε τής ψυχής, και διά την ήδονήν αποκανικέ

¹ CCC has decays hadow) older n.r.h. The letters within [] occur to be later, and the [] represents a noe between decays- and sider for cult two, or at most, three letters. Was the original reading associated. Cr. test me of degelous Pol. 9. 0. 1337 b. 31.

(). also Pol. O. 5. 1339 b. 11 sqq., where the relation of Music 1176 h 27 to raidia is discussed. It is shown that music is not merely useful as a relaxation—reasistance, but that it has also a higher function—reasistance of dorly hydrons advise h kard rhy alphany private 1340 a. 1. being a great educational instrument most rever to hydronized discribe 1340 a. 7. This point, however, is not before us here, nor its value apir diagraph—as one of the modes of temploying and enjoying that axidy which is the end (see Pol. O. 4. 1339 a. 25).

άδυνατούντες δέ συνεχώς πονείν άναπαύσεως δέονται] (/ x 4 9 5 34 πώς οδν ούδελε συνεχώς ήδεται; ή κάμνει; πύντα γάρ τὰ ἄνθρώπεια άδυνατεί συνεχώς ένεργείν: Med. A. 7, 1072 h. 14 διαγωγή δ' έστίν αια ή άριστη μικρών χρόνον ήμεν ούτω γάρ δεί έετινο έστεν, ήμεν γάρ άδύνατον.

Hadia is a necessity imposed upon man by his composite nature. It is a foolish mistake to make this necessity the end. On eleparchia, an contributing to definance. See Introductory Note to e. 8.

§ 8. cl μη και βίου βίου is here the life of a citzer, as lix-1177 a, 9, tinguished from ζωη, animal life. This distinction, however, between the two terms is not always observed. On the position of the δούλος, see note on viii. 11, 7, b, 5.

CHAPTER VII.

ARGI MENT.

Hith new consisting in verticus function, Perfect Happiness will consist in the function which proceeds from the highest virtue—that of the principle which is test in Man and naturally authoritative in him, and most divine—heavan I hat Perfect Happiness is speculative function is a conclusion in accordance with what has already been last down and with the tenth for speculative functions is the highest, most continuous, and most pleasant of all functions. Justices, the most coloubleing—for though the Philosopher and the first Man with need the necessaries of life, the just man needs other people on whom to

The three functions of music are distinguished in Fol. 6. 5. 1339 b. 13 merepor rudicar, h mudiar, h diagogy everyon d' els varia rátresus cue pairera períxir.

exercise his vertue but the Philosopher, though perhaps it so better for him & have forends to be'p him in his thinking, an yet torn't by himself, being of a men the most self-inflicing. Again special to funct in as the only function which is loved for itself alone; thinking and necking the thruting, result from et, is hereas in the ophere of moral conduct there are objects attained sepost the actions reliech the perform Agricu, Haffinett is thought to be the seed in leavere we are busy in order that we may have alience my wage war in cover that we may enjoy proce. Now, the worst exiture mente t themse was in war and in the performance of cred duties - en actions seem to but men thisy themrelies"-actions, suited of precentment uses sty and grammer, but yet acoust at come and beyond themselves—at the a question of fower it may be or of homeor, or of Hoppiscon for eneself and one's feriens estrems but to the life of eperulative familion belong ale the prerogutives a high are aways to the infe of the Fuenced set is the countend, at his a parameteral at common which anyments it, is to self sufficient, it is the employment of busine it is - s far as mone examp allower-unweared this life, if it ofton to its gerfet ouration, is bestelf Happiners. It is a light which is higher than human. It is not as committee men, but as having in us a write fermiple, that we shall fee they life Let us not then testen to these who tell us that we are human, and ou, at to mend known things—that we are mertal, and ought to mend mertal trenge; but, as far at in milies, let us over surjecte as immedals, and no all for the nite of house in accordance with that which is highert in me that part of as a tack, though small on bulk, so, in foreer and worth, exacted for above all the ret. The spart Komon-berng his overeen part, is the man. He tweeter, was Lives at artisty to Keason lives according to what he cruly is. His age is his own-therefore naturally the best and excelent for him " his own in this eminent sense-therefore realises the highest Happiness.

Introductory Note.] Mich Figh, introduces this chapter with the following comment: όποι διττή ή όρετή ή μιν ήλωή ή δε δεωρήτεση καλ δια τουτο καὶ ή εὐδαιμονια διττή εν μεν τῷ πρωτφ βελλως είτε περι πολετιής ενδαιμονίας... όν τούτω δε λέγει περί τῆς δεωρήτεση εὐδαιμονιας καὶ εὐδαιμονιας καὶ εὐδαιμονιας καὶ εὐδαιμονιας καὶ εἰδαιμονιας καὶ εἰδαιμονιας καὶ εἰδαιμονιας καὶ εἰδαιμονιας εὐδαιμονιας τῷ καλιτικώς εἰδαίμους ἀδυκατον γύρ εὐτιν δε τικη γενέυδυς ενωμιας (μέτε κὴ μετρησαντι τὰ παθή διὰ τῶν ἡθικῶν ἀρετῶν, και κατὰ τολιτικτε εἰδαιμονιας (ήμαντι: ἀἰριστα γὰρ εὰ παθή τὰ αυτών φίσει καὶ ἀσταθήτητα ... οἰ εἰν κοιρος ενεργειν του ὑπὸ τῶν ἀλόγων καὶ τομαχῆς ἐμποιητικα, πῶς εἰσαιμονιας εἰρηται τοὶς εἰπούσε την πρακτικήν αρετήν καὶ τὰ τελος αιτές της εἰδαιμονώς εἰτηθειοτατας τινας εὐαι πρῶς ὑποδος ήν τῆς θεωρητικής εἰδαιμονώς

1177 a. 13. § 1. nard the apariothe Sec 1. 7. 13 auto the desirence and redece-

etre 84 rous rouro etre allo mi. What is the alternative to voir 2177 a. 13. suggested here? The words a. 15 etre beion by and oird eire row up ipin rd bestraror sects to help us to the answer. This is help us rd bestraror is man's rour: see x. 7. 8 beion be rous uples rds deliperor: accordingly something tigher than man's rour must be marked by the words eire beion be an oird—some immediate presence of God in each man, to guide him provide that'y, like the inspired operabling prophy appayropant areo rou of the mappylyppion—of the Meno (99 F). This alternative is, of course, rejected by Aristotle

On two es hair to destruter Mich. Eph. Ims the following sine deter de to destruter to estate, or idea aire est the aironair sal oldes the destruction of the point of the aironair sal oldes destructed aire of the aironair sal oldes destructed destructed

h releiu eddacuoria] This phrase has not occurred before in the a 17. Ethics; but war aperque releian occurs in the definition of the eddacuar map in i. 10. 15.

or & for be supprised, eleptron] 'at hace nusquam sic legintur: lacting egit it habes in libro vi indictum' (Suscind!). Perhaps, in the absence of the Niedman head original of Book vi, we may be allowed to refer to E. N. i. 5. 2 and spiror of θεωρητικός. There is no mention of the θεωρητικός βισε in E. N. i. 7. §§ 3-8—2 passage which has much in common with the chapter now before us; but we must assume that Aristotle had not forgotten the θεωρητικός βισε when he wrote L. 7. §§ 3-8.

§ 2. Rul yap à vous r.l.] i.e mi yap à sous auditories dort rûn èn a. 20 han, mu ru yenoru nepi à à vous apartorie dort rûn yenorûn. For the use of the equitet apartorie in connexion with sous 20th rà voyrun see Med. A. 9, 1074 b. 33 abrûn ûpu soul, tînep dort rû apartorin, au cortun propagate voyateus adquet. Reason is the principle which prevails (sparsi) in the world. It has might as well as right.

πρώττειν] as distinguished from θεωρείν: see note on i. 10. 10, a. 22. b. 15 συστων δ΄ αὐτών αλ τιμιώναται μονιμώτεραι δια τό μαλιστα καλ συνεχέσστατα καταζήν ἐν αὐταίε τοὺε μακαρέυνε: but ε/, note απ ιχ. 9. 5, π. 6— σὐ γὰρ βάδιον καθ αὐτὸν ἐνεργεῖν συνεχῶς, μεθ ἐτερων δι καλ πρὸς πλλους βρον—α statemen, which seems to conflict with the doctrine of this chapter. We must, however, allow much for the difference in the

1177 s. 22, point of view. In ix the good man is viewed as morner field in a as opened for the five.

δτιούν] Instead of Bekker's comma, Susemial and Dywater rightly place a full stop after δτωύν.

- a. 25. § 3. η φιλοσοφία] σπρία is the reading of Ph, Ald., CCC, Cambridge Bi, Bi, Bi. Of course φιλοσοφία is right, the argument being—", the pursuit of wisdom (ρελοσοφία) is no pensart, how much more pleasant must the possession (σοφία) be?"
- a. 20 matapersery:] Lb, (bb, and CCC give this spelling. Much. Fra capita in as follows—different alrebjorous of delipsion nedapore, on the moderacie is immerced in metter, and often repeats that he has done this, or not these that: a de theopies sale the péans tou detail entre entrepuese oldenors de perovola plants.

εύλυγον δε τοίς είδους των ξητούντων ήδιω την διαγωγήν είναι) The contrast marked by role eldone and ros (groups bere to not that between the more efficient as a treasure (if Grant's note here) and the improve of pulgons by which that treasure is accuralated or Aristotle would certainly tell us that of these two the μαθησιε is the more pleasant. But this between the ένέργεια κατά την êgo, and the drapped by which the ege is formed. The order derives more pleasure from the ass which his trained facult es make of his accumulated knowledge, that the framer derives from the process by which faculties are trained and knowledge a accumula ed. Similarly, it is the perfectly formed hamor, and not the min who is becoming bosons, who finds the greater pleasure in the performance of ra disma. We must be careful, then to understand the siddres here as onveyou inephoners, not as metely since execute The accumulation of knowledge in the head, or more conveniently, in the horary is as false an ideal of 11: as the accumalation of money. An instructive discussion-partly in relation to acadenical education-of the question 'Is Treti, or is the men at exercise in the parsuit of Truth, the superior end?" will be found in Sir W Hamilton's Lectures on Meanthymes, Lect 1, vol 1 3p 8-18. Hamilton describes it as 'perhaps the tras. current theoretical, and certainly the most important practical, problem in the whole compass of pulosophy. For according to the said on at which we arrive, must we accord the higher or the lewer rank to

certain great departments of saudy; and what is of more impor- 1177 a. 20. tance, the character of its solution, as it determines the air, regulates from first to last the method which an exhibitened science of education must adopt."

§§ 4-7.) In these sections it may perhaps be thought that the a. 27. Comparative Sire is presented as a career distinguished from the noherode Blue-the career of the sevant, as distinguished from that of the man of affairs. That the savant neces less yopny's than the man of affairs, and so is disoperatopee, is true in a sense although we must remember that the savant is himself the highest product of civil lite, and the order and amerity of trait ale are naterally necessary to lus form, being, in a way, his xopnyin. That the career of the savant was parely what Arisco In uncerstood by the Bruppriede for is most thely it was his own career; but here, I take it, he asks us to look at the Beapprints Blor, not as a separate career arde by side with other careers in the cas, but rather as the firm of the notioned Bios, that is, of all life in the city. Accord ingly, when he custinguishes à incopena à ama the spatiative apertu (x 7. 1) from \$\tilde{\gamma}\$ kará výr \$\tilde{\lambda}\lambda \tilde{\gamma}\rangle \tilde{\gamma} \tilde{\ga tinguish two lives, but rather two points of view. The eidminorin of the notice is higher than that of the andperor, as the wear's higher than the vona - but there is no work without vona, and no vona without ψοχή. The 'city' exists or the sake of its 'thinkers,' but the 'thinkers' are no caste apart; they are the leaven in the mass We nest remember that it is of h rehela elbusporla that he is speaking here. Fure beaple constitutes of release elderpown. But man cannot engage in this beopen centrationally or, even at intervals, perfectly. Only God can continuously and perfectly life of pure bewpin is too high for man, because he is concrete. 'H release eldaquora, ther, being beyond the reach of man, he is left With estimation to the extent of his bearing see F. N. x. 8 8. This means that Despis is the formal element in his evelopovia. The outpie, as distinguished here (x 7 4) from the hienos, is this formal element abstracted and personified for the sake of clearer presentation. But we must not make 'a material use of a merely formal principle -we must not suppose that the outdo, as described here E N. x. chapters 7 and 8-raises as an individual to bear away the prize of actual eidaspoola from the domoine. The beappyrings this

is not a separate life coordinate with the notionois plot, but a spirit

1.77 a. 87, which penetrates and ennobles the latter. When the 'political' life is said to be doyalos (x, 7, 6, b, 12) this is doubtless true of the lives of ord nary politicians, who make politics a trade, sal jecting themselves to the vicissitudes of party fortine, and placing that end in its doman. but it is not true of the life of the 'good min,' whose exoly consists in the quiet of a well regulated mired, not in an impossible immunity from the "interruptions" of gractical afe-Unless we understand spoky in this sense, we must surpose that in the Ethi is the life of the good man is depicted as a more or less troubled and unsatisfactory public career, in which he is pull fully conscious of the difficulty of finding occasions for the exercise of his temperance, just ce, liberality, and other virtues and ng, if he is ever to reach the highest kind of happiness, in with frawal from social activity, and the attainment of Nivoria, such as the Norplatonists understood the beapprises him to be. Nothing could ... more opposed than this to Anstotle's view of life as sexual from beginning to end.

I take it, then, that when he contrasts the Gropping's flor as d the apparails flor. Aristotle semetimes thinks especially of the difference between the life of the student or savant and that of the paraman and sometimes (as here, x. 7, §§ 4-7) wishes rather to call attention to the rither way, or apparation the, as distinguished from the concrete manifestation, of mans life as a whole. But these two ways of looking at the flor Groupping's scarcely present themselves to him as two. The result is a confusion of expression which earlied the mystics of a later age to quote Austotle's authority for the extravagances—the discoustis contrasted, as a man who has difficulty in finding people on whom to exercise his discousage, with the gropes, who has something better to do than to exercise discousing!

For more on Aristotle's view of the relation of the Graphende Size to the repartable Size, see note on i. g. 2, also notes on vi. 1, 1 and vi. 13, 8.

Piutarch discourses on the inseparability of these two size in an interesting passage—de liberis educandis, 10—redelous de decimente hydrau rote devapérous την πολιτικήν δύναμεν μέξαι και ατράσαι τη φελοστημία και δυσιν άντουν μεγίστουν άγαθουν απηβόλους έπαρχειν έπελαμάνου, τοῦ τε κοινωμέλους βίου, πολιτικομένους τοῦ τε έκτροντε και γελητεί, δεμπρίβοντας περί φελοσσφάιν. τριών γθρ όντων βίων, δει διερητικός, δ δε όπολουστικός, δ μεν δελυτος ποι δικλος των ήδουδος (μαδης και μικρυπρικής δύτεν ό δε θεωρητικός, τοῦ πραστικό δων

μαρτάτου, ἀνωφελήσ ὁ δὲ πραστεκές, ἀμοιρήσου φιλοσιφίας, ἄμουσου καὶ 1177 a 27 πλημμελής. πειρατίου οὐν εἰε δύνυμεν καὶ τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν, καὶ τῆς φελοστοφίας ἀντιλαμβίνευθαι, κοτὰ τὸ παρείπου τῶν καιρῶν, οῦτων ἐπολιτεύτατο Περικλης, οῦτων ᾿Αρχύτας ὁ Ταραστίνος, οῦτων Δίων ο Συρασίσιος, οῦτως ὙΕπομενῶνδας ὁ Θηβοῦνε΄ ὧν ἐκάτερος Πλότωνος συνουσιαστής. When Plato (Rep. 520 A) compeis his philosophers to re-enter the cave, he asserts the soul-and-body hke connexion between the θεωρητικόν είων and the πραστικος βίως. I understand Austotle to believe in the same intimate connexion, although, as a professed savant, he probably differed from Plato as to how the savant or 'philosopher' ought to make his inflaence felt in society; he probably attached more importance than Plato dia to the mere presence of 'thinkers'—of an academic element—in the city. He would probably not have wished to see his 'thinkers' tike to 'policies'—even if, by so doing, they might have become 'philosopher kings.'

§ 4. b pèr dirates deirat mode ous diratempayinet nai pil ar. 30. 8 di codos noi nos adrès ar directal despeir. The corpor, as hus contrasted with the directs, is, for the moment, taken out of the human environment. He is not the savant, actually existing in society, but the personification—or even deffication—of the theoretic element in man. Then follow mined ately the words at 34 solvion d'ione correppole ixer, which refer to the savant, as an actually existing member of society. Aristotle, as I have said, looks at the diappricos slor from two points of view—as the firm of human life, and as the career of the savant; but the two points of view sometimes tend to merge in each other.

συνοργούς] The special reference is probably to ή redain φιλία, a. 34 and the βιήθεια afforded by its 'Dialectic' see Introductory Note to Book viii. So far as the remarks made in this section apply to the σοφός, as an actually existing savant, it seems to me that his independence of ή lorde χορηγία is exaggerated. Not to mention the remoter social conditions of his existence, he owes much to educational institutions; and, if he is a student of nature, as Aristotic himself was, he will require the special χορηγία of the laboratory.

§ 5. οὐδὰν γὰρ ἀπ΄ αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι] Scc .Met. A. 2. b. 2
982 b. 11 διά γαρ τὸ θαυμαζειν οἱ ἄνθρωπο. επὶ ευν κοὶ το πρώτον ἄμξωντο
φιλοσοφείν, ἐξ ἀμχῆς μὰν τὰ πρόχειμα τῶν ἀπόρων θαυμάσαντες, εἶτα κατα
μικρὸν οὖτω προϊώντες καὶ περὶ τῶν μειζότων διαπορήσαντες, οἶον περί τε τῶν

- 1177 b. 2. της στλήσης καθημώτων καὶ των περί τόν ήλων [κώ κερί δυτημέν] τοὶ της της τοῦ καντός γενίσεως. ὁ δι ἀπορών καὶ θαιμάζων οίεται ἐγνεειε ('id κα ὁ φιλόμυθας φιλόσοφός πάς ἐσειε ὁ γὰρ μεθας σύγκειεε ἐπ θιαματίων ῶπτ' είπερ δια τὸ ψεύγειε τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐψελοσύψησαν, φωτραν ἔτι ἐτα τη εἰδίνει τὸ ἐπίστασθαι εδιωναν, καὶ οἱ χρήσεως τινου ἀνοτε, μεμπικεί διαιτιτό συμβεβηκοι' σχεδών γὰρ πευπον ὑπαρχιστών των ἀναγκαιων εια πρα μαστώνην κοὶ διαγωγήν ἡ τοιούτη φρόνησες θρέπο (ητείσθει. δίλον οἰν ῶπ δι' οὐδεμιαν πύτην (ητεύμεν χριαν ἐνεραν' ἀλλ' ῶσπερ ἄνθρωπός φαιν ελεύθερος ὁ ἐπυτοῖ ἔνεκο και μὴ δλλαν ῶπ, οὐτω καὶ κίτη, μένη ελευθερο οὐσα τῶν ἐπιστημών μόνη για μὐτη ἐνοπός ἐνεκέν ἐστω. διο καὶ δικαιων διν οὐσα τῶν ἐπιστημών μόνη για μὐτη ἐνοπός ἐνεκέν ἐστω. διο καὶ δικαιων διν οὐσ ἀνθρωπίος νομίζοιτα αὐτῆς ἡ πτησιο.
 - b 8. практийг] 60 Rissow, Sasemili, and Bywairs, for B keers практийг. Besides Kh and Hell, quoted by Susemilil. Cambr. gives практийг. Rassow (Formh. 70) deserbes практийг аз "Для авил пейгіде."

The statement and do row upnation... h 4 upages does not conflict with the h yap compagin redor of vi. 2. 5, for compagin is the whole system of manus upperson whereas the upnation everyweer of the present section are actions performed as means: of, in 3 15 of do upages and allow drems.

& O, Bonei ee & evbaissovia er en oxody eiras 'It is a sort of returned as it were the fruit of our exertions' (Grant). 'One of the Aristotelan ideas, says Prof. Jowest (Policies vel. t. p. calies, which we have a difficulty in translating into English words and modes of thought is oxing as his oxing dayong. To us less so mears has be more than the absence of occupation, the necessary alternation of play with work. By the Greek, oxoloj was regarded as the best tion of a gentleman. In Aristotle the notion is still further files and for he seems to regard it as an internal state in which the intellect, tree from the cares of practical life, every zes or reposes in the consciousness of truth. See also his note on the or by doryest agodije Pol. vin. 2. 1338 a. 10 vol. 1. p. 205, where he saw that the expression is nearly equivalent to the in the again, Surpayed 1348 a 21 the first sense of the world diagony is that employment of lessure which becomes a gentler an" . . . 'Further it is joired with poimure (Pol. 8. 4. 1339 a. 25), and therefore seems to mean the rational or inclicatual employment and enjoyment of leisure. It is always distinguished from mudiá and deámnose, "amusemen" and "relaxation," which are properly, not ends, but only means to

renewed exertion (cp. Nic. Eth. x. 6, § 6); and so means to 1177 b. 4. means whereas diaywyń and oxodń are ends in themselves. The idea of "culture," implying a use of the it tellect not for the sake of any further end, but for itself, would so far correspond to diaywyn."

The pie of spaceties. b. 8 sourced Russow (Forsch. p. 32) b the pie of spaceties after piece years b. 12. Thus h. 9 office yip alpires. . b. 12 yimers intited ately follows solventiate in elephysical distributions. This is a great improvement to the run of the passage, but perhaps (since transposing sentences is always risky work) we ought to be satisfied with the amount of improvement produced by hywater's parenthesis office h. 9 . . b. 12 years.

φόνοι γίνουτο] Kh has γίνηται, and Cambr. has φύνου.

b. 12.

έτέραν ούσαν τής πολιτικής] πολιτική (= aύτό τό πολιτιένοθαι b. 13) b. 14.
is the lean arealy ευίργοια—it results in a rease external to itself

δηλον ώς] Ramsauer proposes δή ώς, οτ δηλον ότι ώς. I do not b. 15. think that any change is necessary.

§ 7. at \$4 tar per n.t h.] The apodesis of this sentence begins b. 10. with b. 24 \$ redefa di abbanovia.

καὶ παρ' αὐτήν οὐδενὸς ἐφίεσθαι τέλους | See Met. A. 2. 982 b. 27 b. 20 μωνη γλη αὐτή αὐτής ἔνεκεν ἐστιν : Met. 9. 8 1050 a. 34 ὖσων δέ μή ἔντιν άλλο τι ἔγγον παρα τὴν ἐντηγειαν ἐν αὐτοῖε ὑπάρχει ἡ ἐνέργεια, οἶον η δρασιε ἐν τῷ ομωντι και ἡ θεωρία ἐν τῷ θεωρουντι, και ἡ (ωπ ἐν τῃ ψιχη, διὰ καὶ ἡ σὐδαιμονία. [ωἡ γὰρ παιά τις ἐστέν.

nai êxelp the hoorin aincian (ality de supalifel the érépyelan)] See x. 5. 2.

δή] So Bekker and Bywater. I prefer Susem his δί given by M≥ b. 22 and Ob. On sol... δί see Eacken de Arist. die, satz Purs saz de particularum wise, p. 32 'adjungt soi... δι rem novam sauge tam leni modo ut idem fore a next a que re'. He remarks that soi... δί is more frequent in E. N. w, viii, ix, and x, than elsewhere in the Aristotelian writings.

rà κατά ταύτην. The τα is introduced by Lywater from Kb, Ml, b. 23. The sentence seems to me to run better without it.

- 1177 b 26. λαβούσα μήπος βίου τέλειον] This means that the life of the eddlepow must have a reasonable duration; that it must be long enough for him to do his life's work in: see note on in δ is by redeig i, 7, 16, a. 18.
 - & B.] The Osupyrude Bloc is an ideal; it cannot be realised by man, for he is concrete. But the effort to real se it, as far as poss ble, is all-important in human life. The effort to realise it coordinates man's powers, and exal's their vitality-it gives him Flan, and carries him on to the attainment of many things while his reach, which he would not otherwise aspire to. Perhaps we may venture to translate the doctrine of this section into be language of modern philosophy, and say that Austotle makes 'the ! Id a of God! the *regulative principle! in man's 1 fe, ... It deed. Eudemus puts the doctrine hardly otherwise in a passage which is the best commentary on this section—E. E. H. 15, 1249 b. 6 20 8 δισπερ και εν τοις άλλοις πρός το άρχον (ήν, και προς την έξιν ευτο τοι ενέργειαν την του άρχοντος, οξον δούλον πρός δεσποτου καλ έκαστον πρω τρ έπαστου παθήπουσαν ώρχην, έπες δε και ανθρωπος φυσει συνέστηκαν έξ άρχοντος καὶ άρχομένου, καὶ έκαστον άν δέοι πρός την έαυτών άρχην (ς» (airy di dieri) ahhas yap à iarpus) apri not ahhas à igneur enime de Frence incluy) : ofthe & Tyes and to Comparison. Or you extractions drywe δ θεός, άλλ' οδ ένεκα ή φρόνησες έπιπίστες (διστύν δέ το οδ ένεια. διωρώται d' er allace), èrre ceirbs ye obberos beiras. Free obr aiperes nai arriou rin φύσει άχιθων ποιήσει μαλιστο τήν του θεος θεωριαν ή σωματος ή χυτρατος ή φιλων ή τών άλλων άγαθών, αίτη άματη, και ούτος ό έρος εάλλωτεος: ήτις 8' & di Erdeiar & di inepholips nudires ron deux depareires mi thumpir, aire δε φαίλη. έχει δε τουτο τη ψιχη, και ούτος της ψυχης όρως ώρετευς, το βκιστα αδοθάνεσθοι του άλδγου μερους της ψυχής ή τοοχίτου. Τίς μιν οδο όρος της καλοκάγοθίας, καὶ τίς ό σκοπύς τών απλώς άγοθών, έστω είνηκενον.
 - b 28. roß συνθέτου] 'man's concrete ha use,' 'man as concrete' '11 σύνθετος οὐσία is the concrete thing—the union of ύλη and μουφή. 25 distinguished from the μορφή which is οὐσία διευ ύλης. Thus ζών 28 ψυχή ἐν σώματι is a σύνθετης οὐσία of which ψυχή is the οίσια διευ ύλης or if ἢν οἶνως: see Md. 11. 3. 1043 b. 29 sqq.
 - b. 22 αθρώπενα φρονείν κτλ] The editors quote Rhet 1. 21 1304
 b. 24 αhere 'θωτά χρη τὸν θεατών, ουν ἀθαυστο τὸν θεατών φρονών' 5 given as a γνωμη, and Pindat, Isthm. v. 20 θεατά θεατών συστεί: εξ. 2100 Antiphanes (apud Stob. Flor. vol. i. p. 316 ed. Meineko) εί

Contrit of βελτιστο δυητά και φρασού: Sophocles (Tereus Fr. 515 Dind) 1177 b.33 βυητά φρασούν χρή βυητήν φύσω: Anonym. apud Nauek (Trag. Gr. Fragm. p. 690) άνθρωπον δυτα δει φροσούν άνθρωπονα. The saying was evidently proverbial.

adaparters] answers to the bedy becameires not becapily of E. E. 11, b. 33. 35, 3349 b. 20 quoted above.

τῷ ὅγκῳ μικρόν] Noũs le 'small in bulk' as compared with the 1178 a. 3. σύνθετον το he hi trules. Of course we must not press this statement.

The θείάν τι ἐν ἡμῶν ls an immaterial principle without ἔγκε—like God in the οὐρονόν. Who has no μέγνθον: see Mel. A. 8. 1073 a. g. so, Dante (Foradiso xxvin) sees God as a point of piercing light, so small that the smallest star would seem a moon beside it—

La Donna mia, che mi videva in cura Forte sospeso, disse: Da quel punto Depende il cielo e tutta la natura.

Zell quotes Seph. Elench. 34. 183 b. 22 μέγιστον γάρ ίσως δρχίε παντων, δυστερ λεγεται' διό και χολεπωτατον' δυφ γάρ κράτιστον εξί δυνάμει, τοσούτη μικρατατον δυ τή μεγάθει χαλεπώτατον έστιν άφθήναι.

τιμιότητι] Kb stands alone, so far as I know, in reading ποιότητα. This is a plausifile reading, the contrasted τῷ ἄγκφ being equivalent to κατα το ποσών. The conjunction δυνομει καὶ ποιότητι occurs in Plutarch de Viet Mor. 5 άρετὴ... ἀκρότης μεν έστι τῷ δυνομει καὶ τῷ ποιότητι, τῷ ποοῷ δὰ μεσότης γίνετοι.

§ D. einep to répler noi épairor) (J. ix. 8 6 Contp di cal milie eù a. 2.
Algurerou palier elem donei nei nàs dilla occupa, occupationi indepense.

τὸ λεχθέν τε πρώτερον, the reference may be to x. g. 8.

s. 4.

CHAPTER VIII.

ARGUMENT.

It is that a second best—a merely human Happiners—that is realized in the tips of word action, for man's moral nature, rooted as it is for the most part on the passions, belongs to him as "Convete Human Being," not as "Fure Reason."

The life of Pure Reason—the Happiness of speculative function—would need VOL 12.

to mend external equipment to a less extent than that of moral action. The "neces coses of info" tainher and owned seems way perhaps need to an even extent out in nonatosich meeds for the performance of his proper families of differ weighty. The moral agent meeds money for his Labrahy and justice (good intentions was not enough for the manifestation of these virtues ment for his County, exportantly for his Temperance, but the chinker mean hand there external things for the performance of his few tion—very these the moral hunder thanking. It is an energie man and member of early and is about to live the his of moral actions (for he discount represent himself from the ignal moral actions, that the thinker well need there external to next.

That Perfect Happines, s. speem'atere function may be seen also from the that to the gods, whom we doen most Kierrel and Happy, we do not exceed enoral actions - hore run mions it would be to think of them as restoring he was justly, faring danger coungeously, expending manay libers, y, tempted to us bud desires forwork, and conducting themselves transcribed -- no through the whole lest of the moral actions are shall find none worths of the gods yot we all had that they live and therefore ful fresh some functionenty do not sieth like t advancen . what function, then, remains to a sing being twhen moral action, and with it, of course, the action of the article is had been set aside? Only speculative from ton remains. Souls is the fronte a of Coil. Her whole left is blaned, man's left is b'ened is far at he recite something like to the function of God, the other animals are marrie the fee of Happiness, because vory have no part in Specula we Thought. Interes is co-extensive with Specialize Thought. He who has Specialized I tought in fuller measure hu. Happiness on fuller measure-not as senselving forming mean Speculation Thought, but as involved in the very events of Specialities Thought for Speculative Thought is in its own exence pre some - it is an end in ituf

Hupteness, then, may be defined as a manuferinter of Shewlater of Theoght hut numan nature in not self influent as regards the perfermance of the new lative functions. The thinker, as converte man, need, excepts the perfermance of the new che perfermance at those functions in which the well need great appliance is not the performance of those functions in which the performance of those functions in may do made seeds we had been loss of some and reason the new often a man may do made seeds we had been loss of some and reason the need to the first and the new of former. And we will be not do do not the total lating men in for items of former. And retail the hand before the notificially furnished the ment of the manufers to come to affect with the mobility action, and revel to the test and performer to the two of great wears had performed after most conductive to Happeness, or the less of five many who pieces of the most conductive to Happeness, or the less of great with the properties of the new men of all sever to agree with our virtue. Such appropriate of the new men of all sever to agree with our virtue. Such appropriate of the new ment of the first of a real our ultimate of few ment be to be facts of the her agree ment or non agreement with their our theorem must be to be facts of the her agree ment or non agreement with their our theorem must be to be facts.

The man who lives the life of leason and serves Keana seems to be at each the best man and the be the loved by the gods. If the gods care for min and it is believed that they do it is notural to suffer that they do it is notural to suffer that they take a new a

Fearen, went in best in man, and most about to themselves, and that they recompense we's good those who leve and honour it. The Trimber them, went be the beloved by the Gods—another reason for helding that he is the most Mappy.

§ 1. desportunal The Groppeneal delegrant are being but we must 1178 a 10. be careful not to misunderstand Aristotic here. When he contrasts the durant as apartur apie irepor, and the cooper as bearing and aircor, and declares the life of the latter to be happier, he is really contrashing man in the concrete, and reason the form of man (see note on rea ovedirou x. 7. 8, b. 28). This form, he would tell us, is realised in the concrete life of the just man, as well as in the conerete life of the savant, the proofing of the just man's moral nature being determined in relation to the same owners which regulates the speculation of the savant. Man's concrete life (which, as concrete, is always ir convene and mois irripore) is 'happier' in proportion as it real ses this gaonee more purely. The savant, therefore, who realises the oxoxos theoretically as well as practically (he must have realised it as opposition before he can realise it as outfor) stands higher than the just man who realises it only practically. But the concitions of haman existence make the comparatively wishdrawn life of the savant impossible except for a very few. When Austotle tells us that the life of the savant is 'happer' than the life of the man of affairs, he does not imply that it is open to the bulk of mank and to choose this 'happier' life. The exhortation xph be . . . up barn independ deliverifier is addressed to the balk of manked, because it is open to every man who is not werappoperor wood doerfer to contribute—if not in some brilliant way, as polit cian, or so dier, or leader of fashion, or at dete-at least as honest man, to the eldomorio of a city in which savants are produced and held in honour.

τά άλλα] So Susemuli and Bywater: Bekker has άλλα. The τά is given by L⁰, Ald., CCC, Cambr., NC.

xpeiaus | "services."

6, 12,

noi neafeat] Rassow (Forsch. p. 33) places mi (rois) neuffeat affect midion a. 13.

τό πρέπον έκάστψ] τό πρέπον τῷ πλησίον (Paraph.),

a. 13

§ 2. 'Again, moral virtue seems in some points, to be actually a, 16

- 2178 a. 14. the result of physical constitution, and in many points to be closely connected with the passions' (Peiers). Muchelet iin lerstantis i not show distript as that manum rectitude, from which as principle the identificant distript spring; but in § 3 is not show distript and at its oil distript seems to have exactly the same meaning. The reference in its seems to be to distript distript in heri ed good tendency eliquidence vi. 13. 1; in malli, not only to the general connexion between isolar distript and the most, so often insisted on (e.g., in it 6 to), but also perhaps to those justificates it sais mideau (ii. 7, 14) which are not strictly decrease such as alder.
 - a. 16. § 3. συνίζευκται 8. 17 φρονήσει | See vi. 13. 6 ωίχ αίν το άγαθλο είναι πιριώς δυτο φρονήσεως, σύδε φρονμου δυνο του έρδιστε τίντης, and note there with references.

The motive of the present section (which Grant regards as containing "the germ of much that is expanded in the Film and books, of. Eth. vi. 12, 9-10, 13, 4") is thus given by Mich Lightham for our fleries aperas authorities of our, delicites and tax application acting gip of perfect our our defense are the roll of perfect and of the our our demonstration of the perfect of any our sufference of any our sufference of any suf

- 6. 19 συνηρτημέναι δ' αὐται καὶ τοὶς νάθεσε] Κ^b has συνηρτημένη (ες ἡ φρόνησες) δ' αὐταίε (ες, ταὶς ἡθ, ἀρεταίς) κ. τ. λ. Ramsauer conjectures συνηρτημένοι (ες αὶ ἡθ, ἀρεταί) δὲ ταύτη το (ες, τῆ το φρωήσει) κ. τ. λ. Οι συνηρτημένοι (ες ῆ το φρωνησει καὶ οἱ ἀρεταί) δ' ἀλληλοιε το κ. τ. λ. Susem hi conjectures συνηρτημέναι δ' αὐτῆ το κ. τ. λ. I think that συνηρτημένοι δ' αὐται 18 ε.ght: the ἡθικαὶ ἀρεταί, notwithstand og that close connexion with the intellectual faculty φράνησει, are π. ε. τ. σύνθεταν, for they are implicated with the πιθη: καὶ τοἱς πεδεκι τησα 18 ' not only with φράνησει, but also with the πιθη.' I that that Grant is wrong in mak ng αἰται take up φρανησει and the ἡθι ἀρεταί.
- a. 29. \$\frac{1}{2}\$ be now next up to play \text{ We are reminded of de An. 13 \, \frac{1}{2}\$. \$\frac{1}{2}\$ of the solution of the solution

is included with voil approved and discrete and discrete first of the imperior, 1178 a. 22 See Edwin Wallace's interesting discussion of 'Aristotle's Theory of Thought' - Aristotle's Psychology: Introduction, Chapter x...

διακριβώσαι] K^b has ἀκριβώσαι, probably omitting the δι- because 6, 23 of the immediately preceding ~u: for K^b, with all MSS., reads • ζογται which Sus. accepts.

§ 4. 86fers n. r. h.] From this point onwards to the end of § 8, 1178 b 32, the theopyrude Bire is discussed in much the same way as it has already been discussed in ch. 7. see Rassow, Fors. h., p. 36.

προσποιούνται κ. τ. λ.] Coraes has—δεί χρημάτων τῷ διασίφ εἰε τὰι α. 31. ἀντοποδιατιε, ίνα δηλος γένηται δίκαιος ών τό γὰρ βουλισθαι δικαιοπραγείν δόηλον καὶ οἱ άδικοι γορ, μὴ εἰπορούντες χρημάτων, προσποιήτωντ ἀν εἶνω δικαιων.

δυνάμεως] The Paraph. has—δεί γόρ τῷ μίν ἀνδρείφ καιρού τινδε κατ- a. 32. αλλήλων εαὶ τῆς ἐν αωματε δυναμεως ἄθεν ἐπιδείξεται τὴν τάλμαν και την καρτερίαν. Ramsauer, however, thinks of a general with forces at his disposal.

¿fouclas] se, rob decharratma (Cornes).

4. 23.

τως γάρ δήλος έσται ή ούτος ή των άλλων τις:] 'fur how cise can he, or the possessor of any other virtue, show what he is?' (Peters.)

6. δ. διφ. σβητείται τε . . . b. ε δν εῖη] This is a remark a, 34. made in passing, to show the importance to ἡθική ἀριτή of προξείε and the opportunity of performing them. 'Hθική ἀριτή realises its end (εὐ δή τέλεων) only when good intentions are carried out in good actions.

After δμφισβητείται L^b, O^b read δί, accepted by Bekker, and CCC, B¹, B² read δί τι, which may perhaps be regarded as supporting τι, given by K^b, M^b, and accepted by Susembl and Bywater. For δμφισβητείται, L^b, Γ, CCC, NC, B¹, B¹, B¹ have δητείται.

nórepor κυριώτερον τής dperής] 'which has more to do with constituting virtue'— which is the more important element in virtue.'

§ 6. πρός γε την ενέργειαν The θεωρών, gud θιωρών, needs no b. 4.

1178 b 4 χυρην a-no well-appointed stage, as it were, for the exercise if his θεωρητική δείργεια: but, quá δυθρωτας, he chooses to exercise πραστικαί δυίργειαι also, and for them he will need χυρηγία.

Indeed the qualification 'que la pamos,' applies to him not only when he exercises postural impress, but also when he exercises his beapproof in year: if he does not require for the latter an elaborate appropria, he requires at least fellow actors—sympathetic and stimu-

lating friends. See Introductory Note to Book val.

The words be 6 alpeiras of eard vive (so, iffletive) aperior aperior are to be carefully noted, as stating explicitly the inherence of the femperate flow in the apparate flow. The femperate flow man, and chooses to live the social life. Aristotle's despite to flow as travested by those who afterwards made at a life of actual with drawal from the flesh. Aristotle's ideal of fempia is a regularize ideal of which the Neo-aristotelians made a constitutive use.

- b. 7. Δεθρωπεύεσθου] Cotace has an interesting note here—τών ενατίων ή λίξιε, σημαίνουσα τὸ παρὰ τοὶε Γάλλοιε ε΄ λιπκαπίετε. ἔσωσε δ΄ αἰτὴν κοὶ ἡ συνηθεία, κατα μετοχήν μιλιστο' δυθρωπευμένου γαρ ἐποικουντε λίγομεν, τὸν ἀστείων τὰ βθη, καὶ ἀγαπητῶς τοἱς δλλυιε συμπεμφαράμενων
 - § 7] Grant remarks on this section—' As stale argues have that we cannot attribute morality to the Delty without falling into more anthropomorphism; but it might be replied that there is the same difficulty in conceiving of God as engaged in philosophic thought... If it is conceded that the life of God is only analogues to that of the philosopher, we might then ask, why not also analogues to the life of the good man?' With this criticism which amounts, as I understand it, to saying that Aristotle's notion of God is not anthropomorphic enough, it is instructive to compare the criticism of Plotinus—that Aristotle errs in attributing some to the First Principle: 'Αριστοτίλης δε χωριστόν μεν το πρώτον από εντρτόν, νούν δε αλτό κουτό λέγων πάλιν οδ οδ το πρώτον πουί (μ. 490), for the First Principle is δενώτων νεδ (μ. 541).
- b. 15. al δὶ σώφρονες] To Lb, the only authority quited by Susemul for al, may be added Cambr. All other MSS, apparently read al.

pupà nai àrdica écar] Meretus (var. lecl. vu. 22, cited by Zell) 1178 à 17 quotes Cic. de nat. deor iii. 15 as a passage modelled on this sec ion—Jam justit a, quae suum cuique d stribuit, quid pertinet ad deos? hommum societas et communitas, ut vos dicitis, justituam procreavit. Temperantia autem constat ex praetermitten lis voluptatibus corpons, cui si locus in coelo est, est ctiam voluptatibus: nam fortis deus intelaga qui poiest? in doiore? an in labore? an in periculo? quorum deum nihil attingit.

rou nouir] 'vide quam procul abesse jubeatur dei creatoris b.21. imago' (Ramsauer).

wort of rou beou everyeen . . . bewonten ar ein | Sec Mel. A. 7.

§ 8. καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖτ] Ramsauer's conjecture καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖτ is 5.30. supported by NC, which reads τό.

οὐ κατά συμβιβηκὸς ἀλλά κατά τὴν θεωρίων αὐτη γάρ καθ κύτὴν τιμία] Orapia is itself εὐδαιμονία: it is not a means which produces εὐδαιμονία, as the doctor produces health. For the meaning of τιμία, see E. N. i. 12

§ 9.] With this section begins a discussion of the relation of ή b. 33. deter eigeppia to eidasposia. The discussion is not confined strictly to the relation of τά άττός to the είδωμονία of the θεωρητικός βιος. It is suggested that τὰ ἀττός are not nearly so important for the είδωμονία of the πρακτικός βιος as is vulgarly supposed; and we are allowed to infer a fartiori that their influence in the δεωρητικός βιος (so far as that βιος can be d stinguished as a separate career in the city) is very small.

cosamorfoorra . . . a. a marapior] I think that these two words 1170 a. t. are used here with exactly the same meaning.

aŭrapase oŭb' ἡ πράξιε] This is the reading of Kb, Ald., and B', a. 3. All other authorities recorded, so far as I know (Susemill gives Γ, Lb, Mich. Eph., Heliod., Aret., Mb, Ob, and I can add B', B', Paris. 1853. CCC, NC. Cambr.) interpolate oùb' ἡ πρίσιε between aŭrapase and οὐδ' ἡ πράξιε. It has been conjectured that πρίσιε represents χρῆσιε. Coraes adopts χρῆσιε in his text. Mich. Eph. has—οὐδ' ἡ πρίσιε τουτέστιν οὐδι τὸν αὐταραειαν δεὶ πρίνειν δε τῶν χρημάτων ὑπερβολῆε. I cannot attach much weight to the mere circumstance

- 1179 a. 3. that Kb omis the words; I believe that they represent something original in the text.
 - a 8. § 10, τοσαύθ'] μέτρια.
 - 4.9. § 11 36λων] See the conversation between Solon and Crossess Herod i. 30-32, especially th. 30, where Solon says that Telest the Athenan was the happiest man be had ever known. Telest was we l-off, he lived to see his children's chalten, and he died glori analy in battle, and his countrymen erected a monument to him where he fell.
 - A 11. πεπραγότας δε το κάλλισο"] Kb omits τό: so also do Cumbr., NC, and Paris. 1853—thus, apparently, making πεπραγώται intransitive. The intransitive use of πέπραγα, according to Verch (Greek Verbs) is found in Pindar, Europades, and Plato: but the intransitive use of πέπραγα is late. Accordingly NC the only MS which supports Spenge's conj πεπραγότας, so far as I know—can hardly be right with πεπραγότας δε κάλλιστα.

os vero] om. NC, l'aris. 1853. Bywater has an important suggestion here (Contrib. p. 69)—'I incline to think that we should revert to the K° l' reading nemoryiros de ωλλιστ' φέτο, and understand φέτο in the sense of 'he thought' or "meant," so as to mak a certain distinction between the actual words (στο στεφαίστο καλικ) and what they meant by implication. Compare F. F. 1213 t. 11 for a similar use of φέτο."

- 2. 12. σωφρόνως] Mich. Eph. has—eine di σωφρόνωε άνελ τοῦ κοτά πανας ζώντα τὰς άρετάς.
- α 13. "Αναξαγόρας] Cf E. E. 1. 4. 1215 b. 6 'Αναξαγύρας μέν ὁ Ειλαζεμένας έρωτηθείε τις 6 εὐδαιμουέντατος, 'οὐθείς,' εἶπεν, ' ὅν σὰ κομ (ειε' ολλ' διτοπος δν τίς σος φανείη' τοῦτον δ' ἀπετρίνοτο τον τρόπον δετίκος, άρων τιν έρομεναν εἰδύνατον ὑπολαμβανοντα μή μέγαν δυτα καὶ καλον ή πλυίτων ταιτητε τυγχανείν της προσηγορίας, αὐτός δ' Ισως φετο τὸν ζωντα αλίπως καὶ καδαρώς πρως τὸ δικαίον ή τενος θεωραίς κοινωνούντα θείας, τοῦτον ὡς ἀνθρωνείων εἰπειμακόριον εἶναι.
- Labiy true; but we must verify them by direct reference to the facts of human life, as given in our own experience; if they do not a rece with these facts, they may be set down as more theories—A year 2.28.

§ 13] Rameauer suggests that this section has been added by 1179 a 22 another hand. I think that the suggestion is well worth making. The section has no connexion with what immediately precedes; and the view which it seems to favour of a personal relation between the gods and men is har lly what we expect from a writer who has described the godhead as in § 7. We seem to have to do with a Platonising Austotelian, rather than with Aristotle. Much Pph has caught the ring of the section in his commentary—θιοφιλής (i.e. δυφιλεί δ θεός Mich. Eph.) δρα δ συφός εί γιορ ήμεῖε φιλούμεν τοῦς ἀγανώντας τους ήμῶν παίδας ἡ συγγενείς, πῶς οῦ δει τον παναγαθου θεὸυ φιλείν τοὺς ἀγανώντας τους ήμῶν παίδας ἡ συγγενείς πῶς οῦ δει τον παναγαθου θεὸυ φιλείν ποὺς ἀγανώντας τους ήμετας τὸ συγγενείς αὐτῷ;

CHAPTER IX.

ARGUMENT.

We have now complised our Theory of Lefe: but have we failfiled the intention of this Traities? No: this is a practical Traities, and annot sup short with a more Theory of the Good Life, but must indicate how we can be usual good men.

If the mere Matement of Theory mere in steel enough to make men good, then indeed I heavy would have a right to all those 'great feer' that Theories speaks about but the truth is that Theory, though it may have some good practical influence on generous youths, and may help to place statural nobusity of disposition in the safe heeping of Versue, is someties to smile the aritimary man to married the nighest graduetes he abstract from ene's, not from respect for what is good, but from feer of punishment: he leves as passed actions, following his own placemens and avoiding the passes offered to them: he has no considered of the good and of that which brings real placemen, for he has never tasted it. What Theory could transform much a nature?

Three agencies whereby men become good are commonly recognised - Nature, Habit, Teaching

Natural ensembnes plainly does not defend on ourselves at boungs by the operation of divine causes to those who are truly fortunate.

Theory and leaching are not effective unless the hearer's mind has been prepared beforehand, by a course of haints, to like and divishe arguet, as a field must be tilled for the med,

This preparation—becinning from the carlied years, residing in the formation of a good moral character—can scarcely be carried on except by the State. We must accordingly have Laws regulating the education and conduct

of the young—yet and of adults too, throughout the whole course of these hier for the majority of men do what is right, and because it is right, but he saw they are constrained to do it. Law—expressing the Proces as Peacen of the community, has that proves to constrain obediene which no fasher—we indicated man, who is not an absolute monarch, passesser.

Unity on the Sparton State and a few elever has the language grown any attention to the nursure and habits of the extrems - most Sector neglect their matters enterely, and about each mon to rule her wife and cheldren as in

pleases, like a Cyclops.

It here the State neglects its duty, it would seem to be immobent on the individual to do what he can for the moral education of he was the dren and fraceds. He will encode best of he have made himself expalse of legicial agost he can concert his own clickbren by mouration laws as the wrotten laws of the State, did they exist, would admost all the citizens.

This system of paternal education, though only second lest, is not washood in frentiar advantages at has the basis of natural affection in the children so build upon, and it can suit steelf to the effectal needs of individual cates. From special needs may indiced be med, in a way, by oursely emperical knowledge, but if they are to be met in the right way, they must be out by a knowledge of general principles—the father news, as we have used, make himself capains of legislating

How, then, is a man to make himself capable of legislating? Can the printered politicisms leach him? It would appear not. The political art is not like the other arts, which are taught by those who practise them. These who process to teach the political art are the Sophists, who do not process the art. and three who practise the art rely on heach and personal experience—the secret of their twicess they do not attempt to explain in specific or books, and cannot communicate to these sons or friends—they surely would do so, if they could. Only this seems plane—that experience has not a little to do with these smears—for my six that those who love on political surroundings become politicisms.

Expersence, then, is clearly necessary, as well as theory, so one who would

become capable of legislating

As for the professed teachers of the pointieal art—the Sockests, they are far from besing teachers of it: they do not know even what it is, or what it is concerned math, if they know, they mould not identify it math k heters, or over place it besea h liketeric; and they would not them had it is easy to liquid by making a collection of famous lives, and selecting the best of them—as if the selection did not not creditizence—as if all did not depend on deciding rightly, it ho, we would ask, is the intelligent judge of the product of any art—of a missival composition, or a painting! The experienced mu when we painter Now, laws are the products of the political art. Here, then, as one to become capable of arginising—capable of deciding which are the best law without experience? Collections of constitutions are like collections of medical cases—anches to those who have not got the discerning faculty which center from the experience of practice to those who have such experience they are likely to be very modul.

Our productions, then, having left the subject of Legislation uncommined, we perhaps ought now ourselves to consider them and with it the whole subject of the

government of the State-that our Phylosophy of Man may be made as complete at the can make it

First then set us try to recount what is good in the various statements of our predect rors, then, looking at the collected Constraintions let no try to see what things preserve and what destroy States and Constitution, and what are the causes of good and bad government. When we have seen these causes, we shall be better able to see clearly what sort of Constitution is the best, and how each Constitution may be best ordered, and what laws and customs it is best for it to

Let us then begin.

Introductory Note. The Ethics may be said to end with chapter 8. The present chapter introduces the subject of the Politics. In the Ethics the theory of life has been set forth. But the of ject of the Treatise was not simply to supply a theory. A theory of life, which is only a theory-which we cannot see our way to realising at all-is not worth setting forth, even as a theory. It is not interesting, to say the least. The theory set forth in the Ethics has all along awakened interest, because we have seen that it is set forth in order to be applied in practice; but the Treatise, as a practical manual, would be incomplete, unless it ended by indiculing more precisely, to those concerned with moral education, for whose use it is intended, how the theory may be applied in practice how human brings, constituted as they are, may be got to act up to the principles which have been shown in theory to be the true principles of conduct. We accordingly find the Ethics ending with a chapter which indicates (for details we must go to the Politics) the lines on which practical effect may be given to the theory of life which has been set forth.

The gost of the chapter is this:—It is vain to begin by preaching the true theory. The hearers mus, be first prepared to hear. The moral nature must be trained; and direct appeals to the understanding cannot train the moral nature. Nor can home influences -at least, unsided. They have not sufficient force. Nopos alone is strong enough to enforce the dictates of reason. Hence it is some which those interested in carrying out the true theory into practice must try to enlist in their service. It is not by the illdirected and feeble agency of indiviouals, but only by the institutions of the State, that citizens can be trained to live up to the true theory of conduct. Let us, then, try to embody the true theory in Legis-

lation. This has not hitherto been done effectively.

The circumstance that this chapter, written so entirely in the spirit of the First Book (see especially E. A. i. 2), follows insmediately on the discussion of the beapprade flor is very significant, showing that Alistotle does not regard I is doctrine of the supremary of the beapprade flor as in any way inconsistent with his doctrine of enderuch as the opportunity interful.

- 1179 a. 33. § 1. περί το τούτων] So Susemill and Bywater, with Lb, Ob, CCC, NC, B¹, B², B¹. Bekker tends περί τούτων with Kb, Mb. With regard to the list given here of subjects which have been discussed in the Ethics, see note on π. 6. π.
 - 24. τοις τόποις] This is the only instance, apparently, in Aristotle of the plural = τόπφ, or δε ἐν τύπφ: see Γucken, κέστ den Speachy, des Arist. (die Proepositionen) p. 26.
 - b. 8. § 2. § εἶ πως άλλως ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα] Mich. Eph has—εἰ με επὸ τῆς τῶν ἀμετῶν χρήσοως γινόμεθα ἀγαθοὶ χρηστίων αἰταῖς: εἰ δε των έλλων τροποιη ἐκείνον ζητητιον' πόντως δι χρηστιον ἐκείνοι δι' ὧν ἀγαθοὶ ἐσόμεξος ε g. attention to the rules of health contributes indirectly to morality.
 - b. 6. § 8 Oloyuw] The editors quote vi δ' Λοκληπωδαιε τοῦνο y' Rose θεδε , ἐσσθαι κακότησα καὶ ανηράς φρένος ἀνδρῶν, | πολλούς ἄν μεσθους καὶ μεγάλους ἔφερον. Cf. Plato Meno 95 E, where the last 1 re is cited.
 - b. 6. logden] The construction is—dulental logden upor signobal tore cheedepart.
 - b. 9. κατοκώχερον This is the reading of Kb and All adopted by Bekker and By water. Susembl adopts κοτακωχορον, the realing of all other authorities apparently. In Pol. ii. 6. 1169 L. 30 we have κατακωχορον (apparently in all MSS.), on which see Newman's critical note, vol. 1 p. 88. There seems to be no doubt that κοτακώχ μου is a corrupt form. Comes gives the meaning of the prince σατοκωχιμον έκ τῆς δρετῆς as follows σημαίνει δ'ούν κατά λεξεν ή φράσιο, ούτω διοδευαι ώστε κατέχεσθαι έν της έρντης, ώς έκ θετα, καὶ οινων δυθουσιών καὶ θεόληπτου γίνεσθαι.
 - b 10 malonayabiar] The word occurs only twice in the E. N here and in 13, 3, 16, in neither place with the technical meaning which it has in the E. E.: see notes on E. N vi. 1, §§ 1-3 for the

connexion of the oxonor of that passage with the operate calorage 1178 b 10. Glar of E. E. H. 15.

- § 4. alboi] See E. N. iv. 9, where the moral value of ados is b. 11. discussed. It is a praiseworthy modes in the young.
- § 8. dyownrow... In 20 dperies] There are so many difficulties b. 10. in the way of acquiring άρισή, that we must be satisfied if, with a little agencies which produce it at our disposal, we succeed in getting some share of it.
- § 6. φόσοι ... εθει ... διδαχη Το elent fication of τό της φύστως δ. 20. b 21 with τό διά τινας θείας αίτας τοῖς ώς άληθώς είτιχεσιν έπάρχου b. 32 enables us to see that the ages cas mentioned here are those mentioned in Ε. Ν. 1. 9. 1 διορείται πότερον έστι μαθητόν ή εδιστόν ... ή κατά τινα θείαν μοῦρον ή ωὶ διά τύχην παραγένεται— where see notes. It was not necessary of course for the argument of i. 9 to contrast μαθητός and έδισμός as moral agencies; both together, as involving human effort, were consisted with non-human agenc es—θεός and τύχη.

bid rivas belas airlas rols ώς dànbüs εδτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει] See F F 5 22 H. 14. and M. M. ii. 8, where εὐτυχία is discussed—(1) as the g ft of God, and (2) as the result of natural endowment φύσιε. The writers refuse to make the gods the authors of the so-called εὐτυχία of the undeserving, and prefer to consider the εὐτυχάν as one who has a happy natural enlowment or instinct (described, however, as τὸ ἐν ἡρῦν θέον Ε. Ε. 1248 a. 27), which prempts him to do the right thing: thus the writer of the M. M. says (1207 a. 36) ο γαρ εὐτυχης ἀστιν ὁ ὁνευ λόγον ἔχων ὁρμην πρὸς ταγαθά, καὶ τούτων ἐπιτιγχίνων, τοῦτο ὁ ἐστὶ ψύσεως ἐν γὰρ τὴ ψυχῆ ἔνεστιν τὴ φύσει τικοῦτον ῷ ὁρμῶμεν αλόγως πρὸς ἀ ἀν εἰ ἔχωρεν. Cf. the suggestion thrown out in the Meno 99 Ε ὀρετή δυ εἰη οῦτε φύσει οῦτε διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ θείς μοίρς παραγιγνωμένη διου νοῦ οἶς ἐν παραγίγνητα.

The statement b. 21 rd pir our ris pioness diftor in our idi intiinitized must be taken with this qualification—that it is one of the
recognised daties of the sometimes, according to Aristotle, to see
that a bad pions does not grow up in the citizens by the mult plication of the diseased and the weak. It is within the power of
the semodings, as it is within the power of the breeder of domestic
animals, to improve the breed.

- 2170 5.23. 6 82 hayot x + h] On the uselessness of supplying theory to those whose moral natures have not been trained, see i. 3. §§ 3-7. On to sakes xalpur sal pureir b. 25, see ii. 3. 2 and x. s. s.
 - b. 26. δσπερ γήν την θρέψουσαν τό υπέρμα] Comes quotes Περροεταίες Νέμος § 2—ή μεν γαρ φυσιε ήμέων όκοιαν ή χωρή το δε διγματα των δεδασκόντων δευίων τὰ υπέρματα: ή δὶ παιδομαθή τὸ κατ' δίμην κύτὰ πεσείν ἐε τὴν ἄρουρον.
 - b, 27. § 7 av | W is the reading of most MSS., but Kb has av.
 - b. 28. Shus r'] CCC and NC have show dr. The Paraphrant may have read show yap: he has dishow yap or of hope deman ed middle increase dhad file rock.
 - b. so. § 8. olicion] Cf. the obside deports of i 3 5. Aristo'se is perhaps not think ug here so much of the fibes objects (x. q. 3) which item, or habituation, presupposes, as of the fibes formed by habituation, without which the pipal cannot derive solid participation delyes, or an appeal to his objects (cf. overs § 7, b. 27).
 - b 31 de véou...b. 32 véposed Here Aristotle comes to the point. The real y potent influence in moral training is that exerted by the rules, written and unwritten, and the institutions of the State as a whole. It is these, then, that we must reform, if we wish an improve the morality of the people.
- 1180 a. 1. § 0. oix inarde...a. 4 Sior] 'In a spirit the very opposite of this remark,' says Grant, 'Fencies is reported (Thucvd. it. 37) to have boasted of the freedom enjoyed by the Athemans from all vexatious interference with the daily con fuet of individuals... On the one hand I bucydides proised the free system of Athems; on the other hand Aristotle praised the organised and educational system of Sparia; see below § 13, and of. Ith. i. 13. 3, and note He was probably led into this political in stake, partly by the site of society in Athens itself, partly by the influence of Plato, from whom he included one of the essential ideas of communism,—namely, that the State should arrange as much as possible instead of as little as possible.'
 - Appenda p. 170) if correction is needed. The wire of the MSS is explained by most editors, as by Cornes—ra and rise species

ent incustoire aposendarquiva; but it e words sal islifeadas, and sal neal 1180 a. 3. raira, may be thought to refer us to new habits which have to be acquired by adults, as distinguished from those which have been acquired in youth. I think that aird is so obviously the right word after inergioises, that we must not make too much of the difficulty of connecting it with sal islifeadas, or of explaining sal nept vaira. I feel that to write drea (which occurred to me independently) after inergional is to credit Aristotle with a rather weak remark. The words of it sild aires to inerghifusase interest (in also seem to tree to be in favour of wird. The Paraph has—dll ineded and dishpublishes to the nall note aprent forevoir islifes.

- § 10. al adher' drarrovers rais dyamonicas florais] Cf. a. 13. Bentham, Principles of the Penal Code: Part 3 (of punishments), ch. 6 (the choice of punishments). 'Search out... the motives of offences, and generally you will recognise the dominant passion of the offender, and you may punish him, according to the proverbial saying, with the instrument of his sin. Offences of cupality will be best punished by pecuniary fines, when the wealth of the offen ler admits it; offences of insolence, by humilianon; offences of idlences, by compulsory labour, or forced rest.'
- § 11. raura 84 y(voir ar] The apodosis begins here; on the a 17. construction, see note on l. t. 4, a. 14.
- § 12. ἡ μέν οὖν πατρική πρόσταξις οὖκ ἔχει τὸ ἐσχυρόν] ' Romanus a. 18. antiqui tempons alter judicasset" (Ramsauer).

λόγος ων άπό τινος φρονήσεως και νου] Cf. Pol vi. 11 1287 μ 28 α. 21. ὁ μέν ούν τὸν νόμον κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκτί κελευειν ἄρχειν τον θεὸν και τὸν νούν μονους, ὁ δ' ἄνθροπον κελεύων κρυστίθησε και θηριον' ἢ τε γαρ έκεθυμία τοιοίτον, και ὁ θυμός ἄρχοντας και τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνθρος διαφθειμε.. διάσερ ἄνεν δρέξεως νούς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν.

§ 13. de mora de ta Annedamorlas notes a.t.l.] Cf. Pel 0 1. a. 24
1337 2. 31 indusers d' de ter and touto Annedamorlas nal yip
ndelothe noisural anabite nois milder ad nois toutone, and Jonett's
note (vol ii. p. 293) 'Aristotle appears to praise the Lacedaemonume, not for the quality of their education, ... but for the
circumstance that it was established by law. According to
becrates Panath. 276 d, the Spartans fell so far below the general

- 1180 a. 94. standard of education in Hellas, that they did not even know their letters. . . . and according to Plate, or rather according to the author of the Platonic Hippins Major (285 C), "not many of them could count."
 - a. 25. (†) per blique. The f, inserted by Bywater, is of course logcally necessary; at the same time, ping per blique does not seem an ungreek way of saying almost the only. The Cretan system is mentioned along with the Spartan in E. N. i. 13. 3, who e see note.
 - a. 20. auxhomkūs] Od. iz. 214:

θεμιστεύει δε εκαστος παίδων ηδ' ελόχων, οὐδ' αλλήλων αλέγουσιν.

- a. 29. § 14. spátiotor per our to gireobat southe énimelecue sai ophie because, as we have seen, only the State can enforce operion e, and because—this has not been actually menue ned, but is implied in the words word, ropoderge, ropos the education of each individual is part of a single system; the individual does not belong to himself, so that his education may be conducted with reference only He is a member of the body politic; and it is for notioned, as degicerround interiput, to see that he is educated for his function in the organism to which he belongs; see Pol. 6, 1, 1317 2. 21 inei & ev ed eikos eg nobes navy, havepor ort ant eir natheur par nal the aithe deagrains clear nauton and taithe the structure come accept mil på nar idlar, de splinor feavres por inspektiras sår alsod starper idig re nal pathyan idian, he do baffy, bidianne. See pilo the norme more naciobae nai the banques. That do aidi xin supelem airis aire- two eleat tor modition tidd minter the worther, proper you concret the calence ή δ' έπερίλεια πέφωτεν ικώστου μορίου βλεπειν πρός την του όλου emperator,
- a so. and spar adre boracea.] Grant translates 'and that it should have power to effect the object in question': Start translates 'and dass diese die Kraft habe, such Geltung zu verstraften.' The words are added, like a quoted phrase, with little regard for grammat cal connexion. Bywater brackets them here a, 30, segmenting that they should follow orangolates as 32. This suggest on has the mert of bringing the words and span aird binardar close to palabor & do roiro binardar differen.

descrip δόξειεν δυ προσήκειν τοῦς σφετέροις τέκνοις καὶ φίλοις εἰς 1180 a 31 descrip συμβάλλεσθαι] The Paraph has—προσήκειν ἐκόστφ δόξειεν ἀν τοῦς ἐαντοῦ τέκνοις καὶ φίλοις εἰς ἀρετὴν βυηθεῖν ἡ βυηθεῖν προθυμεῖσθαι Where the State neglects the education of its citizens, it is incumbent on the private individual to do what he can to help his own children and friends to become good. He will succeed best in this task, if he brings to it the legislator's point of view (νομοθυτικός γενόμενος 2. 33)—if he remembers that he is educating επίπεις

γεγραμμένων κ.τ.λ.] In the passage which begins here, and goes a 35. down to the end of § 17, b. 28, Aristotle says nothing inconsistent with the statement b. 29 κράτιστον μέν σύο τό γίνεσθοι κοινήν ἐπιρέλειων καὶ ἐρθήν, but points out how, in the absence of State-e lucation, home-education, conducted from the legislator's point of view, may make the most of certain minor advantages which it has—its power of appealing to the family affections (§ 14), and its being able to sint its system to the special needs of particular cases (§ 15) Mich. Eph. misses the point of the passage—(ητητίον πών προ δλίγον είπων μηδεν ἰσχύειν τὰν πορατής είναν φησίν ἐπίσης τοις νόμοις καὶ τοῖς ἰθωνιν ἰσχύειν καὶ μητεον δτι περί τών πολλών καὶ μοχθηρώς ζώντων είπει μηδεν Ισχύειν ἐνταύθο δὲ περί τών κολώς ἀντιγομένων τοῦτο λέγοι.

 $\eta\theta\eta$] Bywater, following K^{\dagger} , L^{\dagger} , O^{\dagger} , for $i\theta\eta$ (M⁵) accepted by 5 4. Bek and Sus. I think $\eta\theta\eta$ is right. The reference is to the 'national character.'

ours not evolutions of πατρικοί λόγο, not red etal) to that their author ty is equal to that of νόμος (see § 12). Aristotle is making out as good a case as he can for home-education, as second-best. It was doubtless his opinion that even with a good system of State-education, something is left for home-education to do.

§ 15. Sante en lateuris] After these words Coraes conjectures b B and presentings, on account of the example of the matrices which follows.

od naor την αυτήν μάχην περιτίθησι»] Stahr has an important b to note here. He points out that περιτιθένω means 'to put on as a garment,' and suggests μειλίχην (the cestus) for μίχην. I do not think that this is a happy suggestion; but I think that παρατιθησικ, which he mentions as preferable to περιτίθησικ if μίχην be retained,

vol. II. H h

- time b. 10. is probably the right realing. Where were and waps are concerned, we need have little hesitation in neglecting MS, authority, and going full weight to internal reasons (see note on vii. 3.14, b. 9). Here superstrain gives the exact meaning required—"the doctor does not prescribe the same treatment to all fever patients; and the boxing-master does not put before all pupils, for their limitation, the same style of defence and attack."
 - b. 17. § 16. καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονα διτα] τὰν μη τὰ εαθώλου «ἰδότα (Paraph).
 - D. 18. δι άμπειρίαν] The editors quote Mel A s g8s 2. s2—πρέε μέν οἰν τὸ πράττιν έμπειρία τέγνης οὐδέν δοκεί διαφέρεων, ἀλλα καὶ μάλλον έπινη χάνοντας δρώμεν τοὶς λμπείρους τῶν δινει τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον ἐχύντων, αίτων δ' ότι ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθ ἐκαστόν ἐστι γνώσες, ἡ δὲ τέχνη των καθόλου, αὶ δὶ πράξεις κεὶ αὶ γνωίσεις πᾶσια περὶ τὸ καθ ἔκαστόν εἰσιν οὐ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ὑγιοξει ὁ ἰστρείων, πλήν ἀλλ' ἡ κατα συμθεληνές, ἀλλα Καλλίων ἢ Σωκράτη ἡ τῶν άλλων τινα τῶν οῦτω λεγομένων, ῷ συμθεληνές, ἀλλα Καλλίων ἢ Σωκράτη ἡ τῶν άλλων τινα τῶν οῦτω λεγομένων, ῷ συμθεληνές ἀλλου καθόλου γνωρίζη, τὸ δ' ἐν τοίτω καθ ἔκαστον ἀγνοη, πολλάκις διαμαρτηπεται τῆς δεραπείαν δεραπείνου τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἔχη τις τὸν λόγον, αιὰ τὰ μέν καθόλου γνωρίζη, τὸ δ' ἐν τοίτω καθ' ἔκαστον ἀγνοη, πολλάκις διαμαρτηπεται τῆς δεραπείαν δεραπείνου τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὑπολαμβούρουν, ὡς κατὰ τὰ εἰδενοι μάλλον ἀκολουθούσων τὴν σοφίων πάσιν τοίτο δέ, ὅτι οἱ μεν τὴν κὶτων ἔσαστο, οἱ δ' οδ. οἱ μεν γὰρ ἔμπειροι τὸ ἔτι μὲν ἴσαστη διότε δ' οἰς ἔκαστον οἱ δὲ τὸ διότε καὶ τὴν αἰτίκο γνωρίζουσεν.
 - b 28. § 17. τάχα δὲ καί | τάχα δ΄ ἐν καί is the reaching of Γ, Lb, Ald, Ob, CCC, Cambr., NC: τάχα δὶ καί, of Kb, Mb, accepted by Bekker and Bywater. I incline to τάχα δὸ καί read by Susemith after Ramsaner.
 - b. 80. § 18. πορά των πολιτικών; μόριον γάρ έδώκει τῆς πολιτικής είναι] See vi. 8, 2 τῆς δὲ περὶ πολικ ή μεν ώς ἀρχιτιατωνού φρωσους κουσθετική.
 - b. 81. ἡ οὐχ δμοιον κ.τλ.] The editors note that Arritotle is in k bird here (§§ 18, 19) to Plato, Meno 91 A-100 C, where it is shown that if the sophists cannot teach desti, neather can statemen themselves, otherwise they would try to teach their own sons. Cf. also Protag. 319 D, E, 320 A, B. Aristotle's view, we knew, is that a father may as repoterwise, teach his son desti; it is assumed that, if repoterwise, he will be able to do so; but the question formally proposed at the beginning of § 18 πόθεν ή και κυμοθετικός γενουν δεν

res; is not distinctly answered here. Indeed, Aristotle seems to 1180 b 31 forget, in the heat of his attack on the sophists, that this question is before him. The only approach to an answer is (§ 21) that, to people with political experience, the study of codes and constitutions may be profitable.

olor larpel γραφείς] So Susemini and Bywater following Mb, r b. 86 (so also NC and B1. Bekker reads οδον Ιωτροί και γροφείς, because Kb and Lb (also CCC and Cambr) give Ιωτρικοί γραφείε.

δυτάμει τενί . . . και έμπειρία μάλλον ή διανοία] Plato says 1161 a 2 Μεπο 99 B. C—εί μή επιστήμη, ενδοξία δή τό λοιπόν γίγνεται, ή οι πολιτικοί δυθρες χρωμενοι τός πάλεις δρθυσσιν οίδεν διαφεροντως έχοντες πρός τό φρονείν ή οι χρησμορδοί το παί οι θεομάντεις.

καίτοι κάλλιον ήν ίσως ή λόγους δικανικούς το καὶ δημηγοριεούς] a. & The Puraph. seems to have caught the force of καλλιον here—
μείζου γαρ ûν ήν αὐτοῖε els φιλοτιμίαν τιποίτους συντιθίναι λάγους ή
δικανικούς το καὶ δημηγορικούς. Ambi...on would urge them to produce such treatises rather than speeches in the law courts and
assembly; if they do not produce them, it is because they cannot in just as they do not teach their sons, because they cannot.

§ 19. οὐ μὴν μικρόν γε δοικεν ή έμπειρία συμβαλλεσθαί] The art a 0. of statesmanship cannot be formally taught; but this does not mean that it is incommunicable. It can be picked up informally, by those who live constantly in political surroundings: this shows how much 'experience' has to do with its acquirement. We may safely conclude that any one who wishes to become repuler wie must have 'experience' in addition to (aportion a. 12) 'theory.' Aristotle seems here practically to agree with Anylus, in the Meno 92 E-93 A, who says that the young Athenian acquires the opera of an Athenian citizen by associating with the xokol miyofol of Athens, his elders: see the Paragh. - purepor robur, three thirmers διδάσκειν τὰ πολιτικα, ότι καὶ έβουληθησαν αν, καὶ ἐδιδασκον Ιπεί δι οὐ фанности біданности, фанерах бті обти еббласта бідинных, обти айта) λόγος των τὰ πολιτικά ποιούσιο ή έπιστήμη ιλλά έμπειρές, και γάρ οδ purpor à épariste apòs to apatrem auphiditerm. Amorai pup dià the πολιτικής συνηθείας μάλλου πολιτικοί. Δια τοίτο τοίς έφιεμένοις περί τής rodarung elderen, and impression runde porta and completon.

§ 20. Shas yop . . . 2 15 iriberar] See note ! 2, §§ 5-7, 2, 27, on a. 14. the position of propers.

νομοθετήσαι συναγαγόντι τοθε εύδοκιμούντας τών νόμων] Spengel 1181 n. 16. (on Rhel. 1309 b. 9) thinks that Isocrates (upl deribberes, 82, 83) is alluded to here—inned & irruvda mondyludaper bure eat ente λόγους τους εξρημένους και τους νόμους τους κειμένους όποριθμήτουν είναι, και των μέν νόμων έπαινείσθαι τους άρχιμοτάτους, των δέ λόγων τους καιτοrarove, obsert ene abrue diamolae spryon early, addit rose per rove schume τιθέναι προαιρουμένοις προθργου γέγονε το πλήθος τών κειμένων, οιδέν γιφ aurous dei fareir tripous, adda rous mapa rois addous codomisourus reme-Circa guruyayetr, & hadiwe barre du olin floudaffete moignese, role de unpi τους λύγους πραγματευαμένεις διά το προκατιληφθία τά πλείστα το ναστίου συμβεβηκε λίγοντες μεν γάρ ταύτο τούς προτερον είρημένας αναισχυσιώ eal hypere discourt, eawà de syroveres éniméros exphonoures. Much that is interesting and suggestive with regard to the personal relations between Austotle and Isocrates will be found in Terchina ler's Leterarische Fehden im werten fahrh, war Ch. Driver Abselvat. Fehde des Isocrates gegen Aristoteles und Plato. For a vigorous attack on the sophists, however, see Isocrates eard row opportun. Grant has a good note here—' Aristotle's account of the sophots' method of teaching policies is precisely analogous to his account of the way in which they taught dialectic. He here speaks of their taking a shallow view of politics and making it ar inferior branch of rhetoric; and he adds that they adopted a superficial eclecticism, making collections of laws without touch ng upon the principles from which legislation must depend. They thus imparted mere results, which to those who are un astructed in principles are wholly uscless. In the same way (Soph, Elmh 34, 183 b. 38 sqq) be says that they gave various specimens of argument to be warnt by heart, and that this was no more use than if a person who undertook to teach shoemaking were to provide his purils with an assortment of shoes.' The method of the modern 'crammer' could not be better described than it is at the end of the Soph. EL

- 6. 17. Somep ouble the endoughe outer acc. abs.
- a. 21. τοίς δ' ἀπείροις άγασητόν κ.τ.λ.] The όπειροι here, so fir as they are capalle of passing a correct judgment on the general result, that be compared with the 'amateurs' mentioned in Pol in. 11. 1282 2.

 1 sqq. quoted (vol. i. p. 36) in note on πεπαιδευμένου i. 3 4, b 23.

 Or perhaps the Spattans of Pol. Θ. 4. 1339 b. 2 may be thought a closer parallel—δυπερ οι Λικωνιτ; έκεινοι γδρ εὐ μαθώννετε διακε δύνανται κρίνειν δρθώς, ώς φασί, τὰ χηστά και τὰ μὴ χηστά τῶν μελων.

At any rate, the point is that only persons practically acquainted 1181 a. 21. with the conditions of a given city can select the right laws for it.

of δέ νόμοι τῆς πολιτικῆς ἔργοις ἐοίκασιν] Good laws are pro-a. 98 duced by those who know the art of πολιτικῆ in its lighest branch—νομοθετικῆ. How, then, can the mere study of these products make νομοθετικῶς one who is επ ἡκρ. not yet νομοθετικῶς? It can no more do so, than listening to good music can make one a composer—or reading the 'Lancet,' a doctor.

The notioning is the reading only of Kb. All other authorities seem to have rose notioning—except indeed NC, which has the notioning.

§ 21. 00 yap pairoves... b. 5 effect] Grant has a good note b. 2 here, in which he says that συγγράμματο (frequently mistranslated prescriptions) are perhaps reports of cases or monographs on particular diseases.

ταθτα δέ τοίς μέν έμπείροις ώφελιμα είναι δοκεί] See note on b. a. i. 3. 7, a. so.

ίσως οὖν καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αὶ συναγωγαί... b. g b. 6. εὐχρηστ' ἄν εἰη] See Rhel. i. 4. ε 360 a. 30 χρήσιμαν δὰ προε τὰς νομοθεσίας τὸ μὴ μόνον ἐπαίεν τίς πολιτεία συμφερει ἐπ των παμεληλυθότων
θεωμούντε, ἀλλά καὶ τὰς παμὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἰδίναι, αὶ ποῖαι τοῖς ποιοις
άρμάττουσιν. ὥστε δηλον ὅτι πρὸς μὰν τὴν νομαθεσίαν αἱ τῆς γὰς περιοδοι
χρήσιμοι' ἐντεὐθεν γὰρ λαβείν ἔστιν τοὺς τῶν εθνων νόμους, πρὸς ἀί τας
πολιτικὰς συμβουλὰς τὰς τῶν περὶ τὰς πράξεις γραφόντων ἱστορίας ἀπαντα
δὲ ταῖτα παλιτικῆς ἄλλ' οὐ ἐρτορικῆς ἄργον ἐστίν.

areo εξιως] By εξις here we are to understand the trained eye b. c. which comes from long familianty with a subject διά γάρ τὸ έχειο ἐε τῆς έμπειρίας ἄμμα δρώσιο ἀρθώς (vl. 32. 6).

εί μή όρα αὐτόματον] Cf. Philemon (Meineke Fragm. Com. vol. b. 11. iv. p. 34)— ήκουσα τυύτων αὐτός, οὐδὲ φύεται | αὐτόματον ἀνθρωποιστυ, δ βέλτιστε, νοῦς | δισπερ ἐν ἀγρῷ θέμος ἐκ δὲ τοῦ λέγεω τε καὶ | ἐτέρων ἀκούεω καὶ θεωρήσαι . . . | κατὰ μικρὰν ἀεί, φασί, φυσιται φρένες.

edouversirepos & ele rasta a.r.h.] edouversirepos & is contrasted with to per spires and or b. 10. Those who have not the critical fire which comes only from familiarity with the actualities of

1181 b. 12 political life cannot be trusted to arrive at sound pract cal decisions regarding the laws and institutions which it is best to select from the compendia, although perhaps their study of these compendia may sharpen their inteligence for political questions. The merely literary study of politics cannot give a man practical insight (rd apheno eahlie), although it may give him a power of superficial appreciation (elemental). I think that it is necessary thus to distinguish between rd pile spirous eahlies and elementary so the here, although in vi. 10 elementar is simply the faculty roll episeus eahlies.

b.12 §§ 22, 23.] These sections, evidently added to connect the Ethan with the Politics, fall under the frima facie suspicion which attaches to all such connecting-passages in the Anstotelian writings.

As was pointed out in the Introductory Note to this chapter, the theory of life set forth in the Ethics, is set forth as one which can and must be realised in practice. The Politics, as describing in detail the way in which the theory of the Ethus may be realised, thus logically follows the Filiner in Aristotle's system. But we do not know what was the chronological order in which the two treatises were composed. The reserences in the Politics to the Ethics, as to a work already in existence, count for little or nothing: they are probably due to later editors. But the question of the order in which the two treatises were written a question which perhaps cannot be settled- s not before us here. If the Politics were written after the Ethios, they were evidently not written as a mere continuation, starting from the Deyoper our apparent, with which the Ethics now end. The Politics begin (n much the same way as the Ethics) as an independent work. The first book of the Pontice has nothing to do with the list of subjects given here in E N x 9. 23. According to this list the Politics ought rather to begin with the second book (see Susemil Aristoleles' Politick greek u. denti. b. vol. i. p. 72). If Aristotle having written, in whatever order, the Ethics and Politics as separate treatises, afterwards collected his works into a corpus, he might, of course, add a passage to connect the two treatises. It is indeed highly improbable that he ever collected and arranged his works; but if he did, would Le have written a connecting-passage like this? With the Repullic

in existence not to mention the Laws —could be have said 1181 b.12.
supplication of the aperiod desprished to the expedicited
Aristotle, I feel sure, could not have said the; whereas the exaggeration would be natural from the pen of an editor in later times anxious to present his Philosopher as the creator of a great self-cortained system. A small point may be noticed in passing — it would not perhaps be worth noticing unless suspicion attached otherwise to the passage—the word disputiented is a small eight in the Aristochan writings. Another (perhaps smaller) point noticed by Ramsauer, is that the phrase h might in disputient (Byw., disputition Bek. Sus.) pilosophia does not occur in the Ethics or Paletics.

The commentators point out that § 23 is a daypaph, or rough table of the contents of the Politics (omitting the contents of Politics), according to the traditional arrangement of Books. Thus

πρώτου μέν b. 25 = ii. sira b. 17 = iil-vi. θεωρηθέστων b. 20 = γii, vili.

The epitome of the *Politics* in Stob. Ecl 2. 6 17—ascribed to Didymus, the instructor of the Emperor Augustus—seems to follow the traditional order of the Books, at any rate, it puts Books vii and viit at the end. For this epitome, see Mullach *Fragm. Phil* vol. il. 100, 101, and Newman's *Politics*, vol. ii. p. zvii.

The circumstance that a διαγραφή of the contents of the Foldier is given here (E. N. x. 9, 23) is, I think, against the genuincness of

Teichmuller (Lit. Fehden, pp. 18; 199.) founds on the words b. 12 wapahistories our the upprepar are properties to repl this vopoleolas, the concussion that the E.N. were published before the Lams. He thinks that the Exp. is not west vopoleolas. I cannot agree; and the words b. 14 and Show by west wolveness seem to me to gnore the Rep. instead, as Teichmuller argues (p. 188), of recognising it.

Telchmolier (Ist Fehsen, p. 188 note, makes a very ingenious use of this circumstance in the interest of his theory referred to in the look note above—" kamsaner sagt: " averewyrev vocabalum apud Aristotelem me legare omnino non memoli," Ich meine nua, dass Aristotelem, da er mit den of motorou grade den Plato meinte i. e. the Arch., as distinguished from the as yet unpublished Larar), absolution Platon schon ctwas gesuchten und pretiosen Ausdruck wahlte, um damit monsch sur Plato's tiefe Forschung annua pielen, deusen Gesetze erwartet wurden, aber noch immer nicht erschienen waren (Vergl. Platon. Hippias, p. 198 C). Bei Aristoteles komint das Wort, wie auch Bontteens Index myt, sonst sicht vor; dagegen ist im Herachtrach und Platonuch."

1181 b 12 the passage. An editor, it seems to me, would be much more likely than Aristotle to give us a diegoood of this kind.

The last point to notice is b. 17 de rue overypious rederroot. Grant, following other commentators, understands these words to refer to the now lost collection, known in antiquity as of malario, and ascribed to Aristotle, containing, it would appear, descriptions of 158 Constitutions, Hellenic and non-Hellenic-see Berlin Aristotle, p. 1535 sq. for fragments. Rose (de Arist. icir. erd. at queter, pp. 57, 58) brings forward, as it seems to me, conclusive reasons for refusing to ascribe this collection to Aristotle. If, then, the reference in is two goveypaires notureion is (as Grant and others suppose) to this collection, we have an additional ground for considering the passage before us to be non-Aristote and In the Politics Aristotle pever refers to a cellection of modernian as having been made by houself-in the Politics, if anywhere, he would be likely to do so, if such a collection had existed; and in the present charter (E. N. x. 9) his tone towards of ouroyayai viv wakerear (1181 b. 7) is not that of a man who had himself laid a trap for the unwary by making a evroywyn. On the other hand, if the συσγμέναι πολινείαι mentioned here (§ 23) are merely the notirefat instanced and discussed in Pol. news, then it must be said that these molumen are not accurately described as "a collection of modifical "-overyween modifical. The witer of this section seems somehow or other to have connected in his mind the makerian instanced in Pol in-vi with the collection known to him as 'the notoriou of Aristotle.' He probably surposed that Aristode used that collection as a book of reference when he wrote the Politics.

I agree, then, with Susem.hl (see Arutoteks Pelitik griech. u. dentsch, vol. 1. p. 71 sqq. Einleitung) that iff 22, 23 ought to be bracketed.

This paragraph was written before the publication of the Advance moderate, and is printed without alteration.

INDEX TO NOTES

(The references are to the pages of these volumes, except noder the head "Textual conjectures, &c.," where the pages of the her in Aristotic are quoted.]

Amusement, place of, in Life, il. 196, 437-9

Categories, referred to, L 75, 80, 81, 187, 190, 383; il. 411-13.

Education, Aristotle's theory of, i. 23,

158, 161; li 459, 462-5. vidupovia, what? î. 5, 18, 44, 54, 94-7, 101, 102, 128, 135, 138, 143-4. 147, 153; 11, 349-60, 385, 431, 439 199.

relation of dperf to, 1 65: 11 99. relation of re durás to, 1. 66-8, 102, 103, 128-30, 138-48, 388; 11. 250, 3841 4451 455-

'Freedom of the Will,' and Responsibility, Austotle's doctrine of, i. 225-30, 233-6, 240, 276, 279, 318-30, 409-500, 501-11; 11. 16-17. 379-80.

Bouleman, L. 15, 269-72. тропіресы, і. 7, 242-50; ії, 26-8,

100-1, 173-4, 17, 201), 331. Friendship or Social besting (\$40.4a), Books van and in. See esp, ii, 262-4. Sudvois, ii. 367 sq.

Future life, Aristotle's doctrine of, L 139, 140, 142, 149, 150.

God, and the Cosmos, Aristotle's theory of, 1, 253-6; il. 55, 56, 117, 251, 259-51, 365-9, 357-8, 415, 449, 454, 457.

Habit, doctrine of, i. 112, 269-72, 206-7; li. 290.

Intellectual doered, how many are there? il. 32-3, 94.

Intellectual Faculties and Virtuesdiárom, il. 23-6, 31-2.

Becverryr, ii. 101, 213-4.

Boga, fi. 49, 129.

έσιστήμη, ii. 35 sq. νούε, (a) Book vi. ch. 6; (δ) other references, il. 13-4, 91-4, 380-1, 441.

rove and believes distinguished, it. 23-5, 28, 31-2,

φράνησες 1. 145, 203; ii. 43 299., 60. 76, 83 (J. for albourie, il. 78, for sweets, il. 83, 469-70; for yrdin li. 86), 100, 104, 207-10, 130, 219-13, 235.

τύχνη, Ι. 4, 6, 1831 ii. 40 εqq., 51, 243-

eopia, ii. 51 egg., 98, 113.

Knowledge, theory of, i. 144, 212; it 11-15.

Advor, sard tor oppor, and perd too όρθοῦ λόγου, il. 111-12 (cf. i. too-1).

Mean, doctrine of ethical, L 175, 176, 193-9, 102-3, 108-9, 110-11, 375. 473-5.

Method of Ethica, Aristotle's, L 1-3. 26-42, 46-67, 104-14, 115-18; II. 130-4.

Money, its function, i. 416-8, 459-71. | poors, Aristotle's doctrine of, and teleo Moral Virtuesdedpere, f. 282 sqq. (1/ 1. 213 and 303). Surmocury, a) notes on v; b) other references, ii. 164, 166-7, 199, 311-20, 315, 306-7. Exertepiórne, i. 300 agq dereiena, notes on Book v. ch. to c/. it 85 mg % makemayasia, L 330, 304; H. 460. ритрадопрівния, І, 328 мід. μεγαλομυχία, i, 334 είξι, (ή. L. 301). wpactryt, 1, 349. συρροσύνη, i. 164, 804 sig. (for decharia see i. 164, 213, 318; il. 135-7, 173-4, 198-9, 301. φιλονιμία, έ. 347. Minor Moral Virtues-down of tdeportment in society," i. 353 sqq. postery aperty, relation of, to Moral Virtue, i. 130, 171, 200-3, 213-4:

ii, 103-6, 108-9, 113, 461 (for Ovads see l. 395-8, ii, 166-7, 182-

5; for seperie and allow see i.

214, 369-72).

Philosophers, modern, referred to-Bacon, I, 210, Dutler, L. 196; 16, 27. Cudworth, L 31, 271; ii, 29. Darwin, li. 26g. Green, L. 397; E. 14, 17, 347. Humilton, 1. 311; u. 73-5, 238, 442 Hegel, i. 5, 336. Hobbes, i 278, 485; in 27. Jowett, 1, 67, 301 2; 11, 446. Kant, 1, 206 7, 210, 291, 336; ii. 74. 239-41. Locke, 1. 19, in 79. Lotee, i. 76. J. S. Mill, J. 28, 39, 104-7; i., 67, 222-3, 238-9, 416, 434. Schopenhauer, i. 163; il. 141. Shaftesbury, L 201; Il. 109. Spencet, f. 195, 119. Spinota, i. 15, 39, 227, 336; ii. 29, 279-80, 378-80, 386, Stewart, Dogald, L. 28, 263.

logy, 1, 3-4, 7-8, 16, 14, 133-5, 169-70, 166-9, 1087; 16 380-2.

Plate (and Platenasts, erroceed by Aristotle, L 45, 71-89, 155, 183, 293-41 11. 48, 322-4, 230-2, 234. 246, 403, 406-17.

Pleasure, theory of, a notes on vu-II-I4anla, 1 5; & other reke ences, L 24, 132, 135-6, 177-81, 271, 301-4, 306-8; il. 209-10. 279-80, 304, 374, 188.

voluteiae (optal and vapentlefineviae , E. उठ्छ अपूर्

Practical Syllogism, and doctrine of anima! motion, ii. 18-12, 49, 147-61, 167-8.

Psychology, i. 9, 98, 212-12, 263-7, 978, 309, 211, 3131 11, 9-15, 71-5, 39 L 3, 435

Reason (Loyor, opérnate), relation of, to weller, i. 3/3-41, 54-6, 265-7, 179, 200, 213-34, 245-7, 295-8, 371; il. 112-13, 136-7, 189-60, 201.

Slavery, L 20; ii. 310, 312, 316-19. Socrates entretsed, 1, 293; II, 110, 127 eqq., :62 3.

Standard of conduct, what, and he w determined and perceived to makin, & amount, & amount, & amount, φρονημος, δ δρθδι λόγοι", 2, 4, 8-10, 24, 90, 173-4, 183-6, 200-7, 209. 217-18, 271, 288, 291, 351, 364-6. 370, 11 3-4, 7-8, 27, 99-100, 203, 279-80, 301, 356, 373, 378, 381-2, 435-4

State, supremacy of they relation of Individual and Family to, L 18-as, 94, 292, 389-90, 410-14, 423, 480, 482-93 il 63, 66-3, 303 2, 352-4, 378-9, 357-8, 395-6, 459, 460, 464.

Technical terms and phrasesdiδιον, L. 82 ; 11. 36. Δεριβίε, L. 26, 106-7, 361. draymaion, L. 256-9; ii. 35-6, 323, 399Technical terms and phrases (cont.)άρχή, L. 110-11. deparploseur, &, ii. 30. Histor, L. 68. ydvat, 1. 37 γνώριμα απλου-ήμων, i. 49. See, L 26. divaper, i. 378; ii. 155. rd elven, i. 399-401; ii. 63. vi dφ' doùs λογομονα—vel πρός δο λογόμανο—vi καν' draλογίαν λοyópera, i. 86-8, 385-6. dripyoia, L. S. ¢αωγωγή, l. 222; ff. 37−8, 51. ¢παινετον − τίμιον, 1. 153 αφ. (cf. 1. 844% Zwerat, f. 324; li. 927, 374 μοταβαίνειν, l. 91. μέρος, L 129 ; il. 99. ofer, 1, 163 | il. 200. δρώσυμου, Ι. 86, 380-3. äтер, ii. 40, 247 8. rd bri-rd &ore, i. 56, 110. nepl touran nal de touran, l. 32. rà de évi to word. L 33. συνένυμον, Ι. 86, 404-5. TÍ \$07:0 \$ WOIGH TE, 1, 108-10. र्ग के बीम्बा, है, 210.

₩λη, I. 2б. φυσιών-λογικών, 1. 37, 163; 11. 155, 268. Textual conjectures, &c., 1096 s. 4. 1104 b. 29, 1107 c. 30, b. It, 25, 1108 b. 27, 1110 b. 16, 1111 b. 9, 1114 b. 18, 1117 m. 19, 1120 b. 9, 1122 a. 35, b. 14, 1113 a. 11, 1194 a. 29, 1125 a. 28, b. 1, 1127 b. 8, 1126 b. 0, 1139 a. 25, b. 30, 1134 b. 22, 1135 b. 18, 1136 b. 27, 1137 a. 30, 1138 a. 18, 1140 b. 4, 1141 b. 18, 1142 n. 12, b. 18, 2153 b. 2, 2165 2. 22, 1179 a. 8, 1174 a. 20, 21, 1178 a. 33, 24 fewportude flor, relation of spansons, Bios to, i. 5-6, 59-62, 89, 413; ii. 3, 6-8, 113, 849-50, 357, 361, 443-8, 451, 454, 460 τύχη and το εὐτόματον, i. 154-5, 259-60; il. 41-1. Transitional moral dispositionsdeputito, Book vii passim; of, 1. 164. λγαράταια, Book vii passim; of. l. 164. pakanta and saprepia, Book vit, ch. 7.





